CHARLES X'S WARS

Volume 3 - The Danish Wars, 1657–1660

MICHAEL FREDHOLM VON ESSEN

Century of the Soldier
1618-1721
No.97

The Century of the Soldier series – Warfare c.1618-1721

https://www.helion.co.uk/series/century-of-the-soldier-1618-1721.php

'This is the Century of the Soldier', Fulvio Testi, Poet, 1641

The 'Century of the Soldier' series covers the period of military history c. 1618–1721, the 'golden era' of Pike and Shot warfare. This time frame has been seen by many historians as a period of not only great social change, but of fundamental developments within military matters. This is the period of the 'military revolution', the development of standing armies, the widespread introduction of black powder weapons and a greater professionalism within the culture of military personnel.

The series examines the period in a greater degree of detail than has hitherto been attempted, and has a very wide brief, with the intention of covering all aspects of the period from the battles, campaigns, logistics and tactics, to the personalities, armies, uniforms and equipment.

About the author:

Professor Michael Fredholm von Essen is an historian and former military analyst who has published extensively on the history, defence strategies, security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. He is currently the Head of Research and Development at IRI, an independent research institute. Educated at Uppsala, Stockholm, and Lund Universities, Michael Fredholm von Essen has lectured, including during conferences and as visiting professor, at numerous institutions and universities around the world. He is the author of a large number of books, articles, and academic papers, including *Muscovy's Soldiers: The Emergence of the Russian Army, 1462–1689* (Helion, 2018); *Charles XI's War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675–1679* (Helion, 2019); *The Lion from the North: The Swedish Army During the Thirty Years War, Volume 1: 1618–1632* (Helion, 2020); *The Lion from the North: The Swedish Army During the Thirty Years War, Volume 2: 1632–1648* (Helion, 2020); *Charles X's Wars Volume 1: Armies of the Swedish Deluge, 1655–1660* (2021); *Charles X's Wars Volume 2: The Wars in the East, 1655–1657* (Helion 2022); *The Shogun's Soldiers Volume 1 and 2* (Helion 2022); *The Hunt for the Storozhevoy: The 1975 Soviet Navy Mutiny in the Baltic* (2022); *Transnational Organized Crime and Jihadist Terrorism: Russian-Speaking Networks in Western Europe* (Routledge, 2017); *Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies* (Routledge, 2016); *Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State* (NIAS, 2018); *Eight Banners and Green Flag: The Army of the Manchu Empire and Qing China, 1600–1850* (Pike and Shot Society, 2009); and a large number of articles on early modern warfare in *Arquebusier*, the journal of the Pike and Shot Society.

About the artists:

Born in Curitiba, in southern Brazil, **Anderson Subtil** holds a degree in Drawing from the School of Music and Fine Arts of Paraná State. Since 2018, he has worked as an illustrator for several Helion & Company series. His artwork has been published in books and magazines in Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria and Japan.

Sergey Shamenkov is a graduate of the Academy of Arts in Lviv, and currently lives and works in Odessa, Ukraine. He is an artist and author who has worked on many military history publications. In addition, he is also a sculptor, historian of historical uniforms and clothing, and reenactor. The uniforms of the Great Northern War have a special interest for him, especially those of the Swedish Army of Charles XII. He is a founding member of the *Jönköpings Regemente* historical re-enactment group. He frequently illustrates volumes in Helion's Century of the Soldier series.

Submissions The publishers welcome submissions for this series. Please contact series editor Charles Singleton by email: charlessingleton@helion.co.uk or by post: Helion & Company Limited, Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre, Budbrooke Road, Warwick, CV34 5WE.

HELION & COMPANY

CHARLES X'S WARS

Volume 3 – The Danish Wars 1657–1660

Michael Fredholm von Essen

'This is the Century of the Soldier', Fulvio Testi, Poet, 1641

Helion & Company

Helion & Company Limited
Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre
Budbrooke Road
Warwick
CV34 5WE
England
Tel. 01926 499 619
Email: info@helion.co.uk
Website: www.helion.co.uk
Twitter: @helionbooks
Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/

Published by Helion & Company 2023
Designed and typeset by Serena Jones
Cover designed by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk)

Text © Michael Fredholm von Essen 2023
Colour artwork by Sergey Shamenkov, Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023
Maps drawn by George Anderson © Helion & Company 2023

Illustrations attributed to Army Museum, Stockholm, are reproduced under the Creative Commons license and derive from the website. Illustrations attributed to Royal Armoury, Stockholm, or Skokloster Castle are reproduced under the Creative Commons license and derive from the website. Other illustrations are reproduced under GNU Free Documentation License (GNU FDL) coupled with the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike License or derive from the author's personal collection. Photographs attributed to Medström are reproduced with the permission of this publisher.

Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologise for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.

ISBN 978-1-915113-60-3

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited.

For details of other military history titles published by Helion & Company Limited, contact the above address, or visit our website: http://www.helion.co.uk

We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors.

Contents

Chronology iv
Dramatis Personae xxxviii
Introduction xlix
Prologue: Two Kings and an Admiral li

1. The Geostrategic Context of the Danish Wars 57
2. The Swedish Military Establishment 65
3. The Danish Military Establishment 106
4. The Norwegian Military Establishment 124
5. The Dutch Expeditionary Force 133
6. The Danish Declaration of War 137
7. The Attack on the Duchy of Bremen 140
8. Danish Supremacy at Sea 156
9. The Struggle for Scandinavia 165
10. The March Across the Belts 195
11. The Imperial Intervention in the Commonwealth 213
12. The North-Eastern Front 224
13. The Death of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy and Rise of Ivan Vygovskiy 238
14. The Lithuanians Abandon Livonia 241
15. The Battle for Prussia 253
16. King Charles Rekindles the War with Denmark 267
17. The Battle of the Sound 282
18. The Siege of Trondheim 301
19. The Storm of Copenhagen 303
20. King Charles Regains Supremacy at Sea in the Baltic 322
21. The Struggle for Fyn 335
22. The Swedish Offensive into Prussia 362
23. The Battle of Konotop 382
24. The Sieges of Mitau and Bauske 391
25. The Death of King Charles 399
26. The Aftermath and Legacy of the Deluge and the Danish Wars 408

Colour Plate Commentaries 417
Further Reading 426
Bibliography 429

Chronology

All dates N.S.

1657 – The Empire Intervenes in Poland; Denmark Invades Sweden; Sweden Retaliates

9 January	Danish Council of the Realm authorises King Frederick's intent to prepare for war against Sweden.
21 January	King Frederick issues orders to put the army in order and raise additional enlisted units.
1 February	King Frederick appoints Axel Urup overall commander in Scania.
5 March	Danish Estates authorise funding for war against Sweden.
10 March	Realising that war is imminent, Swedish Department of Trade orders its residents abroad to inform Swedish merchant captains that they should return to Sweden, or if war breaks out, shelter in English ports.
13 March	King Frederick issues orders to raise additional men in Norway and approves Iver Krabbe's proposal on the modernisation of the Norwegian army organisation.
23 March	Treaty of Paris between France and the English Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell against Habsburg Spain; in response, Emperor Ferdinand and his son Leopold form an alliance against France, England, and Sweden – which they suspect of pro-French sympathies.
30 March	The Emperor signs an agreement to send 12,000 soldiers and artillery to assist King John Casimir of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.
2 April	Emperor Ferdinand dies; soon after, an Imperial expeditionary force under Melchior von Hatzfeldt assembles in Silesia.
5 April	Navy Major Gustav Sperling sets out from Stockholm with a Swedish squadron of four warships bound for Pillau, with orders to retrieve the corpse of the late Chancellor Erik Oxenstierna for burial in Sweden; having arrived in Prussian waters, Sperling also reconnoitres the waters around Danzig.
13 April	Danish Admiralty sends a squadron under Peter Lützen to patrol the River Elbe.
30 April	King Frederick gives Grand Marshal of the Realm Anders Bille his patent of overall command.
2 May	Danish Council of the Realm authorises King Frederick to declare war on Sweden.

8 May	Danish Crown hires three armed and manned warships in Amsterdam, under Peter Jansen de Koningh; soon afterwards, the Crown hires another three warships in Amsterdam, under Marquor Rodsten.
9 May	France and England conclude a secret treaty with the intention to support Swedish King Charles against Denmark, Poland, and the City of Danzig; soon afterwards, the secret treaty leaks to the public.
21 May	Swedish Grand Marshal of the Realm Gustav Horn dies of natural causes; Lord High Justiciar Per Brahe assumes command of homeland defence.
23–25 May	First Danish acts of war; Niels Juel seizes three Swedish merchantmen passing through the Strait, arrests their crews, and incorporates the ships into the Danish navy.
27 May	Second Treaty of Vienna; The heir apparent to the Holy Roman Empire, Leopold, ratifies the agreement signed on 30 March to send 12,000 troops and artillery to assist King John Casimir; soon after, Hatzfeldt moves against Swedish-held Cracow.
30 May	Danish Admiralty orders Lützen's Elbe Squadron to seize Swedish shipping.
31 May	All Danish and Norwegian bishops ordered to instruct their priests to pray for military success and prepare the people for war.
1 June	Danish Crown issues the first letter of marque to privateers willing to attack Swedish ships, and orders the seizure of all Swedish ships in Norwegian ports or sailing along the Norwegian coast; in a belated gesture, the Danish Crown orders a few regimental cannons and mortars to be delivered as reinforcements to the artillery-poor Norwegian army.
8 June	King Frederick orders the four Norwegian ironworks to be put on a war footing.
10 June	King Frederick orders Bille to attack Swedish Bremen–Verden.
11 June	Having received news of the Second Treaty of Vienna, Denmark declares war on Sweden; Laurits Nielsen's Kattegat squadron initiates a blockade of Gothenburg; in Prussia, King Charles learns of the secret treaty between France and England.
12 June	Lützen's Elbe Squadron seizes a Swedish merchant ship from Gothenburg named *Stockholm*, which he subsequently incorporates into his squadron; in neighbouring Glückstadt, Holstein, Lützen's government-sanctioned attack is correctly interpreted as a Danish declaration of war on Sweden.
13 June	Rodsten's three warships ordered to the River Weser to attack Swedish shipping.
15 June	Denmark's declaration of war on Sweden is delivered to Erik Stenbock, Governor of Halland; on the following day, Per Brahe, the Swedish Lord High Justiciar and commander on the southern border, receives the declaration.
19 June	The commandant of southern Norway, Iver Krabbe, returns to Bohus Fortress.


Swedish offensives
Muscovite offensives
Transylvanian offensives
Imperial offensives
Crimean offensives
Commonwealth offensives
Danish offensives
Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
N
SWEDEN
MUSCOVY
NORWAY
Stockholm
Riga
North Sea
DENMARK
Baltic Sea
Königsberg
Ravensburg
Pomerania
DUTCH REPUBLIC
Bremen
POLAND
Berlin
Cleve
Mark
Cologne
Warsaw
Brest
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Magdeburg
Saxony
Silesia
Cracow
L'vov
Kiev
Bohemia
Moravia
UKRAINE
FRANCE
Breisgau
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Styria
Buda
Pest
Transylvania
Tyrol
Carinthia
Carniola
HUNGARY
Croatia
CRIMEA
SWISS CONFEDERATION
Karlowitz
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Black Sea
Adriatic Sea
Balkans
0
200
400
600 km

Military Operations 1657

20 June	Denmark's declaration of war reaches the Swedish Council of the Realm in Stockholm; Danish Admiralty orders Nielsen's Kattegat squadron to return, expecting the Swedish Stockholm fleet to be on its way south.
23 June	Danish army under Anders Bille ready to cross the River Elbe into the Swedish Duchy of Bremen, but stormy weather prevents the crossing for three days.
24 June	Norwegian unit under Major Peter Brun demands tribute from Swedish peasants west of the Göta Älv river.
25 June	Following an initiative by Iver Krabbe, Governor Per Ribbing of Gothenburg agrees to a local border truce on the island of Hisingen, shared between Norway and Sweden.
26 June	Bille's army finally moves into the Duchy of Bremen; however, because of bureaucratic and chain-of-command difficulties he does not receive the artillery he needs.
27 June	Ampliation Treaty between the Netherlands and Denmark augments the existing defence alliance; The Hague promises a fleet and 6,000 infantry if Denmark faces foreign aggression.
29 June	Following orders, Nielsen abandons the blockade of Gothenburg, arriving in Copenhagen on the following day (30 June) only to be ordered on 1 July to reinstate the blockade.
30 June	In Thorn, Prussia, King Charles receives the news about the Danish declaration of war; he dispatches Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock to assume command in Sweden under the authority of Lord High Justiciar Per Brahe and, for his own use, requests two warships to meet him in Wismar or Stralsund, in case he needs to sail to Sweden; in Danish Holstein, Henrik Sehested sets out with his cavalry regiment towards Swedish Wismar; a few days later he returns with several horses, cattle, and sheep, which he, unopposed, captures on Swedish territory.
4 July	King Frederick sets out with the Danish main fleet, mistakenly expecting that King Charles upon learning of the Danish declaration of war will leave the army in Poland and immediately travel by sea to Sweden – which would enable the Danes to intercept and capture the Swedish king on route; in Bremen, Bille leads his cavalry and dragoons against the Swedish cavalry concentration at Horneburg, near Stade; first Norwegian raid into Swedish territory.
5 July	King Charles sets out from Bromberg with the Swedish main army, bound for Denmark by way of Swedish Pomerania.
6 July	Bille lays siege to Bremervörde.
9 July	Bille again denied the artillery he needs against Bremervörde, this time because of a spelling mistake.
10 July	King Frederick's fleet reaches Danzig.
11 July	Bille finally receives the artillery he needs against Bremervörde; in Norway, Norwegian units cross the Göta Älv river from Bohus Fortress, but return whence they came upon encountering armed Swedish levies.

12 July	King Charles reaches Stettin, Swedish Pomerania; King Frederick's fleet departs from Danzig; Johan von Firck raids the Swedish side of the Göta Älv river.
14 July	Swedish resident in Hamburg, Vincent Möller, reports that Danish cavalry soon will abandon the Holstein border and retreat to Itzehoe; in Norway, another skirmish between Firck's men and Swedish levies, Krabbe returns to Bohus Fortress after another visit to Akershus, orders reinforcements into Sweden to support Firck.
15 July	Krabbe crosses the Göta Älv river, bringing three regimental cannons.
16 July	Lieutenant Colonel Frederik von Ahlefeldt crosses the Göta Älv river to support Krabbe; after an indecisive skirmish, the Norwegians retreat across the river.
17 July	Friedrich von Buchwald appointed Danish commandant of Bremen, despite having resigned because of ill health.
18 July	Commonwealth and Denmark sign a formal alliance against Sweden (ratified by the Commonwealth on 6 September); after a week-long siege, Bremervörde surrenders to Bille; back in Copenhagen, King Frederick writes to Bille that King Charles is on his way, orders a council of war on whether to abandon Bremen and retreat to Holstein.
20 July	Bille receives intelligence that King Charles is on his way to Holstein from Pomerania; Hans Rantzau abandons the southern border of Holstein and retreats in the direction of Glückstadt. In Poland, Imperials and Poles under Melchior von Hatzfeldt lay siege to Swedish- and Transylvanian-held Cracow; Poles under Stefan Czarniecki, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, and Stanisław 'Rewera' Potocki and Tatars under Mehmed Khan defeat Prince George Rákóczy's Transylvanians at Chernyy Ostrov, capturing their supply train.
21 July	King Charles's army marches out of Demmin, reinforced by units from Pomerania; Swedish agent Khünberg reports that Rantzau has left the Holstein border and is expected to reach Itzehoe on 23 July.
22 July	The Danish main fleet, under Henrik Bielke, lands a drummer on Rügen in Swedish Pomerania, bringing a message requesting the population to surrender or face the consequences; angry Pomeranians imprison the drummer, after which Bielke lands soldiers under Lieutenant Colonel Tønne Huitfeldt and Vice Admiral Nicolai Helt to steal some sheep; upon their return (still without the drummer), the Danish fleet withdraws; King Frederick instructs the Admiralty to round up all ships, boats, and barges from the Baltic Sea coast of Holstein to deny the expected Swedish army the means to cross to the Danish islands.
23 July	Bille, still south of the River Elbe, receives the message from Rantzau that he has abandoned the Holstein border and retreated; he also receives King Frederick's message that King Charles is

	on the way (which Bille already knows); in the Ukraine, Prince George Rákóczy agrees to a peace with the Commonwealth at Medzhibozh.
24 July	Bille takes the bastion at Schwinge.
25 July	King Charles reaches Wismar; in Ingria, Swedes disperse Danila Neplyuyev's corps from Pskov near Jama.
26 July	Bille's council of war in Glückstadt decides to leave infantry garrisons in Bremen but send the rest of the army to confront King Charles; not bound by the peace treaty between the Commonwealth and Transylvania, Tatars defeat Transylvanians at Skalat.
27 July	Bille begins the evacuation of the Danish army from Bremen to Holstein; Eckerich Johann Lübbe promoted to Major General and appointed Chief Commandant of the Duchy of Bremen; Per Brahe's Swedish army invades Danish Scania, crossing the border near Båstad.
28 July	Swedish units under Brahe defeat Danish units under Lieutenant General Ulrich Christian Gyldenløve in the battle of Ängelholm; the ensuing panic then transplants throughout the Scanian army and Copenhagen.
29 July	Additional Imperial infantry join the siege of Cracow.
31 July	In the Duchy of Bremen, Joachim von Volckmar leads a Swedish cavalry unit in a sally against the Danes still laying siege to Stade; on the Norwegian border, Field Marshal Robert Douglas takes Tjurholmen from Krabbe; Tatars again defeat Transylvanians, taking all survivors prisoner at Trembovlya.
1 August	Bille's army assembled in Holstein between Glückstadt, Krempe, and Itzehoe.
2 August	King Charles's army encounters a Danish cavalry squadron under Colonel Hinrich Ahlefeldt on a reconnaissance mission at Hamburg; after a brief but sharp engagement, Danes retreat towards the north; Danish council of war in Itzehoe advocates a cavalry retreat to Rendsburg in the north; Duke Adolph John's Swedes defeat a sortie by the Danzig Army at Dirschau.
3 August	King Charles deploys men and artillery on both sides of the Elbe, which effectively prevents the operations of the Danish Elbe Flotilla, and allows most of the army to go into quarters in Ottensen for some rest after the long march; Bille's cavalry retreats towards Rendsburg.
4 August	János Bethlen, commandant of Cracow, and the Transylvanian part of the garrison receive orders to surrender (sent by Prince George Rákóczy as part of the peace treaty with the Commonwealth); henceforth, only the Swedish contingent under Paul Würtz defends the city.
5 August	Brahe defeats a small Danish force at Ängelholm.
6 August	Death of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy; formally, he is succeeded by his young son, Yuriy, but in reality Ivan Vygovskiy takes control of the Hetmanate and already in the following month begins negotiation of a secret alliance with Mehmet Khan; Danish council of war

	results in the continued flight into Jutland of the Danish cavalry; Rantzau apologises to Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp for the devastation already caused by his former cavalry corps during its flight; King Charles, still in Ottensen, sends an expeditionary corps under Field Marshal Wrangel into the Duchy of Bremen.
7 August	King Charles leads a small expedition across the Elbe, retakes the bastion at Schwinge; Bille sends Ditlev Ahlefeldt across the Elbe with instructions to take command in the Duchy of Bremen; Wrangel takes the bastion at Bützfleth.
7–9 August	Muscovite vessels, probably from Lava, raid the north shore of Lake Ladoga.
9 August	Gustav Evertsson Horn reaches Lava, south of Lake Ladoga.
10 August	Gustav Wrangel's squadron engages Aleksandr Potyomkin's squadron on Lake Ladoga; Douglas leads a reconnaissance party from his Västergötland army towards Uddevalla in Bohuslän, but withdraws when confronted by Krabbe's superior numbers.
11 August	Horn attacks Lava but fails to defeat Potyomkin; Gustav Wrangel attempts to land soldiers near Kobona, but the operation fails and he returns to Nöteborg.
12 August	Vasiliy Choglokov sets out from Olonets by land and water towards Kexholm County north of Lake Ladoga; in Bremen, Field Marshal Wrangel arrives at Lehe, where skirmishes begin.
13 August	King Charles, at Wedel immediately west of Hamburg, continues the march into Holstein.
14 August	Wrangel assaults Lehe; Brahe again moves into Scania.
15 August	Having taken several redoubts north of the Elbe, King Charles and the Swedish main army turn north.
16 August	Lehe surrenders to Wrangel; Douglas abandons the offensive towards Uddevalla and retreats to Vänersborg.
16–17 August	King Charles lay siege to Itzehoe.
17 August	Finnish levies under Zacharias Palmbaum defeat Muscovite raiders from Repola at Pielis, Kajana.
18 August	Having surrendered, János Bethlen and the Transylvanian part of the Cracow garrison depart.
20 August	Having failed in his ambition to acquire Brest under Swedish protection, Bogusław Radziwiłł leaves Swedish service, instead enters Brandenburg-Prussian service; King Charles successfully storms Itzehoe.
22 August	King Charles reaches Slesvig.
24 August	Swedes in Cracow, under Paul Würtz, surrender to Commonwealth and Imperial forces; King Charles visits his father-in-law, Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, at Arenholtz.
25 August	Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp and the ladies at his court inspect the Swedish army, followed by a banquet and ball.
27 August	King Charles's army continues the march towards Jutland.
28 August	Vasiliy Choglokov reaches Kexholm; he initiates a successful campaign of raids in Kexholm County along the roads to Viborg and Nyslott.

29 August	Muscovites blockade Marienburg, Livonia, demanding its surrender.
30 August	Swedes in Cracow depart; on the Scanian front, Brahe abandons Laholm, retreats into Halmstad.
31 August	Muscovites blockade Riga – but do not attack, because of rampant plague.
1 September	In Halland, Axel Urup lays siege to Laholm.
2 September	King Charles reaches Kolding, Jutland.
3 September	King Charles reaches Frederiksodde; King Frederick leads an unsuccessful sally.
4 September	King Charles lays siege to Frederiksodde; near Kexholm, Erik Kruse and Erik Pistolhielm fight Muscovite units under Thomas Crawford.
6 September	Muscovites abandon blockade of Marienburg, Livonia; Swedish main fleet sets out from Stockholm; Iver Krabbe crosses the Göta Älv river to lead an offensive against Gothenburg.
7 September	Brandenburg-Prussian garrison in Posen surrenders to Krzysztof Grodzicki's Poles.
10 September	Brahe and Urup fight an inconclusive battle at Genevadsbro; at nightfall the Danes leave the field; soon after, they also abandon the siege of Laholm.
11 September	Swedish main fleet under Bielkenstierna sets out from Älvsnabben in the southern Stockholm archipelago; leaving a strong garrison in Cracow, the remaining units of the Imperial expeditionary force, under Raimondo Montecuccoli, set out towards Prussia.
12 September	Bille and the remnants of the Danish army in Holstein embark in Glückstadt for transportation to Frederiksodde, protected by Lützen's Elbe Squadron.
13 September	Swedish main fleet reaches the southern promontory of the island of Öland.
14 September	Brahe hands over operational command to Field Marshal Stenbock, travels north to chair the Council of the Realm; King Charles travels to Wismar, handing over command at Frederiksodde to Field Marshal Wrangel.
15 September	Krabbe reaches the vicinity of Gothenburg.
18 September	Gustav Wangel's squadron departs from Nyen, bound for Stockholm.
19 September	Treaty of Wehlau between the Commonwealth and Brandenburg; King John Casimir recognises Frederick William and his heirs as sovereign rulers of Ducal Prussia in return for the renunciation of his alliance with Sweden and the provision of military support; King John Casimir grants amnesty to Bogusław Radziwiłł; Krabbe leaves the Gothenburg area, taking refuge on the truce island of Hisingen; further north, Jørgen Bielke with a significant Norwegian army advances across the mountains into the Swedish province of Jämtland, aiming to retake this province as well as nearby Härjedalen.
20 September	After storms and contrary winds, Bille and his men reach Frederiksodde; Swedish main fleet leaves Öland, aims for the

	Danish islands; Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie leads an offensive from Estonia against Gdov, Muscovy.
22 September	Stefan Czarniecki advances into the Empire; failing to reach Swedish Pomerania he ravages Brandenburg-Prussian Neumark (in blatant disregard of King John Casimir's Treaty of Wehlau concluded three days earlier).
22–23 September	Bielkenstierna's Swedish and Bielke's Danish fleets engage in an inconclusive naval battle off Møn; afterwards, Danes return to Copenhagen while Swedes sail into Wismar.
25 September	De la Gardie abandons the offensive against Gdov, retreats into Estonia.
28–29 September	Ahlefeldt successfully leads a detachment across the Elbe to resupply Danes in Bremervörde.
5 October	Erik Stenbock leads a Swedish army into Bohuslän.
7 October	Krabbe and Stenbock fight an inconclusive battle at Hjärtum; Krabbe retains the field.
8 October	Danish fleet again sets out from Copenhagen; Danes under Knud Ulfeldt defeat Swedes at Sibbarp, Scania, but Ulfeldt falls in the battle.
11 October	King Frederick joins the Danish army in Scania.
13 October	In England, Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell orders a fleet to be sent in support of Sweden; Danish fleet blocks Swedish fleet in Wismar; in Scania, King Frederick and Urup defeat Field Marshal Stenbock at Kattarp; Major General Böddeker defeats the northern Jutland levy at Nabe in Agger.
14 October	Frederick William appoints Bogusław Radziwiłł Governor-General of Ducal Prussia.
15–16 October	Lithuanian Field Hetman Wincenty Gosiewski advances into Livonia; his advance guard attempts to surprise and take Cobron Bastion outside Riga but fails; Gosiewski orders his men to blockade Riga, hoping to succeed where the Muscovites failed, but with no more success.
15–17 October	Muscovite raiders under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy penetrate and burn Narva, aided by Orthodox townsmen.
16 October	Treaty of Korsun' between Sweden and Cossack Ukraine, with the important caveat that the treaty has no bearing upon Cossack Ukraine's relations with Muscovy, to which the cossack army will remain loyal.
17 October	Montecuccoli takes Gołąb on his march towards Thorn.
18 October	Gosiewski's Lithuanians reach Wolmar, commence a siege on the following day.
19 October	Handing over command to Urup, King Frederick leaves the Scanian army at Halmstad, returns to Copenhagen.
23 October	Czarniecki sets out on a raid against Brandenburg-Prussian and Swedish Pomerania; Danish fleet off Wismar abandons its attempt to block Swedish fleet there.
25 October	Krabbe again leads a Norwegian army into Sweden, aiming for Gothenburg.


N
Swedish offensives
Muscovite offensives
Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
Crimean offensives
Cossack offensives
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Stockholm
MUSCOVY
Riga
DENMARK
North Sea
Baltic Sea
Königsberg
Ravensburg
Pomerania
POLAND
DUTCH REPUBLIC
Bremen
Berlin
BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA
Cleve
Mark
Cologne
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Magdeburg
Saxony
Silesia
Kiev
Bohemia
Moravia
FRANCE
Breisgau
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Styria
Buda
Pest
Transylvania
Tyrol
Carinthia
Carniola
Croatia
HUNGARY
CRIMEA
SWISS CONFEDERATION
Karlowitz
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Black Sea
Adriatic Sea
Balkans
0
200
400
600 km

Military operations 1658

26 October	Czarniecki crosses the River Oder at Lebus, devastating the countryside.
31 October	Ivan Vygovskiy assumes the title Hetman of Cossack Ukraine; Cossacks under the Zaporozhian ataman Yakov Barabash and Martyn Pushkar', Colonel of the Poltava Regiment, rise against Vygovskiy; Urup's Scanian army abandons the offensive into Halland, returns towards Scania.
1 November	King Charles writes to his representatives in England, requesting them to intensify their attempts to persuade Cromwell to make good of his promise to send an English fleet to Denmark; Fabian von Fersen brings reinforcements to the siege of Frederiksodde including the former garrison of Cracow.
3 November	Swedes take Frederiksodde; Urup's Scanian army retreats into Scania; province of Härjedalen again in Swedish hands, retaken from Bielke's Norwegians by levies from Dalecarlia under Governor Lorentz Creutz; however, after their return home, Norwegians again take control of Härjedalen.
4 November	Wolmar surrenders to Gosiewski's Lithuanians, who then move on to lay siege to Pernau.
6 November	Treaty of Bromberg between the Commonwealth and Brandenburg; in exchange for military support and the return of Ermland, King John Casimir again confirms Frederick William and his heirs as sovereign rulers of Ducal Prussia and cedes additional territories.
6–7 November	Successful major Swedish sortie from Riga harasses the Lithuanians at Cobron's Bastion.
8 November	Swedish main fleet in Wismar sends four ships, under Navy Major Claes Uggla, to Frederiksodde.
9 November	Lacking the means to take either Stettin or Ueckermünde, or any other fortified location, Czarniecki withdraws from Pomerania; King Frederick orders Urup's Scanian army into winter quarters.
10 November	Krabbe's Norwegian army returns to Norway after plundering the countryside of Västergötland.
13 November	Bielkenstierna sets out for Stockholm with three warships (the *Draken*, *Hercules*, and *Månen*); remaining main fleet left in hands of Admiral Richard Clerck; Major Uggla reaches Frederiksodde.
18 November	Bielkenstierna reaches Ävsnabben in the southern Stockholm archipelago.
19 November	Naval battle between Uggla's squadron and the Danish Little Belt squadron under Peter Bredal off the east coast of Jutland.
21–22 November	Krabbe dispatches 400 men from Bohus Fortress to raid Swedish Västergötland.
24 November	Copenhagen recalls Nielsen's Kattegat squadron and Rodsten's former Weser squadron from the attempt to blockade Gothenburg, since winter is approaching.
25 November	One of Uggla's ships (the *Samson*) captures two Danish vessels in the Little Belt.
26 November	With the Imperial expeditionary corps abandoning the blockade

	of Thorn and moving into winter quarters, King John Casimir sends his army, too, into winter quarters, except for Jan Fryderyk Sapieha who is ordered to blockade Thorn.
28 November	After a two-month siege and out of ammunition, Jon Andersson Myre surrenders Frösö Redoubt to Jørgen Bielke.
29 November	Nielsen and Rodsten leave the vicinity of Gothenburg; a few days later, they return to Copenhagen.
4 December	Muscovites under Afanasiy Ordin-Nashchokin again lay siege to Marienburg, Livonia.
10 December	Ordin-Nashchokin takes Marienburg.
17 December	King Charles orders the main fleet in Wismar to Stockholm over the winter.
19 December	Admiral Hendrik Gerritsen reports from Gothenburg that the Danish fleet returned to Copenhagen for the winter 'a short while ago', and that winter arrived suddenly, with ice closing the Gothenburg port; Swedish main fleet returns towards Stockholm.
30 December	King Charles appoints Gustav Evertsson Horn commander-in-chief in Finland, Estonia, and Livonia; however, Horn declines, stating that Finland demands his full attention and that Livonia is better handled by somebody else.
31 December	Swedish main fleet reaches Dalarö near Stockholm.

1658 – Sweden Defeats Denmark and Concludes a Ceasefire with Muscovy

2 January	Tsar Alexis orders Ivan Khovanskiy, Voivode of Pskov, to continue raiding the Swedish territories to keep the Swedes busy but refrain from major offensives or sieges.
16 January	Swedish sortie from Riga results in the battle at Cobron's Bastion which convinces the Lithuanians to abandon the siege.
20 January	Aleksandr Potyomkin, having dispatched raiding parties towards Nyen and Rautus, is replaced by Fyodor Ladyzhenskiy as voivode of Lava.
21, 24 January	Potyomkin's raiding parties return to Lava.
21–22 January	With the rivers finally frozen, Field Marshal Stenbock commences a major invasion of Norway by dispatching Harald Stake into Bohuslän.
22 January	Prince Vasiliy Solntsev leads a corps from the Novgorod Army to Jama, Ingria.
25 January	Field Marshal Stenbock leads his main force towards Bohuslän, ultimately reaching Kvistrum.
26 January	Commonwealth council of war in Posen argues for the provision of support to Denmark in principle.
29 January	Gosiewski abandons his units laying siege to Pernau.
30 January	Prince Mikhail Shchetinin leads a corps from Pskov to Jama, with orders to join the Pskov corps already there; upon arrival, the Pskov and Novgorod units lay siege to Jama.

February	Having been dismissed as governor of the Swedish colony in West Africa, Hendrik Carloff leads a Danish–Dutch expedition raiding its trading posts.
1 February	Solntsev successfully storms the town of Jama; the defenders withdraw into the castle; Swedish sortie from Pernau under Major General Fabian Aderkas.
3 February	Lithuanians abandon the siege of Pernau.
9 February	King Charles marches across the frozen Little Belt, defeats the Danish defenders at Tybrind Vig, and takes Odense, which he enters on the following day.
10 February	Wrangel takes Nyborg, receives intelligence that the ice is strong enough also in the Great Belt, and finds Bredal's Little Belt squadron frozen in the ice, yet unwilling to surrender.
11 February	News of King Charles's march across the Little Belt reaches Copenhagen.
12 February	Bredal's crews take the squadron out of range of Wrangel's land-based artillery by cutting a channel through the ice.
14 February	Primarily based on Erik Dahlbergh's report late in the evening, King Charles decides to cross the frozen Great Belt; in Norway, Krabbe begins a counteroffensive against the Swedes.
15 February	Denmark and Brandenburg enter into a secret alliance against Sweden; later, soon-to-be Emperor Leopold and King John Casimir join the alliance through the mediation of Frederick William (soon afterwards, King Charles learns about the secret alliance from intercepted letters); King Charles and most cavalry reach Svendborg.
15–16 February	King Charles marches across the frozen Great Belt to Langeland and Lolland.
17 February	Nakskov surrenders to King Charles; Swedish infantry under Wrangel march from Nyborg to Langeland.
18 February	King Charles's army reaches Falster; soon afterwards, advance units of the army cross to Zealand.
18–19 February	Wrangel marches across the frozen Great Belt from Langeland to Guldborg, Lolland.
20 February	Krabbe's and Stenbock's armies confront each other near Uddevalla; on the following night, Stenbock abandons Uddevalla and returns to Sweden; Wrangel's corps rests at Guldborg.
21 February	King Charles orders Field Marshal Stenbock to move into Scania and across the Strait to apply further pressure on King Frederick (but the Danes capture the courier so the order never reaches Stenbock); Norwegians under Lieutenant Colonel Michael Opitz attack Eda in Värmland; Wrangel's corps rejoins King Charles's army at Vaalse on Falster, then cross to Zealand followed by the entire army (on 22 February).
21–23 February	Preliminary peace negotiations in Vordingborg, Zealand; Danish negotiators cannot accept Swedish demands so return to Copenhagen.
23 February	King Charles takes Køge, Zealand; in Bohuslän, Uddevalla surrenders to Krabbe.

24 February	King Frederick finally learns that the Swedish army stands on Zealand.
25 February	Swedish units halt at Torslunda Magle, 22 km from Copenhagen.
26 February	Peace negotiations resume in Tostrup, near Copenhagen.
28 February	Preliminary peace agreement between Sweden and Denmark concluded with the Treaty of Tostrup.
February–March	Vygovskiy agrees an alliance with the Crimean Khanate; he invites the Commonwealth to join the alliance, too.
3 March	Christer Horn, Governor-General of Ingria, leads a relief force out of Narva for an evening march to Jama.
4 March	Horn defeats the Muscovites laying siege to Jama in a surprise morning attack.
7 March	Khovanskiy sets out from Pskov to reinforce the Muscovites at Jama.
8 March	Denmark surrenders, Treaty of Roskilde between Denmark and Sweden.
10 March	Following the successful Swedish relief of Jama, Khovanskiy withdraws most raiders from western Ingria, instead gathering men for a renewed attack on Narva.
24 March	Khovanskiy reaches Narva, to which he lays siege.
2 April	King Charles enters Gothenburg, having visited all important towns the Treaty of Roskilde awarded him in Scania, Blekinge, and Halland.
4 April	In England, Cromwell proposes an offensive and defensive alliance with Sweden against Habsburg Spain, the Emperor, and the Commonwealth, expecting King Charles to attack the Habsburg ancestral lands in Austria while England wages war at sea against Habsburg Spain and sends a fleet into the Baltic to support Sweden.
9 April	Ladyzhenskiy attempts to storm the new redoubt at Nyen, but the Muscovites are repulsed.
29 April	A large Crimean army arrives at Chigirin to support Vygovskiy; King John Casimir contributes some Crown troops for the same purpose.
1 May	Having received orders from Tsar Alexis to initiate a ceasefire with Sweden, Khovanskiy negotiates a truce with Christer Horn.
4 May	Khovanskiy abandons the siege of Narva; negotiations between Khovanskiy and Horn soon result in a local truce to remain in force until a general ceasefire agreement is concluded between Sweden and Muscovy, after which Khovanskiy returns to Pskov (where he arrives on 13 May).
9 May	Swedes take control of Bornholm.
10 May	In Moscow, Swedish and Muscovite representatives conclude a ceasefire agreement, to come into force on 31 May; armistice negotiations to begin in Narva on 25 June with peace negotiations in November.
11 May	Tsar Alexis establishes the Belgorod regional military command or Belgorod Army, in effect Muscovy's first modern-style army group, to safeguard the southern border but also to constitute a strike force against Lithuania.

12 May	Date fixed for Swedish field army on the Continent to be ready to march on Brandenburg.
15–16 May	Swedes under Major General Barthold Hartwig von Bülow raid Bromberg.
16 May	Swedes occupy the island of Hven in the Strait.
20 May	Swedes take control over Trondheim.
22 May	In Olonets, Choglokov receives information about the general ceasefire agreement concluded between Sweden and Muscovy; he informs the Swedes in Sordavala; Convention of Copenhagen secures the full sovereignty of Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp's Schleswig domain.
24 May	In Lava, Ladyzhenskiy receives information about the general ceasefire agreement; he informs the Swedes in Nöteborg.
27 May	In Ingria, Christer Horn receives information from Novgorod about the general ceasefire agreement concluded between Sweden and Muscovy.
4 June	Field Marshal Robert Douglas formally appointed De la Gardie's successor as overall military commander in Livonia and Estonia.
9–11 June	Vygovskiy's cossacks, with Crimean Tatar support, crush the cossack insurgency under Pushkar' and Barabash at Poltava; Pushkar' is killed, Vygovskiy's cossacks sack and burn Poltava, while the Tatars raid the countryside; Vygovskiy breaks with Muscovy.
16 June	King Charles departs Gothenburg for Middelfart, where he arrives on 20 June, and Flensburg, where he arrives on 24 June; during this voyage he concludes that another war with Denmark in unavoidable.
18 June	Gustav Sperling lands Swedish reinforcements, including 600 conscripts from Scania and Blekinge, on route for Marienburg in Prussia, disembarking the troops near Putzig at Niclaswalde between Stutthof and Danzig; Tsar Alexis appoints Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy commander of the Belgorod Army.
23 June	Date fixed by Tsar Alexis for Romodanovskiy to advance into Lithuania with the Belgorod Army; however, realising Vygovskiy's break with Muscovy, on 22 June the order is countermanded and Romodanovskiy instead ordered to reinforce Kiev and support the new Kiev commandant, Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev.
25 June	Barabash and his men take refuge with Romodanovskiy.
29 June	Sperling and his squadron of five warships search merchantmen for sanctioned goods off Danzig.
2 July	Imperial units, under Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches, lay siege to Thorn.
3 July	Soon-to-be Emperor Leopold I in his Election Capitulation appeases France by renouncing participation in the war between France and Habsburg Spain; in return, Leopold feels free to go on the offensive against Sweden without risking French intervention.
17 July	Swedish Council of the Realm, in Gottorp, discusses the threat against Thorn, what can be done against Brandenburg, Leopold's

	Election Capitulation, and whether a new war against Denmark will be necessary in light of the Danish refusal to co-operate in closing the Strait to foreign war fleets.
18 July	Leopold I elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.
25 July	Copenhagen again refuses to co-operate in closing the Strait to foreign war fleets, thereby inadvertently confirming King Charles's assessment that another war is unavoidable.
27 July	Having arrived in Neumünde on the previous day, Douglas assumes command in Livonia.
1 August	Krzysztof Grodzicki's Polish corps joins the Imperials laying siege to Thorn.
2 August	Swedish Council of the Realm endorses a new war against Denmark.
3 August	Bielkenstierna embarks on the warships that already are equipped in Stockholm.
4 August	Douglas sets out to retake Wolmar and Ronneburg from the Lithuanians.
8 August	Swedes under Douglas lay siege to Wolmar.
13 August	Lithuanians agree to surrender Wolmar, departing on the following day (14 August).
14 August	Bielkenstierna brings the remaining fleet units to Dalarö in the southern Stockholm archipelago to join forces with the part of the fleet that already is ready.
16 August	King Charles sets out from Kiel with an army bound for Korsør on Zealand.
17 August	Swedish troops land at Korsør, initiating the second Danish war.
18 August	King Charles sends orders to Admiral Gerritsen, on the west coast, and Sperling, on route from the Bay of Danzig, to blockade the Strait and Copenhagen.
20 August	Lieutenant General Claes Tott blockades Copenhagen on land, anticipating the arrival of Swedish warships; Bielkenstierna, still in the southern Stockholm archipelago because of unfavourable winds, receives an order from King Charles dated 14 August, informing him that an attack on Denmark was imminent and that Bielkenstierna immediately must sail to Copenhagen; having retaken the Livonian countryside, Douglas returns to Riga (where he arrives on 22 August).
21 August	King Charles lays siege to Copenhagen, but sends his heavy artillery to reinforce Frederiksodde as a precaution against an Imperial–Brandenburg-Prussian offensive from the south; Admiral Gerritsen's squadron arrives in the Strait.
23 August	First Danish sortie from Copenhagen shows that this time, the Danes will fight for their capital.
24 August	A squadron of 12 Swedish warships from Korsør arrives to blockade Copenhagen.
26 August	Vygovskiy's brother, Colonel Danilo Vygovskiy, and Qaplan Murza's Crimeans attack Kiev, held by Muscovites under Sheremetyev; on Zealand, Wrangel lays siege to Kronborg Castle.

27 August	Gerritsen's squadron arrives at Copenhagen, a few days later followed by Major Specht's squadron.
30 August	Following a change in wind direction, Bielkenstierna finally able to set out towards Copenhagen.
31 August	The Netherlands resolves to send a fleet and soldiers to assist Denmark.
31 Aug–4 Sep	Imperial reinforcements join the besiegers at Thorn.
1 September	Armistice negotiations commence between Sweden and Muscovy (represented by Bengt Horn and Prince Khovanskiy).
3 September	Danilo Vygovskiy's cossacks abandon the attack on Kiev, withdrawing to the south-east; Vygovskiy executes the captured Barabash.
2 September	Major Danish sortie from Copenhagen; during the ensuing night, Bredal sets out with a boat-borne party to attack several Swedish warships.
5 September	Bielkenstierna arrives at Copenhagen with part of the Swedish main fleet.
5–6 September	Transylvania's capital Alba Julia sacked by Crimean Tatars and Ottoman units.
6 September	Swedes under Douglas enter Courland, claiming to be on their way to Lithuania.
9 September	Gale-force winds damage many ships in the Netherlands, delaying the projected departure date (previously fixed at 15 September); Norwegian army from Bergenhus lands at Trondheim, laying siege to the town recently ceded to Sweden; Danish sortie from Copenhagen fails because the men get drunk.
11 September	Danish sortie from Copenhagen.
13 September	Death of Oliver Cromwell disrupts King Charles's hopes for an alliance with England; Danish sortie from Copenhagen.
14 September	Obdam receives his instructions: protect Dutch merchantmen operating in the Baltic and support the King of Denmark.
15 September	Harald Stake advances from Vänersborg towards Halden, Norway.
16 September	Wrangel captures Kronborg; Vygovskiy agrees to Treaty of Gadyach between Cossack Ukraine and the Commonwealth, which rekindles the conflict between the Commonwealth and Muscovy.
18 September	Vygovskiy's cossacks and Tatars attack Kamennoye in southern Muscovy.
20 September	Polish reinforcements under Lubomirski join the besiegers at Thorn.
22 September	King Charles receives the news that Frederick William of Brandenburg marches against Holstein with a coalition army.
24 September	Czarniecki leads his contingent across the River Oder into Brandenburg to be part of the Imperial–Brandenburg-Prussian–Commonwealth coalition army which is assembling in Mecklenburg under Raimondo Montecuccoli to intervene in Denmark; Douglas returns into Courland, aiming for the capital Mitau.
27 September	First units of the coalition army enter Holstein; Harald Stake retreats from Halden because of supply shortages.

28 September	Duke of Courland accepts Swedish security guarantees in exchange for Swedish acceptance of Courland's neutrality, subject to future ratification by King Charles.
30 September	Prince Yuriy Baryatinskiy defeats Vygovskiy's brother, Konstantin Vygovskiy, and the Crimean commander Qaplan Murza at Vasil'kov.
5 October	Vygovskiy's cossacks and Tatars attack Oleshnya in southern Muscovy.
8 October	Norwegian army from Akershus arrives at Trondheim, joins forces with those already besieging the town.
9 October	Lithuanian and Brandenburg-Prussian units defeated by Muscovites at Kowno.
9–10 October	Douglas takes Courland's capital Mitau in a coup, captures the Duke of Courland.
10 October	Danish sortie from Copenhagen.
12 October	Coalition army reaches Hamburg; former Danish soldier Jacob Dannefer deserts from Swedish service on a Swedish transport off Copenhagen and together with 10 Danish prisoners hijack and sail the ship into the city.
14 October	Danish sortie from Copenhagen.
15–18 October	Vygovskiy sends letters to King Charles, proposing a return to the Treaty of Korsun' between Sweden and Cossack Ukraine.
16 October	Coalition army reaches Slesvig.
17 October	Obdam's Dutch fleet finally sets out, bound for Denmark.
17–18 October	King Charles lands on Amager island; on 19 October King Frederick joins a Danish sortie which results in a skirmish involving the two Kings, neither of whom is aware of the presence of the other.
21 October	With negotiations for extension of the Commonwealth-Muscovite truce collapsing, Prince Yuriy Dolgorukov's Muscovites defeat Gosiewski's Lithuanians at Verkiai, taking him prisoner; Yuriy Nemirich, Vygovskiy's chancellor, sends a letter to King Charles, asking for Swedish protection of Cossack Ukraine against Muscovy.
23 October	Belgorod Army, under Romodanovskiy, departs for the Ukraine.
30 October	Obdam's Dutch fleet passes Skagen, the northernmost point of Jutland.
31 October	Nemirich sends a letter to Duke Adolph John, proposing that Sweden conclude a peace with the Commonwealth and instead join in the alliance against Muscovy.
2 November	Dutch fleet assembles at Lappegrund off Kronborg Castle near Helsingør.
5–10 November	Vygovskiy attacks Kiev for the second time, but without success; in Bohuslän, Norwegian units move into Sweden, but only skirmishes follow before they retreat.
6 November	King Charles turns down Wrangel's suggestion to attack Obdam's fleet when the winds are favourable, instead preferring to let the Dutch initiate hostilities so as not to be the aggressor.
7 November	Obdam decides to force the blockade.

8 November	Battle of the Sound; Dutch fleet forces the Strait and raises the Swedish blockade of Copenhagen.
11 November	Coalition units reach Haderslev.
12 November	Coalition units take Kolding town (but not the citadel Koldinghus, still held by a Swedish garrison).
13 November	Danish Council of the Realm orders Vice-Admiral Peter Bredal to sail to Flensburg or Aabenraa to embark part of the Brandenburg-Prussian army to Copenhagen; in the Ukraine, Belgorod Army defeats Grigoriy Gulyanitskiy's cossacks at Piryatin.
16–17 November	Swedes deflect a major assault on Thorn, but attackers capture three bastions.
26–27 November	King Charles crosses the Strait from Kronborg to Landskrona.
29 November	Danes and Dutch attempt to block the Swedish port of Landskrona by sinking several ships in the entrance channel; however, the attempt fails and nine Norwegian sailors fall into Swedish captivity.
1 December	King Charles again crosses the Strait, returning from Landskrona to Kronborg.
13 December	English fleet, under Vice-Admiral William Goodsonn, leaves port bound for Denmark, with instruction to protect English interests in the Strait by providing some degree of support to King Charles.
14 December	Supported by Bredal's Little Belt squadron, Brandenburg-Prussian and Polish cavalry units cross to island of Als in small boats, with their horses swimming beside them.
16 December	King Charles crosses from Zealand to Fyn.
17–18 December	Rutger von Ascheberg, having defended Sønderborg on the island of Als but now out of supplies, evacuates his men under cover of darkness and embarks on ships under the command of Major Uggla bound for Zealand; Bredal falls when he together with a Danish-Dutch contingent attempt to prevent Uggla's crossing.
18 December	Swedish garrison of Nordborg on inland Als surrenders; uprising on Bornholm, insurgents murder the Swedish governor, Johan Printzensköld; Danish troops take control of the island.
19 December	Goodsonn's fleet reaches Skagen.
21 December	Swedes at Trondheim surrender after a long siege, marching out with full military honours on 27 December.
23 December	Swedes at Thorn agree to surrender.
25 December	Frederick William informs the Danes that he will not divide his army, and accordingly not ship part of his army to Copenhagen; Goodsonn's fleet turns back, unable to continue into the Strait under prevailing weather and ice conditions; coalition army takes Koldinghus.
28 December	Bartholomæus Mikkelsen and more than 100 burghers in Malmö conspire to liberate the town with the help of Danish troops, but because of drift ice in the Strait the expected 800 Danish reinforcements fail to arrive.
30 December	Swedes at Thorn surrender with full military honours to the

Imperial, Brandenburg-Prussian, and Commonwealth besiegers; Truce of Vallisaare agreed between Sweden and Muscovy.

1659 – Everybody Engaged

3 January	Goodsonn's English fleet returns to primarily Woolwich and Chatham for the duration of the winter.
5 January	Andrzej Potocki's Crown army, dispatched by King John Casimir to aid Vygovskiy, crosses the Dnieper, advances towards Kiev.
6 January	Mikkelsen and co-conspirators in Malmö make a second attempt to liberate the town with the help of Danish troops; again, these fail to arrive, this time because the ships go aground in the darkness; soon, the Swedes learn of the plan, arrest the co-conspirators (after a long trial, some 30 are found guilty and sentenced to prison, while the three ringleaders are sentenced to death).
8 January	Douglas takes Goldingen, Courland.
31 January	Treaty of Ribe between Denmark and Brandenburg formalises their alliance.
1 February	Würtz sets out from Stettin, Swedish Pomerania, for an offensive into Prussia.
6 February	Duke Adolph John, from Marienburg, joins forces with Würtz at Hammerstein; this begins a Swedish offensive in Prussia.
10 February	Adolph John and Würtz take Konitz.
17 February	Vygovskiy takes Mirgorod; in Denmark, Wrangel attempts to land troops from Nyborg on Langeland but faced with stiff Danish resistance, including strong cavalry, fails.
18 February	Prince Ivan Khovanskiy's Novgorod Army defeats a numerically superior Commonwealth army led by Mikołaj Stanisław Judycki and Władysław Wołłowicz at Myadel' during the renewed Muscovite offensive in Lithuania; Wrangel again attempts to land on Langeland, but faced with stiff Danish resistance again abandons the attempt.
21 February	King Charles attempts to storm Copenhagen but fails, suffering serious losses.
16 March	Duke Adolph John and Würtz lay siege to Dirschau.
17 March	Swedes under Fabian Aderkas defeat Polish and Courland units under respectively Colonels Ernst Johann von Korff and Ewald von der Brinck at Hasenpoth, Courland; Korff and Brinck first retreat, then surrender.
18 March	Edward Montagu receives instructions for the English expedition to Denmark; essentially, his task is to preserve the balance of power and prevent the coalition army from taking Fyn, Zealand, or other Danish islands held by Swedish units – but not initiate a war between England and the Netherlands.
19 March	Dirschau surrenders to Duke Adolph John and Würtz, who take possession on the following day (20 March).
20 March	Recently conquered Liebstadt surrenders to Polish and


N
Swedish offensives
Muscovite offensives
Cossack offensives
Danish offensives
Crimean offensives
Commonwealth offensives
Imperial offensives
Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Stockholm
MUSCOVY
Riga
North Sea
DENMARK
Baltic Sea
Königsberg
Ravensburg
Pomerania
DUTCH REPUBLIC
Bremen
POLAND
Berlin
Cleve
Mark
Cologne
BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Saxony
Magdeburg
Silesia
Kiev
Bohemia
Moravia
FRANCE
Breisgau
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Styria
Buda
Pest
Transylvania
Tyrol
Carinthia
Carniola
Croatia
HUNGARY
CRIMEA
Karlowitz
SWISS CONFEDERATION
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Black Sea
Adriatic Sea
Balkans
0
200
400
600 km

Military operations 1659

	Brandenburg-Prussian units, signifying the end of the Swedish offensive into Prussia.
22 March	In the Strait, Swedish ships skirmish with the stranded Dutch warship *Zeeridder*, stuck in the ice.
24–25 March	Continued inconclusive skirmishes around the *Zeeridder*.
28 March	The Hague informs King Frederick that the Netherlands will send a second Dutch fleet to support the Danish cause, with 4,000 additional infantry.
29 March	Wrangel again lands on Langeland, this time with a strong force divided between two landing sites; after initial resistance, Langeland surrenders on the following day (30 March).
1 April	King Charles crosses the Strait to Landskrona.
8 April	Swedish main fleet of 25 ships, under Bielkenstierna, leaves its winter port of Landskrona; Dutch–Danish coalition makes no attempt to confront Bielkenstierna.
9 April	Swedes evacuate main part of Frederiksodde, transferring the remaining garrison into the Citadel.
10-11 April	Inconclusive naval battle off Æro Island between Wrangel's squadron from Fyn under Major Tering Henriksson and a stronger combined Dutch–Danish squadron of 12 ships under Vice Admiral Nicolai Helt.
14 April	Bielkenstierna's fleet reaches Langeland; Helt's squadron withdraws into the protected Flensburg Firth, which means that Sweden regains superiority at sea in the Baltic.
16 April	English fleet under Edward Montagu, General at Sea and Earl of Sandwich, enters the Strait; Bielkenstierna's fleet reaches Als; in the coming days, Wrangel assumes overall command and the fleet is reinforced with Tering Henriksson's squadron from the Little Belt and Uggla's small squadron from Gothenburg.
22 April	Soldiers from Wrangel's fleet take Nordborg but fail at Sønderborg on Als, at the entrance to Flensburg Firth; Swedish units from Douglas's army take Windau.
25 April	Wrangel abandons Als, and thereby the attempt to move his fleet into the Flensburg Firth to deal with Helt's squadron; instead, he turns towards Lolland; Douglas takes Libau, which completes the Swedish conquest of Courland.
26 April	Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy and Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host Colonel Ivan Bespalyy reach Vygovskiy's base at Konotop.
30 April	Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy joins Trubetskoy and Bespalyy at Konotop.
1-2 May	King Charles travels from Kronborg via Korsør, Zealand, to Nyborg, Fyn.
5 May	King Charles sets out with the main fleet.
7 May	King Charles lands on Falster, taking the island; Dutch–Danish fleet under Obdam and Bielke sets out from Copenhagen.
8 May.	King Charles lands on Lolland; Danish units on the island under Colonel Joachim Kørber retreat across the island to the fortified Nakskov.

9 May	Muscovites attempt to storm Konotop, but without success.
10 May	Battle of Rødsand between Bielkenstierna's Swedish fleet and Obdam's and Bielke's combined Dutch–Danish fleet; neither side gains the advantage and strong winds ultimately force the two fleets to separate, with the Swedes returning to the Strait while the coalition fleet moves into Flensburg Firth; Bielkenstierna seriously wounded.
11 May	Swedish horse reach Nakskov.
13 May	Swedes blockade Nakskov, in which Kørber holds out; over the coming days Swedes take the rest of Lolland.
15 May	In the Netherlands, Ruyter receives his instructions.
18 May	With a local three-month truce recently concluded between the Commonwealth and Muscovy in northern Lithuania, Swedes under Douglas defeat a Courland–Lithuanian army under Colonel Samuel Komorowski at Schoden, which marks the end of the Swedish offensive against Samogitia.
20 May	Obdam and Bielke attempt to relieve Nakskov, under siege by Wrangel, but Swedish artillery and musket fire from newly established redoubts and small Swedish ships prevent the longboats with Danish soldiers and Dutch crews from landing; Ruyter's fleet sets outs from the Netherlands.
21 May	First Concert of The Hague initiates peace negotiations between Sweden and the Commonwealth; Brandenburg-Prussians under Joachim Ernst von Görzke attempt to blockade Duke Adolph John's headquarters at Marienburg, Prussia.
27–28 May	Swedes evacuate Frederiksodde Citadel during the night, crossing to Fyn.
30 May	Mehmed Khan leads his main army out of the Crimea, into Ukraine; he sends another corps to guard the Muscovite border against Don cossack intrusions; Swedish main fleet under Gustav Wrangel moves into Landskrona.
31 May	Danzig Army attacks Dirschau.
1 June	Swedish warships in the Strait resume the blockade of Copenhagen; second Dutch fleet under Ruyter arrives in the Strait.
6 June	Gustav Wrangel sets out from Landskrona with a squadron of ultimately 14 warships and troops to reinforce Fyn.
8 June	Swedes from Zealand, under Philip of Sulzbach, wade ashore on Møn, gaining control of the island on the following day.
11 June	Coalition army attempts to land on Fyn, but fails; yet, they successfully take the small island of Fænø between Jutland and Fyn.
15 June	Obdam's, Ruyter's, and Bielke's fleets join forces in the Great Belt.
27 June	Dutch and Danish fleets line up against English and Swedish fleets between Jutland and Zealand, but Montagu proposes that they extend the ceasefire agreed by the First Concert of The Hague.
30 June	Having failed to accomplish his mission because of unfavourable winds, Gustav Wrangel returns to Landskrona; angry by the lack of progress, King Charles relieves Gustav Wrangel of his command.

2 July	King John Casimir orders Czarniecki to return to the Commonwealth.
4 July	Mehmed Khan and Vygovskiy join forces.
6 July	Coalition army again attempts to land on Fyn, but Wrangel beats them off; Montecuccoli lightly wounded while on board a Dutch warship.
7 July	Major Uggla sets out with a squadron of 12 warships from Landskrona, in a new attempt to reinforce Fyn.
8 July	Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian cossacks under Mehmed Khan, Nureddin Sultan Murad Geray, and Hetman Ivan Vygovskiy decisively defeat a Muscovite army under Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy at Konotop.
12 July	By chance, Uggla's squadron and first Obdam's, then Ruyter's fleets run into each other between Pomerania and the island of Møn; having exchanged fire with Obdam, Uggla retreats towards Bornholm; meanwhile, following Wrangel's advice, King Charles orders Navy Major Owen Coxe to set out with a squadron of warships to reinforce Fyn, but this time travelling north of Zealand to evade the two Dutch fleets in the western Baltic.
15 July	Coxe's squadron of nine warships from Landskrona, Kronborg, and the Strait sets out.
16 July	Combined Dutch fleet assembles at Copenhagen, ready for action with the ceasefire over.
17 July	Having failed to reach Fyn, Uggla's squadron goes into port of Ystad for supplies.
22 July	Uggla's squadron sets out from Ystad.
24 July	Second Concert of The Hague.
25 July	Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches assembles an Imperial army at Grossglogau in Silesia for a planned attack on Swedish Pomerania; in Denmark, Joachim Kørber surrenders Nakskov on Lolland to Field Marshal Stenbock.
August	Taking advantage of the victory at Konotop, Crimean Tatars raid 18 districts in Muscovy, burning farmsteads and carrying off large numbers of prisoners destined for the Crimean slave markets.
2 August	Obdam's Dutch fleet sets out from Copenhagen, intending to go on the offensive against the Swedes on the Danish islands; Coxe's squadron defeats the Dutch–Danish squadron supporting the coalition's landing attempt on Fyn at Æbeltoft, capturing or destroying five warships and 30 transports; having suffered from unfavourable winds, Uggla's squadron returns to Ystad; with two captured prize ships the only tangible gain.
2-3 August	Combined Courland–Lithuanian army under Komorowski takes the town of Mitau, leaving only the castle in Swedish hands.
3 August	Obdam receives orders to abort the offensive because of the negotiations during the Second Concert of The Hague; Uggla's squadron again sets out from Ystad.
4 August	Third Concert of The Hague; England and France compel the Netherlands to co-operate in negotiating peace, but King Charles

	will not compromise; Lieutenant General Erik Kruse arrives in Reval with Swedish reinforcements from Finland.
5–6 August	Following the defeat at Æbeltoft, Frederick William abandons the island of Fænø during the night, for the time being also abandoning his attempts to take Fyn; soon afterwards, Swedish units under Colonel Johann von Waldeck-Landau raid and burn yet more coalition transports at Kolding, Jutland.
9 August	Uggla, then in the Grønsund Strait between Falster and Møn, relieved of his command by the angry King Charles for failure to reinforce Fyn, being the second navy commander to suffer this fate for this reason; his deputy Tering Henriksson assumes command of the squadron which is incorporated into Wrangel's fleet; back in Kronborg, King Charles rewards Coxe and promotes him to Admiral Lieutenant.
11 August	Entering Pomerania from the south, Souches' Imperial army reaches Landsberg an der Warthe, from which he sends a detachment to take Greifenhagen (which falls on 18 August) and then moves against Damm.
16 August	Crown Field Hetman Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski and Crown General of Artillery Krzysztof Grodzicki lay siege to Graudenz, held by a Swedish garrison under Johann Puchert.
17 August	Duke Adolph John hands over command to Field Marshal Lieutenant Lorenz von der Linde.
18 August	Not wishing to miss the expected conquest of Pomerania, Frederick William departs with his main army from Jutland; in Courland, Komorowski lays siege to Goldingen.
20 August	Obdam disembarks the Dutch infantry at Amager, near Copenhagen.
20–21 August	In Swedish Pomerania, Souches takes three outlying bastions at Damm.
21 August	Imperial corps under Johann Reichard Starhemberg, detached from Souches' army, takes Kammin, Pomerania.
22 August	Lieutenant General Erik Kruse arrives in Riga with Swedish reinforcements from Finland.
25 August	Having crossed the bare mountains into Swedish Lapland, Preben von Ahnen and a Norwegian raiding party burn the mining refinery in Silbojokk and its associated village and church.
28 August	Ahnen's Norwegians backtrack to the silver mine at Mount Nasa where they destroy the mining facilities.
29–30 August	Units of Lubomirski's army storm Graudenz, defeat the Swedish garrison, and due to the fires started during the assault burn most of the town.
30 August	Starhemberg's Imperial corps advances to Wollin, Pomerania.
31 August	Imperials take Greifenhagen Great Bastion.
3 September	Douglas attempts to relieve Goldingen, but fails; Montagu's English fleet departs from Danish waters, bound for home.
4 September	Czarnicki's corps departs from Denmark.
6 September	In Pomerania, Starhemberg's Imperial corps storms Wollin; in

	Prussia, Swedes abandon Dirschau; in Copenhagen, Ruyter receives orders to take action against the Swedes; Dutch fleet takes the little island of Samsø between Jutland and Zealand, which is abandoned by the Swedish garrison of 30 men.
9 September	Imperials take the bastion at Dievenow, Pomerania.
11 September	Imperials take the small Swine Redoubt, Pomerania.
12 September	Komorowski takes Doblen, Courland.
13 September	Last units of coalition army bound for Pomerania leave Holstein.
14 September	In preparation for shipping a coalition army to Zealand, King Frederick orders Hans Schack, commander on Zealand, to commandeer all vessels in port.
14–15 September	Ruyter attempts an attack on the Swedish fleet at Kronborg with the fireship *Liefde*, but the attempt fails, causing no damage.
17 September	Having finally received siege artillery, Souches takes Damm; in Scania, 460 Danish soldiers land in and take the town of Ystad in a coup; within days learning that Field Marshal Stenbock approaches with a Swedish army, the Danes abandon the town as well as those pro-Danish guerrillas who assemble to support them.
19 September	Colonel Jacob Spens surrenders Swedish-held Goldingen in Courland to Komorowski after a long siege; despite an agreement of free departure, the Swedish officers are imprisoned and the men enlisted into Komorowski's units.
20 September	King Frederick orders all available privateers with Danish letters of marque, regardless of the terms of their contracts, to escort the commandeered transports on their way to Kiel, where the coalition army is expected to embark.
20–21 September	Dutch–Danish coalition plans a major surprise attack on the Swedish supply depot at Køge, Zealand; Swedes learn of the attempt, which is thwarted.
21 September	In Ukraine, Vygovskiy is disavowed and shouted down by a cossack assembly at Germanovka, south of Kiev; soon after, Vygovskiy resigns the position of Hetman to Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy and retires to the Commonwealth.
22 September	Lubomirski lays siege to Marienburg, Prussia.
25 September	Windau surrenders to the Lithuanians, following the mutiny of the garrison which consists of Danish or possibly Norwegian conscripts.
26 September	Frederick William's primarily Brandenburg-Prussian coalition army from Denmark enters Swedish Pomerania.
27 September	Lubomirski and the Danzig Army join forces to lay siege to Danziger Haupt.
28 September	Frederick William's army reaches Loitz, after which it advances to Greifswald.
29 September	Wrangel sails from Falster, Denmark, to Swedish Pomerania; Souches' main army advances to Stettin.
2 October	Imperial units attack Greifswald; however, on the same day Wrangel's Swedish corps from Fyn disembarks, relieving Greifswald and Wolgast; the Imperals retreat to Demmin.

5 October	Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł's Brandenburg-Prussians retake Libau; Komorowski's Lithuanians and Brandenburg-Prussians lay siege to Schrunden.
10 October	Souches is reinforced by a contingent of Brandenburg-Prussian siege artillery from Spandau; in Prussia, having simultaneously laid siege to Marienburg and Danziger Haupt, Lubomirski abandons the siege of Marienburg so that he can focus on Danziger Haupt.
11 October	Ruyter's fleet and the commandeered transport fleet sail to Kiel, to embark Danish cavalry for the planned attack on Fyn.
13 October	Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł's Brandenburg-Prussians lay siege to Grobin.
18 October	Erik Lode surrenders Schrunden to Komorowski; Erik Armfelt surrenders Grobin to Bogusław Radziwiłł's Brandenburg-Prussians.
20 October	Souches is reinforced by yet another contingent of Brandenburg-Prussian siege artillery; Czarniecki's corps from Denmark back in the Commonwealth, moves into winter quarters in Greater Poland; Douglas abandons Courland, returns into Livonia and disperses his army in winter quarters; Obdam's fleet returns to Copenhagen.
22 October	Ruyter's fleet, reinforced with a Danish squadron, reaches Kiel.
25 October	Frederick William's primarily Brandenburg-Prussian coalition army lays siege to Demmin.
27 October	In Ukraine, Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy signs the Treaty of Pereyaslav.
31 October	Norwegian intrusion into Bohuslän advances towards Kvistrum and Uddevalla.
1 November	Obdam's fleet (19 warships, one fireship, several merchantmen) sets out from Copenhagen, bound for home; on the way, Obdam exchanges artillery fire with Swedes in Kronborg and Helsingborg with no known effect caused by either side.
6 November	Wrangel's advance relief force, consisting of an ensign and 46 men, reaches Stettin; Ruyter's fleet, reinforced with a Danish squadron and a squadron of privateers in Danish service, sets out from Kiel with Schack's army on board.
7 November	Treaty of the Pyrenees ends the war between France and Habsburg Spain.
8 November	Schack's Danish-Dutch army attempts a landing at Nyborg but fails.
10 November	Coalition army under Schack lands at Kerteminde on Fyn; Wrangel's main relief force reaches Stettin, in total 160 men moved in with fishing boats.
11 November	Würtz commands a sally from Stettin which destroys much of the Brandenburg-Prussian siege artillery; in the evening, Wrangel himself arrives in Stettin.
12 November	Schack concludes the disembarkation of his army at Kerteminde; Eberstein's army assembles at Kolding.
13 November	Schack concludes the fortification of his position at Kerteminde; Obdam's fleet returns to port in the Netherlands.

14 November	Coalition army under Eberstein lands at Middelfart on western Fyn.
15 November	King Charles redeploys 1,500 infantry from Zealand to Philip of Sulzbach's command on Fyn; Imperials abandon siege of Stettin.
16 November	Eberstein orders a strong cavalry force to Odense; Sulzbach receives letters from King Charles, which he interprets as an order to conserve his forces.
17 November	King Charles receives information that Sulzbach has decided to attack Eberstein.
18 November	Sulzbach retreats to Nyborg.
19 November	Eberstein's main army sets out towards Odense; Schack reaches Odense; the surprised King Charles receives a letter from Sulzbach saying that he decided not to attack after all but instead had retreated into Nyborg; acting upon the King's urgent orders, Field Marshal Stenbock crosses the Great Belt to advise and assist Sulzbach.
21 November	Schack's and Eberstein's coalition armies on Fyn unite.
23 November	Ruyter takes Knudshoved Bastion outside Nyborg.
24 November	Eberstein and Schack defeats Sulzbach at the battle of Nyborg; Aleksander Hilary Połubiński, having assumed overall command in Courland following the death of Komorowski, marches into Mitau and lays siege to the castle.
25 November	Having gained peace with Spain, France declares that as a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, it is obligated to send an army to restore peace in the Empire, should Frederick William and Emperor Leopold not cease their aggression against Sweden's German possessions; Eberstein's and Schack's coalition armies and Dutch–Danish fleet lay siege to Nyborg, where Swedes surrender; Swedish Estates assemble in Gothenburg.
26 November	Faced with proposals to move the coalition army to Zealand, Ruyter in Nyborg explains to Schack and Bielke that supply shortages and approaching winter preclude another operation for the Dutch fleet; soon after, Eberstein's and Schack's armies retreat to Jutland and Holstein; Poles return with Eberstein on route for Poland.
9 December	Convention of Helsingør effectively concludes the war between Sweden and the Netherlands.
10 December	Swedes at Strasburg, under Colonel Johann Pleitner, surrender.
12 December	King Charles asks Field Marshal Lars Kagg to command the next invasion of Norway.
15 December	Ruyter goes into winter quarters in Copenhagen.
22 December	Swedes at Danziger Haupt, under Claes Danckwardt-Lillieström, surrender after a long seige; meanwhile, other Polish units are less successful, so Marienburg and Elbing remain in Swedish hands.
30 December	King Aduafo of Efutu and King Frederick sign an agreement which grants the Danes rights to build a fort and trading post on the West African Gold Coast in a location separate from that of the already-present Swedish colony.

1660 – Peace Between Sweden and the Coalition; Setbacks for Muscovy

3 January	King Charles leaves command in Denmark to Sulzbach
8 January	Mitau agrees to surrender to Aleksander Hilary Połubiński's Lithuanians, with Swedes marching out two days later (10 January).
13 January	Novgorod Army under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy storms Brest, burning the city in the process.
15 January	Field Marshal Kagg leads an invasion army out of Vänersborg towards Norway.
23 January	Kagg lays siege to Halden.
30 January	The Hague orders the Dutch units in Denmark including the fleet, in Copenhagen but locked in by ice, to resume the war against Sweden.
23 February	King Charles dies in Gothenburg, Sweden.
3 March	Having learnt of the King's death, Kagg abandons the siege of Halden, returns to Sweden.
4 March	Swedish regency government in Gothenburg orders Admiral Bielkenstierna to resume command of the main fleet in Landskrona.
15 March	Units of Ruyter's fleet initiates a limited blockade of Landskrona; Bielkenstierna arrives in Landskrona, resumes command.
17 March	King Frederick attempts to persuade Ruyter to carry out an immediate attack on the Swedish fleet; when Ruyter declines, King Frederick asks him at least to continue the blockade, because he worries that the Swedish fleet otherwise will set out to blockade Copenhagen.
18 March	Dutch and Swedish representatives agree to a ceasefire; Bielkenstierna informs Uggla in Korsør of the ceasefire with the Dutch, orders him to continue operations against Danish vessels and in particular transports that might be used to move the remaining coalition units to Zealand.
19 March	Ruyter orders the termination of the blockade of Landskrona.
20 March	Bielkenstierna reports that key components of the Swedish fleet in Landskrona will be ready for combat operations within a couple of days.
22 March	Admiral Lieutenant Sperling sets out from Landskrona with a squadron of seven warships.
25 March	Danes lay siege to Tønning, the stronghold of Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, intending to pressure the Duke to surrender the sovereignty he gained in 1658.
28 March	Sperling initiates a limited blockade of Copenhagen.
29 March	Faced with a Dutch ultimatum, King Frederick agrees to continue peace negotiations, abandons plans for further offensive operations.
30 March	Sperling commences a full blockade of Copenhagen; Novgorod Army lays siege to the Lithuanian fortress of Lyakhovichi, held by Mikołaj Stanisław Judycki.


N
Swedish offensives
Muscovite offensives
Cossack offensives
Crimean offensives
Commonwealth offensives
Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Stockholm
MUSCOVY
Riga
LITHUANIA
DENMARK
North Sea
Baltic Sea
Königsberg
Ravensburg
Pomerania
DUTCH REPUBLIC
Bremen
POLAND
Polonka
Berlin
Cleve
Mark
Cologne
BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Saxony
Silesia
Magdeburg
Kiev
Chudnov
Bohemia
Moravia
FRANCE
Breisgau
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Styria
Buda
Pest
Transylvania
Tyrol
Carinthia
Carniola
HUNGARY
CRIMEA
Croatia
Karlowitz
SWISS CONFEDERATION
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Adriatic Sea
Black Sea
Balkans
0
200
400
600 km

Military Operations 1660

31 March	Sperling's squadron in the Strait reinforced with six more warships, reaching a total of 13 warships.
3 April	Swedish warships, probably from Uggla's squadron, as part of an operation against Danish privateers take the opportunity to destroy two Danish supply ships in Heiligenhafen, Holstein.
5 April	Swedish warships, probably from Uggla's squadron, attempt a landing on the island of Fehmarn, but the attempt fails.
10 April	Ruyter orders the Dutch fleet to patrol the entrance to Copenhagen to prevent Swedish warships from seizing more Danish ships, effectively breaking the Swedish blockade.
19 April	Eberstein surrounds Tønning, the stronghold of Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, with the support of two Danish privateers.
20 April	Bielkenstierna terminates the Swedish blockade of Copenhagen.
21 April	Swedish warships east of Zealand take a Dutch galiot with Field Marshal Hans Schack and Lieutenant General Hans Ahlefeldt on board; the two are taken captive and sent to Malmö.
3 May	Treaty of Oliva between Sweden and the Commonwealth, the Habsburgs, and Brandenburg concludes the war between them and allows the Commonwealth to focus on the war with Muscovy.
5 May	Ruyter's fleet in the Strait seizes 10 Swedish ships bound for Stockholm, mainly old warships in need of refurbishment but loaded with plunder from Denmark.
13 May	Nine Dutch warships and a fireship under Rear Admiral Schram deploy at Landskrona.
15 May	Uggla unsuccessfully attacks a Danish supply depot in Neustadt; Copenhagen receives the news about the Treaty of Oliva, which means that henceforth only the Netherlands stands behind Denmark against Sweden.
20 May	With Dutch permission, a longboat from the 10 seized Swedish ships is sent to get fresh water from Zealand, where it is attacked by Danes.
28 May	Uggla's squadron lands Swedish soldiers from Wismar under Conrad Mardefelt on Fehmarn; Danes refuse to surrender.
1 June	Mardefelt withdraws from Fehmarn, having failed to subdue the Danes but with fresh supplies from the island and several captives.
6 June	Treaty of Copenhagen concludes the war between Sweden and Denmark; Ruyter releases the 10 seized Swedish ships.
11 June	Swedish army abandons Carlstad camp, which initiates the Swedish withdrawal from Danish territories.
27 June	Crown army under Czarniecki and Lithuanian army under Paweł Jan Sapieha defeat Muscovite Novgorod Army, under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy, at Połonka; Muscovites abandon siege of Lyakhovichi; henceforth, Muscovites abandon the attempt to go on the offensive against Warsaw and instead focus on defending existing conquests.
7 July	Commonwealth units take Minsk.
10 August	Commonwealth units under variously Krzystof Sapieha, Michał Kazimierz Pac, and Czarniecki again lay siege to Mogilyov.

13 August	With the evacuation of Swedish units from Denmark completed, Ruyter's fleet finally sets out from Copenhagen, bound for the Netherlands.
27 August	Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev sets out from Kiev on an offensive aimed against L'vov, supported by Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy's and Timofey Tsetsyura's cossack armies.
26 September	Stanisław 'Rewera' Potocki's Poles and Nureddin Sultan Murad Geray's Tatars attack Sheremetyev at Lyubar; however, Sheremetyev withdraws in good order towards Chudnov.
27 September	Having reached Chudnov, Sheremetyev deploys in a wagon fort; for several days, the two sides exchange artillery fire while the Muscovites run out of supplies.
28 September	Battle of River Basya near Mogilyov, fought to a draw between Czarniecki and Yuriy Dolgorukov, commander of the southern Muscovite army in Lithuania.
4–6 October	Dolgorukov fights off a succession of Commonwealth attacks from his position at the village Gubarevo; as a result, Commonwealth units again abandon the siege of Mogilyov.
6 October	Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski learns that Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy's army has reached Slobodishche.
7 October	Lubomirski advances against Khmel'nitskiy at Slobodishche, while Murad Geray blocks Khmel'nitskiy's retreat; the resulting battle is inconclusive.
13 October	Sheremetyev attempts to break out towards Slobodishche but fails.
17 October	Lubomirski persuades Khmel'nitskiy to sign the Treaty of Chudnov, abandoning Sheremetyev's Muscovites and pledging allegiance to the Commonwealth.
21 October	Having learnt of Khmel'nitskiy's surrender, Timofey Tsetsyura and his cossacks defect, pledging allegiance to the Commonwealth.
26 October	Sheremetyev begins negotiations for surrender.
4 November	Sheremetyev surrenders at Chudnov, negotiating safe passage for his army; during the night, Crimean Tatars massacre the Muscovites and enslave the survivors.

1661 – Peace between Sweden and Muscovy

10 February	Mogilyov's burghers successfully rise against the Muscovite garrison, returning the town to Commonwealth rule.
1 July	Treaty of Kardis ends the war between Sweden and Muscovy; meanwhile, Khmel'nitskiy's cossacks, Poles, and Crimean Tatars repeatedly raid Left-bank Ukraine.
4 November	King John Casimir, with a combined and numerically superior Crown-Lithuanian army under respectively Czarniecki and Kazimierz Żeromski, defeats Ivan Khovanskiy's Novgorod Army and Afanasiy Ordin-Nashchokin's Livonian division in a surprise attack at Kushliki, near Polotsk.

3 December	Following a long siege by Commonwealth armies, Muscovite garrison in Wilno surrenders to King John Casimir.

1662 – Muscovy Consolidates Control over Left-Bank Ukraine

26 July	Muscovites, under Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy, and Ukrainian cossacks loyal to Muscovy, under Yakov Somko, decisively defeat Ukrainian cossacks, under Khmel'nitskiy with Polish and Crimean Tatar support, at Kanev, which neutralises the Commonwealth's and Ukrainian cossacks' capability to dispute Muscovy's rule over Left-bank Ukraine.

1663 – Commonwealth Attempts the Reconquest of Left-Bank Ukraine

27–28 June	Ivan Bryukhovetskiy elected Hetman of Left-bank Ukraine.
Oct–Dec	Muscovite dragoons and Don cossacks under Grigoriy Kosagov, Kalmyk cavalry under Erket Aturkay, and Zaporozhian cossack infantry under Ivan Serko raid Crimean Tatar settlements and attack Perekop twice.
23 November	King John Casimir crosses the Dnieper, in the last Commonwealth offensive to regain control of Left-bank Ukraine.

1664 – Last Commonwealth and Muscovite Offensives Fail

23 January	King John Casimir lays siege to Glukhov in Left-bank Ukraine, but soon afterwards Crimeans abandon him, returning home with their captives.
9 February	King John Casimir abandons the siege of Glukhov.
21 February	Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy arrives with a Muscovite army, which defeats King John Casimir's army at Pirogovka, signifying the Commonwealth's last attempt to regain Left-bank Ukraine.
16 June	Lithuanian Field Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac defeats Prince Ivan Khovanskiy and his Novgorod Army at Vitebsk, signifying the end of major Muscovite offensives into Lithuania.
29 December	Lubomirski is sentenced to death, confiscation of property, and loss of honour for treason; he goes into exile in Silesia.

1665 – Civil War in the Commonwealth

4 September	Lubomirski returns from exile with the support of the army and the Levy of the Nobility, defeats the Crown army under

Stanisław 'Rewera' Potocki at Częstochowa; in Lithuania, Prince Ivan Khovanskiy and the Novgorod Army after taking Dünaburg defeats a numerically weaker Lithuanian relief force, but then withdraws to Pskov as Lithuanian Field Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac approaches with a large army.

10 October Pyotr Doroshenko replaces Teterya as Right-bank Hetman; soon after, he changes sides, enters into secret negotiations for an alliance with the Crimean Khanate, and swears allegiance to the Ottoman Empire (the result of which is the Commonwealth-Tatar war of 1666–1671, in which the Commonwealth and Ottoman Empire fight over the Ukraine).

1666 – Continued Civil War in the Commonwealth

13 July Lubomirski defeats the Crown army, under future King John III Sobieski, at Mątwy.

31 July King John Casimir and Lubomirski sign the Agreement of Łęgonice, which declares an amnesty for the rebels and the termination of the King's political, governmental, and fiscal reform programme; in return, Lubomirski signs a letter of apology.

1667 – Conclusion of Combat Operations Between the Commonwealth and Muscovy

9 February Truce of Andrusovo concludes combat operations between Muscovy and the Commonwealth.

Dramatis Personae

Sweden

Adolph, John (1629–1689), Duke and Generalissimus. Brother of King Charles.

Adolph, William of Saxe-Weimar (1632–1668; also known as Saxe-Eisenach), Duke and Colonel. A son of Duke William of Saxe-Weimar, Adolph William went into Swedish service during the war in the Commonwealth in 1656.

Ascheberg, Rutger von (1621–1693), Colonel. Veteran from Courland who had risen from the ranks in Swedish service during the Thirty Years' War, which he had entered as a common cavalryman.

Arensdorff, Friedrich von (1626–1689), Lieutenant Colonel. First Field Marshal Wrangel's, then King Charles's senior aide. A German from Mecklenburg, during the Thirty Years' War he fought in first Danish, then Swedish service, beginning his military career as a common musketeer.

Banér, Gustav Persson (1618–1689), Lieutenant General of Cavalry, in 1658 promoted to General of Cavalry. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War and nephew of the renowned Field Marshal Johan Banér.

Berndes, Fabian (1610–1678), Major General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War and the war in the Commonwealth, where he made a name for himself as commander of Finnish dragoons.

Bielkenstierna, Claes Hansson (1615–1662), Admiral. Veteran of the naval battles with Denmark during the Thirty Years' War.

Böddeker, Hans (1602–1659), Major General. A Livonian veteran of many wars who first went into Swedish service in 1629.

Brahe, Per (1602–1680), Lord High Justiciar. Veteran of the early years of the Thirty Years' War but since then primarily involved in administration.

Bülow, Barthold Hartwig von (1611–1667), Major General, from 1659 Lieutenant General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had fought at Nördlingen 1634 under Bernard of Saxe-Weimar as well as in other battles.

Burmeister, Christopher (*c.* 1600–1671), Colonel. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War from Estonia.

Charles, Magnus of Baden-Durlach (1621–1658), Margrave and Lieutenant General. Brother-in-law of King Charles. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War when he served together with his brother Frederick of Baden-Durlach.

Creutz, Lorentz (1615–1676), Governor of Dalecarlia.

Dahlbergh, Erik Jönsson (1625–1703), Lieutenant Quartermaster General. Military engineer and fortification officer with experience from the Thirty Years' War. Ennobled as Dahlbergh in 1660.

Danckwardt-Lillieström, Claes (1613–1681), Major General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who rose from the ranks and commandant of Danziger Haupt.

De la Gardie, Jacob Casimir (1629–1658), Lieutenant General, from 1658 General of Infantry. Brother-in-law of King Charles and the son of the first governor of Swedish Livonia. Veteran of French service from 1646 including, in 1648, under Louis, Prince of Condé.

De la Gardie, Magnus Gabriel (1622–1686), Lieutenant General. A brother-in-law of King Charles, he served as Governor-General of Livonia. Brother of Jacob Casimir De la Gardie.

Douglas, Robert (1611–1662), Count. General of Cavalry, from 1656 Field Marshal Lieutenant, and from 1657 Field Marshal. Scottish veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had distinguished himself on numerous occasions on the Continent, including in the battles of Lützen 1632, Wittstock 1636, and Jankow 1645.

Fersen, Fabian von (1626–1677), Colonel and, from 1658, Major General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Fersen, Otto Wilhelm von (1623–1703), Lieutenant Colonel of the Life Guard and, from 1657, Colonel. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Forbus, Arvid (1598–1665), Major General, in 1658 promoted to General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had risen from the ranks.

Frederick of Baden-Durlach (1617–1677), Margrave and General of Cavalry. Elder brother of Charles Magnus of Baden-Durlach and brother-in-law of King Charles. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War, during which he first served Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and then entered into Swedish service.

Siöhielm (Gerritsen), Henrik (d. 1668), Admiral and commander of the Gothenburg Squadron. Naturalised Swede of Dutch origin born Hendrik Gerritsen (Gerdtsson), ennobled Siöhielm in 1658. Went into Swedish service in 1644 as Admiral Lieutenant of the Dutch auxiliary fleet.

Helmfelt, Simon Grundel (1617–1677), Colonel, from 1655 Major General, and from 1658 Lieutenant General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War with particular expertise in fortifications and artillery technology, from 1656 he served as Governor of Riga and from 1659 as Governor General of Ingria.

Horn, Bengt Claesson, af Åminne (1623–1678), Colonel. Commander of the Queen's Life Regiment of Foot 1655, Major General of Infantry and Governor General of Estonia from 1656 to 1659.

Horn, Christer Claesson, af Åminne (1622–1692), Major General. Governor General of Ingria from 1657 to 1659. Brother of Bengt Horn.

Horn, Gustav, af Björneborg (1592–1657), Grand Marshal of the Realm. Renowned but aged veteran and field marshal of the Thirty Years' War.

Horn, Gustav Evertsson, af Marienborg (1614–1666), Lieutenant General of Cavalry and Governor General of Ingria and Kexholm County.

Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had fought in the battle of Jankow 1645. In 1657 promoted to General of Cavalry and commander of the army in Finland and Kexholm County. Horn was the nephew of the renowned Grand Marshal Gustav Horn.

Horn, Henrik Henriksson, af Marienborg (1618–1693), Major General of Cavalry. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War, commander of the Tavastehus Cavalry Regiment which fought in Poland, in 1656 or 1657 promoted to Lieutenant General. Cousin of Gustav Evertsson Horn.

Kagg, Lars (1595–1661), Field Marshal. Veteran of the 1611 Kalmar War against Denmark, campaigns in Muscovy, service for Maurice of Nassau and Frederick V of Bohemia, and most Swedish campaigns during the Thirty Years' War.

Königsmarck, Conrad Christoph von (1634–1673), Colonel. Son of the famous Field Marshal Hans Christoph von Königsmarck of Thirty Years' War fame.

Königsmarck, Hans Christoph von (1605–1663), Field Marshal. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War from Brandenburg in Swedish service who had distinguished himself on numerous occasions, including in the conquest of Prague Castle 1648.

Kruse, Erik (1617–1665), Colonel, in 1656 Major General of Cavalry, and in 1659 Lieutenant General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War and sometime deputy commander of the army in Finland.

Lillie, Axel (1603–1662), Field Marshal. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who early had lost a leg in the service of the Crown.

Linde, Lorenz von der (1610–1670), General of Infantry, from 1658 Field Marshal Lieutenant. Bon vivant, rake, and veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Löwe, Friedrich 'Fritz' (d. 1669), Major General of Cavalry, in 1657 promoted to Lieutenant General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who entered Swedish service as a common cavalryman, suffered wounds on 19 occasions, but never learnt Swedish or to read orders written in Swedish. Naturalised into the Swedish nobility in 1649, his children changed the name to von Löwen.

Mardefelt, Conrad (*c.* 1610–1688), Major General and commandant in Wismar. Noted fortification officer who joined the Swedish army in Prussia in 1629 and eventually became the mentor of Erik Dahlbergh.

Mortaigne, Barthold de (d. 1690), Lieutenant Colonel. A Life Guard officer of Dutch origin who had fought in Swedish service in the Commonwealth.

Oxenstierna, Bengt (1623–1702). Governor General of Swedish-held Poland. Son of Grand Admiral of the Realm Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna.

Oxenstierna, Gustav (1626–1693), Colonel, from 1657 Major General. Brother of Bengt Oxenstierna. Commander of the Swedish defences in the provinces of Värmland and Dal.

Oxenstierna, Johan (*c.* 1615–1664), Colonel. Governor of Västernorrland County which included the provinces of Jämtland and Härjedalen. Brother of Bengt and Gustav Oxenstierna.

Philip Florinus of Sulzbach (1630–1703; also known as Philipp of Pfalz-Sulzbach), Count Palatine and Major General of Cavalry. In 1658 promoted to General of Cavalry and, in 1659, Field Marshal. A relative of King Charles, he began his military career in the Duchy of Lorraine but in 1655 went into Swedish service with an enlisted regiment.

Pistolhielm, Erik Persson (d. 1669), Major, from 1657 Lieutenant Colonel, and from late 1658 Colonel of the Viborg Cavalry Regiment.

Ribbing, Per (1606–1664), Colonel. Governor of Gothenburg. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Schönleben, Johan Benedikt von (1613–1706), Colonel. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Silfverlood, Olof Andersson (*c.* 1584–1676), Lieutenant Colonel, promoted to Colonel after the 1657 battle of Hjärtum. A veteran of many wars and a legendary soldier.

Specht, Tönnes Adriansson (fl. 1657–1658), Navy Major. Naturalised Swede of Dutch origin.

Sperling, Gustav (1630–1660), Navy Major, promoted to Admiral Lieutenant in March 1660.

Stake, Harald (1598–1677), Major General of Cavalry. A veteran of Dutch service as well as the Thirty Years' War who once saved the life of King Gustavus Adolphus, he was a legendary soldier who also fought in the previous war against Denmark and Norway.

Stenbock, Erik (1612–1659), Major General. Governor of Halland and National Master of Ordnance. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had commanded the Life Guard in the battle of Lützen 1632.

Stenbock, Gustav Otto (1614–1685), Field Marshal from 1656. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had distinguished himself in many battles including Nördlingen 1634, Wittstock 1636, and the second battle of Breitenfeld 1642 and before his promotion to Field Marshal served as National Master of Ordnance. Younger brother of Erik Stenbock.

Strussflycht, Daniel Jönsson (1607–1672), Admiral Lieutenant, promoted to Admiral in 1659. Went to sea as a young man and rose through the ranks.

Tott, Claes (1630–1674), Major General, in 1658 promoted to Lieutenant General. Fought in the Commonwealth but also served as sometime diplomat in Paris.

Uggla, Claes Johansson (1614–1676), Navy Major, in 1658 promoted to Admiral. Experienced naval officer who had fought in the previous war against Denmark; he was also a veteran of the Thirty Years' War, having participated in the 1648 siege of Prague, and served as a Life Guard officer in 1655–1656.

Volckmar, Joachim von (1606–1662; also known as Volckmann), Major General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had served in the Old Blue Regiment. Field Marshal Wrangel's deputy in Bremen–Verden.

Waldeck-Landau, Johann von (1623–1668; formal title Graf zu Waldeck und Pyrmont), Count. Colonel, from 1659 Major General of Cavalry. Veteran of King Charles's war in the Commonwealth including the 1656 battle of Warsaw.

Waldeck-Eisenberg, Georg Friedrich von (1620–1692; formal title Graf zu Waldeck und Pyrmont), Count. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War in Dutch service. Lieutenant General and commander of Brandenburg's army in Prussia until 1655. Dismissed in 1658, he went into Swedish service and fought for King Charles in Denmark as General of Cavalry. In September 1659, King Charles sent him to Germany for secret diplomatic negotiations.

Weiher, Adam von (1613–1676), Major General. Pomeranian veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Wrangel, Carl Gustav, af Salmis (1613–1676), Field Marshal and from 21 December 1657 simultaneously Grand Admiral of the Realm. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who in 1646–1648 held overall command over Swedish military forces in Germany.

Wrangel, Gustav, af Adinal (1630–1688), Admiral Lieutenant.

Würtz, Paul (1612–1676), Major General, from 1658 Lieutenant General. Commandant of first Stade, then, following its conquest in 1655, Cracow, and finally Stettin. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Denmark

Ahlefeldt, Claus (1614–1674), Major General, in 1658 promoted to Lieutenant General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War, when he served in Wallenstein's Imperial army, and the previous war with Sweden.

Ahlefeldt, Ditlev (1617–1686), Colonel. Veteran of the previous war with Sweden who also served as diplomat to Brandenburg and the Commonwealth.

Ahlefeldt, Hans (1624–1694), Colonel, promoted to Major General in 1658, and in 1659, Lieutenant General. Veteran of Imperial, Danish, French, and Swedish service in the Thirty Years' War.

Bielke, Henrik (1615–1683), Admiral and commander of the Danish navy. Norwegian veteran of Dutch service and, in Norway, the previous war with Sweden.

Bielke, Jørgen (1621–1696), General Military Commissioner and commander of northern Norway, in 1658 appointed Lieutenant General and overall commander in Norway. Younger brother of Henrik Bielke. Veteran of French and Imperial service and the previous war with Sweden.

Bille, Anders (1600–1657), Grand Marshal of the Realm. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War and the subsequent war against Sweden.

Bredal, Peder Jensen (d. 1658), Captain, in 1658 promoted to Vice Admiral. Experienced sailor of Norwegian origin, who appears to have risen from the ranks.

Buchwald, Friedrich von (1605–1676), Major General. A Holstein veteran of Saxon, Swedish (before 1638), and Danish (1638–1645, 1657) service.

Eberstein, Ernst Albrecht von (1605–1676), Field Marshal. German veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had fought on every side, including in Imperial and Swedish service.

Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp (1597–1659), Duke of Schleswig and Holstein at Gottorp (commonly abbreviated Holstein-Gottorp). Head of a cadet branch of the royal Danish House of Oldenburg, father-in-law of King Charles of Sweden, and for these reasons viewed with considerable suspicion by King Frederick of Denmark.

Friis, Christian (1617–1657), Colonel and National Master of Ordnance. Cavalry captain in the 1643–1645 war against Sweden followed by French service under Turenne.

Gedde, Ove (1594–1660), Grand Admiral of the Realm. Soldier, sailor, and industrialist who in 1620 established a Danish colony in Tranquebar (modern-day Tharangambadi), India.

Gersdorff, Joachim (1611–1661), Steward of the Realm and the senior member of the Council of the Realm.

Gyldenløve, Ulrich Christian (1630–1658), Lieutenant General. Illegitimate son of Danish King Christian IV.

Gyldenløve, Ulrich Frederick (1638–1704), Colonel. Illegitimate son of Danish King Frederick.

Helt, Nicolai (d. 1666), Vice Admiral.

Henderson, John (fl. 1625–1658), Major General. Veteran of Danish, Swedish, Imperial, and Commonwealth service who possibly rose from the rank of common soldier in the Danish army, fought for the Swedes in the 1632 battle of Lützen, was a Royalist commander in the English Civil Wars, and fought for the Poles in the 1656 battle of Warsaw.

Huitfeldt, Tønne (1625–1677), Lieutenant Colonel, promoted to Colonel in 1659. A Norwegian with some experience from the previous war with Sweden.

Juel, Niels (1629–1697), Vice-Admiral, on 30 July 1658 promoted to Admiral. Veteran of Dutch service.

Koningh, Peter Jansen de (1631–1691), Captain. Dutch naval officer in Danish service.

Krabbe, Iver Tagessøn (1602–1666), Major General. Scanian veteran of the previous war against Sweden and commander of southern Norway until the Treaty of Roskilde.

Löwenclau *genannt* Hadersleben, Jens von (1602–1684), Major General. Jutland soldier of fortune and veteran of, among others, Danish and Swedish service during the Thirty Years' War who, unusually even for this period, at the end of the war seems to have had claims for money owed on both the Danish and Swedish Crown.

Lübbe, Eckerich Johann (fl. 1630–1657), Colonel, from 1657 Major General. From Bremen, over which he was appointed commandant after the Danish conquest. Served King Frederick already when he was Prince Archbishop.

Lützen, Peter (fl. 1654–1667), 'Admiral'. Experienced ship's master who among other journeys had sailed the ***Neptune*** of Copenhagen to St Kitts and Nevis in 1654–1655.

Rantzau, Hans (1599–1674), Major General. An educated man from Holstein who in his youth studied abroad and also visited much of the Ottoman Empire, he later entered into Spanish service.

Rodsten, Marquor (1625–1681), Navy Captain. Jutland noble who after participation in the previous war with Sweden was in Dutch service.

Schack, Hans (1609–1676), Lieutenant General, in 1659 promoted to Field Marshal. A Schleswig veteran of the Thirty Years' War who after a moment in the Danish army had been in Swedish service from 1630 to 1635 followed by French service until 1651.

Trolle, Nils (1599–1667), Governor of Norway.

Ulfeldt, Ebbe Christoffersen (1617–1682). A Scanian noble in Imperial and Spanish service during the Thirty Years' War who later formed the first Scanian free-shooter units, he left Denmark in 1652 because of King Frederick's displeasure with him and others.

Ulfeldt, Knud Christoffersen (1609–1657), Major General and General Military Commissioner. Elder brother of Ebbe Ulfeldt.

Urup, Axel (1601–1671), General. Military engineer with some experience from the Thirty Years' War.

The Netherlands

Killigrew, Sir William (d. 1665), Colonel. Cornish soldier of fortune who was knighted in foreign service.

Puchler, Eustachius (d. 1661), Colonel, in 1659 promoted to Colonel General of the Danish army. Veteran since at least 1621, when he was promoted to Captain. His name was written Püchler in Danish archive documents which secondary sources, even contemporary ones, often misread Piichler or Pichler.

Ruyter, Michiel Adriaenszoon de (1607–1676), Vice Admiral. A sailor and sometime soldier who went to sea as a boy and rose from the ranks, one of the most experienced Dutch naval officers.

Imperial Army

Hatzfeldt, Melchior von (1593–1658), Field Marshal General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War during which he repeatedly fought Swedish armies.

Montecuccoli, Raimondo (1609–1680), Field Marshal Lieutenant and from 1658, Field Marshal. Italian veteran of the Thirty Years' War who, while then in Swedish captivity, wrote an influential treatise on the art of war.

Souches, Jean-Louis Raduit de (1608–1682), General of Cavalry and, from 1658, Overall Master of Ordnance ***(Generalfeldzeugmeister)***. French Huguenot veteran of the Thirty Years' War who after deserting from Swedish service for challenging a superior officer to a duel, when duels were illegal, went into Imperial service.

Sporck, Johann von (1600–1679), General of Cavalry. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who rose in the ranks from either common cavalryman or drummer in the Bavarian army.

Brandenburg

Derfflinger, Georg von (1606–1695), Major General, in 1657 Lieutenant General. Austrian veteran of the Thirty Years' War in Swedish service.

Goltz, Joachim Rüdiger von der (1620–1688), Major General. Prussian veteran of Imperial service in the Thirty Years' War, followed by French service until he entered into the service of Brandenburg in 1654 with the rank of colonel.

Kannenberg, Christoph von (1615–1673), Major General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who rose in the ranks from common cavalryman in Swedish service.

Sparr, Otto Christoph von (1599 or 1605–1668), General, from 1657 Field Marshal General. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War in Imperial service who from 1651 served as Overall Master of Ordnance and from 1655 was overall commander of all Brandenburg-Prussian troops.

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

Czarniecki, Stefan (*c.* 1599–1665), Colonel. Castellan of Kiev from 1655. Veteran of numerous wars including against Gustavus Adolphus's Swedes in Prussia, Muscovites, Ottoman Turks, Tatars, cossacks, and in Imperial service in the Thirty Years' War.

Dönhoff, Heinrich (*c.* 1585–1659; Polish: Henryk Denhoff), Colonel. Prussian noble who in 1626–1629 fought in the Commonwealth army against Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, in 1633–1634 commanded a Commonwealth German cavalry regiment in the Smolensk War against Muscovy, later fought cossack rebels and Crimean Tatars.

Getkant, Fryderyk or Friedrich (1600–1666; Lithuanian: Frydrichas Gedkantas), Lieutenant Colonel. Experienced military cartographer, artilleryman, and fortification officer who served as deputy head of the Crown artillery.

Gosiewski, Wincenty Aleksander Korwin (*c.* 1620–1662), Lithuanian Field Hetman. Formerly General of Artillery of Lithuania.

Grodzicki, Krzysztof (d. 1659), Crown General of Artillery since 1653. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War who fought Gustavus Adolphus's Swedes in Prussia, studied in the Dutch Republic, served in the Imperial army under Wallenstein, and in the 1640s fought cossacks and Tatars.

Kettler, Jacob (1610–1682), Duke of Courland and brother-in-law of Frederick William of Brandenburg. Veteran of the Smolensk War with Muscovy and efficient entrepreneur, with colonies established in West Africa and Tobago.

Komorowski, Samuel Aleksander (d. 1659), Colonel. Lithuanian veteran of the Smolensk War against Muscovy and combat against cossacks.

Koniecpolski, Aleksander (1620–1659), Prince and Colonel. Voivode of Sandomierz and Grand Standard-bearer of the Crown, a court rank. Son of Stanisław Koniecpolski who fought Gustavus Adolphus.

Lubomirski, Jerzy Sebastian (1616–1667), noble and magnate. Crown Field Hetman from 1657 to 1664.

Pac, Michał Kazimierz (1624–1682), noble and magnate.

Połubiński, Aleksander Hilary (1626–1679), Lithuanian Field Scribe and hussar commander.

Potocki, Andrzej (1618–1663), noble and magnate. Crown Equerry, a court rank, from 1655, Voivode of Bratslav from 1662 to 1663.

Potocki, Andrzej (*c.* 1630–1691), noble and magnate. Son of Stanisław 'Rewera' Potocki.

Potocki, Stanisław 'Rewera' (1589–1667), Crown Grand Hetman. Veteran of wars with Muscovy, Sweden, and Ukrainian cossacks. He acquired the nickname 'Rewera' because he so often included the Latin words *re vera* ('in fact') in his speeches.

Radziwiłł, Bogusław (1620–1669; Lithuanian: Boguslavas Radvila), Prince. Veteran of the Thirty Years' War, in Swedish service under Carl Gustav Wrangel from 1637, followed by Dutch service from 1642.

Sapieha, Jan Fryderyk (1618–1664; Lithuanian: Jonas Frederikas Sapiega), noble and magnate. Crown Field Scribe. Veteran of the French army, in which he fought under Louis, Duke d'Enghien, later Prince of Condé, and the wars against Ukrainian cossacks and Tatars.

Sapieha, Paweł Jan (1609–1665; Lithuanian: Povilas Jonas Sapiega), Lithuanian Grand Hetman. Veteran of the Smolensk War against Muscovy and wars with Ukrainian cossacks.

Muscovy

Baryatinskiy, Yuriy Nikitich (*c.* 1610–1685), Prince and, from 1659, Commandant of Kiev.

Buturlin, Andrey Vasil'yevich (d. 1676), Boyar. Commanded a corps in the Ukraine from 1654 onwards. Commandant of Kiev from 1656 to 1658, Division Commander in the Ukraine in 1659, and Commandant of Pereyaslav from 1660 to 1661.

Cherkasskiy, Yakov Kudenetovich (d. 1666), Prince and Commander of Tsar Alexis's Great Division, thereby the Tsar's deputy commander. Member of a Kabardian princely family from the Caucasus, known as Uruskan Murza before his baptism.

Choglokov, Vasiliy Aleksandrovich (d. 1667), Boyar. Voivode of Olonets from 1657. An experienced officer who from the end of the Time of Troubles and the 1613 accession of Michael Romanov served in various locations including Siberia and the Arctic north, in 1646/1647 also fought Tatar raiders, and in 1656 served as a diplomat during the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Wilno.

Dolgorukov, Yuriy Alekseyevich (*c.* 1610–1682), Prince, Division Commander of the Bryansk army, and then Army Commander.

Khovanskiy, Ivan Andreyevich (d. 1682), Prince, Voivode of Pskov, and, from 1659, Commander of the Novgorod Army.

Kosagov, Grigoriy Ivanovich (d. 1701). Noted expert on the small war and commander of dragoons, Don cossacks, and Kalmyks.

Kurakin, Fyodor Fyodorovich (d. 1684), Prince, Commander of the Ryazan army.

Kurakin, Grigoriy Semyonovich (fl. 1629–*c.* 1682), Prince, from 1657 to 1659 Commander of the Novgorod Army.

Ladyzhenskiy, Fyodor Abrosimovich (d. 1676), Boyar. Voivode of Lava from 1658.

Ordin-Nashchokin, Afanasiy Lavrent'yevich (1605–1680), Boyar and diplomat.

Potyomkin, Aleksandr Semyonovich (fl. 1656–1657), Voivode of Lava from 1657.

Potyomkin, Pyotr Ivanovich (1617–1700), Voivode of Lava until 1657. Veteran of the war in the Ukraine. Distant relative of Aleksandr Potyomkin.

Pozharskiy, Semyon Romanovich (*c.* 1611–1659), Prince and Division Commander of the Ryazan army.

Romodanovskiy, Grigoriy Grigor'yevich (d. 1682), Prince and, from 1658, Commander of the Belgorod Army.

Shchetinin, Mikhail Ivanovich (fl. 1640–1658), Prince. Commandant of Pskov from 1656 to 1658 and of Dorpat in 1658.

Sheremetyev, Matvey Vasil'yevich (1629–1657), Boyar and Commander of the Pskov army, son of Vasiliy Petrovich Sheremetyev.

Sheremetyev, Vasiliy Borisovich (1622–1682), Boyar and Commander of the Belgorod Army in the Ukraine from 1654 and, from 1658 to 1659, Commandant of Kiev.

Solntsev, Vasiliy Andreyevich (fl. 1657), Prince. Corps Commander of the Novgorod Army.

Trubetskoy, Aleksey Nikitich (1600–1680), Prince and Commander of the Bryansk army, followed by, from 1656, the Pskov army and, from 1659, the army in the Ukraine.

Cossack Ukraine

Barabash, Yakov Fyodorovich (d. 1658), Ataman of the Zaporozhian Host.

Bespalyy, Ivan Fyodorovich (fl. 1619–1662), Ruthenian noble, Colonel of the Uman' Regiment, and Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host from 1658 to 1659.

Bogun, Ivan (*c.* 1618–1664; name before joining the cossacks unknown, although his patronym sometimes given as Fyodorovich), Colonel of the Kal'nik, Pavolotsk, and Chigirin Regiments and Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host from 1663 to 1664. Key leader of the pro-Swedish party among the cossacks.

Bryukhovetskiy, Ivan Martynovich (1623–1668), Ataman of the Zaporozhian Host, Hetman of Left-bank Ukraine from 1663, ennobled as Boyar in Muscovy in 1664, and wedded to the daughter of Prince Dmitriy Alekseyevich Dolgorukov in 1665.

Doroshenko, Pyotr Dorofeyevich (1627–1698), Ruthenian noble and Hetman of Right-bank Ukraine from 1665.

Nechay, Ivan Nechayev (fl. 1655–1669), Ruthenian noble, son-in-law of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and Colonel of the Belarus cossack host.

Nemirich, Yuriy Stefanovich (1612–1659; also known as Georg or Jerzy Niemirycz), Ruthenian noble and Ivan Vygovskiy's chancellor. First swearing allegiance to the Swedish Crown, for whom he enlisted a cossack-style cavalry unit and assisted with the preparatory work for the Treaty of Radnot; in 1657 he switched side to the cossack Hetmanate and converted to Orthodox Christianity. Key leader of the pro-Swedish party among the cossacks, until he in May 1659 again swore fealty to King John Casimir.

Pushkar', Martyn Ivanovich (1598–1658), Colonel of the Poltava Regiment.

Serko, Ivan Dmitriyevich (*c.* 1610–1680), Colonel of the Kal'nik Regiment and Ataman of the Zaporozhian Host.

Silich, Anikey Korchak (d. 1663), Ruthenian noble and Colonel of the Chernigov Regiment.

Somko, Yakov Semyonovich (d. 1663), Colonel of the Pereyaslav Regiment and Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host from 1661 to 1663.

Teterya, Pavel Ivanovich (1620–1670; earlier known as Paweł Morzkowski), Ruthenian noble, Colonel of the Pereyaslav Regiment, and Hetman of Right-bank Ukraine from 1663 to 1665.

Tsetsyura, Timofey Yermolovich (d. 1671), Colonel of the Pereyaslav Regiment and Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host in 1660.

Vygovskiy, Danilo Yevstaf'yevich (d. 1659), Ruthenian noble, brother of Ivan Vygovskiy, and sometime Colonel of the Bykhov Regiment.

Vygovskiy, Ivan Yevstaf'yevich (*c.* 1608–1664), Ruthenian noble, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy's chancellor, and Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and Cossack Ukraine from 1657 to 1659.

Vygovskiy, Konstantin Yevstaf'yevich (fl. 1658), Ruthenian noble, brother of Ivan Vygovskiy and Colonel of the Turov-Pinsk Regiment.

Zolotarenko, Vasiliy Nikiforovich (d. 1663), Colonel of the Nezhin Regiment from 1655 to 1656.

Transylvania

Bethlen, János (1613–1678). Chancellor of Transylvania and Commandant of Cracow, after Transylvania assumed formal control of the city.

Khanate of the Crimea

Geray, Ahmad (fl. 1659), Prince. Mehmed Khan's eldest son.

Geray, Murad (1627–1696), Nureddin Sultan 1659–1663. From another line of the Geray family, appointed Khan in 1678.

Geray, Selim (1631–1704), Prince. Appointed Khan in 1684.

Qaplan, Murza (fl. 1658). Noble and corps commander.

Introduction

The present book describes and analyses the two devastating wars between Sweden and Denmark–Norway and its various allies, most importantly the Netherlands, during the reign of Swedish King Charles X Gustavus, an experienced former general from the Thirty Years' War and commander of the ongoing war in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth popularly known as the Swedish Deluge. This third volume also continues and concludes the story of the devastating wars in the east between Sweden, the Commonwealth, Brandenburg-Prussia, Muscovy, Transylvania, Cossack Ukraine, the Tatar Khanate of the Crimea, and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. In addition, the book explains the continued development of the Swedish Army and Navy after the Thirty Years' War, and details the military systems of Denmark and Norway.

The Dano-Swedish War of 1657–1658 was initiated by King Frederick III of Denmark and Norway. Perceiving what he thought was an opportune moment to recover territories lost in 1645, he attacked Sweden while the Swedish King was fighting two simultaneous wars in the east, against the Commonwealth, and Muscovy. Fighting also took place on the border between Sweden and Norway. Unfortunately for King Frederick, the outbreak of war with Denmark prompted King Charles to withdraw from his campaign in Poland. Based on experiences from the Thirty Years' War, Charles led an invasion army to Denmark from Sweden's possessions in Germany. After entering Jutland from the south, the Swedish army in a surprise winter campaign marched across the frozen Great Belt and Little Belt straits onto the Danish island of Zealand, threatening the capital of Copenhagen. The rapid Swedish attack took the Danes by surprise, and Denmark surrendered. The Dano-Swedish War of 1658–1660 was a continuation of the previous war. This time, Charles thought that the time was ripe to subjugate Denmark under the Swedish crown. However, Denmark received support from the Netherlands, the Empire, Brandenburg, and Poland. In early 1660, Charles fell ill and died, which paved the way for, first, the Treaty of Oliva which concluded the war between Sweden and the Commonwealth, the Habsburgs, and Brandenburg and then, soon afterwards, the Treaty of Copenhagen, which restored peace between Denmark and Sweden and for the first time established a lasting border between the two countries.

At the time of the war, some of the belligerent powers followed different calendars. The Gregorian calendar, named after the sixteenth-century Pope Gregory XIII who introduced it, had been developed as a correction to an observed error in the old Julian calendar. The visible result of the correction was that the date was advanced 10 days; that is, 4 October 1582 was followed by 15 October 1582. The Holy Roman Empire changed calendar on this date, as did most Catholic nations. However, many Protestant countries initially objected to adopting a Catholic innovation. The Duchy of Prussia was the first Protestant nation to adopt the Gregorian calendar. However, neither Brandenburg nor Denmark adopted the new calendar until 1700, while Sweden delayed yet longer. Muscovy's successor Russia delayed further still, until 1918. Most of the belligerents in the war accordingly used the Julian calendar, which for this reason differed from the one used in Catholic nations and at present. Old Style (O.S.) and New Style (N.S.) are terms commonly used with dates to indicate that the calendar convention used at the time described is different from that in use at present. Unless noted otherwise, the dates given here will be N.S.

The different calendars caused confusion already in seventeenth-century Europe, and the situation frequently causes problems for historians. Swedish, Danish, and Muscovite archival documents relating to the war commonly use the O.S. calendar, and most Swedish-language works describing the war still follow this style. However, the Swedish field chancellery occasionally used N.S. dates while in Poland, so it is not always possible to be certain about the style employed in a given document. Meanwhile, Commonwealth documents and modern Polish-language histories naturally follow the N.S. calendar. I have yet to see a work on the Deluge without the occasional wrongly calculated date, and no doubt there will be mistakes in the present volume, too.

As for spelling of seventeenth-century European names, the linguistic, ethnic, and regional diversity then as well as now does not allow for a single, fully consistent system. State borders, languages, and name forms have changed, often more than once. This holds particularly true for eastern Europe. Major parts of the region were in the seventeenth-century dominated by speakers of non-Slavic languages, including Lithuanian, Tatar, and German. The written forms of, say, modern-day Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian have diverged from one another, and at present some take the choice of one over the other as acceptance of modern-day claims of territory or cultural 'ownership'. No such suggestion is implied in this work. Instead, I have, whenever possible, used the traditional English versions of names (which commonly were based on Russian name-forms), or when it seems appropriate, the German name-forms typically employed in contemporary works of history. For obvious reasons, German geographical names were particularly common in Prussia but also in north-western Poland. Thus, we have Copenhagen, not København, Warsaw, not Warszawa; Kiev, not Kyiv; Moscow, not Moskva; Åbo, not Turku; Danzig, not Gdańsk; Posen, not Poznań; Bratslav, not Bracław; Chernigov, not Chernihiv or Czernihów; and the Dnieper, not the Dnipro or Dnyapro.

An attempt has been made to include, in addition to English-language translations, the original names in Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, Polish, Lithuanian, Russian, Tatar, Hungarian, Finnish, and German, where it seemed important to do so for reasons of clarity. However, since neither language had a codified system of spelling at the time, the forms used are not necessarily those used today. Still, anybody with a working knowledge of the language should be able to identify the word forms employed. The same goes for personal names, which were then spelled in a variety of ways. Moreover, names and titles were long and cumbersome, and we often do not know which of several given names an individual preferred.

Prologue: Two Kings and an Admiral

For details on the other contenders in the struggle as well as more details on Swedish King Charles, see Volume 1.

Charles X Gustavus, King of Sweden

Charles X Gustavus (1622–1660; r. 1654–1660) was the son of John Casimir, Count Palatine of Zweibrücken-Kleeburg in Germany, and Catherine, daughter of Swedish King Charles IX of the House of Vasa. Charles Gustavus was born in Sweden, where he also grew up. He was highly educated. Growing up speaking German with his parents, he also knew Swedish, French, Latin, and some Italian. King Charles was a Lutheran, since this was the requirement for Swedish kingship. There is nothing to suggest that he was overly pious. King Charles first showed his ability as a soldier and general in the Thirty Years' War.

When Queen Christina abdicated in June 1654, Charles Gustavus became King in her stead. He married Hedwig Eleonora of Holstein-Gottorp (1636–1715) soon after his coronation in 1654, and, although as was customary among royal families theirs was an arranged union, there is every reason to believe that their marriage was a happy one. King Charles liked to have Hedwig Eleonora at his side, even while on campaign. Soon after giving birth to their son, the future King Charles XI, Hedwig Eleonora travelled to the Swedish field army in Poland. In 1658 she also followed King Charles to the war in Denmark, where the two for a while stayed in Kronborg Castle in Helsingør, already immortalised by Shakespeare as Elsinore. Meanwhile, their young son remained in Sweden, where he was kept safe during the wars.

King Charles distrusted Denmark, which he regarded as a threat not only to Sweden but also to the renewed sense of co-operation in Europe brought along by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. King Charles never neglected the Danish threat, and he had considered the issue before going to war in the east. Before he became King, he had fought in Denmark under Field Marshal Lennart Torstensson. In a letter, he then expressed his hope that the war would help 'weed out the Danish nation, this plague on universal and communal harmony' (*pour exstirper ceste nation Danoise, peste d'une*



Gustavus, 1652 or 1653 (Sébastien Bourdon)

tranquillité universelle et commune).[1] While Charles wrote about the threat posed by the Danish state, we can assume that his views also reflected the traditional enmity between Danes and Swedes. The enmity was also perhaps reflected in the choice of words. When discussing Danish kings, Swedes often referred to them as Jutes, not Danes. It was relevant that his Queen came from the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, which was located south of Jutland and strived to acquire full sovereignty. Her father, Duke Frederick (1597–1659), for this reason usually suffered from poor relations with the royal Danish House of Oldenburg.

King Charles was ambitious, thrived at war, and was physically brave. He was close to his men, both officers and common soldiers, who probably respected that the King shared the perils of war with them. As a commander, King Charles was an audacious tactician who had no match among his opponents. He was a competent but not brilliant strategist, meticulous in planning his campaigns but also ready to take chances when a good opportunity arose. King Charles did not neglect diplomacy. He sent envoys to all potential allies and adversaries, including the Khan of the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire. King Charles habitually kept all options open as long as he could, before committing himself to a particular course of action, so that he could make full use of opportunities. What others, then and later, may have interpreted as the instinct of a gambler was rather the result of King Charles's willingness to use every opportunity available to him. This characteristic made King Charles keep his long-term plans to himself, which incidentally makes it difficult for later historians to distinguish between what he regarded as his primary objectives and those which he merely took advantage of in an opportunistic manner.

However, when the Danish wars began, King Charles had already been at war in the Commonwealth for two years. He had spent a longer time than this at the front in the Thirty Years' War, but this time, he was in overall command, not only of the field army but of all operations on all fronts. Following the death in autumn 1656 of Lord High Chancellor Erik Oxenstierna, King Charles in addition to military command also had to handle all important foreign policy issues. Finally, he had to consider the domestic political situation of his kingdom, including relations with the Estates and Parliament. The pressure must have been tremendous. When in late August 1656 faced with war with Muscovy as well as the Commonwealth, and with the knowledge that

---

[1] Charles to Axel Oxenstierna, 31 December 1643; cited in Hilding Rosengren, *Karl X Gustaf före tronbestigningen: Pfalzgrefven intill tronföljarvalet 1649* (Uppsala University, dissertation: 1913), p.166.

Denmark, too, wanted to go to war with Sweden, King Charles wrote: 'God knows how our things stand. I do not believe that our homeland has been in such a dangerous situation for many years.'[2] Although in public King Charles remained as warlike as ever, there is reason to believe that the constant warfare put its mark on him. Still, he trusted in his and his army's ability to defeat the Danes one more time.

Frederick III, King of Denmark



Frederick III
(Wolfgang Heimbach)

Frederick III (1609–1670; r. 1648–1670), of the royal House of Oldenburg, was born the second son of Christian IV of Denmark and Anne Catherine of Brandenburg. He only became the heir to the throne after the death of his elder brother in 1647.

The King of Denmark was the ruler of several quite different domains. He was King of Denmark, which comprised Jutland and the Danish islands of Zealand, Fyn, and Lolland. Denmark was commonly referred to as the Kingdom. He was also King of Norway, since the Crowns of Denmark and Norway were united in a personal union under one king. In addition, he was the suzerain of Schleswig-Holstein, which extended south of Jutland to the River Elbe in the vicinity of Hamburg. While the King of Denmark personally owned about half of Schleswig-Holstein, much of the rest belonged to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, with whom there was considerable friction. In addition, Holstein was a duchy within the Holy Roman Empire, which gave it the rights and duties of other Imperial domains. In addition, there were several other, formally independent counties and enclaves in the area, all of which depended on the King of Denmark. Schleswig-Holstein and the adjoining enclaves were commonly referred to as the Duchies. Finally, the King of Denmark had also obtained, by inheritance, sovereignty over Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, two German counties west of Bremen and the River Weser. These two possessions were commonly referred to as the Counties.

A traditional problem for Danish kings was the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, which occupied a strategic position south of the Danish heartlands. Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp (or, technically more correct, Duke of Schleswig and Holstein at Gottorp, the residence of the House of Holstein-

---

[2] Torsten Holm, *Översikt över Sveriges krig under 1600-talets senare hälft* (Stockholm: Militärlitteraturföreningen 148, 1927), p.46.



Frederick III, 1656
(Karel von Mander III)

Gottorp, which was a cadet branch of the royal Danish House of Oldenburg) strived to acquire full sovereignty for the Duchy. The Duke was also the father-in-law of King Charles and followed a pro-Swedish policy. In 1657, Duke Frederick entered into a formal alliance with Sweden. Although the Duchy's small military was not a threat to Denmark, its territory could function as a base for a Swedish attack from the south, which made Holstein-Gottorp a threat to King Frederick.

Highly conscious of how once-powerful Denmark had been defeated and overrun by Swedish armies during the Thirty Years' War, King Frederick was eager for a re-match and revenge. Before Denmark's defeat, Frederick had ruled Bremen and Verden as, respectively, Prince Archbishop and Prince Bishop. However, both these territories had since been ceded to Sweden.

The key to the long-time rivalry between the Danish and Swedish kingdoms was the Sound Toll. Whoever controlled the Strait, or Sound, also controlled the customs revenue. Second, both Denmark and Sweden had territories that were separated by sea, including the important Danish possession of Norway and the Swedish possession of Finland, in addition to numerous islands and, for Sweden, overseas territories on the other side of the Baltic Sea. Both thus faced the very real need to maintain a naval power which could safeguard the supply lines between their different territories and possessions. But this naval power also made the two kingdoms a threat to one another.

King Frederick faced dissension at home, in particular vis-à-vis the nobility, many of whom opposed the King's ambition to transform the elective monarchy into absolute and hereditary rule. Because of old quarrels before he rose to the Danish throne, King Frederick did not get along well with Anders Bille (1600–1657), the Grand Marshal of the Realm and overall commander of the Danish army. King Frederick also did not trust his brothers-in-law, in particular Corfitz Ulfeldt (1606–1664) and Hannibal Sehested (1609–1666). Ulfeldt had served as steward of the realm during the two-month-interregnum after the death of Christian IV and the ascension to the throne of Frederick III. Falsely accused of plotting against the King's life and thus fearing for his life, Ulfeldt then left Denmark, ultimately going into Swedish service. Sehested had served as Governor General of Norway, the army of which he had led with some success in the previous war against Sweden. Accused of embezzlement a few years after the ascension of King Frederick, Sehested resigned and went into exile. In many ways, the fate of Ulfeldt and Sehested were typical of the period. Distrusting most of the Danish nobility, which resented his desire for absolute rule, King Frederick preferred to appoint Germans to positions of authority.

While his political life was turbulent, King Frederick enjoyed a seemingly idyllic marriage. In 1643, he married Sophie Amalie of Brunswick-Lüneburg. The couple had several children. Queen Sophie Amalie shared her husband's plans for absolute rule, and the two apparently enjoyed each other's company.



Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam (Jonas Suyderhoef)

Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam, Admiral of the Netherlands

Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam (1610–1665), Banner Lord (*baanderheer*) of Wassenaer and Lord (*heer*) of Obdam, Hensbroek, Spanbroek, Spierdijk, Schoonouwen, Opmeer, Zuidwijk, and Kernhem, was the supreme commander of the Dutch navy. He had been ready to intervene in Sweden's wars already in 1656 when he, as Lieutenant Admiral Jacob Obdam (before he in 1657 acquired his primary title), led a Dutch fleet of 42 warships to Danzig to break the Swedish blockade of the important merchant city.

Obdam was the son of an admiral, but he began military life in the army. A cavalry captain in 1631, he soon rose to the rank of colonel, and received a commendation for fighting the Spanish at the siege of Maastricht in 1632. Later on, Obdam led several diplomatic missions. On such occasions, he got to know Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg. In 1648, Obdam attended, as the official representative of the Netherlands, the baptism at Kleve of Frederick William's eldest son. In 1651, he visited Frederick William at Düsseldorf to discuss a possible military alliance.

Politically, Obdam opposed the House of Orange, perhaps because his family was Catholic and accordingly distrusted the puritan Calvinists who rallied around William of Orange. Moreover, Obdam proposed a strong navy at the expense of the army. In part because of the absence of politically acceptable alternatives and in part because of his own political connections, Obdam in 1654 was appointed supreme commander of the Dutch navy. Although he initially lacked knowledge of ship handling and naval tactics, he learned on the job and eventually became convinced that superiority at sea could best be won by attrition. Henceforth, he aimed for defensive tactics, arguing that the superior Dutch gunners were best used to disable enemy ships by artillery fire from a distance. Obdam argued against aggressive tactics including boarding.

In 1633, Obdam married Agnes van Renesse van der Aa. The couple had three children. Obdam spoke German and Latin but little or no French or English.

1

The Geostrategic Context of the Danish Wars

When Sweden invaded the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1655, Denmark's King Frederick interpreted this as an excellent opportunity to attack Sweden to take revenge for his father's defeat in the Thirty Years' War. He also anticipated more tangible gains. First, he wanted to regain the province of Halland, which Denmark had been forced to surrender with the Treaty of Brömsebro in 1645 which concluded the previous war between Sweden and Denmark. Halland was an important province, but its strategic position also gave Sweden a significantly more secure access to the North Sea than previously. Second, Denmark wanted to acquire the duchies of Bremen and Verden. Third, Denmark wanted to rescind Sweden's exemption from the Danish Sound Toll, another result of the Treaty of Brömsebro. At the time, Sweden had also gained the provinces of Jämtland and Härjedalen from Norway and the Baltic islands of Gotland and Ösel from Denmark. Although less important to King Frederick, we can assume that their loss was not forgotten in Copenhagen. King Frederick may also have expected that a successful war against the arch-enemy Sweden would reinforce royal power over the Council of the Realm and the senior nobility.

Then, the news of the Swedish victory in the 1656 three-day battle at Warsaw reached Copenhagen. King Frederick postponed the attack. Clearly, Sweden remained undefeated.

However, the geostrategic context seemed to favour King Frederick. Although the war in the Commonwealth had mostly gone well for the Swedes, the vast territory did not quite surrender. Moreover, its King, John Casimir, enjoyed the support of Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657; r. 1637–1657) of the Holy Roman Empire, who was willing to intervene militarily. Although presumably in some part due to a wish for revenge for his losses in the Thirty Years' War, the proximate reason was grand strategy. France was again at war with Habsburg Spain, the Empire's key ally. France attempted to persuade Sweden to join the war through an attack on the ancestral Habsburg lands of Austria. France also aimed to draw England into the struggle, which was not difficult. On 23 March 1657 France and the English Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell signed the Treaty of Paris against Habsburg Spain and,


N
DENMARK - NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Baltic Sea
Gulf of Bothnia
POLISH - LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH
DUCAL PRUSSIA
ROYAL PRUSSIA
POMERANIA
MECKLENBURG
BRANDENBURG
DUCHY OF BREMEN
HOLSTEIN-GLÜCKSTADT
HOLSTEIN-GOTTORP
Jutland
Fyn
Zealand
Lolland
Rügen
Öland
Gotland
Dagö
Ösel
Aland
Dalecarlia
Värmland
Jämtland
Härjedalen
Hälsingland
Ångermanland
R. Elbe
R. Oder
R. Vistula
Verden
Bremen
Stade
Glückstadt
Itzehoe
Frederiksstad
Tønning
Rendsburg
Tønder
Aabenraa
Ribe
Kolding
Slesvig
Flensburg
Kiel
Hamburg
Lübeck
Lüneburg
Lauenburg
Schwerin
Wismar
Güstrow
Rostock
Ribnitz
Havelberg
Wittstock
Fehrbellin
Berlin
Demmin
Anklam
Stralsund
Greifswald
Usedom
Schwedt
Gartz
Stettin
Kammin
Kolberg
Svendborg
Odense
Nyborg
Korsør
Nakskov
Nykøbing
Vordingborg
Helsingør
Copenhagen
Roskilde
Malmö
Ystad
Landskrona
Helsingborg
Ängelholm
Båstad
Halmstad
Laholm
Markaryd
Falkenberg
Varberg
Kungsbacka
Gothenburg
Elfsborg
Bohus
Alingsås
Lidköping
Skara
Falköping
Jönköping
Mariestad
Linköping
Norrköping
Söderköping
Västervik
Nyköping
Kalmar
Karlstad
Örebro
Uppsala
Christiania
Magnor
Morast
Eda
Särna
Frösö
Östersund
Trondheim
Mt. Nasa
Hudiksvall
Sundsvall
Umeå
Piteå
Luleå
Lauenburg
Danzig
Konitz
Bromberg
Thorn
Mewe
0
100
200
300
400
500 km

Denmark, Norway, and Sweden


N
SWEDEN
Baltic Sea
Dorpat
Pskov
LIVONIA
Wenden
Pilten
Riga
Goldingen
Kokenhusen
COURLAND
Mitau
Doblen
Bauske
Dünaburg
SEMIGALLIA
R. Dvina
Pol
SAMOGITIA
Kowno
Verkiai 1658
Wilno
Labiau
Tilsit
Königsberg
LITHUANIA
Oliva
DUCAL PRUSSIA
Filipów
Danzig
Elbing
ERMLAND
ROYAL PRUSSIA
Marienburg
Prostki
Konitz
Stuhm
THE COMMONWEALTH
POMERANIA
Minsk
Polonka
Draheim
Graudenz
Strasburg
Stettin
Bromberg
Thorn
R. Oder
Gniezno
R. Vistula
Nowy Dwór
Posen
Warsaw
Brest
GREATER POLAND
Rawa
Sobota
Glogau
Kalisz
Warka
Gołąb
Radom
Lublin
Breslau
Częstochowa
Zamość
Oppeln
Sandomierz
Jaroslaw
R. Oder
Cracow
L'vov
LESSER POLAND
Prague
R. Dniester
R. Danube
Vienna
TRANSYLVANIA
WALLA
0
100
200
300
400
500 km
Tver
Moscow
Vitebsk
Smolensk
R. Don
Shepelevichi 1654
Shklov 1654
RUTHENIA
MUSCOVY
R. Dnieper
Voronezh
Konotop 1659
Belgorod
Kiev
AINE
Korsun
hudnov 1660
Lyuba
Akhmatov 1655
R. Dnieper
Trembovly
Bratslav
ZAPOROZHIA
R. Don
DAVIA
CRIMEAN KHANATE
Black Sea
R. Danube
Bakhchisaray

The Commonwealth


N
Kajaneborg
Brahestad
FINLAND
Sordavala
Nyslott
Olofsborg
KEXHOLM
COUNTY
L. Saimen
Kexholm
L. Ladoga
Olonets
Tavastehus
Villmanstrand
Viborg
Taipale
Rautus
Åbo
Ladoga
Helsingfors
Nyen
Lava
Nöteborg
R. Neva
Gulf of Finland
Kaporie
Jama
INGRIA
Reval
Narva
Ivangorod
Vallisaare
Dagö
ESTONIA
Wask-Narva
Gdov
Kardis
Lais
L. Peipus
Novgorod
Ober-Phalen
Dorpat
Ösel
Pernau
Karkus
LIVONIA
Pechory
Pskov
Walk
MUSCOVY
Wolmar
Adzele
Marienburg
Wenden
Neumünde
Dünamünde
Riga
R. Düna (Dvina)
Kokenhusen
COURLAND
THE COMMONWEALTH
Dünaburg
0
50
100
150
200 km

in extension, the Empire. As a result, the Emperor worked to establish an alliance against its existing and potential enemies. Since Sweden belonged to the latter group and indeed was the chief military threat in the north, the Empire on 30 March 1657 agreed to send 12,000 soldiers and artillery, to be paid by the Commonwealth, to assist King John Casimir. This was more a means to keep the Swedes busy outside the Empire than because of any deep-rooted feelings of solidarity with the King of Poland.

With France and England lining up against the Habsburgs, the latter responded by forming an alliance with the Netherlands, the enemy of their enemy France, and with Denmark, the enemy of their potential enemy Sweden. This was an alliance based on geopolitics, not religion. France was a Catholic country, while Denmark and the Netherlands were Protestant. As a result, the Habsburgs, both in the Empire and Spain, advised Denmark to declare war on Sweden. The Netherlands offered the same advice. The Dutch were suspicious that Swedish power was growing too strong, which would enable Sweden to control the Baltic trade. Surely, Sweden could not simultaneously confront the Commonwealth, Muscovy, Denmark, Norway, an Imperial expeditionary force, and a Dutch fleet?

In response to these developments, France and England on 9 May 1657 concluded a secret treaty with the intention to support Swedish King Charles against Denmark, Poland, and the City of Danzig, the chief mercantile port in the region and virtually autonomous of the Commonwealth, of which it formed part. The treaty text began sensibly. In Article 13, the treaty promised that if Denmark declared war against Sweden, King Louis XIV of France and Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 'promise to employ all possible means to oppose the King of Denmark, disrupt his plans, and to assist and defend the King of Sweden in his, and to assist him also in his enterprise against the city of Danzig and the King of Poland.'[1] It was agreed that France would fund an English expedition to conquer the Strait and the Baltic Sea, a campaign to be carried out with the aid of the King of Sweden. However, then the treaty moved into somewhat surreal territory. It now envisaged that France and England in partnership would occupy a number of towns and strongpoints in the Baltic region and Norway, and that Cromwell would have full right of control over these lands. Sure enough, the secret treaty soon afterwards leaked to the public, and unsurprisingly, caused alarm in several European capitals. King Charles, too, wondered what Cromwell, King Louis, and the latter's chief minister, Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602–1661), were up to in their apparent intent to divide up the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic region.[2]

---

[1] Article 13: 'Et comme le Roi de Dannemarc, selon qu'il le laisse assez apercevoir, commence à se declarer ouvertement contre le Roi de Suède, le menaçant de lui tomber sur les bras avec une Armée, sadite Majesté T. c. & ledit Seiegneur Protecteur promettent d'employer tous les moyens possibles de s'opposer audit Roi de Dannemarc, de rompre ses desseins, & d'assister le Roi de Suède dans les siens & de la deffendre; & de lui aider aussi dans son entreprise contre la Ville de Dantsic & le Roi de Pologne.' J. Du Mont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* 6: 2 (Amsterdam: Brunel, Wetstein, Smith, Waesberge, and Chatelain, 1728), pp.178–9.

One who was not alarmed was King Frederick, who instead decided to act while he still enjoyed the support of two great powers, the Habsburgs and the Netherlands.

---

[2] Cromwell wanted an alliance against the Emperor. He envisaged a situation in which the Swedish army could be used in conjunction with that of France against the Habsburgs in Germany, while he initiated a general war at sea against Habsburg Spain, during which English fleets would attack Habsburg interests in the North Sea, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean – a project linked to Cromwell's Western Design against Spanish interests in the Caribbean. If Cromwell had lived, the war that began as a conflict between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy over the Ukraine might have rekindled the Thirty Years' War and spread to the Americas.

2

The Swedish Military Establishment

While this chapter includes a full description of the Swedish navy, it offers only such details of the army that resulted from new developments that took place during the Danish Wars. For a full description of the organisation, procedures, tactics, and equipment of the army under King Charles, see Volume 1.

Sweden still had the arguably most modern and up-to-date military establishment. The systems and organisations already put in place to raise the Swedish army during the Thirty Years' War remained and continued to function for the duration of King Charles's reign.[1]

The Swedish army remained a well-trained, professional, and very disciplined military force. Swedish soldiers entered battle with the expectation to win, even against superior odds. In part the effect of professionalism, indoctrination, and the memory of previous conquests, the expectation of victory was perhaps even more the product of the strict, even ruthless, discipline enforced within the army. The Articles of War of the late King Gustavus Adolphus regulated Swedish military life. It was forbidden to desert or to run away from battle. It was also forbidden to surrender a bastion or redoubt until one had already endured three attempted storms, there was no hope for help, and the men faced certain death. The punishment for all these crimes, and many others, was death.

Sweden had a fully functioning defence industry, but the country could not produce everything in sufficient quantities. For instance, additional supplies of gunpowder had to be imported from the Netherlands and Lübeck. This was risky, because Lübeck was exposed in case of a Danish offensive on the Continent, and the Netherlands was no longer a friendly power.

---

[1] Michael Fredholm von Essen, *The Lion from the North – The Swedish Army during the Thirty Years War: Volume 1, 1618–1632* (Warwick: Helion, 2020); Michael Fredholm von Essen, *The Lion from the North – The Swedish Army during the Thirty Years War: Volume 2, 1632–1648* (Warwick: Helion, 2020).

In spring 1656, King Charles had mobilised some 84,000 men of all categories. Although well below Swedish military manpower at the end of the Thirty Years' War (which may have exceeded 110,000 men), it was nonetheless a very significant force and the largest ever achieved under King Charles. In the same way as during the Thirty Years' War, most of the fighting strength of the field armies consisted of men enlisted abroad, primarily in Germany but also in the Commonwealth.

However, normal attrition took its toll and in autumn 1656 the unidentified epidemic at the time known as the plague struck, reducing numbers significantly. As commonly happened under such circumstances, depleted enlisted regiments were dissolved and the survivors moved to reinforce other units. Depleted companies of national regiments were merged with those of other national regiments. This means that it becomes more difficult to ascertain actual numbers. It has been estimated that in the summer of 1657, only somewhat more than 22,000 men were deployed in the field against the Commonwealth and Denmark (11,600 in the Commonwealth and 10,800 marching towards Denmark). Yet, the field armies should not be confused with total military manpower. In addition to these soldiers, the Swedish military included at least 16,000 men in German garrisons, over 18,000 in Sweden, over 5,000 in Finland, and some 6,000 in the Navy. In total, despite casualties and losses from plague, by mid 1657 more than 67,000 men remained under arms, although some were too ill for active service.[2] Even after more than two years of warfare in the east, Sweden remained a formidable military power.

Tactical Doctrines

The Swedish model as established during the Thirty Years' War was a combined arms model, in which the infantry and field artillery acted in unison with the cavalry. Even so, the share of cavalry and dragoons grew. Henceforth, it became customary to attach dragoons to the cavalry units in order to provide the latter with supporting firepower that was able to keep up with the speed of movement. Many cavalry regiments included an attached company of dragoons or two. The emphasis on horse did not only derive from the shock capability of the cavalry, but also because of the increasing scarcity of supplies in the theatre of operations. Only horse had the required mobility to cover sufficient distances to find those supplies that remained available. Yet, in full-scale battles, the cavalry horses constituted a limiting factor. Most could not carry on for more than four or five hours, before they needed rest. Moreover, it was not always easy to replace lost horses. The army in the Commonwealth and elsewhere on the Continent often faced shortages in the number of cavalry horses available.

Swedish infantry tactics had changed little since the Thirty Years' War. The Swedish model continued to emphasise the offensive. Pikemen and musketeers remained arrayed in no more than six lines, with the pikemen in the centre. The musketeers were trained to fire in volleys (salvoes), several ranks at a time. Following a volley, the pikemen would charge the enemy. Yet, the share of pikemen in the army fell, and organisation was simplified, for practical reasons but also to accommodate soldiers who were less well trained and disciplined in comparison to previous Swedish armies. Over time, this resulted in an increased focus on infantry firepower. The infantry then became a defensive arm, and it was up to the cavalry to charge the enemy. Infantry might, for instance, disperse caltrops in areas where they wanted to thwart enemy cavalry operations. Dispersing caltrops on the ground took little time. They were particularly effective against horses but would slow down infantry, too. Yet, this reduced the offensive potential of the infantry. Over time, the infantry began to be seen primarily as a base around which the cavalry could operate in set battles. Even so, infantry was always needed to lay siege to towns and fortresses, and to man them afterwards.

---

[2] Michael Fredholm von Essen, *Charles X's War 1: Armies of the Swedish Deluge, 1655–1660* (Warwick: Helion, 2021), p.93.

The Swedish field artillery was characterised by mobility and independence. The regimental cannons retained their importance in the Swedish army. They were deployed in conjunction with the units which they were designated to support, either in front of or between units. Regimental cannons were frequently deployed on the flanks so that they could support their unit with flank fire. Against cavalry, the most commonly employed projectile was the explosive grenade. Against other targets, round shots were employed, so that the shot after landing would continue on its course bouncing through several enemy ranks.

Meanwhile, the Swedish model of siege warfare was already second to one, and continued to develop. One such tactical and technical innovation was the formation of small grenadier units of Swedish musketeers who fired musket grenades from their standard-issue muskets. A musket grenade was an egg-shaped grenade with attached barbs that might attach to buildings to produce a more efficient blast. The musket grenade was fastened to an attached shaft of a diameter equal to the musket's calibre. Since the Swedish army carried standard-issue muskets, this meant that most any musket could be used. The shaft was hollow and loaded with gunpowder. When fired, the musket's regular gunpowder load pushed the grenade out of the barrel at the same time that it also ignited the gunpowder in the shaft. Having burned for the appropriate time, the grenade exploded. This idea derived from King Charles, according to the noted Imperial field marshal and military theorist Raimondo Montecuccoli who fought in the war. Ordnance Lieutenant Colonel Bahus produced 500 such grenades which were delivered from Stade to be used during the storm of Copenhagen in early 1659.[3] Of these grenades, 300 were issued to a unit of 60 men from the Drabant Guard under Lieutenant Colonel Barthold de

---

[3] Josef Alm, *Eldhandvapen 1: Från deras tidigaste förekomst till slaglåsets allmänna införande* (Stockholm: Rediviva, 1976), p.250; Josef Alm, *Arméns eldhandvapen förr och nu* (Stockholm: Kungl. Armémuseum, 1953), p.114; Jonas Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid* (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982, 1995), p.223.

Mortaigne (d. 1690), a Life Guard officer who a generation later would play a yet more prominent role in the Scanian War of 1675–1679.[4]

Organisation and Training

The national cavalry consisted of volunteers and was organised into provincial regiments according to where it was raised. The national infantry consisted of conscripted troops, like the cavalry organised into provincial regiments. The artillery consisted of enlisted professionals. The core of the Swedish army consisted of the national regiments.

The Swedish military also made considerable use of enlisted units, both horse and foot, primarily from the Continent but also from other parts of Europe. They were organised and trained similarly to the national units. However, most newly enlisted units never reached establishment strength, due to shortages in personnel available for enlistment. Moreover, soon attrition took its toll. As a result, throughout the war depleted units were regularly re-combined into larger ones.

In 1658, after the Treaty of Roskilde, King Charles asked the Department of War (*Krigscollegium*) to investigate whether it was preferable to abandon conscription as a means to raise infantry and instead extend to all provinces the system of contracting perpetual soldier's holdings which was then already employed with some success in Dalecarlia, Ångermanland, and Västerbotten provinces. However, the ongoing war prevented any general reform along these lines, and the new system was ultimately implemented only in 1682 by the King's son, Charles XI.

In 1658, six new national regiments of foot were formed in the provinces then ceded by Denmark and Norway through the Treaty of Roskilde: Scania, Bohuslän, Halland, Blekinge, and Trondheim County (two regiments). Except for the two Trondheim Regiments, these soon became part of and henceforth were retained in the inventory of Swedish national regiments.[5]

The regiment was the primary administrative formation, but it was also a field unit. On campaign, the regiments were arrayed into temporary higher formations (right wing, centre, and left wing) as needed. As before, each cavalry regiment was expected to have an establishment strength of 1,000 horses, divided into eight companies each of 125 horses. The cavalry, unlike the infantry, counted its strength in horses, not men. Two cavalry companies constituted a cavalry squadron, from which follows that a squadron had a nominal strength of 250 horses. The squadron was the main tactical unit in the cavalry and dragoons, which were similarly organised as the cavalry even though they were expected to fight on foot. Likewise, each infantry regiment was expected to consist of 1,200 men, divided into eight infantry companies each of 150 men. Four infantry companies constituted a battalion, from which follows that a battalion had a nominal strength of 600 men. The battalion was the main tactical unit in the infantry. In the Swedish army, the battalion was for historical reasons sometimes referred to as a brigade.

---

[4] G. Bertil C:son Barkman, Sven Lundkvist, and Lars Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2: *1632 (1611)–1660* (Stockholm: Stiftelsen för Svea livgardes historia, 1966), pp.375–6.

[5] Lars Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé: En konturteckning mot bakgrund av kriget mot Polen', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979), pp.9–48, on p.12. The Scanian Regiment was soon re-established as cavalry and the Bohuslän one as dragoons.

On campaign, a regiment's strength soon dwindled due to attrition. When reinforcements or new recruits were unavailable, which was commonplace, actual strength would fall to a fraction of the establishment strength. Swedish units in the Commonwealth and Denmark were notoriously understrength. Squadrons and battalions were then formed by whatever units were available, regardless of regimental affiliation.

For this reason, and because of the lack of national uniforms, soldiers still used field signs to distinguish friend from foe. From the late 1630s onwards, Swedish soldiers customarily wrapped a wreath of straw around their left arm or put a whisk of straw in the band around their hat as field signs. This custom persisted, and Swedish soldiers used bands of straw at the storm of Copenhagen in 1659. Then, they also wore white shirts and hoods over their usual garments to provide some degree of camouflage against the background of snow, a traditional ruse in Scandinavian winter warfare first recorded in 1504.[6]

Levies

For home defence, the Swedish military establishment made extensive use of levied peasants. Levies were raised through a quota that the peasants had to fill. Levied troops would not be trained, and they would have to pay for their own weapons and supplies. On the other hand, they were only required to serve at home. Levied troops were usually used to man defensive positions along the external borders, in effect being a kind of border guard. The levied peasants would serve for a time, commonly two weeks, then be replaced by other levies from the same area. The Crown directed that former soldiers should be selected as leaders of the levies.

In times of need, the Crown also had the right to raise a general levy of all men able to bear arms. The levied troops would have to arm and supply themselves. Their use was accordingly restricted, for practical reasons, to certain geographical areas and short durations of time. Levies could also be called out in the form of burgher militias, which would have to take some responsibility for defending their towns when under siege.

During the Danish wars as well as the wars of the Deluge, Sweden operated units of levies primarily along the border with Norway, in Finland, and eastern Livonia. A few Swedish provinces such as Dalecarlia were known to raise particularly bellicose levies. However, it soon became clear that

Overleaf:

Top: Swedish soldiers, April 1656. Two officers wear coats, a musketeer in the foreground carries a fork rest, and several trumpeters are signalling. (Erik Dahlbergh).

Bottom: King Charles and his senior commanders, April 1656. (Erik Dahlbergh)

---

[6] Michael Fredholm von Essen, 'Snow Camouflage Dress at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century', *Arquebusier* 32: 5 (2012): pp.31–5.





many peasants in the eastern border regions could not be trusted. Because of religious issues, the Orthodox generally favoured the Muscovites while, in southern Livonia, many still harboured sympathies for the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, levies remained part of the Swedish war effort everywhere on the eastern border. In Ingria and Kexholm County, they often volunteered for duty and participated in raids into Muscovite territory.

In times of war, yet another option was to raise additional, temporary troops from those areas that otherwise were exempt from conscription. This was decided by the Crown on a case by case basis and granted by parliament. This was referred to as a take-out (*utskott*). The troops raised in this manner were armed, trained, and supplied by the Crown, yet only needed to serve in the nearest theatre of war within the country and only for as long as the present war lasted. They could accordingly not be sent overseas. They were, in effect, temporary troops intended to be disbanded when the war ended.

The Crown in times of need also might negotiate additional cavalry from any individual or group in society that could afford to raise cavalrymen, such as the nobility, the civil service, the priesthood, and so on. Although the Crown then did not have to provide for men, horses, and weapons, such troops, similarly to the temporary troops of a take-out, only needed to serve within the country and only for as long as the present war lasted.

The Navy

Under King Charles, Swedish shipbuilding gradually began to move away from the hitherto prevalent Dutch designs, instead adopting more English features. From this time onwards, rigging remained close to Dutch models, while ship features such as hull shape, rudder, and so on grew closer to English ones.

The Admiralty still outsourced shipbuilding to private interests. Master shipwrights (Swedish: *skeppsbyggmästare*) were independent businessmen and civilian in status. Many expert shipwrights from the Netherlands, Scotland, and England took service with both the Swedish and Danish navies.[7] Their plans and models were regarded as private property, and the shipwrights often handed their business down to succeeding generations within the same family. Shipbuilding remained a craft, not a science. The master shipwright worked more with finely crafted models than with theoretically based blueprints when designing new projects, and he shared the empirical knowledge of his craft mainly with others of his kind. The type models employed by these professionals were gathered in specialist collections, used to illustrate the designs in use when embarking upon new projects or in the training of apprentices. Ship models of the English pattern were almost certainly brought to Sweden in 1659 by the shipwright Francis Sheldon (*c.* 1612–1692), who some years later became a shipwright

Opposite page and overleaf: mid-seventeenth century warship, as depicted in drawings attributed to the shipwright Francis Sheldon. (Maritime Museum, Stockholm)

---

[7] Jan Glete, 'Örlogsfartyg, flottor och flottbaser', *Stormakten som sjömakt: Marina bilder från karolinsk tid* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2005), pp.15–20, on p.18.







at Skeppsholmen naval dockyards in Stockholm. None of his models have been individually identified, but ship models dating from the period from approximately 1660 onwards do remain in Swedish collections.[8]

The Admiralty outsourced shipbuilding but not armaments.[9] Naval armaments were the responsibility of the Navy's Master of Ordnance (*tygmästare*), a position formally established by the Crown in 1650 and reserved for professional military men.[10] The Master of Ordnance was connected to the Admiralty but not a member of this organisation. At first, the Master of Ordnance was technically subordinated to the National Master of Ordnance (*rikstygmästare*) who belonged to the army and was in charge of armaments on a national level.[11] The navy's first Master of Ordnance, an experienced artillery officer named Hans Wilhelmsson Clerck (1607–1679) upon formal appointment in 1650 received a salary corresponding to his previous rank of artillery captain (645 Reichsthalers), and this salary remained unchanged until 1659/1660 when it was increased to a pay (1,000 Reichsthalers) which was higher than that of a Navy major (800 Reichsthalers) but less than the salary of an admiral lieutenant (1,240 Reichsthalers).[12] Hans

---

[8] Jan Glete, 'Arvet från flottans modellkammare', *Sjöhistorisk Årsbok* 1990–91 (Stockholm: Föreningen Sveriges Sjöfartsmuseum i Stockholm, 1990), pp.9–44, on pp.22–23.

[9] Michael Fredholm von Essen, 'Early Eighteenth Century Naval Chemical Warfare in Scandinavia: A Study in the Introduction of New Weapon Technologies in Early Modern Navies', *Baltic Security and Defence Review* 13: 1 (2011): pp.122–51.

[10] Einar Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets historia* I: 1634–1695 (Stockholm: Lindberg, 1950), p.84.

[11] Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets historia* 1, 195; Einar Wendt et al., *Amiralitetskollegiets historia* 2: 1696–1803 (Malmö: Allhem, 1974), pp.283–4.

[12] Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets historia* 1, pp.162–3.

Clerck was in 1668 indeed promoted to admiral in charge of the dockyards (*holmamiral*), a title perhaps better translated as director but carrying the status of an admiral.

Through the services of the Master of Ordnance, the Admiralty was the ultimate authority of the practicalities of the various armaments used on board the navy's warships. This was at a time when fleet commanders often had comparatively little experience with maritime affairs. Indeed, it could be argued that with regard to weaponry, the Admiralty was a far more professional organisation than when decisions had to be made on sailing conditions and hull characteristics, since for the latter purpose, civilians were usually relied upon.

Yet, when it came to naval matters, Sweden had a geographical problem. The chief naval base and naval shipyard, Stockholm, was well-protected within an extensive archipelago, but with the prevailing winds, it was difficult to move the fleet out to sea. Moreover, Stockholm's harbour was blocked by ice until well into April each year – and it took at least half a year to equip a fleet. Finally, Stockholm was located far from the southern Baltic, which was the main theatre of operations in any war between Denmark and Sweden. This caused communication and logistical problems, both with regard to supplies and when repairs were needed. One may ask why the Admiralty did not use Wismar or Stralsund as primary naval base for operations in the southern Baltic. The reason was that the navy needed men, and such could only be conscripted in the Swedish mainland. There were simply no crews to be had in Sweden's German territories, which also were exempt from conscription. In comparison, Denmark had a geographical advantage. Denmark's chief naval base, Copenhagen, was located on a main shipping lane, enjoyed the use of an almost continuously ice-free harbour, and moreover was located on the southern Baltic. Besides, Copenhagen usually enjoyed a westerly wind, which made it easy for the Danish fleet to leave port.

A key task for the navy was to secure the sea lines of communication. Both men and supplies were regularly transported to and from Germany, the Baltic territories, and Finland, and the navy had to protect the transports. Troops and equipment were regularly shipped from a variety of Swedish ports. Special embarkation facilities for horses including distinctive bridges had been built in Dalarö port, near Älvsnabben in the southern Stockholm archipelago, Elfsborg near Gothenburg, and Helsingfors in Finland.

The normal sailing season was from May through October. However, the needs of war tended to prolong the sailing season. When needed, the navy could extend the sailing season throughout the winter as well. As a result, the navy was familiar with prolonged operations, even though such only took place when wartime conditions demanded it.

Warship Strength

Being a country of far-flung settlements connected by waterways but few good roads, Sweden had always relied on ships for maintaining supply and communication links and was a substantial naval power. During the latter half of the Thirty Years' War, Sweden maintained a navy which was larger than that of England and roughly equal to those of France and the Netherlands. However, the navy was reduced after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, just like the army. The Swedish navy under King Charles never reached its previous strength (Table 1). Even so, by 1655 Sweden was surpassed in number of warships only by England (133 warships, up from 53 in 1645) and the Netherlands (101 warships).[13]

In early 1656, King Charles ordered the Admiralty to outfit the existing warships and also build yet more. The Admiralty immediately set to work, producing an inventory of all existing ships and an assessment of which repairs were needed. When done, the Admiralty reluctantly concluded that Sweden lacked the funds needed for expanding the navy as desired. This was unsurprising. Sweden was renowned for its military might, yet the country still suffered from state poverty. The assessment was not a feeble excuse but reflected realities. Besides, the Admiralty immediately set to work to outfit the existing fleet and refit those that needed repairs.[14]

Table 1. Number of warships in the Swedish navy, divided by size (metric tons)[15]

Year	100–500	501–1,000	1,001–1,500	1,500+	Total
1645	29	24	1	3	57
1650	17	22	1	2	42
1655	12	25	3	1	41
1660	9	20	3	1	33

Smaller ships were used, too, most notably pinnaces (smaller full-rigged ships of a type that later would develop into the frigate), galiots (small ships with nearly flat bottoms which enabled navigation in shallow waters and more commonly were used as merchantmen), and fireships, the latter of which belonged to no particular type.

The Crown could also make use of armed merchantmen to increase fleet size further. Most were flutes of the Dutch type, which was the most common type of cargo-carrier in the region. The Crown in 1645 introduced a customs policy which favoured Swedish-built and Swedish-owned armed merchantmen which also would be suitable for navy service. This scheme provided more ships than the navy could hire, and the system successfully remained in operation for decades. In fact, while the merchantmen which took advantage of the policy flew Swedish flags and were crewed by Swedish sailors, the owners were frequently Dutch, for whom the investment in customs-free auxiliary ships was a most profitable proposition since it made them exempt from the Sound Toll.[16] Incidentally, we will see that this scheme infuriated King Frederick of Denmark so much that he listed it as a cause for war.

---

[13] Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, Acta Universitatis stockholmiensis (Stockholm Studies in History) 48:1, 2 vols, 1993), pp.550, 575, 607, 639.

[14] Finn Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön på Carl X Gustafs tid: Ett bidrag till nordisk sjökrigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-Studier 6, 1974), pp.70–74.

[15] Glete, *Navies and Nations*, pp.607–8; Glete's revised figures as of August 2005.

When a Dutch fleet entered the Baltic Sea in the summer of 1656 on its way to Danzig, King Charles ordered an inventory of the armed merchantmen then available as auxiliaries in case of war. The result turned out to be 54 ships, including 19 in Gothenburg. Not all were immediately available, however; according to one list 12 ships were on route to Spain, one was bound for France, two were on route to Hamburg, and one to Riga.

The auxiliary ships were sorely needed, because the Navy's Gothenburg Squadron which formerly protected the Swedish west coast was dissolved after the Thirty Years' War. Mårten Thijssen Anckarhielm (d. 1657), a naturalised Swede of Dutch origin ennobled for his naval services, ably commanded the maritime defences of Gothenburg, but he had hardly any resources and, moreover, died in late March. When faced with war with Denmark in the summer of 1657 the Admiralty accordingly appointed Hendrik Gerritsen (Gerdtsson, ennobled Siöhielm in 1658), another naturalised Swede of Dutch origin, as the commander of a new Gothenburg Squadron. Gerritsen had gone into Swedish service in 1644 as Admiral Lieutenant of the Dutch auxiliary fleet then commanded by Admiral Anckarhielm. The new Gothenburg Squadron would be established from a couple of warships then under construction in Gothenburg and those 19 auxiliary ships that were within reach. Unfortunately, none was equipped and neither funding nor crews were available. By late July, five warships were turned over to the navy. They received cannons and crews, but no soldiers could be spared until after the King's conquest of Jutland in November 1957. Since no funding was available for the squadron, Gerritsen for several months had to take personal loans to finance the venture. There was a shortage of sailors and even cannons. Sweden was a major exporter of cannons, but available stocks were exported to the Netherlands just before the outbreak of hostilities – presumably one of the most flagrant arms industrial miscalculations of all times.[17]

The Inshore Navy

Sweden also had an inshore navy, consisting of shallow-draught vessels, primarily rowing boats of a type known as *lodja*, with a sprinkling of flat-bottomed river transports of a type known as *struts* (or *struss*). The name *lodja* was of Slavic origin, but it is unclear if it was only the name or also

---

[16] Jan Glete, *The Swedish Fiscal-Military State and Its Navy, 1521–1721* (Stockholm University working paper, nd), pp.24–5.

[17] Ernst Bergman, 'Kompaniskeppen i Göteborg och den danska blockaden 1657', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.197–219; Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, 130; both of which also list the names of the auxiliary ships and those of the Gothenburg Squadron.



Left: Contemporary drawing showing all types of ships then in the Swedish navy, including warships, pinnaces, galleys, and the smaller vessels of the *lodja* and *struts* type. Although depicting the Swedish fleet at the 1621 siege of Riga, the ship types had not changed fundamentally by the time of King Charles, except that galleys were phased out during the Thirty Years' War. (Georg Schwengel)

Below: Pinnace, in the port of Wismar. Although this is the Commonwealth ship *King David*, Swedish pinnaces were identical. The crew has taken down the main yard and are bending (tying) on the mainsail.





Right: A small sailing vessel of the *struts* type. The spritsail is mistakenly depicted above, not below, the bowsprit. (Crest of the Strusshielm family, House of Nobility, Stockholm)

Below: Swedish yachts. (Johan Sasse, 1650–1652)



the type of river vessel which was adopted in the early seventeenth-century. Either way, the *lodja* was an open rowing boat which also might carry a mast or two. It was sufficiently large to take soldiers and the occasional 5- or 3-pounder cannon. Some were quite large. In 1607, the Swedish Crown ordered the construction of 60 vessels of the *lodja* type, each with 12 pairs of oars and able to carry 160 men and supplies for two months. The weight should not impede the crew from dragging the vessel a considerable distance overland, for instance from one river to another in the style of the old Viking longship. Smaller vessels of the type were built, too, with a crew of only 40 men and six to eight pairs of oars.[18]

The *struts* was a flat-bottomed one-masted boat which was commonly used for moving goods on rivers. Unlike the *lodja*, it was decked. It was very similar to the Dutch boyer (*boeier*), a small coaster, and there is some evidence that in Sweden the two terms were used interchangeably, for instance the boyer *Oxen*, built in Stettin in 1641, which in 1656 was referred to as a *gaffelstruts*.[19]

The inshore navy existed because the Swedish navy had to maintain an amphibious capability to control estuaries and major rivers. Riverine transport played a vital role in the movement of supplies, artillery, and sometimes men. Inshore squadrons were established also in major lakes. However, the inshore vessels were too small and poorly armed to stand a chance against Danish or Dutch warships on the open sea.

Manpower

In early 1656, the Admiralty also assessed its available manpower. It turned out that the navy had a total number of 5,021 sailors. Because it was still winter, only 175 were on duty, but the remaining were subject to recall.[20] Although the total did not quite reach the maximum achieved during the Thirty Years' War, it was still a respectable number, and in 1655 the parliament agreed to increase the number of sailors further in the coming three years. By 1657, the total reached 5,425.[21] By 1658, the navy planned for as many as 8,434 men, but so many could not be raised.[22]

Since 1635, the navy relied on a system based on the 'perpetual sailor's holding' (Swedish: *ständigt båtsmanshåll*) to provide revenues for sailors. According to this system, a peasant would enter into a contract with the

---

[18] S. Artur Svensson (ed.), *Svenska flottans historia* 1 (Malmö: Allhem, 1942), pp.76–7.

[19] Lars Bruzelius, The Maritime History Virtual Archives <www.bruzelius.info/Nautica/Shipbuilding/Types/struss.html>; citing AK reg. 14 March 1656.

[20] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.72.

[21] Johan Levin Carlbom, *Om Karl X Gustafs polska krig och öfvergången till det 2:dra Sundskriget* (Gothenburg: Centraltryckeriet/Oscar Ericson, 1905), p.88. The figure would have reached 6,250, had not 825 men fallen ill, died, or deserted when the muster roll was completed.

[22] Patrik Höglund, *Skeppssamhället: Rang, roller och status på örlogsskepp under 1600-talet* (np: Universus/Forum navale 77, 2021), p.86.



Swedish sailor, 1628. Clothes based on archaeological finds from the *Vasa*. Sailors' dress remained unchanged during the reign of King Charles. (Vasa Museum, Stockholm; photo: author)

Crown to provide revenues for a sailor. In return, the peasant benefited from tax exemption and freedom from conscription. He could choose either to serve himself during the formal six-month sailing season, during which his wife and children took care of the farm, or he could pay another person to serve. The system was similar to the 'perpetual soldier's holding' (*ständigt knektehåll*) which was used in some provinces to provide revenues for soldiers. The perpetual sailor's holdings provided a permanent force of some 3,000 men. In times of war, the Crown could raise additional, temporary troops. This was decided by the Crown on a case by case basis and granted by parliament. Then towns and peasants would have to find additional temporary sailors during such years when the navy was fully mobilised. The system was appropriately referred to as a 'redoubling' (*fördubbling*). The navy made sure that men from the same village or town were dispersed among several ships, so that in case of loss of an entire crew the male population of a given location would not be too severely depleted.[23]

Unlike the army, the navy remained fundamentally native Swedish in composition. A key reason for this was the reliance on conscription and sailor's holdings. However, the practical need of having everybody aboard the ship communicating in the same language may have been a factor, too.

The best sailors were those recruited from merchant ships. They already knew the tasks that had to be carried out. In addition, they were more resistant to the many diseases that commonly decimated naval crews, since they already had encountered, and survived, some of them. However, Sweden was far from the international centres of maritime commerce, and it was more difficult for Swedish naval officers to find experienced crews than it was for their Danish counterparts, who had access to exactly this kind of men.

For this reason, most of the navy's sailors were raised from the coastal population in the traditional manner. As a result, most were coastal fishermen rather than blue-water sailors, and their skills were insufficient to man modern warships. Danish naval crews were generally more experienced than Swedish ones. Their sailing season was longer, which meant that they had more time to get accustomed to their ships and tasks. Moreover, many of the Danish sailors, and an even larger share of those from Norway, had previously served on Dutch merchantmen or warships. Besides, the Danish navy also employed many experienced foreign sailors, hired in Amsterdam and Hamburg. This, too, made their crews more skilled. The contrast with most Swedish sailors who, at best, had a background as inshore fishermen is striking. The Danes used to call Swedish sailors 'farmboys dipped in water'.[24]

---

[23] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, pp.81–2.

Having said this, Sweden nonetheless had a limited number of experienced seafarers. Most derived from the west coast, from the ports in and around Gothenburg. Often with considerable experience from commercial shipping to the Netherlands, Spain, or even further afield, they were more suitable for privateering tasks than regular naval operations. But they excelled on such ventures, and Gothenburg merchants were always willing to fund privateering enterprises. During the war, Gothenburg was sometimes blockaded by the Danish navy. Even so, Swedish privateers operated out of the nearby ports of Varberg and Halmstad which faced the Kattegat south of Gothenburg. Sometimes, they completely disrupted communications between Denmark and Norway, which meant that dispatches either did not arrive at all, or took from 40 to 50 days to reach the destination instead of the more normal three days.

In times of war, each warship was commonly manned by a number of soldiers on average corresponding to about 40 percent of the naval crew. This was lower than during the Thirty Years' War, when the corresponding share was about 60 percent.[25] However, the number of soldiers varied greatly according to mission and availability.



Swedish pilot, as depicted in the first Swedish naval instruction manual from 1644, written by Johan Månsson. Common sailors would not have been as well-dressed as this pilot.

A warship usually had only two or, at most, three commissioned officers: the captain and one or two lieutenants. They might, or not, have previous naval experience. The senior under-officer was the ship's master (*överskeppare*), who was a professional mariner. Unlike the officers, he would stay with the ship throughout the winter, since he was in charge of maintenance and preparations for the next sailing season. On a small ship, the ship's master would be in sole command, since no officer would serve on board. Early in the century, he would in some ways be regarded as the equal of an officer, and most new lieutenants had still served as ship's master before their commission as officer. The ship's master was assisted by a master's mate (*underskeppare*). Another important under-officer post was

---

[24] Nils Erik Villstrand, '"Bondpojkar doppade i vatten": Svensk sjömilitär rekrytering ur ett jämförande perspektiv (1500–1800)'; Christoffer H. Ericsson and Kim Montin (eds), *Människan i flottans tjänst* (Åbo: Jungfrusund 6, 2001), pp.43–58. Although primarily dealing with eighteenth-century sources, the description is apt also for the seventeenth century.

[25] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, p.85.





Swedish sailors at the battle off Fehmarn, 1644. (Skokloster Castle) that of boatswain (*högbåtsman*), who led the ordinary sailors and also was responsible for damage control when in battle. Then there would be a pilot (*styrman*, a title separated into three degrees of seniority) who was familiar with the winds and currents of the area of operations and was responsible for navigation. A pilot had to supply his own navigational instruments. The ordinary sailing crew was divided into two watches, each of which included a leading sailor (*skeppman*) to assist the officer, usually a lieutenant, in command of the watch. A watch was subdivided into two quarters, each directed by a quartermaster (*kvartermästare*). Under-officers were not as harshly punished for offences as common crewmen. Most importantly, they were not flogged 'before the mast' which was the location where sentences were carried out on board.

The sailing crew took turns on duty, with each watch spending four hours on duty at a time. The crew were divided into two categories, experienced (*befaren*) and inexperienced (*obefaren*). The experienced sailors had mastered all sailing tasks, and might be ordered to stand at the helm or act as officers' servants. The inexperienced handled most hard, physical labour, often under the supervision of experienced sailors. The crew also included specialists of various kinds, including the cook, a carpenter (*timmerman*) or sometimes several, and a drummer or trumpeter for signaling. The master gunner (*konstapel*) would command the gunners (*bysseskyttar*) who directed the soldiers who were assigned to handle the shipboard artillery. Over time, the need for more theoretical knowledge in navigation and gunnery led to an increase in the status of pilots and master gunners, especially in relation to the ship's masters, so by the end of the century, most new lieutenants came from these groups.[26]

Before 1657, only a large ship would have a barber surgeon.[27] However, from this year additional barber surgeons were enlisted so that they eventually could be found on many warships. Naturally, any army barber surgeon who might be on board would assist, too. A large ship would also have a chaplain. Elsewhere, army priests who happened to be on board fulfilled the role of ship's chaplain. The navy also employed a number of scribes, but again, when an army scribe was on board, he would be tasked to handle navy business as well. In short, the army personnel that served on a warship was regarded as an integral part of the crew and would fulfil naval duties appropriate to their skills and training. Finally, the navy always employed a small number of ship's boys aged 12 and up, commonly the sons of sailors, who had duties but were regarded as in training. Moreover, each officer, whether of the army or navy, was entitled to bring a servant aboard, but these were not enrolled in the crew. As a result, each warship might have a few underage boys aboard, whether these were ship's boys or servants.[28] Women were not allowed on board during combat operations.

---

[26] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, p.187.

[27] Fred Hocker, *Vasa: A Swedish Warship* (Stockholm: Medströms, 2015), pp.102–5.

[28] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, pp.77, 79, 87–90.



Ship's crew from a contemporary votive ship, Kållered Church, Västergötland. From left to right: drummer, captain (armed with a broadsword), pilot in jacket and breeches, trumpeter (instrument missing), two crewmen. Most wear long coats to protect against the cold.

While the Swedish Crown had fewer experienced naval officers than the Dutch and Danes, it made good use of them. When the Admiralty in 1656 learnt that a Dutch fleet had sailed into the Baltic Sea (in order for Obdam to show the flag at Danzig), it ordered Captain Olof Eriksson Willman to set out with the newly built *Höken* ('Hawk', 22 cannons, manned by a crew of six officers and 50 men) to keep an eye on the Dutch and then report back to Stockholm, in particular if the Dutch showed any inclination to enter Swedish waters.[29] Willman was just the man for such a mission, because he knew Dutch naval procedures very well. After service in the Swedish army which invaded Denmark during the war of 1643–1645, Willman had in 1647 found a position with the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC), and in 1648, sailed to Java. Willman remained in VOC service until 1653, during which time he among other distant countries visited Japan where he even met the Shōgun, the country's military ruler, and senior Japanese officers who expressed a keen interest in Willman's military and scientific knowledge.

Tactics

Naval battles in the Baltic Sea had been decided by the use of cannon instead of boarding and hand-to-hand combat since the Nordic Seven Years' War of 1563–1570. However, Swedish naval tactics still emphasised boarding, which

---

[29] The Admiralty learnt of Obdam's Dutch fleet on 15 June 1656 and Willman received his instructions on 7 July 1656. Obdam arrived at Danzig on 27 July.



Ship's cannon. (Vasa Museum, Stockholm; photo: author)

indeed often was regarded as the preferred means of attacking the enemy, not least because of the difficulties in finding and retaining experienced sailing crews. Boarding accordingly remained a preferred method of winning a sea.

Before battle took place, the admiral would give instructions to his captains, including on which signals to be used and the assignment of each captain. However, during actual battle each captain essentially acted on his own. He would select an enemy ship of similar size to his own and then attack it. Even so, from 1644 onwards, Swedish fleets began to co-ordinate their movements to a higher degree than in the past.

Every battle began with a period of manoeuvring, during which the respective fleets attempted to gain a favourable position, in particular with regard to the wind. Seventeenth-century sailing rigs allowed only a limited ability to sail to windward. This meant that the fleet to windward had the advantage, since it could choose whether to initiate or decline battle.

Ships commonly reduced sail before engaging, since this made the ship easier to handle and also improved visibility. This was important, since the cannons were aimed by moving the ship, not the cannons themselves. Naturally, only the artillery on one side of the vessel could concentrate fire on one particular target. Even so, due to the construction of seventeenth-century ships, it was impossible to bring all guns on one side to bear on a single target. It was only the guns in the middle of the ship which could be so concentrated. For obvious reasons, the stern and bow guns could only fire in their respective directions. However, because of the curved shape of the ship's hull, even those guns on the side which were positioned near the stern and bow of the ship might not be able to bear on an enemy directly to the side.

In addition to round shot, which was the most common type of shot, the Swedish navy employed chain shot, which was designed to damage the rigging and tear holes in sails, both of which reduced the enemy ship's ability to manoeuvre. Other, less common but still employed types of shot included spike shot and scissor shot, which were believed, probably in error, to cause more damage in close quarters. Ships did not carry large supplies of ammunition. The Swedish navy generally allocated 30 shots per cannon to its warships, with the appropriate volume of gunpowder. This was only raised to 50 shots per cannon in 1658.

When firing against the enemy crew exposed on the upper deck, grape-shot cartridges (multiple balls of musket or larger size in a cartridge) or case-shot (smaller balls or scrap metal in a canister) would be used, in similarity to the regimental artillery in land battles. However, the area effect of a round shot hit should not be underestimated. Although a round shot might not penetrate the thick oak sides of a large warship, its energy was still transferred to the ship's structure, causing sharp splinters of wood to break loose. This would create a cone-shaped cloud of wooden splinters inside the hull. Each splinter had the capacity to maim, and since conditions were cramped, the danger of being hit by splinters when under enemy fire was considerable. If the round shot penetrated, it would bounce through the hull, causing additional damage wherever it passed.



Chain shot and scissor shot. (Vasa Museum, Stockholm; photo: author)

Finally, there was musket fire. Musketeers would be stationed in the tops at the mastheads, on the upper deck, or in the quarter galleries to fire at enemy crewmen. This was the task of the soldiers, except for those who were assigned as gunners.

Once the ship came alongside the enemy, the soldiers would board. The final struggle would be fought hand-to-hand, just like on land, with muskets, axes, boarding pikes, and cutlasses or rapiers. Because of the expense of building and outfitting a warship, it was usually deemed preferable to capture an enemy ship instead of sinking it.

Those crewmen who died in battle would eventually be buried, either on land or at sea. However, the dead were not thrown overboard during a battle but taken aside and covered. The navy realised that it was bad for the crew's morale to see their dead comrades lay unattended, but it was even worse for them to see their mates thrown overboard without a funeral service.[30]

A tactics of last resort was to blow up one's own ship, so as to prevent its capture by the enemy. Although this was not formally regulated, except possibly in local instructions, the practice seems to have been commonplace. Charges would be prepared in advance. A ship would only be blown when there was no hope of recovery, and in the heat of battle, it does not seem to have been difficult to find men willing to fire the fuse.

---

[30] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, pp.235–6.

Disease

Beyond open battle, the navy was exposed to other, more insidious dangers. The highest risk was posed by disease. In addition to the numerous diseases which afflicted the army garrisons, shipboard conditions posed further danger, for instance from scurvy, caused by a lack of vitamin C. The navy had long been aware of the dangers of scurvy, and of how to prevent it, for instance by procuring lemons for the crew. There was also an awareness of the need for personal hygiene, even though this might have been difficult to live up to while on shipboard duty. Swedish and Finnish culture had a tradition of regular bathing, and the navy yard had a bath house, with two men employed to operate it.

There was also an expectation that crews would know how to swim. That many Scandinavians could swim was explicitly and repeatedly mentioned already in the well-known *Historia de Gentibus Septentrionalibus*, a monumental work by Olaus Magnus on the Nordic countries, which was first published in Rome in 1555. There are also records from the seventeenth-century which suggest that many knew how to swim. While navy records are not explicit on this point, they take for granted that people who were not trapped underwater would have a good chance of surviving until they were rescued, which would suggest at least some swimming skills.[31]

There were few facilities for medical treatment of the wounded beyond the limited care provided by those few barber surgeons who served on large ships. Medical treatment was free, unless the wound had been caused while brawling, in which case the wounded sailor had to pay the barber surgeon for treatment. Certain ships were designated as hospital ships, to which the ill and disabled could be moved while the campaign was still ongoing. At the same time, it was decided that at least the soldiers on shipboard duty would be rotated back to land after every two months spent at sea. For obvious reasons, these measures could not always be implemented in times of war.

There was an understanding that the Crown should provide aid to the widows and children of fallen and crippled sailors. The navy set aside funds to provide financial aid in such cases. Some of the money was taken from fines collected for misdemeanours, while the remaining share was collected as a percentage of the wages of all who served in the navy. To this would be added charitable contributions. In addition, a limited number of old or semi-crippled sailors might find employment in the naval dockyards, where they worked tending the bath house or with similar light duties.

Naval Personal Weapons

There still was little difference between the army and navy when it came to service conditions, and many infantrymen served as shipborne infantry.

---

[31] Hocker, *Vasa*, p.129.



Ceremonial admiral's broadsword, manufactured in Sweden by David Casparsson Kohl in 1648. Total length 120.5 cm, blade length 93.3 cm, and weight 1.59 kg. Some admiral's broadswords were heavier still. (Royal Armoury, Stockholm)

Naval personal weapons included rapiers, of the same type as was used by the infantry, or sabre-like cutlasses that also existed in small numbers. The navy often received army surplus rapiers. In addition, the navy employed a variety of spears, half-pikes, and pikes. Naval regulations for pikes were identical to army regulations. Half-pikes were to be 2.97 m (five cubits) in length, the same as in the army. The navy also utilised a small number of partisans, carried by under-officers.

An admiral as well as some captains would still carry a broadsword as a sign of command. Although at this time primarily a ceremonial weapon, some commanders used them in hand-to-hand combat.

In addition to other weapons, sailors employed axes, both as tools and weapons. As for firearms, the navy employed muskets, blunderbusses, and pistols. Most were matchlocks, although the navy knew that they formed a fire hazard and accordingly preferred the safer but more expensive snaphance locks. Pistols intended for the navy, so-called boarding pistols (Swedish: *änterpistoler*), usually had snaphance locks and were occasionally carried several at a time, hanging from bandoliers.[32] Finally, the navy employed hand grenades and a large variety of incendiaries.[33]

Music played an important role for signalling and in various ceremonies. The music was also probably intended to reinforce the men's morale. Most were trumpets, but a flagship might also have a kettle-drum. However, the Navy found it difficult to enlist a sufficient number of trumpeters. Fortunately, the army units deployed on warships generally included a trumpeter or two, which were then used also for naval signalling.[34]

---

[32] Josef Alm, 'Flottans handvapen', *Sjöhistorisk Årsbok 1953–54* (Stockholm: Föreningen Sveriges Sjöfartsmuseum i Stockholm, 1954), pp.67–147, on pp.72, 76–83, 85–7.

[33] Alm, 'Flottans handvapen', p.91. See also Michael Fredholm von Essen, 'On the Trail of Rocketry: The Enigma of Scandinavian Naval Pyrotechnics in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century', *Arquebusier* 30:6 (2008), pp.24–39.

[34] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, pp.76–7.

Uniforms

The Crown provided navy sailors with clothing. As a result, they ended up dressed in much the same way as sailors of merchant ships. Sailors did not yet wear uniforms, but the style of their dress was not identical to those of other commoners. For instance, when a sailor in 1654 prepared to desert, he acquired 'peasant dress' as a means to evade capture. This suggests that naval dress at least differed from peasant garments.[35] In 1658, some naval crews received jackets of blue cloth, but there is no reason to believe this to have been intended as a uniform. In the 1660s, blue caps were sometimes distributed.[36] Based on what is known from contemporary illustrations, sailors customarily wore woollen stockings and baggy breaches which were going out of style on the Continent but still remained in use among commoners in Sweden. Most were made of woollen cloth, which was cheap and also had the advantage of retaining body heat even when wet. Above, he would wear a short jacket. Instead of a hat, most would wear the *karpus*, a round woollen cap with flaps that could be turned down to protect the eyes, ears, and neck. In winter, the *karpus* might be fur-lined. To this might be added a long coat, when weather conditions were poor, and a pair of leather gloves. In short, naval dress was practical and workmanlike rather than indicative of rank or profession.

As usual, officers provided their own clothes. At sea, they too dressed plainly. This characteristic was true also for the nobility, at least some of whom dressed in far more comfortable and plain clothes at sea than they were expected to wear on land. For instance, the clothes worn by Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna when he commanded the Swedish fleet in the 1659 battle of Rødsand, where he was badly wounded, are preserved in the Royal Armoury, Stockholm. The clothes consist of jacket and breeches of plain woollen cloth, without any decoration or traces thereof. In appearance, the Admiral's dress was almost identical to that worn by commoners at the time, except for the baldric, which consisted of expensive materials as was expected of an officer. But the baldric was reserved for battle, and it is unlikely that the Admiral would so arm himself for daily shipboard activities.

Preparations for the Danish War

Sweden had an efficient intelligence establishment and soon learnt of the Danish war preparations. In response, Parliament ruled to increase conscription so that it not only included the present year's quota, but also that of the next year. In the provinces of Småland, Östergötland, and in Åbo (Finland), this decision led to protests and even some unrest. In the provinces of Dalecarlia and Närke, however, the decision was applauded. The Dalecarlians, who had a tradition of fighting Danes, said that they would

---

[35] Mary Pousette, 'Klädd ombord', *Skärgård och örlog: Nedslag i Stockholms skärgårds tidiga historia* (Stockholm: Kungliga Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2009), pp.103–16, on p.109.

[36] Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, p.249.



Left, below left and right; overleaf: The daily clothes and baldric worn by Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna during the 1659 campaign. The bloodstains derive from a serious wound he sustained when hit by a round shot. (History Museum, Stockholm)







accept not only conscription of one man of 20, but one man of 10 or even one man of seven. In Närke, the reaction was even stronger, with the province offering a general levy of all able-bodied men.

Realising that war with Denmark was imminent, King Charles in March 1657 sent Lieutenant General Henrik Horn (1618–1693), Major General Gustav Oxenstierna (1626–1693), and Lieutenant General of Cavalry Gustav Banér (1618–1689), the nephew of the renowned Field Marshal Johan Banér and himself a veteran of the Thirty Years' War, back to Sweden from the war in the Commonwealth.

The civilian administration followed events, too. Five days after the Danish Estates authorised funding for war against Sweden, the Swedish Department of Trade (*Kommerscollegium*) ordered its residents abroad to inform Swedish merchant captains that they should return to Sweden, or if war broke out, take shelter in English ports.

King Charles expected the Swedish Grand Marshal of the Realm (*Riksmarsk*) Gustav Horn (1592–1657) to lead the homeland defences. The able but now aged Horn had fought throughout the Thirty Years' War and was always the first choice for command. However, Horn soon died from natural causes, so Per Brahe (1602–1680), the Lord High Justiciar (*Riksdrots*), had to assume temporary overall command in his stead. Brahe, too, had fought in the Thirty Years' War, but since 1630 he had focused on civilian administration. Upon learning of the death of Horn, King Charles ordered Brahe to take direct command on the border with Danish Scania, the most exposed border region, with a particular focus on the province of Småland.

The King nominated other veterans to regional commands. The one-legged Field Marshal Axel Lillie (1603–1662) took command in Kalmar from which he could protect eastern Småland's border with the Danish province of Blekinge.[37]

Major General Erik Stenbock (1612–1659), was already governor of the province of Halland, which made him eminently suitable to lead the defences there. Stenbock was a veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had commanded the Life Guard already in the battle of Lützen 1632 and was also the National Master of Ordnance.

The important port-town of Gothenburg was handled in a similar manner. Its governor, Per Ribbing (1606–1664), was another veteran of the Thirty Years' War and accordingly quite able to defend the port.

Further north, on the border with Norway, the indomitable Major General Harald Stake (1598–1677) served as governor of Skaraborg County. Stake was a veteran of many wars who once had saved the life of Gustavus Adolphus.

The aforementioned Gustav Oxenstierna assumed command in the provinces of Värmland and Dalecarlia.

---

[37] The King's first choice, the aged Field Marshal Lars Kagg (1595–1661), was ill. Lillie almost immediately had to face a crisis of another type. In spring 1657, an epidemic struck Kalmar, the population of which suffered a high mortality rate. The epidemic was likely the plague which already ravaged Riga and Reval and in August reached Stockholm.



Above: Per Brahe, *c.* 1650. (David Beck, Skokloster Castle)
Below: Harald Stake. (Gripsholm Castle)



Gustav Oxenstierna's elder brother Colonel Johan Oxenstierna (*c.* 1615–1664) was already governor of Västernorrland County further north, which included the formerly Norwegian provinces of Härjedalen and Jämtland. Another veteran, he was eminently suitable to command there.

The city of Stockholm was less exposed to Danish or Norwegian attacks, but just in case, the King appointed Major General Arvid Forbus (1598–1665), the son of a Scottish soldier in Finland and a veteran who had risen from the ranks during the Thirty Years' War, commander of the capital defences.[38]

The aforementioned Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna (1615–1662), a veteran of the naval battles with Denmark during the Thirty Years' War, was ordered to prepare the main fleet in Stockholm for further action. Bielkenstierna had helped the King to administer his estates before his accession to the Crown and they had become good friends. King Charles had learnt to rely fully on the admiral.

Notably, all senior officers were veterans of the wars on the Continent, and even the senior civilian officers had some degree of military experience. King Charles probably reasoned that if they could not defend the homeland against Danes and Norwegians, then nobody could.

When the news of the Danish declaration of war reached King Charles on 30 June, he was at Thorn in Prussia. He quickly made preparations for retaining parts of the territory which he had conquered. King Charles ordered the stronger and more important strongpoints in the Commonwealth to be defended, while small and weak ones in less important territories were dismantled or destroyed. He had already appointed his brother, Duke Adolph John (1629–1689), commander-in-chief of the remaining Swedish forces in the Commonwealth. King Charles left four generals to serve his brother: the bon vivant and rake General Lorenz von der Linde (1610–1670), Lieutenant General Christoph Delphicus zu Dohna (1628–1668), and Major Generals Hans Jürgen von Würzburg (fl. 1640–1657) and Barthold Hartwig von Bülow (1611–1667). All were long-time veterans. The King left 8,600 men (2,000 cavalry, 700 dragoons, and 5,900 infantry) as a defensive force in Prussia, and an additional 3,000 (600 cavalry, 300 dragoons, and 2,100 infantry) under Paul Würtz in Cracow (Table 2, p.104).

---

[38] Carlbom, *Om Karl X Gustafs polska krig*, p.82.

At the same time, the King ordered Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock (1614–1685) back to Sweden.[39] The Field Marshal, Erik Stenbock's younger brother, had distinguished himself in many battles including Nördlingen 1634, Wittstock 1636, and the second battle of Breitenfeld 1642 and before his promotion to Field Marshal served as National Master of Ordnance, the post then assumed by his brother. The King expected Field Marshal Stenbock to assume direct command of homeland defence for the time being, so that Lord High Justiciar Brahe could return to his regular duties. Another senior officer who received orders to assist with homeland defence was Robert Douglas (1611–1662), who at the time was on leave in Sweden. Recently promoted to Field Marshal, Douglas was a Scottish veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had distinguished himself on numerous occasions on the Continent, including in the battles of Lützen 1632, Wittstock 1636, and Jankow 1645. Although well-regarded by everybody, from the King to the burghers of Gothenburg, he had found the irregular warfare of Poland less suited for his skills. Meanwhile, we have already seen in Volume II that the defences of Finland were put into the hands of the ruthless Gustav Evertsson Horn af Marienborg (1614–1666), Governor General of Ingria and Kexholm County, who was an experienced officer who had fought in the battle of Jankow 1645.



Claes Bielkenstierna. (Maritime Museum, Karlskrona)

When King Charles in July 1657 marched to Denmark, his army consisted of 10,800 men (roughly 7,900 cavalry, 800 dragoons, and 2,100 infantry) (Table 3, p.106).[40]

It is obvious that King Charles carefully selected the units for the two respective armies, the one he would bring to Denmark and the one which stayed behind. The invasion army primarily consisted of horse (8,700 horse versus 2,100 foot), while the one which would defend the acquisitions in Prussia and Poland focused on foot (3,600 horse versus 8,000 foot). The two armies faced different tasks. The one would go on the offensive against Denmark, while the other had orders to remain on the defensive, to hold fortified positions until the threat from Denmark was neutralised.

---

[39] Field Marshal Stenbock's command in the Commonwealth was then assumed by Jacob Casimir De la Gardie, one of King Charles's brothers-in-law.

[40] Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.208–9, 262–7.



Above: Duke Adolph John, c. 1650. (Jeremias Falck)
Below: Duke Adolph John as an ancient Roman general (David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl)



According to the intelligence available to King Charles at the time, the Danish army in Holstein consisted of some 180 companies, which if they maintained establishment strength signified a strength of 18,000 men.[41] King Charles's army was significantly smaller. Yet, the King expected to pick up additional units then under enlistment in Pomerania, Wismar, and Bremen-Verden. Although many records are lost, there is evidence that King Charles expected to gain an additional 3,400 cavalry and 2,600 infantry for his field army through ongoing enlistment in these territories. In addition, he expected to retain some 2,800 dragoons and 4,000 infantry (including 1,000 national troops) in Pomerania to defend against Commonwealth attacks. Likewise, he expected some 3,500 of the infantry in Bremen–Verden to remain to defend against Danish attacks (Table 4, p.108).[42] The enlistment targets were not achieved, but units remained in the German territories.

King Charles complained that he was unable to bring heavy artillery from Prussia, because of a lack of strong horses. Of the approximately 30 cannons which he managed to bring, most were light. Because of the lack of horses, he could only bring two 24-pounders. He also had too few artillerymen. Additional artillery would have to be arranged in Pomerania and Wismar.[43] Fortunately, Field Marshal Wrangel was already there to prepare for the expected Danish invasion.

The Swedish army from Poland lacked fresh uniforms, some gear, and was hardly suitable for the parade ground. However, it consisted of veterans who were justifiably proud of and confident in their superior combat skills. Immediately before the army's

---

[41] Tersmeden, 'Carl X'. The reality was less, probably 120 companies of a total of 13,150 men (Table 10), or perhaps 122 companies of 12,250 men, as suggested in Johan Levin Carlbom, *Karl X Gustav: Från Weichseln till Bält 1657 - Tåget över Bält och freden i Roskilde 1658* (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz, 1910), p.59.

[42] Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.210–11.

[43] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.122.



Field Marshal Robert Douglas on horseback.

advance into Holstein in the summer of 1657, the 24-year-old Nils Brahe, recently promoted to Colonel and proud of his men (he had replaced Axel Lewenhaupt as head of the Uppland Regiment), wrote to his uncle:

> I hope with God's help, if they [the Danes] dare stand against us, that our dishevelled cavalrymen will show them how experienced men fight. We are not very strong [in numbers], but those we have are selected people of whom hardly anybody has not [already] thirty times experienced hard-fought encounters … The best is that nobody, neither low nor high, doubts a positive outcome. It is a miracle to watch in our cavalry and infantry the bravery and heart with which they wish to meet the enemy, so that one certainly can say: *continua victoria vincere dedidit, vinci oblitos reddidit* [continuous victory taught them to conquer and made them forget how to taste defeat].[44]

---

[44] Nils Brahe to Per Brahe, 20 July and 1 August 1657 (O.S.); cited in Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé: En konturteckning', p.39.

In late July 1657, the military forces in the Swedish heartland consisted of a total of 18,860 regulars, in addition to artillery and levied peasants. Of this, a total of 8,325 regulars, the entire field artillery, and quite a few units of levies were earmarked for the field armies (Table 5).[45] Garrisons were located in Gothenburg (2,233 men); Halmstad, Varberg, and Laholm (in total 1,347 men); Kalmar (1,228 men); Jönköping (380 men); Nyköping, Norrköping, Vadstena, and Örebro (in total 443 men); Stockholm (1,257 men); Borgholm (on Öland, 213 men); Gotland (172 men); Frösö Redoubt (162 men); and in Uleåborg with surroundings in north-western Finland (822 men).[46] Homeland deployment was defensive, with an emphasis on garrison units in those fortified strongpoints that were most exposed to Danish and Norwegian attacks. In the north and in central Sweden, garrisons were comparably smaller.

Table 2. Swedish units retained in Prussia and Cracow, summer 1657[47]

Prussia
Cavalry
Field Marshal Robert Douglas's Cavalry Regiment (two companies; E)
Erik Drake's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Major General Hans Jürgen von Würzburg's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Duke John Adolph's Life Regiment of Horse (E)
Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Martin Wallrath's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Barthold Bierman's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Wenzel Sadowski's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Captain Bremer's Cavalry Company (E)
Total: Approximately 2,000
Dragoons
Karelian Dragoon Regiment (one company, in total about five men)
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Dragoon Regiment (four companies; E)
Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock's Life Regiment of Dragoons, under Lieutenant Colonel Wolff Bomsdorff (E)

---

[45] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.133. Hedberg cites Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.220, 273–5, but either has amended the published figures slightly. The data roughly corresponds to those archive documents (College of War to King Charles, 27 February 1657; College of War, 16 July 1657, both O.S.) cited in Carlbom, *Om Karl X Gustafs polska krig*, pp.79–81; Arne Odd Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen og gjenerobringen av Jämtland 1657–1658* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1967. Carl X Gustaf-studier 2), pp.72–3.

[46] College of War to King Charles, 27 February 1657 (O.S.).

[47] Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.208–9, 265–7.

Heinrich Benedict von Hatten's Dragoon Regiment (E)
Ludwig Fritze's Dragoon Regiment (E)
Martin Wallrath's Dragoon Company (E)
Lieutenant Colonel Martin Lange's Dragoons (E)
Johann Puchert's/Claes Danckwardt-Lillieström's newly enlisted dragoons (E)
Total: Approximately 700
Infantry
His Majesty's Life Guard of Foot (E)
Her Royal Majesty the Queen's Life Regiment of Foot (E)
Skaraborg Regiment
Jönköping Regiment
Björneborg Regiment
Östgöta Regiment
Hälsinge Regiment
Västgöta-Dal Regiment
Elfsborg Regiment
Västmanland Regiment
Ångermanland Regiment
Duke John Adolph's Life Regiment of Foot (E)
General Lorenz von der Linde's Regiment (E)
Lieutenant General Christoph Delphicus zu Dohna's Regiment (E)
Claes Danckwardt-Lillieström's Regiment (E)
William Cranstone's Regiment (E; Scots, part of unit)
Johann Puchert's Regiment (E)
Captain Friedrich Kühne's Battalion (E)
Men from various regiments, including the Kronoberg, Dalecarlia, and Västerbotten regiments, who for one reason or another had been left behind (part of Kronoberg Regiment was in Cracow, while the Dalecarlia and Västerbotten regiments had been shipped to Riga)
Total: Approximately 5,900
Grand Total: 8,600
Cracow
Cavalry
Major General Claes Tott's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Jacob von Yxkull's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Men from various regiments
Total: Approximately 600

Dragoons
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Dragoon Regiment (eight companies; E)
Total: Approximately 300
Infantry
Kronoberg Regiment
Hälsinge Regiment (two companies)
Kalmar Regiment
Värmland Regiment
Duke Franz Erdtmann of Saxe-Lauenburg's Regiment (E; part of unit)
Major General Paul Würtz's Regiment (E)
Fabian von Fersen's Regiment (E)
Total: Approximately 2,100
Grand Total: 3,000

Table 3. The Swedish army which departed from Poland bound for Denmark, July 1657. Although exact numbers for each regiment are unknown, it is obvious from the totals that all units were significantly understrength.[48]

Cavalry
Life Guard of Horse, also known as the Life Regiment of Horse (two companies)
Uppland Cavalry Regiment, under Erik Planting
Västgöta Cavalry Regiment, possibly under Major Per Hierta
Åbo Cavalry Regiment, under Fabian Berndes
Småland Cavalry Regiment, possibly under Staffan Klingspor
Tavastehus Cavalry Regiment, under Johan Galle
Östgöta cavalry regiment, under Ludwig Wierich Lewenhaupt
Her Royal Majesty the Queen's Life Regiment of Horse, also known as Duke John George of Anhalt-Dessau's 1st Cavalry Regiment (E)
Prince Adolph of Nassau's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Duke John George of Anhalt-Dessau's 2nd Cavalry Regiment (E)
Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Duke Ernst Bogislaw de Croÿ's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Margrave Charles Magnus of Baden-Durlach's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt's Cavalry Regiment (E) (four companies)

---

[48] Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.208, 262–4; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.122.

Landgrave Frederick of Hesse-Homburg's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Field Marshal Carl Gustav Wrangel's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Major General Daniel von Arentsen's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Major General Hans Böddeker's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Rutger von Ascheberg's Cavalry Regiment (E; part of unit)
Casper Bornemann's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Johan Otto de Wahl's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Joachim Engel's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Joachim Hugel's Cavalry(?) Regiment (E)
Hermann Huhl's Cavalry Regiment (E)
J. Knaust's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Hans Christoph von Königsmarck's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Conrad Christoph von Königsmarck's 2nd Cavalry Regiment (E)
Caspar von Letmathe's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Lieutenant Colonel Johan Nachtigall's Cavalry Squadron (E)
Christopher Fredrik von Oberbeck's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Johan Pringel's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Count von Solms's Cavalry Regiment (E) (only core remaining)
Captain Walter Stackelberg's Cavalry Company (E)
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Cavalry Squadron (E)
Martin Unger's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Johann von Waldeck-Landau's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Total: Approximately 7,900
Dragoons
Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł's Dragoon Regiment ('Blue Dragoons') (E)
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Dragoon Regiment (four companies; E)
Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg's Dragoon Regiment, under Jacob Johann von Wulffen (E)
Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock's Life Dragoon Regiment (E)
Adam von Weiher's Dragoon Regiment (E)
Lieutenant General Gustav Banér's Dragoon Squadron (E)
Lieutenant Colonel Henrik Johan Taube's Dragoon Squadron (E)
Total: Approximately 800
Infantry
Uppland Regiment, under Nils Brahe

Södermanland Regiment, previously under Axel Lewenhaupt, now possibly under Per Larsson Sparre
Hälsinge Regiment, under Per Larsson Sparre
Kalmar Regiment, under Gustav Jespersson Cruus
Värmland Regiment, under Johan von Essen
Simon de Bolsey's Regiment (E)
Jacob Casimir De la Gardie's Regiment (E)
Philip Hegstereich's Regiment (E)
Major Rolamb's Battalion(?) (E)
Count Palatine Philip of Sulzbach's Regiment, under Colonel Johann Wilhelm Gengel (E)
Total: Approximately 2,100
Artillery
Two 24-pounders
Approximately 28 light cannons
Grand Total: Approximately 10,800

Table 4. Swedish units in Bremen–Verden at the time of the Danish attack in June 1657. Most were in the process of recruitment, all were considerably understrength, and only a few (marked with *) were ready for operations.[49]

Cavalry
Duke Adolph William of Saxe-Weimar's Cavalry Regiment (E)*
Nicolaus Prætorius's Cavalry Regiment (E)*
Johann von Waldeck-Landau's Cavalry Regiment (E; part of the unit)
Rutger von Ascheberg's Cavalry Regiment (E; part of the unit)
Alexander Andreas von der Osten's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Georg Friedrich Öffener's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Ernst von Stoltzenberg's Cavalry Regiment (E)
Total: Approximately 2,800
Dragoons
Captain Münchhausen's Dragoon Company (E)
Total: Approximately 50
Infantry
Conrad Christoph von Königsmarck's Regiment (E)*

---

[49] Tersmeden, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', pp.270–71.

Duke Franz Erdtmann of Saxe-Lauenburg's Regiment (E; part of the unit)
Johann von Waldeck-Landau's Regiment (E)
Major General Joachim von Volckmar's Regiment (E)
Major General William Vavasour's Regiment (E)
Johann Schmidt's Regiment (E)
Dietrich von Düring's Regiment (E)
Hieronymus Friderich van Iddekinge's Regiment (E)
Simon de Bolsey's Regiment (E)
William Cranstone's Regiment (E; part of the unit)
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Lundie's Company (E)
Captain Kozenberg's Company (E)
Total: Approximately 6,700

Table 5. Swedish units in the Swedish heartland, March 1657[50]

Cavalry	3,865
Dragoons	850
Infantry	14,145
Artillery	
Levies	
Total (excl. artillery and levies)	**18,860 regulars**
Of which designated for the field army:	
Cavalry	3,025
Dragoons	695(?)
Infantry	4,605
Field artillery	
Levies	
Total (excl. artillery and levies)	**8,325 regulars**

---

[50] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.133.

3

The Danish Military Establishment

The two most senior officers, under the King, of the Danish military establishment were the Grand Marshal of the Realm (Danish: *Rigsmarsk*) and the Grand Admiral of the Realm (*Rigsadmiral*) who respectively commanded the army and navy. On paper, these officers carried great weight. They were selected by the Council of the Realm (*Rigsraadet*), which suggested three men for each post, among whom the King chose one. In theory, every royal command that touched on military matters must be transmitted through one of these officers, who if he wished could overrule the King. However, reality was quite different.

The Grand Marshal of the Realm, Anders Bille (1600–1657), had served in his position since 1642, which meant that he was overall commander also during the previous disastrous war with Sweden in 1643–1645. Bille was an able administrator, and had for a while served as cavalry captain during the Thirty Years' War. Yet, most of his military experience derived from being defeated first by Imperials and then by Swedes, and it remains unclear how much Bille actually knew about the modern methods of war that these two opponents had mastered. Moreover, during the Thirty Years' War Bille had found himself arguing against the man who later would be King Frederick, and the King never quite forgave his general. We will see that King Frederick imposed restrictions on Bille which meant that his overall commander, far from being in a position to overrule the King, in reality had to follow the counsel of his own subordinates whom the King had appointed. Besides, Bille may have overrated his certainly great administrative capacity, thinking that it also enabled him to manage the requirements of modern warfare almost single-handedly. A contemporary, Ditlev Ahlefeldt, in his memoirs related how he frequently advised Bille to establish a staff unit to assist him, yet Bille each time said that he did not need one and could handle everything on his own.[1]

---

[1] Knud Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen 1657 samt Krigsbegivenhederne i Elbegnene indtil Udgangen af September nævnte Aar', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 7: 6 (1905–1906), pp.366–512, on p.410.



Anders Bille. (Artist unknown)

The Grand Admiral of the Realm, Ove Gedde (1594–1660), had served in his position since 1645. A soldier, sailor, and industrialist who in 1620 established a Danish colony in Tranquebar (modern-day Tharangambadi), India, Gedde was a capable officer with experience from many duties. However, he was close to several nobles who in the 1650s because of the King's displeasure found it safer to flee abroad. King Frederick accordingly mistrusted Gedde, too, and made sure that he despite his exalted rank henceforth played no role in the command structure of the navy.

As in Sweden, the nobility dominated the officer and under-officer corps of the cavalry as well as higher ranks in all units, whether conscripted or enlisted. Many a young noble began his military career as a cavalry corporal. In comparison, infantry and dragoon officers up to and including the rank of captain were seldom of noble birth. Besides, the leading Danish noble families dominated the officer corps. One assessment has shown that out of approximately 200 noble officers, as many as 60 – that is, almost a third – belonged to the seven most prominent Danish noble families. Of these 200 officers, 10 carried the name Bille, six Brockenhuus, seven Holck, 10 Kaas, 12 Rosencrantz, eight Steensen, and seven Urne.[2]

With regard to military organisation, tactics, and weapons, Denmark had adopted many Swedish practices. There were also obvious similarities between the customs and social structures of the two neighbouring countries. Both countries had parliaments that needed to be appeased and a powerful Council of the Realm in which political decisions were debated, with Council meetings documented in extensive protocols. Yet, there were no such similarities in the military decision-making process. While Swedish kings

---

[2] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen', pp.408–9.



Ove Gedde. Like many Danish notables at the time, Schack wears the white insignia of the Order of the Elephant suspended from a blue ribbon. (Albert Haelwegh after Abraham Wuchters)

would discuss strategy and tactics with their senior military commanders, these meetings were brief, often took place on horseback, and were not documented in protocols since no clerical staff attended. If the king was not present, the senior military commander took decisions in the same manner on behalf of the king, without the need to consult the king who might be far away or unavailable. In military matters, neither King Charles nor his army commanders ruled by committee.

In Denmark, the military decision-making process was radically different. The King's commanders tended to have little influence. The position of grand marshal or grand admiral was no more than an honorary title. On 3 May 1657 King Frederick instructed Bille, in writing, that he was not authorised to take decisions on his own. All decisions had to be taken in a formal council of war, and Bille would have to follow the majority decision as expressed by the officers who took part in the council of war. Moreover, the King firmly enforced his right to appoint or dismiss officers of the rank of captain and up. In effect, the Grand Marshal of the Realm was little more than the chairman and executor of the council of war, which consisted of men appointed by the King. Moreover, King Frederick retained the right to issue direct instructions on any matter, which Bille then would have to follow.[3]

In short, King Frederick's instructions hamstrung his overall commander, compelling him to follow the majority decision on all issues, unless the King suddenly decided to micromanage the campaign from his palace in Copenhagen. The instruction also enabled the individual members of Bille's council of war to demand that decisions on which they did not agree should be referred to Copenhagen, even when the issue was urgent. In the mind of the King, time was not of the essence when fighting a war. Everything would take place at an orderly pace. It usually took four to five days by courier to send letters between Copenhagen and the southern Holstein border, and sometimes longer, but King Frederick did not consider this an obstacle to his micromanaging affairs.[4]

In many ways, King Frederick's decision-making process resembled modern-day bureaucratic infighting. The Danish strategy was decided in committee meetings, in which the King, if present and if he chose to, carried the final decision. Yet individual members of the committee frequently disagreed, and there is no certainty that the King always made his opinion clear. This led to a situation in which disputes and rivalry grew common among the senior military commanders, which in turn led to further divisions and errors of judgments in the conduct of the war. This corresponded poorly with the demands imposed by seventeenth-century battle-field conditions. As will be shown, King Frederick's leadership style frequently resulted in indecision and delays that affected the army, and in extension the entire country, badly.

---

[3] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.417–18; Gunner Lind, *Hæren og magten i Danmark 1614–1662* (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1994), pp.242–5.

[4] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.435.

Raising the Danish Army

Denmark had made attempts to introduce a standing national army based on conscription already in 1614, immediately after the Kalmar War against Sweden.[5] Yet, the enlistment of professional units in Germany continued as before. When the Danish Crown rebuilt its military establishment after the defeat by Sweden in 1645, one means of doing so was to copy, or rather outdo, the Swedish conscription system. In 1646, the Crown for this reason ordered a reduction in the number of enlisted units. Instead, national units would form the backbone of the army. Conscription would be the key means to raise infantry. Previously, the quota was one man from each nine farmsteads (in Sweden, the corresponding quota was one in 10). Henceforth, however, the quota was increased to one man per five farmsteads.



King Frederick's Drabant Guard, March 1658. The uniform colours are unknown. (Erik Dahlbergh)

The nobility would still be obliged to provide armed and equipped cavalrymen according to the traditional military duty known as *Rostjeneste* (retinue of nobles), an old name that can be translated as military service but originally signified service on horseback. Other cavalry would remain enlisted, but in Denmark and thus national in character.

This reform resulted in a military establishment consisting of at most some 10,300 men. Of these, some 2,300 men served in the enlisted national cavalry and the retinue of nobles. They were formed into squadrons, each of which on average consisted of four companies. The up to 8,000 conscripted infantry were divided into five regiments. This interim organisation only lasted until the end of the Thirty Years' War.[6]

---

[5] Michael Fredholm von Essen, *The Kalmar War, 1611–1613: Gustavus Adolphus's First War* (Warwick: Helion, forthcoming 2023).

[6] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.367–78. For further details, see Lind, *Hæren*, pp. 39–87.

The size of Denmark's population in the 1650s is difficult to estimate. Significant population loss (an estimated 15 percent) took place in the early 1650s because of an epidemic referred to as the plague. Additional losses followed during the war against Sweden. As a result, estimates range from some 800,000 in the entire country (including Scania and Holstein) in 1650 to some 680,000 in 1655 and only 600,000 in 1660. At the latter date, the remaining core territories of Denmark (excluding Scania, which had been lost, and Holstein, which was not counted), had an estimated population of less than 410,000.[7] The high figure for 1650 remains significantly lower than the corresponding figure for Sweden (which stood somewhere between 925,000 and 970,000 in Sweden and some 450,000 in Finland).

Most officers were Germans and many were Dutch. In both the Danish and Norwegian army, the great number of such enlisted officers ensured that German became the common language of command, and that the military establishments followed Continental tactical doctrines developed during the later years of the Thirty Years' War. In the field, the army accordingly fought not in regiments but in squadrons and battalions.

Cavalry

By 1650, Denmark's cavalry consisted of the retinue of nobles, which consisted of six companies, each of 100 men. However, the Council of the Realm in 1651 disbanded half of this force, against the will of the King. The enlisted national cavalry was then divided into the Jutland Cavalry Regiment, of three companies under Captains Christopher Hvass, Niels Lykke, and Mogens Arenfelt; the Fyn Cavalry Regiment, of two companies under Sten Bille and Jørgen Kaas; the Zealand Cavalry Regiment, of two companies under Iver Flemming and Bjørn Ulfeldt; and the Scanian Cavalry Regiment, of two companies under Henrik Lindenow and Jacob Grubbe. This resulted in three companies of the retinue of nobles and nine companies of enlisted cavalry – probably around 1,200 men and certainly less than before.

To counter the reduction, King Frederick in late 1651 ordered the establishment of a new type of national cavalry, based on what suspiciously sounded like conscription (and over time, the Crown changed its service conditions, which indeed made it similar to those of other conscripts). Henceforth, each parish (Danish: *sogn*) must provide one armed and equipped cavalryman. For this purpose, a parish typically equalled 30 to 40 peasant families. Likewise, each priest and each sheriff (Danish: *ridefoged, herredsfoged*) must provide one armed and equipped cavalryman. The cavalry raised by these means would be referred to as *sogne-*, *præste-*, and *fogedrytteriet* ('parish, priest, and sheriff cavalry'), or *sognerytteriet* ('parish cavalry') for short. Most parts of the country, except Fyn, reluctantly agreed, and on 1 May 1652 (O.S.), an order to this extent was sent to the local administrators. Unsurprisingly, nobody volunteered to sign up as a cavalryman. As a result, a new order on 22 April 1653 (O.S.) stated that the local administrators should select the most suitable man for this service, and in return, he would be exempt from taxation. The parish cavalry would assemble and exercise for five days, three times per year.

---

[7] Aksel Lassen, 'Befolkningsudviklingen i Danmark 1660–1769: Nogle iagttagelser og foreløbige resultater', *Historie/Jyske Samlinger* 5 (1959), pp.173–97, on p.182.

Priests and sheriffs were no more eager to pay for the supply of cavalrymen than the peasants under their respective spiritual and secular jurisdiction. It was accordingly suggested that if they only provided one cavalryman, all their servants would be exempt from conscription into the infantry. Since even this offer failed to elicit volunteers, the local administrators were in 1655 ordered to select the best men among the conscripted infantry in order to turn them into priest and sheriff cavalrymen. The new cavalrymen were formed into companies, of various size. It was only in Scania and Blekinge that companies were formed into squadrons before war broke out. A major weakness was the lack of training. Although first intended only for service within the national borders, this premise was ignored when war eventually broke out. By then, the parish cavalry had reached a strength of about 3,300 men.

In 1655, the Crown required the nobility to double the retinue of nobles. This unit, the reinforcement of nobles (*Rostjenestens fordobling*), would only exist in times of war, although weapons and equipment had to be stored in advance so that men and horses could be raised swiftly. It was planned that the introduction of the reinforcement of nobles would result in more than 1,000 additional cavalry, which would result in a total (together with the parish cavalry) of between 5,000 and 6,000 men.

The establishment strength of a cavalry company was 90 men, plus officers, which made the organisation comparable to that of Swedish cavalry companies.[8] However, depending on how the company was raised, the number of men could vary from 60 to 70 or from 140 to 150.

Infantry

By early 1651, the national infantry was divided into the Zealand Regiment (eight companies), the Jutland Regiment (seven companies), and the Scanian Regiment (five companies). The regimental organisation was not fixed. Nor was the regiment a field unit. Instead, the three national regiments of foot functioned as territorial administrative units only. The soldiers were conscripted peasants, each required to serve for three years. After this period of service, they were released, although with the obligation to serve again in case of war, that is, they would function as a national reserve. Despite considerable opposition, in particular from the nobility of Fyn, King Frederick in 1652 managed to persuade the nobility to conscript soldiers also from the peasants of the noble estates (in the same manner as in 1638–1645). Such a unit became known as a nobles' company (Danish: *adelsfana* or *adelskompagnie*) or, when grouped together, nobles' battalion (*adelseskadron*).

---

[8] Carlbom, *Karl X Gustav*, p.58.

Each such soldier would serve for four months every year, for the duration of three years, in the garrisons of Copenhagen or Frederiksodde (modern-day Fredericia). The name nobles' company derived from the origin of the men as peasants of the noble estates; nobles did not serve in these units except as the occasional officer. The nobility resented the establishment of nobles' companies. While Danish nobles often served as colonels in either national or enlisted regiments, they much preferred to have peasants working on their estates than conscripted into the army.

An exception from the general reluctance to serve in the army was the island of Bornholm, where peasants mostly held their own land and accordingly were more willing to fight for it than peasants elsewhere.

When conscription did not produce enough men, the Crown reinforced existing units with enlisted men, as needed.

Temporary Units

In times of war, the Danish Crown retained the option to raise additional, temporary units. This was decided by the Crown on a case by case basis and was apparently primarily implemented in the German-speaking Duchies, which otherwise were exempt from conscription into national units. As we have seen, Sweden employed a similar system, referred to as a take-out (*utskott*) and likewise limited to those areas that otherwise were exempt from conscription. In Denmark, the system was referred to under the same name, although translated into German (*Ausschuss*) since the Duchies were German-speaking. Temporary troops were armed, trained, and supplied by the Crown, yet were intended to be disbanded when the war ended. Even so, some companies were incorporated into regular regiments, including those sent to invade Bremen–Verden.

Territorial Levy and General Levy

In 1652, King Frederick established a Territorial Levy (Danish: *Landeværn*), consisting of all men between ages 16 and 40 who did not manage a farmstead. The eligible male population was divided into companies which were commanded by retired soldiers or respected peasants. The system was introduced throughout Denmark including on islands such as Langeland, Lolland, Falster, and Møn.

These national forces were technically not to be used outside the country, or even outside the province in which they were raised. When King Frederick in 1657 ordered their use for invading Swedish territory, this caused resentment, certainly among the nobility but also, one may assume, among the peasants who provided the manpower.

Danish kings still claimed the right in times of need to raise a General Levy (Danish: *Almindeligt Opbud*), consisting of every male from age 18 to 60. When raised, they were expected to acquire a musket with ammunition or, if they could not afford this, a pike. The General Levy was to be organised into companies under officers whom they chose among themselves. Exclusively intended for defensive purposes, King Frederick in 1657 ordered the raising of a general levy in Schleswig-Holstein and the adjoining enclaves based on the take-out principle. The attempt failed miserably, and the General Levy played no role in the war.

Garrison Units

Companies from the Jutland Regiment were regularly detached for garrison service in strongholds such as Rendsborg and Frederiksodde. This was essentially a one-way street; each year, a company was detached from the regiment for garrison service. Instead, fresh men were conscripted to raise a new company to the regiment. The military establishment also included two enlisted companies, consisting of both Germans and Danes, which served in garrisons in Copenhagen and Scania. There were also smaller garrison units consisting of enlisted men.

The Crown in 1655 ordered two Norwegian infantry companies, one from the Akershus Regiment and another from the Bohus Regiment, to garrison fortifications around the Strait. These were large, old-style pre-war companies, each consisting of 250 men. When preparations for war began in spring 1657, another 200 Norwegians from various locations were conscripted and sent to Copenhagen. They may have formed part of the approximately 500 Norwegians who seem to have served as soldiers on board Danish warships, formally under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tønne Huitfeldt (1625–1677).[9] However, it is difficult to clarify the respective shares of Norwegians who were sent into garrison units or detached for shipboard duty.

Artillery

There was no formal organisation of the artillery into units. Instead, artillerymen served in forts and citadels as required. All artillerymen were enlisted, like in the past. All were specialists: officers (up to the rank of captain) or under-officers. Infantrymen detached from their units provided the necessary additional muscle.

In January 1657, Anders Bille ordered the formation of a field artillery. Previously, the Danish army had employed light regimental cannons, serviced by the foot regiments, in the Swedish manner. However, this time Bille and the National Master of Ordnance (*rigsfelttøjmestere*), Christian Friis (1617–1657), gathered artillery wherever they could find it, in the Copenhagen armoury, the fortresses, and the castles owned by the Crown. They conscripted draught-horses, saddlery, carriages, and transportation labour from southern Jutland and Fyn. Bille and Friis wanted six horses and two drivers for each cannon. This was an ever-increasing number, which in the final requirement before the outbreak of war had risen to 610 horses and 305 drivers. This was never achieved, and there is little doubt that the Swedish field artillery brought by King Charles was qualitatively superior to the Danish field artillery.

---

[9] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.33, 59.

Freeshooters and Dragoons

While the Territorial Levy and sometimes even the general levy took part in battles and provided men to garrisons, their impact on the outcome tended to be negligible. However, the continued operations during the war of pro-Danish guerrillas in parts of Scania and, although far less so, in other former Danish or Norwegian provinces, proved a persistent threat to Swedes, whether civilians or soldiers. The Swedish authorities referred to the guerrillas as *snapphanar* (sing. *snapphane*), a term of unclear origin that most likely was an old expression for brigand or robber. It was certainly a pejorative term, and it is unlikely that anybody would have called himself a *snapphane*, unless it was to intimidate his victims.

However, during the war *snapphanar* came in two main varieties: genuine *snapphanar*, who were outlaws in the true sense of the word, and 'freeshooters' (in Danish German: *Freyschützen*), paramilitary soldiers who regarded themselves as in Danish military service.

The *snapphanar* were outlaws who made a living from crime. Often hardened brigands who lived in makeshift camps in the forest, they were violent, had no formal organisation, and only co-operated with Danish troops when they found it convenient. As the war continued, their gangs were swelled by an influx of destitute peasants and army deserters.

The 'freeshooters', on the other hand, were recruited for Danish military service. During the 1643–1645 war with Sweden, the Danish Crown attempted to exchange the old levy system of local defence in Scania with a more up-to-date military organisation, consisting of men who had received some military training. A Scanian noble, Major General Ebbe Ulfeldt (1617–1682), accordingly formed units of voluntary freeshooters, recruited from the locals, who would operate as guerrillas against the Swedish communication lines, including on operations that reached into Swedish territory.[10] Ulfeldt later fled Denmark because he feared King Frederick's displeasure.

Even so, Ebbe's brother Knud Ulfeldt (1609–1657) in 1657 raised a squadron of dragoons (*Ulfeldts Dragoneskadron*) from Scanian peasants who essentially were voluntary freeshooters with horses for transportation. Some reported the squadron's strength as 2,000 strong but if so, they probably confused it with the general levy. Ulfeldt then led his men into battle but fell already in the first engagement, at Sibbarp, where his men drove off a Swedish cavalry company under Colonel Sven Ranck, who apparently searched out and shot Ulfeldt dead before he withdrew.

---

[10] Bo Knarrström and Stefan Larsson, *Hans Majestäts friskyttar av Danmark* (Stockholm: Riksantikvarieämbetet, 2008), pp.70–74.

However, the ultimately most famous free-shooter was Svend Poulsen (*c.* 1610–*c.* 1680), a veteran of the Thirty Years' War and the previous war with Sweden. His exploits, real and imagined, were from 1853 onwards described in numerous works of fiction. The real Poulsen recruited some 100 disgruntled peasants from Halland who were dissatisfied with Swedish rule. On 20 June 1657, Poulsen and his men swore fealty to King Frederick in Helsingborg, after which they returned to the borderlands in Scania and Halland to kill Swedes.

Many among both *snapphanar* and freeshooters carried rifled muskets of the type used for hunting. This made them efficient guerrillas, and most of their activities consisted of raiding, attacks on communication lines, and similar activities. However, already from the outset of the war, they engaged in private plundering and murder in the neighbouring Swedish province of Småland. In response, Swedish peasants self-mobilised to defend their farms against the intruders. The struggle between the two groups tended to be vicious and bloody.

Preparations for War

In January 1657, King Frederick issued orders to put the army in order and raise additional enlisted units. Numerous units were soon formed, by individuals or families. The noble Gunde Rosencrantz raised a regiment of foot for his son Jørgen. Others raised units which they intended to command themselves. Meanwhile, the national regiments were reinforced by enlistment - but enlisted units received national soldiers, too, when needed to fill up the ranks. So did Frands Brockenhuus receive a patent to enlist a cavalry regiment of three companies, to which he was then permitted to add 200 of the parish cavalry from Fyn.[11]

In mid 1657, the Danish military establishment accordingly consisted of an estimated 11,200 cavalry, 1,500 dragoons and freeshooters, and 15,000 regular infantry (Table 6, p.121).[12] There were also many former national soldiers, who in case of need could be recalled into service, and the organised but essentially untrained territorial levy.[13]

Operationally, the King wanted two field armies, one in Holstein and one in Scania. He wanted the units from the territories west of the Great

---

[11] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.378–411.

[12] The Swedish resident in Helsingør Magnus Durell in September 1655 reported the totals for both Denmark and Norway as follows: 4,000 infantry in Scania and Blekinge, 2,000 infantry on Zealand, 4,000 infantry in Jutland, 4,000 infantry on Fyn and Fehmarn, that is, in total 14,000 infantry in Denmark, together with 8,000 infantry in Norway. Durell reported the total number of horse in both Denmark and Norway as 10,000. Carlbom, *Karl X Gustav*, p.33. Considering that additional men were raised before the war, Durell was not far off the mark. In comparison, Carlbom underestimated Danish numbers.

[13] Lind, *Hæren*, p.92, estimates a total military establishment of 30,000 to 40,000 men, based on the number of companies formed.



Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp. (David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl, Gripsholm Castle)

Belt (Jutland and Holstein) to concentrate on the southern border, while the units from the islands (Zealand, Falster, Lolland, and Fyn) and Scania should move to the Scanian border with Sweden. In reality, some units from Fyn were nonetheless sent to the southern border.

Orders were issued for the first Jutland units to march towards the southern border in January 1657. There, conditions were not great from a military perspective. The only existing military forces in the Duchies, that is, Schleswig-Holstein and the adjoining enclaves, consisted of the retinue of nobles. However, they never mobilised nor trained together. In February, orders were accordingly issued from Copenhagen that the Duchies should raise a general levy of all able-bodied men. This order was aimed to preempt not only a Swedish invasion but also any attempt from Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, whom the King disliked, to act on behalf of the Swedish cause.

Except for the attempt to raise a general levy, mobilisation was successful. So many new recruits were raised that for a while, the Zealand Regiment of foot consisted of 22 companies while the Scanian Regiment of foot consisted of 24 companies. Even the nobles' companies in Zealand, Lolland, and Falster were reinforced to include, for a while, eight companies.

Unfortunately, the quality of the new recruits left much to desire. A Swedish agent in Copenhagen, Peter Chambers (*c.* 1610–1678), reported about the new recruits of the Zealand Regiment of foot:

> They exercised some of their infantry a few days ago; many of them carried the rapier on the right side, the pike on the left shoulder and the musket on the right; I watched this in amazement. And their officer ran all over the place like another wild goose and ordered them from the left to the right without even noticing if they carried their weapons on the right or left side. Despite this, the other Danish nobles prized him and claimed that he was a brave man and excellent officer. And I bet my life that anyone of our common soldiers would be able to teach both their officers and men to handle their weapons.[14]

Even though many of the enlisted officers and men had some military experience, most Danes did not. Nor had they been sufficiently trained, either individually or in units. When put to the test against the battle-hardened and well-trained Swedish army from the Commonwealth, it soon became clear that Danish expectations fell short. However, the situation was not as clear cut versus Swedish units elsewhere. Although generally better trained, the Swedish units in Bremen and the Scandinavian lands had not yet had the chance to gain as much battle experience as those in King Charles's army. In the opinion of the Swedish Major General Joachim von Volckmar (1606–1662), who assumed overall command in Bremen-Verden in 1657, and in July 1657 had to fight off the first Danish onslaught against Stade, the Danish cavalry had excellent horses and were very well armed.[15]

---

[14] Chambers, 21 February 1657 (O.S.), RA, Skokloster Saml. 2 Fol. Nr. 64; cited in Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.386 n. 1. Chambers was ultimately exposed by the Danes and in late May 1657 had to flee to Germany. He continued to report from Hamburg and Lübeck, remaining in Swedish service until 1674.

Table 6. Danish army regiments, 1657. Numbers are necessarily estimates. E = enlisted, P = parish cavalry[16]

Cavalry		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Retinue of nobles (*Rostjeneste*)	3	500(?)
Reinforcement of nobles (*Rostjenestens Fordobling*)	3	500(?)
Jutland Cavalry Regiment (*Jydske Rytterregiment*) (E)	3	300(?)
Zealand Cavalry Regiment (*Sjællandske Rytterregiment*) (E)	2	200(?)
Fyn Cavalry Regiment (*Fyenske Rytterregiment)* (E)	2	200(?)
Scanian Cavalry Regiment (*Skaanske Rytterregiment*) (E)	2	200(?)
Sten Bille's Cavalry Regiment (*Billes Rytterregiment*), also known as as the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Horse (*Rigsmarskens Livregiment Ryttere*) (E, Jutes)	10	1,100
Kay Lykke's Cavalry Regiment (*Kay Lykkes Rytterregiment*), also known as the King's Life Regiment of Horse (*Kongens Livregiment til Hest*) (E, Fyn)	10	1,000
Frands Brockenhuus's Cavalry Regiment, also known as the Queen's Life Regiment of Horse (*Dronningens Livregiment til Hest*) (E, P Jutland/Fyn)	8	800
Major General Friedrich von Buchwald's Cavalry Regiment (E, P)	4	350
Major General Hans Rantzau's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Jens von Löwenclau *genannt* Hadersleben's Cavalry Regiment (E, P)	12	1,250
Christopher Hvass's Cavalry Regiment (E, P)	6	600
Ditlev Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment, under Josias Breide Rantzau (E)	6	600

---

[15] Volckmar to Wrangel, 26 June 1657 (O.S.), Skokloster archive. King Charles in January 1657 sent Field Marshal Wrangel first to Pomerania and then to Bremen to inspect the defences and do what he could to improve them. Carlbom, *Om Karl X Gustafs Polska Krig*, p.71. When Wrangel left Bremen, Volckmar shouldered overall command.

[16] Sources: primarily Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen'; Carlbom, Karl X Gustav, pp.55–61.

Hinrich Ahlefeldt’s Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Henrik Sehested’s Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	650
Axel Urup’s Cavalry Regiment (E, P)	?	?
Ulrich Christian’s Cavalry Regiment (E)	?	?
Franz Joachim Trampe’s Cavalry Regiment (E, P)	?	?
Total Cavalry		**11,200 (est.)**
Dragoons and Freeshooters		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Niels Krabbe’s Dragoon Regiment (*Niels Krabbes Dragonregiment*), under Lieutenant Colonels Poul Beenfeldt and Eiler Holck, also known as the Grand Marshal of the Realm’s Life Regiment of Dragoons (*Rigsmarskens Livregiment Dragoner*) (E, Jutes)	6(?)	500(?)
Ulrich Christian’s Dragoon Regiment (*Ulrich Christians Dragonregiment*) (E, Jutes)	?	?
Knud Ulfeldt’s Dragoon Squadron (*Knud Ulfeldts Dragoneskadron*) (E, Scanians)	?	?
Svend Poulsen’s Dragoons (primarily Halland peasant freeshooters disgruntled with Swedish rule)	1	100
Total Dragoons		**1,500 (est.)**
Infantry		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Jutland Regiment (*Jydske Regiment*) and the nobles’ battalion (*Adelseskadronen*), under Valdemar Lykke	14	2,300
Zealand Regiment (*Sjællandske Regiment*), of which 2 coy from Fyn, under Erik Quitzow	8–22	800–2,200(?)
Scanian Regiment (*Skaanske Regiment*), under Wulff Hieronymus von Kratzsch	5–24	500–2,400(?)
Nobles’ companies	4–8	800(?)
Ulrich Frederick Gyldenløve’s Regiment, also known as the King’s Life Regiment of Foot (*Kongens Livregiment til Fods*) or Garde de Corps (E)	10	800
Kjeld Lange’s Regiment (*Kjeld Langes Regiment*) (E, Jutes)	10	800
Christian Friis’s Regiment (*Christian Friis’ Regiment*) (E)	?	?
Jørgen Rosencrantz’s Regiment	10	800
Eckerich Johann Lübbe’s Regiment, also known as the Black Regiment (E)	10	900
Ditlev Brockdorff’s Regiment (E)	10	700
Joachim von Bredow’s Regiment (E)	8	?

Knud Ulfeldt's Battalion (*Knud Ulfeldts Eskadron*) (E, Scanians)	?	?
Henrik Lindenow's Battalion (*Henrik Lindenows Eskadron*) (E, Scanians)	?	?
Possibly the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Battalion of Foot (*Rigsmarskens Fodfolkseskadron*)		?
Various garrison units		1,000 (est.)
Total Infantry		**15,000 (est.)**
Artillery		
In garrisons only (E)		300 (est.)
Field artillery, formed of the above in January 1657		
Territorial Levy		
Organised but not called up (*Landeværn*)		
Grand Total (levies excluded)		**28,000 (est.)**

Weapons, Equipment, and Uniforms

Until perhaps as late as 1650, Danish cavalry remained traditional, consisting of fully armoured cuirassiers as well as arquebusiers who might wear a helmet and a breast- and backplate. However, at around this time armour was abolished, and henceforth all cavalrymen were armed in the modern manner, mostly with breast- and backplate only.

Until about the same time, Danish dragoons were no more than mounted infantry, some serving as musketeers and others who somehow brought pikes to carry in battle. During the war with Sweden, there is little, if anything, to suggest that dragoons still carried pikes, so their armament was modernised, too.

Infantry armaments followed the Swedish model, with up to a third of the men armed with pikes and at least two thirds with muskets. Danish infantry used both matchlock and snaphance muskets. Snaphance muskets were also used by dragoons.[17]

In similarity to the Swedish army, the old-style bandolier with wooden bottles for gunpowder was in the process of being replaced by paper cartridges each containing a measured charge of gunpowder carried in a cartridge box. Danish records reveal that in mid 1657, the Copenhagen armoury distributed paper and sailing cloth to make cartridges to Niels Lykke's company of foot.[18] The records seldom reveal when the switch from bandolier to cartridge box took place, but this suggests that the switch already was underway in the Danish army. The same development took place in the Swedish and Norwegian armies, but we lack detailed records thereof.

---

[17] Alm, *Eldhandvapen 1*, pp.170, 196.

[18] Alm, *Eldhandvapen 1*, pp.187–8.

Denmark experimented with, and issued as a service weapon, probably the first repeating musket to be brought into general military service. This was the Kalthoff repeater, invented by the armourer and gunsmith Peter Kalthoff. These weapons were typically made with a ball magazine situated in a cylindrical cavity in the stock under the barrel and a gunpowder magazine in the butt. Many Kalthoff guns used a magazine located in the ramrod cavity. Most had a magazine of 30 balls, while others carried up to 60, although this adversely affected the balance of the gun. Kalthoff built some early models as wheellock weapons, but by 1645, he switched to flintlocks. Some were made as muskets, others as carbines. Most Kalthoff repeaters used a rectangular breech block with two or three chambers. Pointing the muzzle upwards, the shooter operated the gun by laterally rotating the trigger guard to the right and back. This deposited a ball and load of gunpowder in the breech and cocked the gun. After firing, the process was repeated. Another variant of the Kalthoff repeater instead used a cylindrical breech block with a gunpowder magazine beneath the lock, and had a capacity of up to 10 shots. The rate of fire has been estimated as no less than 30 per minute. The weapon was expensive and, if broken, could only be repaired by a specialist gunsmith. Moreover, during continued use gunpowder fouling often caused malfunctioning. Even so, this was the best repeating weapon of its time.[19] During the 1658–1660 siege of Copenhagen, a full company of Ulrich Frederick Gyldenløve's Regiment, also known as the King's Life Regiment of Foot or Garde de Corps, was armed with Kalthoff repeaters. Some of the surviving guns are numbered, with 108 and 110 being the highest.

An artillery system of common calibres was introduced in 1644 and further developed in 1649. Known as King Frederick's system, it established the following standard service calibres: 2-, 4-, 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-pounders. In the early 1650s, regimental 3-pounders were added to the system.

The siege artillery included a variety of cannons, including the aforementioned 18-pounders and 12-pounders as well as mortars.

Little is known of Danish uniform colours during the war, or even if they employed uniforms. The French envoy to Brandenburg, Jean (Johann) Frischmann, in 1658–1659 noted that Danish musketeers wore red coats. We know that another uniform colour among Danes was natural grey.

There is more information on field signs. Since at least 1611, and certainly still by 1641, Danish and Schleswig infantrymen wore a red and yellow band around the arm or hat. Holstein infantry instead wore a red and white band in the same position. In the same way, Danish and Schleswig cavalrymen wore red and yellow sashes around the waist, while Holstein cavalrymen wore red and white sashes. In 1658, the Danes wore similar but possibly not identical field signs. At Copenhagen 1659, they wore white bands, described

---

[19] Alm, *Eldhandvapen 1*, pp.177–9; Gad Rausing, 'Kalthoff's Flintlocks ... The Repeaters of 1657', *Gun Digest* 1991, pp.62–4.





Above top: Kalthoff repeater, mid seventeenth century. Total length 139 cm, barrel length 99 cm, weight 3.9 kg. (Royal Armoury, Stockholm)

Above: Danish 18-pounder of bronze, cast in Glückstadt, 1651. With the royal cypher of King Frederick II. Length 3.97 m, weight 2,435 kg. (Army Museum, Stockholm, AM.010029)

as handkerchiefs, around the hat.[20] The Danish noble officer Niels Rosencrantz (1627–1676) during a battle lost the white band which he wore around the right arm. When he was found, wounded and without field sign, by a group of Danish musketeers, they beat him half to death, since they believed him to be a Swede. It was only when they began to plunder his clothes that they recognised him.[21] At the 1659 battle of Nyborg, the entire coalition army reportedly wore white bands around their hats. Or, perhaps it was only the Danish contingent which did. There is not enough information to be certain.

The Navy

Denmark and Norway had separate armies, but the navy was a common undertaking. Although German officers dominated King Frederick's army, his navy was mostly crewed and officered by Danes and Norwegians, with a significant share of Dutchmen. This ensured that the navy was abreast with technical and tactical developments in naval warfare, as it was practiced on the Continent.

King Frederick worked to increase the strength of his navy, and in the early 1650s, the number of warships in his fleet was again comparable to that of the Swedish adversary. However, this situation did not last long. Already before the war, the number of warships available to the Danish navy decreased. Moreover, the war with Sweden impacted badly on Danish naval strength (Table 7).

---

[20] Roger Manley, *The History of the Late Warres in Denmark, Comprising, All the Transactions, both Military and Civil, during the Differences betwixt the Two Northern Crowns, in the Years 1657, 1658, 1659, 1660* (London: Thomas Basset, 1670), p.48.

[21] Theodor Jakobsson, *Lantmilitär beväpning och beklädnad under äldre Vasatiden och Gustav II Adolfs tid* (Stockholm: Generalstaben, 1938), pp.395–6 n.2,

Table 7. Number of warships in the Danish navy, divided in size groups (metric tons)[22]

Year	100–500	501–1,000	1,001–1,500	1,500+	Total
1645	19	13	2	-	34
1650	17	13	4	2	36
1655	9	13	4	2	28
1660	2	8	4	2	16

In early 1657, the Swedish resident in Helsingør, Magnus Durell, in a report to Stockholm described the current status of Danish navy. Durell reported that the whole country was gossiping about the Grand Admiral of the Realm, Ove Gedde, who they said lacked ability and courage. He noted the difficulties in equipping the fleet, having observed that the warships were dirty and that damages remained unrepaired. Finally, Durell claimed that the Danish sailors were the most miserable in the realm, because they were pressed into service. We do not know if Durell's report had any impact on the Swedish Admiralty's assessment of the Danish navy, but this is unlikely. Almost certainly, Durell this time was angry because of the anti-Swedish sentiments then current in Danish society. Notably, Durell's earlier reports described Danish naval capability in significantly more positive terms. In 1653, he had described its personnel, both Danes and Norwegians, as experienced and able sailors.[23] In short, Durell's pre-war reports were more objective, since he then was not yet affected by the public mood, which only shows that professional intelligence officers, too, may succumb to popular opinion when compiling their reports.

Yet, Durell's continued reporting in 1657 presented a basically correct picture of the Danish navy. The Council of the Realm had ordered a fleet to be equipped, and there certainly were problems, with regard to availability of supplies, lack of repairs, and even tensions within navy command. In April, the Danish Admiralty (Danish: *Admiralitetskollegiet*, only established in 1655) sent two small warships, the newly built *København* ('Copenhagen', 32 cannons, under Peter Lützen) and *Søbladet* ('Sea Leaf', 16 cannons, under Brønild Lauritzen), together with a yacht known as *Prinsens Jagt* ('Prince's Yacht', under Hans Dall) to the River Elbe for operations in the vicinity of Holstein and the Swedish Duchy of Bremen. Peter Lützen, a civilian merchant captain, commanded the squadron. He immediately began to call himself admiral, and at the same time bestowed the rank of respectively vice admiral and rear admiral (*schoutbynacht*, from Dutch *schout-bij-nacht*, 'watch-at-night', the rank below vice admiral) on his fellow merchant captains Lauritzen and Dall.

To increase the number of warships, the Crown hired already armed and manned warships in Amsterdam. In April 1657, three warships commanded by Peter Jansen de Koningh (1631–1691) left Amsterdam, bound for Copenhagen. Soon afterwards, another three warships, under Marquor Rodsten (1625–1681), left Amsterdam, ultimately ordered to the River Weser.

---

[22] Glete, *Navies and Nations*, p.596; Bellamy, *Christian IV and His Navy*, p.279.

[23] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.106, 523 n.31.



Above: Danish ceremonial admiral's broadsword, manufactured in Solingen in 1648 with the name cypher of King Frederick III. Total length 127.5 cm, blade length 95 cm, and weight 2.03 kg.

Above left: close-up of blade.

(Royal Armoury, Stockholm)

The Crown hired auxiliary warships from private enterprises as well. So was, for instance, the aforementioned *København* hired by the Danish Salt Company (Danish: *Det danske Saltkompagni*). The Crown did not pay in cash but with a promise to offset the cost against any forthcoming customs duties the company would have to pay. Soon after the outbreak of war, the Crown on similar terms hired the ship *Samson* (40 cannons) from a Norwegian enterprise, the Northern Salt Company (*Det nordenfjeldske Saltkompagni*). Yet other auxiliary warships were provided by Norwegian business enterprises such as the Iceland Company (*Det islandske Kompagni*) and the Greenland Company (*Det grønlandske Kompagni*). These auxiliary ships included the *Islands Fisk* ('Iceland Fish', 40 cannons), *Caritas* (30 cannons), *Emanuel* (24 cannons), and *Sælhunden* ('Seal', 12 cannons). Private individuals, too, provided small auxiliary ships on similar terms. One was the galiot provided by its owner and master Claus Mikkelsen for reconnaissance purposes which had no name so unsurprisingly became known as *Claus Mikkelsens Galiot* whenever a name was needed. Another was *Klips Galiot*, equally unsurprisingly provided by a Dutch ship's master named Cornelius Willumsen Klip, who with his crew of five men carried out similar reconnaissance missions.

From the hiring of auxiliary warships from private individuals it was but a small step to issue letters of marque for privateers willing to attack Swedish targets. The first such letter was issued already on 1 June 1657, that is, 10 days before the Crown declared war on Sweden (but about a week after a Danish naval squadron under Niels Juel began to seize Swedish merchantmen passing through the Strait). It was issued to a small group of businessmen represented by a Danish compass-maker, Cornelius Kruse, who for this purpose equipped a galiot named *Den flyvende Hjort* ('Flying Stag', six cannons). Altogether, the Crown issued 13 letters of marque in 1657.

King Frederick also needed men. By spring 1657, the Danish navy had 1,300 sailors at its disposal, including 900 conscripted sailors who under normal circumstances would have been sent home for the winter, but this time had been retained on duty. On 21 April, the Admiralty issued conscription orders, demanding 1,000 of the 'best and most experienced' sailors in Norway together with another 527 sailors from Denmark. In the following month, the Admiralty ordered the conscription of yet another 550 sailors from Norway. The Admiralty's need for almost 3,400 conscripted sailors can be compared to the need in 1646, when the Navy had 3,200 sailors, of whom 2,000 were based in Copenhagen. However, the Admiralty needed yet more, so simultaneously enlisted experienced officers and sailors in the Netherlands and Lübeck.[24]

---

[24] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.108.

4

The Norwegian Military Establishment

As noted, the Crowns of Denmark and Norway were united in a personal union under King Frederick. Each kingdom maintained its own separate military establishment, although officers moved freely between them. We have also seen that Denmark and Norway shared a common navy.

In Norway, unlike in Denmark, most soldiers belonged to national regiments, which first had been established in 1628. By the early 1650s, there were four national infantry regiments, including one based at Akershus in the capital of Christiania (modern-day Oslo).

Norway had a smaller population than Denmark. A census of 1664–1666 suggests that the total population at the time was about 440,000 inhabitants and growing. While the population had suffered losses from plague and wars preceding the census, Norway enjoyed high population growth and had done so for more than a century, so the total population is estimated to have been roughly the same in 1657, or some 500,000 if the population of the subsequently lost province of Bohuslän is included in the estimate. Because of the high population growth and the difficulties of subsistence farming caused by the climate, Norway functioned as a source of manpower for the Danish army and navy comparable to the role that Finland played for the Swedish army. Norway regularly contributed a couple of thousand men for service in the Danish military, primarily in the navy but also as garrison units in the Strait or as soldiers on Danish warships.[1] However, for those Norwegians who engaged in trade, the future looked bright. Norway had developed into an important source of raw materials, and the economy grew rapidly. The export of fish – in particular herring – to much of Europe was very profitable. Logging, too, provided substantial revenues, in particular due to the never-ending demand from Dutch and English shipyards.

Military command in Norway followed two separate chains of command. In northern Norway, the General Military Commissioner (*Generalkrigskommissær*), the Norwegian noble Jørgen Bielke (1621–1696),

---

[1] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.33, 35, 36, 59.



Left: Governor of Norway, Niels Trolle, 1650s. (Albert Haelwegh; Skokloster Castle)

Below: *Generalkrigskommissær* Jørgen Bielke. (National Library of Denmark)





Left: Major General Iver Krabbe, 1665.

despite his civilian function commanded the military out of Trondheim. In a similar manner, southern Norway was commanded by Major General Iver Krabbe (1602–1666), who primarily operated out of Bohus Fortress in Bohuslän. Both were subordinated the Governor of Norway, Niels Trolle (1599–1667). Both Bielke and Krabbe were experienced and able soldiers, but Krabbe, a Scanian noble in his fifties, was also a talented administrator who now set out to reform the Norwegian army. The divided command eventually seems to have resulted in conflicting strategic objectives. Although there is no evidence that Bielke and Krabbe were at odds, Bielke, the younger of the two and technically a civilian official, focused on regaining Norway's previous territorial losses in the north while Krabbe was more attuned to King Frederick's objectives in the south. As a result, northern and southern Norway mostly fought separate wars.

Norway had formulated contingency plans for the next war with Sweden already in 1652 and 1653. Each regiment and company were allocated posts along the border, and the conscripts knew where to assemble.

When King Frederick decided upon war with Sweden, Norway conscripted additional men and armed the levy, especially in those areas which lacked army garrisons. The commanders called up border guards and coast guards, put in order and reinforced depots and existing fortifications, and introduced additional taxes to fund the war.

Norway undeniably contributed more resources and men to the defence of Denmark than Denmark did to its twin country. King Frederick, quite correctly from his perspective, regarded the Norwegian theatre of war as of secondary importance. So did King Charles, who allocated more resources – including his experienced field army – to the conquest of Denmark and its Continental territories than to Norway. We will see that the Norwegian army often operated more successfully against the Swedes than its Danish counterpart. The Norwegian successes were real, but they could not have been sustained, had the Swedes focused on operations in Norway instead of Denmark.

Raising the Norwegian Army

Cavalry

The nobility remained obliged to provide armed and equipped cavalrymen according to the traditional military duty known as *Rostjenst* (retinue of nobles). However, the cavalry organisation was obsolete, consisting of independent companies that were untrained for service in squadrons. Although often commanded by enlisted foreign officers, most cavalrymen in the retinue of nobles and the similar structures raised by civilian officials (corresponding to the Danish parish cavalry) were not fully familiar with the tactical doctrines common on the Continent.

Iver Krabbe was quite aware of the obsolete structure of these formations, so he petitioned the King to reform the Norwegian army. In March 1657, Krabbe received the necessary authorisation. We will see that he began work with the infantry. Krabbe had no time fully to reform the retinue of nobles before the outbreak of war (and we do not know if he had such intentions), but he initiated the transformation of the independent cavalry companies into a modern cavalry regiment.[2] In addition, he set what seems to have been an establishment strength of approximately 100 men per cavalry company, including some 12 under officers and officers, which made them roughly comparable to Swedish companies.

Dragoons

There seem to have been few, if any, dedicated dragoon units in Norway before the outbreak of war. When Krabbe in 1657 received the necessary authorisation to restructure the Norwegian army, he raised several dragoon companies as part of the reform. The new companies had an establishment strength of either 101 or 121 men per company, in each case including 21 under officers and officers. As with other units, this made a Norwegian dragoon company roughly comparable to its Swedish equivalent. Most dragoons were conscripted Norwegians.

Infantry

The infantry organisation was particularly obsolete. We have seen that Norway had four regiments of foot: the Akershus Regiment (*Akershusiske Regiment*) in Christiania, Bohus Regiment (*Bohusiske Regiment*) in the province of Bohuslän, Bergenhus Regiment (*Bergenhusiske Regiment*) in Bergen, and Trondheim Regiment (*Trondhjemske Regiment*) in the unfortified town of Trondheim. Of these, the Bergenhus Regiment was less complete than the others, since for geographical reasons it was the least likely to be involved in any hostilities with Sweden and thus was temporarily disbanded in 1646.

Following a reduction in 1649, each of the regiments had a strength of approximately 2,400 men, divided into eight companies of 300 men each. Compared to the Swedish army, there were comparatively fewer officers in these regiments, whose organisation was regarded as out of date. Essentially, the regiments functioned as training regiments. In peacetime, the regiments were not fully manned. Instead, several companies were called up each year for garrison duty, training, and manual labour to maintain the fortifications. The rest of the time, the soldiers worked as farm-hands on the farms from which they came.[3]

When Krabbe in 1657 received the necessary authorisation to reform the Norwegian army, he broke up the old units and instead established new ones, following more up-to-date organisational structures. He split the existing Bohus Regiment into two modern regiments: the Bohus Regiment and Smaalenene Regiment (*Smaalenske Regiment*). Likewise, he divided the existing Akershus Regiment into the Akershus Regiment and the Oppland Regiment (*Oplandske Regiment*). He also split the Trondheim Regiment into two: old and new Trondheim Regiment. The two Trondheim Regiments acquired conspicuously different characters, since most existing Norwegian or Danish under-officers and officers remained in the old regiment while the new regiment was staffed with recently enlisted under-officers and officers, most of whom were French or Dutch in origin.

---

[2] As far as is known, all or most of the cavalry companies, including at least Vietinghoff's cavalry company, in 1657 were combined into Eckstein's Cavalry Regiment. Vietinghoff, formerly a chamberlain of the court of Swedish Queen Hedwig Eleonora, had gone into Danish service in 1654.

[3] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.62.

When Krabbe split the old regiments into half, he also split the companies. Henceforth, a Norwegian infantry company consisted of some 150 to 160 men and from 20 to 26 under officers and officers, which made it roughly comparable to its Swedish equivalent.

In Nordland, the region north of Trøndelag region, three companies of foot were raised. Their purpose was very specific. King Frederick had issued specific orders that when he attacked Sweden, he wanted these companies to enter Swedish territory to seize and gain control of the silver mine at Mt. Nasa and the refinery facilities in nearby Silbojokk.

Levies

The Norwegian army traditionally made great and efficient use of levied peasants, who mostly were farmhands without land of their own. When levies were called up, each farmstead was supposed to provide a musket with 10 to 12 shots and a sword of some kind (usually referred to as a sabre but cutlass might be a better term) or at least an axe. The farmstead also had to provide garments, other gear, food supplies, and some cash for travel expenses to the soldier. Garments were regulated as shirt, breeches, stockings, a pair of shoes, and a headgear of dyed cloth. We do not know what the headgear was supposed to look like, but the remark about dyed cloth suggests that it was not a hat, but probably a *karpus*, a round woollen cap with flaps that could be turned down to protect the eyes, ears, and neck.

Preparations for War

As a result of Krabbe's efforts, the Norwegian regular army during the war consisted of some 12,000 men, of whom – unusually at this time – only 10 percent served as cavalry or dragoons (Table 8, opposite). The vast majority of the men of the army were Norwegians, conscripted or sometimes enlisted for service. Most under officers, too, remained Norwegians. While the modernisation and reorganisation of the old-style regiments necessitated the enlistment of numerous additional officers, most of whom could only be found abroad, the Norwegian army remained essentially a national army, which gave it a character quite different from that of its Danish counterpart.

Table 8. The reformed Norwegian army, late 1657[1]

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Cavalry</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Michael Eckstein's Cavalry Regiment, which included all or most of the following:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eckstein's Life Company of Horse</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Knud Skinckel's Cavalry Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Mouritz Hieronimus von Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Friedrich von Vietinghoff (<i>genannt</i> Scheel)'s Cavalry Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Johan Andersen's Cavalry Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Johan Hülsthorst's Life Company of Horse (Trøndelag retinue of nobles, 87 men)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4" align="right">Total strength: some 600 men</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4"></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Dragoons</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain (1658: Major) Otto Urnes's Dragoon Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Johan (Jan) Nielssen's Dragoon Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Nicolaus Ringkjøbing's Dragoon Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Bertil Lange's Dragoon Company</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Major Knud von Hadelen's Dragoon Company (former infantrymen from the Trondheim Regiment)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Captain Valraven de Graff's Dragoon Company (former infantrymen from the Trondheim Regiment)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Total strength: some 669 men (Trondheim companies were understrength, consisting of only 70 men each including officers)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4"></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Infantry</td></tr>
<tr><td><i>Regiment</i></td><td><i>CO</i></td><td><i>Coy</i></td><td><i>Strength</i></td></tr>
<tr><td>Bohus Regiment (<i>Bohusiske Regiment</i>)</td><td>Major General Iver Krabbe</td><td align="right">9 incl. Life Company</td><td align="right">1,650 men</td></tr>
<tr><td>Smaalenene Regiment (<i>Smaalenske Regiment</i>)</td><td>Otto Skade</td><td align="right">8</td><td align="right">1,400</td></tr>
<tr><td>Akershus Regiment (<i>Akershusiske Regiment</i>), also known as the Blue Regiment</td><td>Hans Jacob Schørt</td><td align="right">8?</td><td align="right">1,500</td></tr>
<tr><td>Oppland Regiment (<i>Oplandske Regiment</i>)</td><td>Major General Georg Reichwein</td><td align="right">8?</td><td align="right">1,330</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bergenhus Regiment (<i>Bergenhusiske Regiment</i>)</td><td>Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Due</td><td align="right">4?</td><td align="right">400–500</td></tr>
</table>

---

[1] Sources: primarily Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.64–71; Carlbom, *Karl X Gustav*, pp.63–4.

Old Trondheim Regiment (*Gamle Trondhjemske Regiment*)	Christopher Frederik von Gersdorff	8	1,173
New Trondheim Regiment (*Nye Trondhjemske Regiment*)	Jørgen Bielke	8	1,055
Helgeland Company (Nordland)	Captain Adrian Jacobsøn	1	112
Salten Company (Nordland)	Captain Cornelius Rytz	1	120
Senja Company (Nordland)	Captain-Lieutenant (the rank between lieutenant and captain) Christen Søfrensen	1	100
Independent enlisted companies (musketeers), under Captains Jan Carstens von der Heyde, Johan Forbus, and Antoni Marschall		3	311 Half with snaplocks, half possibly with wheellocks
Ålen Company (*Ålenske kompani*), under Captain Christen Andersen		1	109 Raised in November in Trøndelag
Jämtland Company, under Captain Oluf Karlsen Godsche		1	280 Raised in December 1657 from Jämtland volunteers
			Total: some 9,500
Garrison Units			
Hugo de Meyer's Garrison Company (Trondheim) and several other garrison units, of unclear but usually low strength which meant that they had to be reinforced from regular infantry units			
Field Artillery			
Field artillery			
			Grand total: Approx. 11,500–12,000

In mid September 1657, a new regiment under Colonel Hans Georg Hausmann was established, although it took time for it to reach any semblance of establishment strength. Hausmann and his officers arrived from Hamburg on 18 September 1657. They then began to form companies and find men. By spring 1658, the regiment consisted of five companies of at least 630, possibly 700 men, all of them musketeers. Some were detached to serve on skerry boats (see below).[4]

In addition to the regular units, men also served as crews on skerry boats and larger coastal ships, in burgher militias, and as peasant levies in the border regions.

Weapons, Equipment, and Uniforms

Norwegian cavalrymen were armed similarly to Swedish and Continental cavalry. Many wore a helmet and a breast- and backplate. The two companies of horse which in 1657 were attached to the Bohus Regiment wore breast- and backplates as well as helmets.[5]

Norwegian dragoons were mounted infantry, all of whom served as musketeers.

Infantry armaments followed the Swedish model, with up to a third of the men armed with pikes and at least two thirds with muskets. A pikeman still wore a helmet and commonly a breast- and backplate. This was certainly the case with the Bohus Regiment which in 1658 consisted of 442 pikemen with breast- and backplate as well as 216 pikemen with only a breastplate. In addition, the regiment had 656 helmets and 108 gorgets. Norwegian infantry used both matchlock and snaphance muskets. Snaphance muskets were also used by dragoons.[6] In Norway, significantly fewer pikes were delivered to the army than in Denmark, which resulted in the musket being the most common weapon. Iver Krabbe wanted, again in imitation of the Swedish model, that all musketeers carried weapons of the same calibre.[7]

Norway lacked much of the production facilities for artillery and gunpowder that were necessary for modern warfare. The country had four iron works that could cast cannons, but peacetime production did not cover the country's needs. King Frederick neglected Norway's artillery until the very last moment, and even then, he provided too little. The Crown did not issue orders to send additional artillery to Norway before early June 1657, when the navy already had begun to seize Swedish shipping, and then the first shipment included only eight small regimental cannons and two mortars. The Norwegian iron works were put on war footing only with the outbreak of war.

---

[4] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.68. It is tempting to see Hausmann's regiment as, at least in part, a predecessor of the Marine Regiment (*Marineregiment*) established in Norway some years after the war.

[5] Josef Alm, *Blanka vapen och skyddsvapen från och med 1500-talet till våra dagar* (Stockholm: Rediviva, 1975), p.263.

[6] Alm, *Eldhandvapen I*, pp.170, 196.

[7] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.44.

There is no information on Norwegian uniforms at the time.

The Coastal Navy

Although Denmark and Norway had separate armies, they shared the navy, which primarily operated in Danish waters. Since Norway could not expect much naval support in case of war, peasants in the coastal districts set up and manned a distinct coastal or inshore navy. This was a tradition that derived from the Nordic Seven Years' War (1563–1570) but corresponded to earlier practices. The coastal navy, which was raised upon orders of the King when faced with war, consisted of small vessels known as 'skerry boats' (Norwegian: *skjærbåter*) or 'gun boats' (Norwegian: *skyttebåter*). Up to 15 m in length, these vessels were open rowing boats which also might carry a mast or two, although the chief means of propulsion was up to 20 oars. Each carried a crew of up to 60 men. A large skerry boat was typically armed with four falconets and, sometimes, a larger cannon in the bow.[8] The obligation to fund and man skerry boats was reintroduced by King Frederick in 1653.[9]

We have also seen that King Frederick ordered the use of Norwegian merchantmen as auxiliary warships. Generally, each port-town had to raise one auxiliary warships. These were used by the navy, or for protection of the sea lines of communication between Norway and Denmark.

---

[8] Thomas Hauge, 'Galeier i den dansk-norske marine', *Norsk Tidskrift for Sjøvesen* 69 (1954), pp.351–71, on p.356.

[9] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.48.

5

The Dutch Expeditionary Force

A few words need to be said about the Dutch expeditionary force, although space does not permit a full study.

The Netherlands employed enlisted units of the Continental type, raised and led by professional officers. It follows that they employed organisational forms, armament, and tactics of the type which was commonplace at the time. The Dutch expeditionary force was commanded by Colonel Eustachius Puchler (d. 1661), a veteran who had led soldiers since at least 1621. All Dutch units brought to Denmark were infantry. The expeditionary force was at first established with a strength of 2,195 men, divided into two companies of 100 men, 13 of 65 men, and 23 of only 50 men. However, the raising of this force caused numerous problems, not least because of the lack of space on the warships of the fleet and shortages in food supplies. In fact, Puchler complained, the food provided was not only too little but also of inferior quality. As evidence, he presented Obdam with a mouldy loaf of rye bread. In the end, Obdam had to provide additional food supplies from navy supplies, and more suitable bread from the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC), which fortunately had shipboard supplies to spare.[1]

Having arrived in Denmark, Puchler's companies performed well. Many of the men were experienced soldiers and all were trained in standard tactics.

Although Puchler's infantry corps was important, the chief strength of the expeditionary force lay in the fleet. The Netherlands was a first-rate sea power, and Sweden was well aware of Dutch naval strength. King Charles, who as we have seen was never afraid to take on a new enemy, had a healthy respect for the Netherlands as a sea power. He was aware of and respected the fighting ability of the Dutch navy and he was equally aware that Dutch wealth enabled the Netherlands to raise new naval units as needed. Before war broke out, King Charles argued that although the Swedes had a fighting chance of defeating the Danish navy,

> in case the Netherlands directly engage in this endeavour, it is advisable that the Swedish fleet does not set out, nor engage in vain expenditures, before other friends [can be found] whose support of the Swedish navy may enable it to carry

---

[1] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.214.


Naues Mercatoriæ Hollandicæ vulgo VLIETEN

Right: Dutch flutes, 1647. (*Platen-Atlas*)



Left: Dutch warships at anchor, mid seventeenth century. (Willem van de Velde the Elder)



Right: Ship's cannons were occasionally loaded while already extended through the gun ports. One artilleryman has climbed out to sit astride the cannon barrel while loading. (Willem van de Velde the Elder, who attended the 1658 battle of the Sound on the Dutch fleet to document the campaign in paintings)





Far Left: Musketeer, reloading his musket. Dutch tile painted in blue, manufactured in Delft. Although many tiles merely copied earlier patterns, often from Jacob de Gheyn's *The Exercise of Armes* (1607), the rapier hilt and dress dates the tile to the mid seventeenth century.

Left: Pikeman. Dutch tile painted in blue, manufactured in Delft, mid seventeenth century.







Above: Musketeers and pikemen. Dutch tile painted in blue, Delft manufacture, mid seventeenth century.

Right: Drummer. Dutch tile painted in blue, Delft manufacture, mid seventeenth century.



Top: Musketeer. Dutch tile painted in blue, manufactured in Delft, mid seventeenth century.

Above: Pikeman. Dutch tile painted in blue, manufactured in Delft, mid seventeenth century.

> out some tasks of value. Instead, the navy should attempt to inconvenience the enemy through piracy and by allowing privateers from Gothenburg and Varberg to hazard their ships so as to reduce enemy strength, both in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, while the fleet remains in a safe location from which it immediately can enter into action when conditions become favourable ... my conclusion is that the navy should not hazard any combat [against the Dutch] without bearing in mind that if we lose our fleet, we cannot so easily build a new one, nor is the homeland sufficiently strong to cure this damage in less than a generation, for which reason it is better to suffer some loss than hazard our entire well-being.[2]

The Netherlands had far more warships than Sweden. However, the Dutch ships were generally smaller and the Netherlands had nothing to compare to the biggest Swedish warship (Table 9). Even so, the Dutch had sailing experience, in which they excelled and, in most cases, surpassed the Swedes.

Table 9. Number of warships in the Dutch navy, divided in size groups (metric tons)[3]

Year	100–500	501–1,000	1,001–1,500	1,500+	Total
1650	41	21	-	-	62
1655	34	65	2	-	101
1660	33	62	2	-	97

When in October 1658 Obdam's fleet finally set out, it consisted of 29 warships, six flutes (transports) with soldiers, four fireships, and four flutes or galiots used to carry food supplies. On route, additional warships joined the fleet, which raised the number of warships to 35 and supply ships to six. The expedition was important to the Netherlands, which dispatched a third of all its warships to the Baltic region. Each warship contained a compliment of marines in addition to the sailing crew. The fleet was followed by 33 merchantmen, some of which were bound for Norway but most on route to the Strait.[4] The war fleet alone carried 1,270 cannons, 3,993 sailors, and at least some 3,000 soldiers (2,195 destined for Copenhagen and the rest employed as marines). Yet, despite its impressive strength Obdam's fleet was actually smaller than the one he brought during the Danzig expedition of 1656 (described in Volume II). Then, he commanded 42 warships, 1,659 cannons, 4,787 sailors, and 1,187 soldiers.[5]

---

[2] King Charles to Per Brahe, 22 June 1657 (O.S.).

[3] Glete, *Navies and Nations*, p.639.

[4] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.215–17.

[5] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.49, 235–7, 551, n.78.

6

The Danish Declaration of War

On 27 May 1657, the heir apparent to the Holy Roman Empire, Leopold, through the Second Treaty of Vienna ratified the agreement signed on 30 March to send 12,000 troops and artillery to assist King John Casimir. When this news reached Denmark, King Frederick saw no reason to wait further. On 11 June, he issued a formal declaration of war on Sweden. The Danish Crown also published two manifests declaring its intentions.

The primary manifest, known in Latin as *Jus feciale armatae Daniae* ('The battle-ready Denmark's right to make war') but immediately translated into several languages and widely distributed, listed Denmark's grievances in five articles:

1. King Frederick had in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia lost Bremen and Verden to Sweden without compensation.
2. Sweden had protected the Danish exile Corfitz Ulfeldt, who had published 'an injurious Pamphlet in divers Languages'.
3. Sweden had refused to return the Norwegian settlements of Idre and Särna after the 1645 Treaty of Brömsebro.
4. Sweden had abused the exemption from the Sound Toll acquired in the 1645 Treaty of Brömsebro and subsequently defrauded King Frederick 'by false Bills of Lading and other cunning devices'.
5. During the Swedish siege of Danzig, the Swedish navy 'with accustom'd Swedish insolence' charged customs duties on Danish merchantmen wishing to trade with the city.

The tone was highly emotional, and as is usually the case with war manifests, the grievances had a basis in fact but presented a propagandistic interpretation of events.[1] Certainly, King Frederick had lost Bremen and Verden during the Thirty Years' War, but he was not then King of Denmark but Prince Archbishop and Prince Bishop of these domains. Corfitz Ulfeldt had sought refuge in Sweden because he feared for his life in Denmark where King Frederick, for personal reasons, wanted him dead or imprisoned. The

---

[1] On Swedish merchants exempt from the sound toll, the manifest complained: '... and that they might make us the more contemptible among forrain Nations, they imploy'd women also.'



Niels Juel. (National Library of Denmark)

settlements of Idre and Särna were so small and remote that at the time of the 1645 Treaty of Brömsebro both sides forgot about them (a Swedish chaplain, with 112 levies, had conquered both in 1644).[2] The sound toll constituted King Frederick's personal income, so the exemption no doubt irked him. And certainly, the Swedish navy had charged customs duties at Danzig. Following diplomatic form, then as well as now, the Swedish Crown soon published a refutation of the Danish accusations.

Meanwhile, a herald-at-arms on 15 June delivered Denmark's declaration of war to Erik Stenbock, the governor of Halland, in his administrative centre Halmstad.

Yet, hostilities were ongoing long before the ink dried on the declaration. The first acts of war took place already on 23–25 May when a Danish naval squadron under Niels Juel seized three large Swedish merchantmen passing through the Strait (their captains had left port against recommendations) and arrested their crews. Juel had already been patrolling the Strait for some time, but on 23 May, he took the Swedish merchantmen *Svenska Lejonet* ('Swedish Lion'), *Gripen* ('Griffon'), and *Lammet* ('Lamb'), the last from Gotland. Although no written order to seize the ship seems to be preserved, he certainly received an order on the following day to seize any other Swedish ships that might follow. There is thus no doubt that Juel's activities were not only sanctioned, but also ordered. The three Swedish ships were immediately incorporated into the Danish navy under their original names although in Danish form and with the appellation 'Swedish' to indicate their origin (*Svenske Løve*, *Svenske Grip*, and *Svenske Lam*).

Moreover, Danish warships commenced operations elsewhere as well long before the declaration of war reached Sweden. On 30 May, the Admiralty ordered Peter Lützen's Elbe Squadron to seize as many Swedish ships as he could, and on 1 June, the Danish Crown issued the first letter of marque to privateers willing to attack Swedish ships. On 10 June, King Frederick ordered Anders Bille to attack the Swedish duchies of Bremen-Verden.

Before war was declared, King Frederick also ordered all Danish and Norwegian bishops to prepare the people for war by instructing all priests to pray for military success on land and sea. They should also explain to their congregations that the efforts of the army and navy would liberate them from the ever-present threat of Swedish aggression.

On 11 June, the same day that King Frederick declared war, a Danish squadron consisting of three warships under Captain Lauritz Nielsen initiated an immediate blockade of Gothenburg. Nielsen's Kattegat squadron was also tasked to protect the sea lines of communication between Denmark and Norway, so the blockade was neither continuous nor very decisive. Nielsen received the support of several Norwegian skerry boats from Bohuslän under Captain Johan Brun, but they could do little in the open sea. Nielsen overestimated the strength of Gothenburg's defences. The Swedes soon learnt that Nielsen requested reinforcements, having informed King Frederick that he had received intelligence that no less than seven Swedish warships were preparing to set out from Gothenburg against him. The Danish intelligence was clearly wrong, since there was not a single Swedish warship in Gothenburg at the time. Moreover, already on 20 June the Danish Admiralty ordered Nielsen to return to join the main fleet, since Copenhagen, apparently in a nervous mood, already expected the Swedish main fleet to be on its way south and wanted to concentrate its forces. Nielsen left the area of operations on 29 June and arrived in Copenhagen already on the following day. However, by then the Danish Admiralty had changed its mind. Already on the following day (1 July), Nielsen was ordered 'immediately and within an hour' to return to the patrol area off Gothenburg. He was also promised reinforcements.

---

[2] Fredholm von Essen, *Lion from the North* 2, p.110.

We have seen that the news of the Danish declaration of war reached King Charles on 30 June, at Thorn in Prussia. The news confirmed what King Charles had long suspected and removed any remaining doubts about Denmark's intentions from his mind. In 1654, the King's late Lord High Chancellor Erik Oxenstierna had reminded the rest of the Council of the Realm that a war with Denmark would be tough: 'We know what a job we had with Denmark last time, when we had the Netherlands on our side', he had said. King Charles had fought Denmark from 1643 to 1644 and knew that the Chancellor was right. He also knew that this time, the Netherlands, one of the two greatest sea powers in Europe, almost certainly would fight on the side of the Danes. The war in the Commonwealth, vicious as it was, never put Sweden at risk. The real struggle for national survival began here and now.

That King Charles henceforth had to fight on two fronts did not worry him. In fact, the King welcomed the news, and so did the army. The war in the Commonwealth had bogged down, and supplies were insufficient. Denmark was a wealthy country, and fighting a war there seemed far more convenient than engaging in fruitless campaigns in the Commonwealth.

King Charles followed the same invasion plan devised by Johan Banér in 1636 and used by Lennart Torstensson in 1643. He would invade Denmark from the south, from the Swedish possessions in Germany. The operations plan for this contingency was already completed, he informed Queen Hedwig Eleonora on 20 June. King Charles spent the next four days making the final arrangements to safeguard his interests in the Commonwealth. Then, he led the Swedish field army towards the west. On 5 July, King Charles set out from Bromberg (modern-day Bydgoszcz) with a Swedish army, bound for Denmark by way of Swedish Pomerania. Any further conquests in the east would have to wait until he had defeated Sweden's primary enemy, Denmark.

7

The Attack on the Duchy of Bremen

Denmark had three land borders with Sweden. Longest was the mountainous border between Norway and Sweden. Shorter but possibly of higher importance was the forested border between the Danish province of Scania, east of the Strait, and the southern Swedish mainland. Finally, there was the River Elbe border between Danish Holstein and the Swedish duchies of Bremen–Verden.

Since King Frederick did not divulge his strategy to his generals, they seemed somewhat uncertain of which objectives to aim for when the Danish army went into action in 1657. Nor has any strategic plan been preserved in national archives. Even so, we may assume that King Frederick all along intended Germany to be the primary theatre of operations, because when he in February 1657 appointed Axel Urup (1601–1671), a military engineer with some experience from the Thirty Years' War, as overall commander in Scania, Anders Bille was already in Holstein preparing the army for the campaign. Yet, it took until 30 April before the King gave Bille his patent of overall command, which suggests that the King prior to this date considered leading the army into the Duchy of Bremen personally.

The Holstein army consisted of some 13,000 men, about half of whom served as cavalry. A major share of this army consisted of Danes, mostly from Jutland, with the remainder enlisted units from the Continent (Table 10). In comparison, the Scanian army was smaller, only some 8,000 men (Table 13, in a later chapter). The different strength of the two armies can be explained by King Frederick's focus on Bremen. He had no objectives in the Swedish mainland, and the Danes knew from history that it was difficult to move an army overland from Scania to Sweden's core provinces further north. Besides, up north King Frederick could also rely on the Norwegian army.

Table 10. The Danish Holstein army, mid 1657. Some figures are estimates.[1]

Cavalry		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Major General Friedrich von Buchwald's Cavalry Regiment (E)	4	350
Major General Hans Rantzau's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Kay Lykke's Cavalry Regiment, also known as the King's Life Regiment of Horse (E)	10	1,000
StenBille's Cavalry Regiment, also known as as the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Horse (E)	10	1,100
Jens von Löwenclau *genannt* Haderslebens Cavalry Regiment (E)	12	1,250
Christopher Hvass's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Ditlev Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Hinrich Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	600
Henrik Sehested's Cavalry Regiment (E)	6	650
Total Cavalry	**66**	**6,750**
Dragoons		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Niels Krabbe's Dragoon Regiment (E), under Lieutenant Colonels Poul Beenfeldt and Eiler Holck, also known as the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Dragoons	6(?)	500(?)
Total Dragoons	**6(?)**	**500(?)**
Infantry		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Jutland Regiment and the nobles' battalion	14	2,300
Ulrich Frederick Gyldenløve's Regiment, also known as the King's Life Regiment of Foot (E)	10	800
Eckerich Johann Lübbe's Regiment, also known as the Black Regiment (E)	10	900
Kjeld Lange's Regiment (E)	10	800
Ditlev Brockdorff's Regiment (E)	10	700
Possibly the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Battalion of Foot	?	?
Total Infantry	**48(?)**	**5,900(?)**
Navy		
Elbe Riverine Flotilla, under 'Admiral' Peter Lützen		Unknown
Grand Total	120(?)	13,150(?) (excl. Navy)

---

[1] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.392, 402; Carlbom, *Karl X Gustav*, p.59.



Field Marshal Carl Gustav Wrangel, 1662. (Matthäus Merian the Younger, Skokloster Castle)

The first Danish offensive was carried out on the Continent, directed against Bremen. Perhaps the reason for this was that King Frederick had personal links to the Duchy, or as it previously was, the Prince Archbishopric of Bremen. From 1637 to 1648, Frederick had ruled Bremen as Prince Archbishop Frederick II, Prince of Denmark. However, Swedish forces had expelled his forces in 1647, and with the Peace of Westphalia, Bremen was ceded to Sweden.

For this or other reasons, Anders Bille on 26 June led an estimated 5,500 well-equipped but mostly inexperienced men from the Holstein army across the River Elbe in an attack on the Duchy of Bremen.[2] The invasion was intended to take place already on 23 June, but stormy weather delayed the river crossing for three days. The governor of Glückstadt, Major General Jacob von Wancken, carried out a diversion against Bützfleth, next to Stade and the bastion at Schwinge, at the confluence of the Rivers Schwinge and Elbe. This enabled units from Lübbe's Black Regiment to cross unopposed further to the north-west, at Belem (east of modern-day Belum, north of Neuhaus) at the confluence of the Rivers Oste and Elbe. The Black Regiment easily took the bastion at Belem. Bille and several senior officers accompanied the advance guard. Another, similar diversion was carried out further to the east, with a fake crossing from Blankenese (on the north shore of the Elbe, west of Hamburg) to Wedel (also on the north shore of the Elbe, west of Blankenese and Hamburg). Because of the diversions, the Swedes thought that the main crossing would take place further east, so Bille's main army could ultimately cross largely unopposed to the west of Stade. Meanwhile, King Frederick (whether by design or coincidence) remained in Copenhagen.

The Swedish army in Bremen–Verden was impressive on paper, consisting of 2,800 cavalry, 50 dragoons, and 6,700 infantry (see Table 4, p.106). However, most units were in the process of recruitment, all were considerably understrength, and only a few were ready for operations. The infantry was dispersed among Bremen's fortresses and bastions. The strongest force was deployed at Stade under the experienced Colonel Rutger von Ascheberg, whom we last met fighting in Poland, while another force stood at Harburg under Duke Adolph William of Saxe-Weimar and Johann von Waldeck-Landau. Other, weaker units were deployed on the western border with the City of Bremen (which was independent of the Duchy). The army was not completely unprepared. In late February 1657, Field Marshal Wrangel had

---

[2] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.150.


Eigentliche Abbiltung des Grefl. Hauſes vnd Veſtung Bremer Förde.
A. Der Innere Schloſsplatz
B. Das Vorwerck
C. Der Newe Luſtgarten
D. Obſt vnd Kuchengarte
E. Reit vnd Renn bahn
F. Ballhauſe
G. Der Stall
H. Canteley
I. Die Schneiderey
K. Rüſt kammer
L. Das New Gebew
M. Zeughauſe
N. Die Kirche
O. Die Gräfl. wohnung
P. Das Frawenzimmer
Q. Alt Frawenzimmer
R. Die Schleuſſen
S. Die Mühl
T. Der Meyerhoff
V. Pomerantzen hauſe
W. Kuche
X. Pilkentafel
Y. Gärtner heuſer
Z. Bickbeen brucke
1. Luſthauſe
2. Badtſtuben
3. Überfahrt
4. Amtsmans hauſe
Thier garten
OSTE FLUVIUS
Ruinirte
Heuser von der Statt
So der Veſtung zu nahe gelegen
Dem Hochgebornen Graffen vnd Herin, Herrn Carolo Guſtavo Wrangeln, Graffen zu Salis, Freÿherrn zu Schoſloſter vnd Bremer Förde, Herin zu Roſstorp, Dero Königl. Maÿt. vnd Cron Schweden Reichs Rahl, Reichs Vice Admiraln, General Felde marſchalln, vnde General Gubernatorn in Hallande etc.
Dediciret vnd Offeriret dieſes Kupffer Vnterthänig. Matheus Merian
Erich Jonson Delineavit

Bremervörde Castle. (Erik Dahlbergh, in Matthäus Merian's *Topographia Saxoniae Inferioris*, Frankfurt am Main, 1653)

inspected the fortifications and issued orders to reinforce garrisons and prepare defences. Understanding that Denmark prepared for war, he had then handed over command to Major General Joachim von Volckmar, after which he returned to Pomerania to reinforce defences there, too.

Bille did not bring the entire Holstein army into Bremen. He left Major General Hans Rantzau with a strong cavalry corps at the border with Mecklenburg. Bille's invasion force consisted of Buchwald's Cavalry Regiment (or rather squadron, since it consisted of only four companies), Hadersleben's and Hvass's Cavalry Regiments, the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Dragoons, most of the Jutland Regiment of Foot and the nobles' battalion, and Lübbe's Black Regiment of Foot, in total about 2,200 cavalry and 2,800 to 3,300 dragoons and infantry. Later, Sten Bille's Cavalry Regiment and Kjeld Lange's Regiment of Foot joined the invasion force as well.

Not everything went smoothly. It did not bode well that immediately before the crossing, Lübbe's Black Regiment mutinied in the absence of its colonel, since the men had not been paid. Yet, no matter that the invasion force was smaller than the Swedish army in Bremen, with most Swedish



The bastion at Schwinge, at the confluence of the Rivers Schwinge and Elbe

units understrength and the infantry dispersed among garrisons Bille easily achieved local superiority in numbers.

The Danes assumed, probably correctly, that the Swedes in Bremen and Verden could be dealt with by reducing three strongpoints: the bastions at Lehe, at the confluence of the Rivers Weser and Geeste (where Swedish architects later would build Carlsburg or Carolus-Stadt which in time developed into the city of Bremerhaven); Bremervörde Castle; and the capital Stade. Stade was too well-defended and fortified to be immediately accessible, and the Danes still lacked sufficient infantry and artillery to lay siege to Bremervörde. Artillery supplies including gunpowder and shot as well as some heavy cannons were stored in Glückstadt. However, the commandant, Wancken, refused to release the supplies to Bille, unless he received written authorisation from King Frederick. Bille had already requested the supply through the proper administrative channels, but no reply had reached the army. And without royal authorisation, nothing could be done to rectify the situation.

Moreover, it turned out that not all Swedes were bottled up in fortifications. Bille received intelligence that Duke Adolph William of Saxe-Weimar and some 1,500 cavalry and dragoons had deployed at Horneburg, southeast of Stade. When Bille led his cavalry and dragoons towards Horneburg, Duke Adolph William withdrew towards Stade, where Bille attempted to raid his camp during the night. The Danes were spotted by a Swedish patrol, but as the Duke then retreated further, into the town itself, Bille at least had the satisfaction of seeing the Swedish horse abandoning the open country. Bille then rode on


STADA.
Albis flu
Die Elb flu
1. Sciffer thor.
2. Cach thor.
3. Hassenvlit thor.
4. Stegher thor
5. Shule thor.
6. Groten thor.
7. Bischoffs hoff.
8. Die Berch Kirch.
9. S. Willat.
10. S. Nicolaus.
11. S. Cosmus
12. S. Iohann.
13. Abtey.
14. S. Iorus.
15. Rahthause.
16. Hospital.
17. Mercaton Basilica
18. Pferd marckt.
19. Zante.
20. Die Wage.

The Duchy's capital Stade, 1640, with the bastion at Schwinge at the confluence of the rivers above. (Matthäus Merian the Elder)

towards Bremervörde. In Stade, Major General Volckmar estimated Bille's forces to be stronger than they actually were, so he did not move out again.[3] As a result, the Danes could move freely in the Duchy. Although the capital Stade remained stoutly defended by the Swedes for the duration of the campaign, the rural areas of the Duchy were soon under Danish control.

As for Bremervörde, Bille still awaited the artillery supplies from Glückstadt, and there Wancken still awaited royal authorisation. However, the King had departed with the fleet, so was unavailable to issue instructions. On 3 July, King Frederick had boarded this father's famous flagship *Trefoldighed* ('Trinity') together with only his personal physician and surgeon and a servant. He had informed neither the council nor the Queen. Only Joachim Gersdorff (1611–1661), the Steward of the Realm (Danish: *rigshofmester*) and the senior member of the Council of the Realm, knew about his departure. The usually well-informed Brandenburg-Prussian diplomat Ewald von Kleist reported home that the King had planned a surprise based on intercepted letters from the Swedish Council of the Realm to King Charles, which expressed a desire for the Swedish King to return home to defend the country against the expected Danish invasion. Early the next morning, King Frederick set out with the Danish main fleet: some 18 warships under Admiral Henrik Bielke, Vice Admirals Nicolai Helt, Niels Juel, and Peter

---

[3] Volckmar to Wrangel, 26 June 1657 (O.S.), Skokloster Archive; cited by Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.446.



Henrik Bielke, 1650s. (Karel van Mander III)

Jansen de Koningh, and 250 soldiers from the Zealand Regiment together with other Danish and Norwegian units.[4] King Frederick expected that King Charles upon learning of the Danish declaration of war would abandon the Swedish army in Poland and travel by sea to Sweden – which would enable the Danes to intercept and capture the Swedish king on route by deploying the major part of the fleet around Bornholm.[5]

To compound the issue of the artillery supplies, on 9 July Wancken informed Bille that the latter's renewed written request for the supplies must be denied on formal grounds, since a noun in the text by accident had been misspelled (*reservieren uns demnach*, 'reserve for us accordingly', instead of *reversieren uns demnach*, 'revert to us accordingly'), which slightly changed the meaning of the request.[6] At this point, Bille gave up bureaucratic finesse and simply took what he needed, with the right formally attached to his high office. On 11 July, this resulted in a delivery of four 18-pounders and four 12-pounders as well as some mortars. Bille immediately put the artillery to good use against Bremervörde, which surrendered a week later.

A few days earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Eiler Holck had taken the bastions at Lehe. Holck enjoyed naval superiority; both Lützen's Elbe squadron and Rodsten's Weser squadron, altogether six ships, assisted in the attack. Of the Danish objectives in the Duchy of Bremen, only the capital Stade then remained in Swedish hands. The Danish cavalry roamed all over the Duchy without encountering any serious opposition. Except Stade, Swedish garrisons only remained in a couple of minor strongholds, primarily Burg and Schwinge. So far, things looked good for the Danes. In fact, Bille took Schwinge on 24 July, and he also successfully pushed back a relief attempt from Stade.

Then news arrived that King Charles was on his way to Holstein from Pomerania.

---

[4] Admiral Henrik Bielke later complained about the soldiers, who apparently did not easily take to shipboard service. He particularly disliked the Lollanders, all of whom 'make themselves sick while at sea and eat like horses'. Bielke to Gersdorff, 15 July 1657 (O.S,); cited in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.137.

[5] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.135.

[6] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.447.

The Flight of the Danish Cavalry

When King Frederick learnt that King Charles approached from the south instead of first returning to Sweden, he panicked. Focusing on taking Bremen, he had not prepared defences in the south. King Frederick accordingly sent an urgent despatch to Bille, ordering him immediately to leave Bremen to defend the Holstein border.

We will soon see that other Danish commanders panicked, too, but Bille did not. Instead, he assembled boats and river craft to cross to Blankenese. It seems that he intended to join forces with Hans Rantzau's Cavalry Corps which already stood on the border. Altogether, Bille then had an estimated total of 7,000 to 8,000 men (5,000 to 6,000 cavalry and 2,000 to 3,000 foot and dragoons) dispersed through Bremen and Holstein.[7] This estimate, although possibly somewhat low, compares unfavourably to the approximately 10,800 men in King Charles's army from the Commonwealth (see Table 3, p.104), especially since the Swedish King could be expected to add yet more units from Pomerania. This time, it was King Charles who enjoyed the advantage of being able to concentrate his forces against an enemy dispersed among numerous garrisons and fortifications.

Bille faced yet another problem. He had requested Rantzau, on the north side of the River Elbe, to assemble additional boats for the crossing by Bille's army, in addition to those that Bille himself could gather on the south side of the river. Then, on 23 July, Bille, while still south of the Elbe, received a message from Rantzau. Alarmed by the rumours of the imminent arrival of King Charles, he had panicked, too, and already three days ago had abandoned the Holstein border and retreated towards Glückstadt. As a result, the border was undefended, and instead of joining forces, Bille's and Rantzau's armies were now separated by the Elbe, and without sufficient shipping capacity to cross rapidly. King Charles had not yet reached Wismar, and in fact stood more than 200 km from the Holstein border, yet mere rumours of his imminent arrival had already shaken the Danish defences to the core. As usual, Swedish agents were well-informed about the situation in the enemy headquarters. Already on 14 July, almost a week before Rantzau began his retreat, the Swedish resident in Hamburg, Vincent Möller, had informed Field Marshal Wrangel that Rantzau's Cavalry Corps soon would retreat to Itzehoe. On 21 July, only a day after Rantzau's departure, another Swedish agent, Johan Hofstetter von Khünberg, reported to Wrangel that Rantzau had left the border and expected to reach Itzehoe on 23 July.[8]

In short, the Swedish commanders were often better informed about the Danish deployments than Bille. And these were not isolated incidents. Bille had a confidential secretary named Nicolai (by some called Nickel), whose diligence apparently enabled him to have some influence on the Grand Marshal. Nicolai may have been diligent, but he was also a Swedish agent

---

[7] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.470.

[8] Möller to Wrangel, 4 July 1657 (O.S.); Khünberg to Wrangel, 11 July 1657 (O.S.); both cited in Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.472; based on documents in the Skokloster Archive.


The march to Denmark, 1657.
The reconquest of Bremen.
King Charles travels separately from the army.
N
DENMARK
JUTLAND
SWEDEN
Aalborg
Kattegat
Arhus
Horsens
Vejle
SAMSØ
Frederiksodde
Kolding
Middelfart
Kalundborg
Roskilde
Copenhagen
Helsingør
Helsingborg
Landskrona
Lund
Malmö
Ribe
Hejis
Odense
Kerteminde
ZEALAND
Ringsted
Køge
Korsør
Haderslev
FYN
Nyborg
Faaborg
Baltic Sea
Aabenraa
Svendborg
SCHLESWIG -
ALS
Rudkøbing
Vordingborg
BORNHOLM
Flensburg
ARØ
MØN
Maribo
Nykøbing
Slesvig
LANGE-LAND
LOLLAND
FALSTER
Gottorp
Tønning
Rendsburg
Kiel
HOLSTEIN
FEHMARN
R. Eider
Itzehoe
HOLSTEIN-GOTTORP
Stralsund
SWEDISH POMERANIA
Greifsw
Belem
Glückstadt
Krempe
Blankenese
Wedel
Lübeck
Wismar
Lehe
Schwinge
Stade
Hamburg
Mölln
Gadebusch
Demmin
Bremervörde
Ueckermü
BREMEN
MECKLENBURG
R. Weser
Bremen
Verden
BRANDENBURG
R. Elbe
0
50
100 km
RÜG
Lauenburg
Schlawe
Danzig
Kolberg
Bütow
Treptow
ROYAL PRUSSIA
Regenwalde
Mewe
Naugard
EASTERN POMERANIA
Draheim
Konitz
Tempelburg
ettin
Friedrichwalde
Flatow
Bromberg
R. Vistula
Thorn
SC

4 Sep. Swedish army lays seige to Frederiksodde

16-17 Aug. Swedes take Itzehoe

2 Aug. King Charles' army encounters Danes at Hamburg; Danes retreat

In early August, Swedes retake Bremen

12 July King Charles reaches Stettin

5 July King Charles sets out from Bromberg

King Charles's Conquest of Jutland, 1657 who sent reports to the Swedish resident in Hamburg, Möller.[9] King Charles likely knew the military disposition of the Danish army before Bille's reports reached King Frederick in Copenhagen.

Abandoning his previous plan to hold the Holstein border, Bille personally crossed the Elbe to Glückstadt. To hold the border was a hopeless task without Rantzau's Cavalry Corps. Besides, the departure of the cavalry and rumours of impending doom at the hands of King Charles had caused morale to tumble in the remaining Holstein units. On 26 July, Bille presided over a council of war in Glückstadt. Following the King's instructions, he made two proposals: one, to remain in Bremen; or two, to cross into Holstein with most of the army to confront the approaching Swedish army, while retaining strong infantry garrisons in Bremen. Following standard Danish practice, the proposals were put to a vote, which was recorded in a protocol. The council chose alternative two, to garrison Bremen with infantry and then move the remaining army into Holstein to confront the Swedes. Having conquered Bremen (except Stade), the Danish officers were unwilling to surrender their gains. As a result, the Danish army further divided its limited strength. During the following three days, much of Bille's army (2,000 horse and 2,000 foot[10]) crossed the Elbe to Holstein at Blankenese, on a variety of barges and river vessels. Major General Friedrich von Buchwald had on 17 July been appointed commandant of the Duchy of Bremen, but by then he had already tendered his resignation because of ill health, after which he departed from the army without awaiting the King's response. As a result, Colonel Lübbe was appointed in Buchwald's stead, on the day after the council of war promoted him to Major General of Infantry and Chief Commandant of the Duchy of Bremen. This was quite appropriate; Lübbe was born in Bremen and had served King Frederick there already when the latter was Prince Archbishop.

With Lübbe stayed much of the infantry: several companies of his own regiment as well as seven of Kjeld Lange's Regiment. Various detachments from the Jutland Regiment and Gyldenløve's Regiment remained in Bremen as well, together with a company of the Jutland nobles' battalion under Major Iver Olufsen. Lübbe retained some cavalry: all six companies of Hvass's Cavalry Regiment, all four companies of Buchwald's Cavalry Regiment, and four companies of Hadersleben's Cavalry Regiment, the latter commanded by Major Anders Sandberg (1620–1677), a veteran of the Thirty Years' War who in due time would become Major General and two decades later play a significant role in Denmark's Scanian War against Sweden. Lübbe's men – altogether 1,100 to 1,200 horse and 1,400 to 1,500 foot – were in poor condition. Some were wounded, and the cavalry units had lost many horses, in Buchwald's Regiment as many as a quarter of the total.[11]

Morale was low in Copenhagen, too. Nobody expected that Bille, or anybody else, would be able to hold the border against King Charles. On 22 July,

---

[9] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.427; based on a document in the Skokloster Archive.

[10] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.117.

[11] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.478.

King Frederick instructed the Admiralty to round up 'all ships, boats, barges, and whatever can be used for shipping' from the Baltic Sea coast of Holstein, in order to deny the expected Swedish army the means to cross to the Danish islands. The Admiralty dispatched the compass-maker Cornelius Kruse with the *Svenske Grib* ('Swedish Griffon', a formerly Swedish merchantman) to empty the ports of Neustadt, Heiligenhafen, Kiel, Eckernförde, Slesvig, Flensburg, Sønderborg, Aabenraa, Haderslev, and Kolding.[12]

On 1 August, Bille's army assembled in Holstein between Glückstadt, Krempe, and Itzehoe. It then consisted of Rantzau's Cavalry Corps, Bille's Cavalry Regiment, the remaining eight companies of Haderslében's Cavalry Regiment, about a battalion of the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Dragoons, the Jutland Regiment of Foot and up to three companies of the Jutland nobles' battalion, Brockdorff's Regiment, most of Gyldenløve's Regiment, and some of Lübbe's Regiment. His command now, if not before, also included the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Battalion of Foot.[13]

Everybody knew that the fearsome Swedes were not far away, but where? On the following day, Colonel Hinrich Ahlefeldt led a Danish cavalry squadron of 300 horse (which possibly constituted his entire regiment) on a reconnaissance mission towards Hamburg. Encountering a Swedish cavalry patrol at Fuhlsbüttel, Ahlefeldt pursued it until he unexpectedly stumbled into what apparently was the advance guard of King Charles's army. After a brief but sharp engagement with Swedish cavalry, including the Life Guard of horse under Lieutenant Colonel Fredrik von Buchwald (1628–1693), the Danes retreated towards the north. However, they ended up in a swamp, where the Swedes took some of them prisoner. Ahlefeldt apparently lost about 50 men but claimed to have inflicted similar losses on the Swedes. He apparently took two Swedes prisoner in the first engagement, but himself lost as captives to the Swedes several men, including Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Körber (whom we later will meet as the defender of Nakskov) and Captain Hinrich Ahlefeldt, the Colonel's namesake and probably a relative.[14] Buchwald may have presented a strange sight during the engagement. Since his leg remained swollen by a badly healed arrow wound caught in the battle of Warsaw, he still rode with only one boot.

On the following day (3 August), King Charles deployed men and artillery on both sides of the Elbe. Meanwhile, the rest of the Swedish army went into quarters in Ottensen (in modern-day Hamburg-Altona) to enable the men some rest after the long march. King Charles's army had covered the 600 km from Bromberg to Ottensen in 30 days, which shows that the army maintained an average marching speed of 20 km per day for a month, without more than a brief rest in Pomerania.[15] Leaving the Commonwealth,

---

[12] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.137.

[13] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.481.

[14] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.483–4.

[15] King Charles's average speed of march was twice that of his predecessor Torstensson's equally famous 1643 march to Denmark from Olmütz in Moravia. Since the distance covered by Torstensson in just short of 80 days was both longer (more than 800 km) and logistically more

King Charles's army first crossed Brandenburg-Prussian territory, with the Elector's permission in accordance with Imperial regulations but apparently not without some unsanctioned plundering along the way. The selected Swedish units in Pomerania and Wismar, reportedly some 3,600 men, joined the army in Demmin.[16] To save time, the army in the customary manner marched through Mecklenburg in three columns, along parallel roads.

The Swedish deployment on the Elbe effectively prevented the operations of the Danish Elbe Flotilla. Peter Lützen reported to Bille that he could no longer prevent the Swedes from crossing the river. Meanwhile, the Danish cavalry retreated. Making a brief stop in Itzehoe, the colonels and lieutenant colonels of the cavalry corps (with the permission of Bille, Rantzau had already left the army) assembled for a council of war. Possibly encouraged by the National Master of Ordnance and former cavalry officer, Christian Friis, they decided that it was more important to conserve the expensive cavalry regiments than to confront the Swedes.

As a result, they would have to retreat to a safe base, such as Rendsburg on the border with Jutland, or even better, the strong fortress of Frederiksodde in Jutland. The cavalry rapidly took off towards the north.[17] The many marshes, canals, and rivers in the region caused problems for cavalry, and there is some reason to suggest that Bille earlier had agreed that the cavalry could redeploy to better ground. Yet, there seems to be no sensible explanation why the retreat continued so far towards the north, and so rapidly. In effect, the Danish cavalry (by then about 4,000 strong) abandoned Holstein without a fight. Perhaps it was panic of the same type that five days earlier had affected the Danes in Scania (after the battle of Ängelholm, more on which below) and Copenhagen, but this time specifically induced by the skirmish north of Hamburg on the previous day. Or, perhaps the decision to retreat was based on sound strategic concerns and began in an orderly manner, but within days, rumours from Scania and Copenhagen reached Holstein and transformed the orderly retreat into a headlong flight (although still in units, since no Swedes were near). So much is certain that observers both then and later were baffled over the long retreat of the Danish cavalry. Because having reached Rendsburg, the retreat very soon continued further north, all the way to the apparent safety of Frederiksodde, again without any Swedish soldier in sight or even in the vicinity.

The Danish cavalry regiments not only fled; they also misbehaved. Despite their rapid retreat, they found time to plunder the countryside which they passed through on the way to Jutland. Their behaviour was so embarrassing that the cavalry corps's former commander, Hans Rantzau, on 6 August felt compelled to write from Slesvig to Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp,

---

complicated, since he travelled through war-ravaged lands, the real speed of march per day was likely similar in both campaigns.

[16] Lars Ericson Wolke, *1658: Tåget över Bält* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2008), p.73.

[17] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.485–6. Friis took part in the council of war in Itzehoe on 2 August that advocated a retreat to Rendsburg, but then he rode north before the others so did not participate in the final decision to go to Frederiksodde, taken on 6 August.

offering his apologies for the devastation caused by his former command during its flight to Jutland.[18]

The Reconquest of Bremen and Invasion of Holstein

Having allowed his men to rest for a few days in Ottensen, King Charles sent an expeditionary corps of 1,800 men under Field Marshal Wrangel into the Duchy of Bremen to clear out the remaining Danes there. Wrangel crossed at Blankenese, at the same spot where Bille had crossed only days before. On the following day, King Charles personally lead a small expedition across the Elbe during which he retook the bastion at Schwinge, garrisoned by 80 Danes.

Meanwhile, Wrangel moved against the still unfinished Danish redoubts at Bützfleth, which were defended by some 450 infantry from Lange's and Gyldenløve's Regiments. Amazingly considering the circumstances, the Danes, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mogens Krag from Lange's Regiment, had not expected any Swedish offensive and were quite unprepared. Colonel Lange was absent, as was the senior lieutenant colonel of Gyldenløve's Regiment, Badenhaupt, the latter reportedly 'visiting his bride' somewhere in the vicinity.

Wrangel first had the defences at Bützfleth pounded by artillery, and then stormed. Wrangel later wrote that the Danes fought bravely, and that 'pike stood against pike', but soon the defenders succumbed to the assault, having lost a third of their strength – 150 men – in dead and wounded. Swedish losses were apparently described as 'nine cart-loads', which suggests a smaller but still significant number, giving evidence of the hard struggle.[19]

At the time, Danish forces in the Duchy stood in four locations: at Bremervörde, Weissenmoor, Belem, and Lehe. Wrangel moved against the bastion at Belem, from which most of the remaining Danish cavalry in the Duchy expected to be shipped across the Elbe. However, Wrangel had sent artillery there, which opened fire on the Danish vessels. As a result, not all Danish cavalry managed to cross. The remaining cavalry, most of which now abandoned their horses the easier to find vessels that could carry them, then joined forces with the remaining infantry at Belem and retreated towards Lehe, where they hoped to find ships to evacuate them. The single exception was Captain Valdemar Daae's company of Buchwald's Cavalry Regiment, which stuck to their horses – but only to dissolve, with men riding away in all directions in small groups to search their fortune elsewhere. Only Daae himself remained, since he had been wounded in one of the skirmishes at Stade. The other remaining Danish units in the Duchy retreated to either Lehe or Bremervörde.

Because King Charles asked Wrangel to return some of his infantry for the continued offensive in pursuit of the Danes in Holstein, Wrangel for the time being let the Danes be at Bremervörde. Instead, he advanced towards Lehe.

---

[18] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.490.

[19] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.499.

Lehe was commanded by Major Iver Olufsen of the Jutland nobles' battalion. The garrison consisted of Olufsen's own company and a company from Lübbe's Black Regiment under Major Holle, both of which were understrength. The garrison was reinforced, if this is the right word, by 82 men from nine other companies of the Jutland Regiment, most of them ill or wounded, and some 150 dismounted cavalry from 13 different companies who had been unable to ship out. One of them was the wounded Captain Daae. In total, Olufsen's garrison counted some 400 men, the ill and wounded included.

Following two days of initial skirmishes, Wrangel assaulted Lehe. On the second day, 16 August, Olufsen fell. Holle then agreed to surrender. The surrendered Danish soldiers went into Swedish service. Those of German origin, including most of the cavalry, were immediately incorporated into the Swedish main army. Having surrendered, the cavalrymen soon overcame their temporary panic. Swedish service apparently suited them, and Wrangel commented that they were excellent men of whom any regiment could be proud.[20] Meanwhile the Danes who went into Swedish service were gathered into a unit of their own, which in time was sent to Reval (modern-day Tallinn) in Estonia.

In 10 days, Wrangel had retaken all of the Duchy except Bremervörde. It says something of Wrangel and his men that he did so faster and with a smaller expeditionary force than the entire army that Bille had needed to take the Duchy in the first place. Bremervörde was strongly fortified, so Wrangel satisfied himself with blockading the town. Wrangel and King Charles likely had ulterior motives for leaving Bremervörde, since its continued occupation by Danish forces, despite its location within the Empire, provided evidence that Denmark had broken the Peace of Westphalia which technically entitled Sweden to request support from other German states.

Meanwhile, King Charles moved north. On 13 August, the day before Wrangel began the assault on Lehe, the King marched out. The Danes attempted to hold the redoubt at Krückau, defended by Lieutenant Colonel Wackerbarth from Gyldenløve's Regiment. After a day of exposure to Swedish artillery fire, the Danes retreated towards nearby Krempe, where Lieutenant Colonel Poul Beenfeldt stood with two companies of the Grand Marshal of the Realm's Life Regiment of Dragoons. However, pursued by Swedish cavalry, both Wackerbarth and Beenfeldt (whom we later will meet as the commandant of Kronborg) surrendered, together with 300 to 400 of their men, presumably their entire contingent.[21]

The Swedes equally quickly overran several other redoubts along the way. Each time, the Danes abandoned their fortifications and retreated. The retreat only stopped at Itzehoe, to which Bille personally led reinforcements. However, following a siege of four days, the Swedes stormed Itzehoe on 20 August. Bille managed to withdraw his remaining cavalry, which was sent north after the others. Holstein then lay open. King Charles led his army in pursuit, following in their tracks. Those Danish soldiers who could retreated all the way to Frederiksodde in Jutland, where also those men gathered whom Bille managed to evacuate by sea from Bremen.

---

[20] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.502; based on a document in the Skokloster Archive.

[21] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', p.504.

Bille made a last attempt to strike back. In early September, he gathered his own life regiment of dragoons and whatever infantry that remained. They marched towards Kiel, where a Swedish garrison under Count Palatine Philip Florinus of Sulzbach (1630–1703) had been installed. However, soon Bille received intelligence that not only was the Swedish garrison stronger in numbers than his own force, Swedish agents knew everything about his plan. Dejected, Bille returned to Glückstadt, where he and most of his remaining 1,000 men embarked for transportation by sea around the Jutland peninsula to Frederiksodde. With them sailed Lützen's Elbe Squadron which meant that Denmark abandoned the entire Elbe region. Many of Bille's men embarked upon the *Stockholm*, the Swedish merchant ship taken by Lützen before war was declared. Perhaps they disliked the ship's name, because after the voyage, Lützen complained that the soldiers on board the *Stockholm* had stolen everything of value and destroyed much of the interior.[22]

Some cavalry under Ditlev Ahlefeldt remained with orders again to cross into the Duchy of Bremen to resupply Bremervörde. However, as soon as Bille had departed, the cavalrymen mutinied. Ahlefeldt only managed to regain some level of control by the end of September. On the night between 28 and 29 September, the remnants of his corps – 100 Holstein cavalry and 600 foot – finally crossed into the Duchy. They successfully penetrated the Swedish line around Bremervörde, resupplied the garrison, but then failed to storm the bastion at Belem, during which they suffered serious losses. The corps took no further action.

---

[22] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.118.

8

Danish Supremacy at Sea

Although King Charles wanted the Swedish navy to secure the southern Baltic, it was the Danes who held naval supremacy. When Denmark declared war, the Swedish main fleet remained in Stockholm. Preparations were not yet concluded, so it left port only late in the season. The minimal Swedish squadron in Gothenburg could do little. Many Danish and Dutch ships patrolled off the Swedish west coast, and Gothenburg was exposed to attack.

In July, Lauritz Nielsen resumed the Danish blockade of Gothenburg. In August, he received reinforcements in the form of Marquor Rodsten and his Weser Squadron. Rodsten wanted to attack Gothenburg, but felt compelled to ask for more warships, because by then, the Swedish Gothenburg Squadron was ready for action. Yet, Nielsen and Rodsten commanded more ships than the Swedish Admiral Gerritsen, who moreover noted, in early September, that 'I am unable to attack the enemy, because he has good warships while I only have simple merchantmen, and also few and untrained men'.[1]

Gerritsen had one advantage, however. When King Charles heard of the Danish declaration of war, he immediately began to issue letters of marque to prospective privateers who were willing to fight for Swedish interests. He was particularly interested in finding such men in England (as noted, the Treaty of Paris between France and the English Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell earlier in the year had shown that England remained a potential Swedish ally, and King Charles's diplomats had long worked to interest Cromwell in a formal alliance against the Netherlands and Denmark). However, others were welcome to sign up as privateers, too. Few details are known of the Swedish privateering war in 1657, but one letter of marque has survived, issued to Captain Percy Owen de Chilworth of Surrey, who commanded a ship known as the *Lyon of Gothenburg*. Privateers operated out of both Gothenburg and Varberg. Most were armed merchantmen, but a number of enterprising Gothenburg merchants equipped a galley of 36 oars which successfully preyed on commercial shipping between Denmark and Norway. One source described the galley as built in Gothenburg but in the Italian manner, while another claimed that the galley was built in the Ottoman empire and only refitted in Gothenburg. Either way, the Danes made great efforts to capture the galley, but without success. Meanwhile, the smallest vessel of the Gothenburg Squadron, the *Sparfven* ('Sparrow') under the command of Lieutenant Anders Olofsson which only carried six 3-pounder cannons, repeatedly penetrated the Danish blockade. The *Sparfven* was a fast galiot, and Olofsson, who would embark upon any daring venture, always escaped the Danish attempts to catch him, often bringing back a trophy ship in the process. According to one contemporary, the Danes hated the daredevil Olofsson so vehemently that they promised him not only death, if they caught him, but would 'burn him in molten lead'. The reference to molten lead may relate to another of Olofsson's tasks. When not seizing Danish shipping, he carried dispatches between Gothenburg and the Swedish headquarters in Denmark. Sensitive dispatches were encased in lead so that they rapidly could be sunk into the sea, if privateers seized the vessel which carried them. The Danes were apparently somewhat cavalier about this method, because once when Olofsson arrived at Field Marshal Wrangel's headquarters (then at Frederiksodde, see below), he not only brought dispatches from Gothenburg but also two seized Danish vessels and a package of dispatches which the Danes had thrown overboard but which Olofsson's men had recovered before it sank.

---

[1] Gerritsen to Admiralty, 26 August 1657 (O.S.).

The privateer activity troubled the Danes, but they hesitated for other reasons, too. As the fortunes of war turned increasingly unfavourable to Denmark also at sea (the battle off Møn later in the year, see below), the Danish admiralty and King Frederick vacillated. Recall part of the blockade force to reinforce the main fleet, or order an attack against the Gothenburg Squadron? Ultimately, neither opinion prevailed, and the Admiralty and the King recalled Nielsen and Rodsten in late November, before the sea froze.[2]

The Gothenburg Squadron never grew sufficiently strong to set out directly to engage the Danish navy. By the end of 1657, it still consisted only of a handful of ships ready for service. Of the navy's warships, the newly built *Göteborg* ('Gothenburg') still remained only a hulk, without rigging, anchors, and artillery. The warship what would be named *Andromeda* remained in the shipyard, not even ready for launch. Only the *Delfin* ('Dolphin') was equipped and armed, in this case with cannons lent by the burghers. Of the auxiliary warships, four were armed and equipped: the *Svan* ('Swan'), *S:t Johannes* ('St John'), *Förgylda Rosen* ('Gilded Rose'), and *Kastellet* ('Citadel'). Two more were not yet ready and in addition lacked artillery: *David* and *Förgylda Falken* ('Gilded Falcon'). A ship from Stockholm, *Hoppet* ('Hope'), was ready but lacked artillery.[3]

Yet, the squadron was strong enough to protect the important port town of Gothenburg and the rest of the Swedish west coast. Moreover, its presence on the coast and the commerce raiding that took place under its aegis prevented the Danes from employing its powerful navy to support Danish and Norwegian land operations against western Sweden.

Moreover, the Danish attempt to blockade Gothenburg had limited effect. Sweden was self-sufficient for most goods, and much of what the country could not produce itself was brought in from the Continent across the Baltic

---

[2] Bergman, 'Kompaniskeppen', pp.206–12.

[3] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.132.

Sea. Besides, the western Swedish ports of Varberg and Halmstad remained open, both for Swedish privateering operations and for bringing in supplies across the North Sea.

The Battle off Møn

We have seen that King Charles was willing to send his fleet into battle with the Danes, but he ordered the Admiralty not to risk the fleet in case of Dutch intervention. In such a case, King Charles preferred to preserve the fleet, instead employing privateers and commerce raiders to inconvenience the enemy. However, in August 1657 King Charles received intelligence from the Swedish resident in The Hague that the Netherlands prepared to blockade Lisbon as part of the ongoing Dutch–Portuguese war and that the greater part of the Dutch fleet already had sailed in that direction, even though the Dutch had retained 12 warships that in case of need could be despatched in support of Denmark.[4] It was accordingly time to launch the main fleet in Stockholm against Denmark.

Work on equipping the fleet had begun early, but it took half a year to prepare a fleet for action. Early in June, Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna requested the auxiliary ships in Stockholm to be called up, too. In early September plague broke out in Stockholm. Fortunately, most preparations were already concluded, so all sailors who still remained in quarters within the city were immediately called up and sent to sea. The auxiliary fleet left Stockholm in good order on 6 September. The naval fleet was then already at Dalarö in the southern Stockholm archipelago. Final preparations were, as usual, carried out there, at Dalarö and Älvsnabben, from which the combined Swedish main fleet finally set out on 11 September, commanded by Bielkenstierna.

By then, the Danish main fleet, under Admiral Bielke, was waiting off Rügen, aiming to blockade Swedish Pomerania while waiting for intelligence on the Swedish fleet. When news reached the Danes that the Swedish fleet had left Öland and sailed for the Danish islands, the Danish fleet set out to meet the enemy.

The Danes had enjoyed naval supremacy in the southern Baltic for three months. Indeed, Bielke had just returned from a failed attempt to conquer Rügen. Despite strongly worded orders from King Frederick to enforce contributions in Pomerania in revenge for what King Charles gained in the Duchies, Bielke had not managed to capture a single fort, and apparently only achieved an ultimately unfulfilled promise from the locals to ransom in cash property which under then prevailing law of war Bielke otherwise could burn (*Brandschatzung*).

The Swedish fleet consisted of 39 warships, with a total of some 1,200 cannons, 4,000 sailors, and 1,900 soldiers (Table 11). It was divided into two squadrons, under respectively Admiral Bielkenstierna and the dockyards director, Admiral Richard Clerck (1604–1668), a Scotsman in Swedish service.[5] The Danish fleet, under Admiral Bielke, consisted of probably 28 warships, with a total of some 950 cannons, 3,600 sailors, and 1,000 soldiers (Table 12). The Swedes outnumbered the Danes.[6]

---

[4] Ernst Bergman, 'Carl X Gustaf och flottan 1657–1658', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.221–51, on p.223.

Table 11. The Swedish fleet in the battle off Møn, 22–23 September 1657[7]

Navy Warships				
Name	**Officers**	**Sailors**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**
Kronan ('Crown')	12	250	150	74
Draken ('Dragon')	18	180	100	72
Hercules	11	150	80	52
Caesar	10	150	80	50
Carolus	10	150	80	50
Svärdet ('Sword')	9	140	70	40
Mars	6	130	70	42
Maria	6	120	60	39
Amarant	6	110	60	38
Samson	6	130	70	34
Wismar	6	120	60	36
Månen ('Moon')	6	110	50	40
Apollo	6	100	50	32
Örnen ('Eagle')	6	100	50	32
Västervik	6	90	50	38
Mercurius	6	110	50	36
Leoparden ('Leopard')	6	100	50	32
Fides	6	100	50	30
Falken ('Falcon')	6	80	50	38
Svan ('Swan')	6	80	40	28
Fenix ('Phoenix')	6	70	35	30
Hjorten ('Stag')	6	70	40	30
Fortuna	6	86	40	24

---

[5] A dockyards director held the rank of admiral but since Bielkenstierna was in overall command, Clerck served as Admiral Lieutenant under Bielkenstierna.

[6] Some suggest a strength for the Swedish fleet of 44 warships, with a total of 1,400 cannons, 6,000 sailors, and 1,800 soldiers, and a strength for the Danish fleet of some 30 warships but with a greater number of cannons than the Swedes brought to battle. Lars Ericson Wolke and Martin Hårdstedt, *Svenska sjöslag* (np: Medströms, 2009), p.95. However, this estimate seems less credible.

[7] Bielkenstierna's report; cited in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.159–60.

Salvator	6	70	40	22
Elefanten ('Elephant')	3	30	20	10
Auxiliary Warships				
Name	**Officers**	**Sailors**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**
Morgonstjernan ('Morning Star')	6	114	73	44
Småland	7	114	63	44
Nordstjernan ('North Star')	5	105	63	40
Fenix ('Phoenix')	5	80	42	30
Samson	5	95	63	28
Halfmånen ('Half-moon')	5	86	42	26
Leoparden ('Leopard')	5	65	37	16
Oxen ('Ox')	6	72	37	22
Boyers				
Name	**Officers**	**Sailors**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**
Flygopp ('Fly Up')	3	28	10	8
Fortuna	3	28	10	8
Svarta Hund ('Black Dog')	3	7	6	8
Ugglan ('Owl')	3	7	8	8
Fireships				
Name	**Officers**	**Sailors**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**
Hafsfrun ('Sea Mistress')	6	80	40	-
Fama	3	40	-	-
Total				
39 ships	246	3,747	1,979	1,231

Table 12. The Danish fleet in the battle off Møn, 22–23 September 1657[8]

Warships				
Name	**Crew**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**	**Notes**
Frederik	377	150	100	
Hannibal	221	100	56	
Trefoldighet ('Trinity')	221	100	50	
Tre Løver ('Three Lions')	221	80	52	
Lindormen ('Serpent')	178	50	50	

---

[8] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.160–61; citing various sources.

Victoria	221	80	46	
Norske Løve ('Norwegian Lion')	178	50	46	
Tre Kroner ('Three Crowns')	165	40	46	
Justitia	145	30	46	
Spes	145	30	36	
Raadhuis ('Town Hall')	130	20	32	Koningh's Dutch auxiliary
Beurs ('Stock Market')	130	20	32	Koningh's Dutch auxiliary
Cogge ('Cog')	130	20	32	Koningh's Dutch auxiliary
Nældebladet ('Needle Leaf')	114	25	32	
Grå Ulv ('Grey Wolf')	114	25	32	
Svenske Løve ('Swedish Lion')	100	30	36	Seized Swedish merchantman
Samson	80	12	40	
Lucifer	120	25	34	Seized Swedish merchantman, ex-*Svenske Grip*
Pelikanen ('Pelican')	114	25	32	
Phoenix	114	25	32	
Lammet ('Lamb')	90	25	30	Seized Swedish merchantman, ex-*Svenske Lammet*
Delmenhorst	94	20	28	
Sorte Bjørn ('Black Bear')	94	20	28	
Falken ('Falcon')	39	10	18	
Spes galiot	15	-	-	
Fireships				
Name	**Crew**	**Soldiers**	**Cannons**	
Caritas	30	-	-	
Norske Fregat ('Norwegian Frigate')	30	-	-	
Skt. Jørgen ('St George')	20	-	-	
Total				
28 ships	3,630	1,012	956	



Claes Uggla

The two fleets encountered each other off Møn around noon on 22 September. For several hours the two fleets manoeuvred for a favourable wind, until Bielkenstierna attacked at some point between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. However, it soon turned out that among the Swedish ships, only Bielkenstierna aboard the *Draken* and the ships of his squadron went into battle, while the others hang back for one reason or another. Afterwards, some claimed that Clerck had been reluctant to risk his squadron. The accuracy of the claim, if any, is difficult to verify. The Danes, too, showed little willingness to fight. As a result, the battle turned into a long-range artillery duel with no major losses on either side. No ship was lost. On the following day, the battle continued at around 8:00 a.m., although again with no decisive result. The only major result was that the Danish flagship, or at least one of the largest Danish warships (there is some uncertainty on Bielke's location during the battle), suffered sufficient damage to disengage. Bielkenstierna wanted to engage and board, but again many of his captains hang back – whether because of unwillingness or damage, or because the crews had fought for two days in a row. The Danes too showed little willingness to act aggressively, but they positioned their largest ships to prevent Bielkenstierna from closing with the others without risking the artillery fire of the large warships. The battle ended around 7:00 p.m. The outcome was essentially a draw. The Swedes lost some 40 men, while 152 Danes were reported as casualties. Only one captain fell in the battle, Henrik Ernst de Batterie on the *Beurs*.[9]

The battle off Møn was the only large-scale naval battle before peace was concluded. Supremacy at sea henceforth remained contested, with neither side able to achieve more than localised superiority.

After the battle, Bielkenstierna moved his fleet to Wismar, while the Danes withdrew to Copenhagen. After repairing battle damages, the Danish fleet in October sailed towards Wismar. For 10 days, the Danes managed to block the Swedes from setting out to sea. However, soon the Danes returned to Copenhagen.

In November, King Charles on several occasions requested the fleet to prepare for moving his army in Jutland to Fyn. Additional transports were assembled, and soon sufficient transport capacity had been raised. Early in the month, the Swedish main fleet in Wismar sent four ships (the auxiliaries *Morgonstjernan*, *Nordstjernan*, *Samson*, and the navy ship *Svan*), under navy Major Claes Uggla (1614–1676), by way of the Little Belt to Frederiksodde in

---

[9] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.162–5, 169.



Mid-seventeenth-century model of a two-decked Swedish warship, earlier believed to be the *Amarant* but possibly a contemporary generic display model. (Maritime Museum, Stockholm; photo: Medström

support of operations there. Uggla was not only an experienced naval officer who had fought in the previous war against Denmark; he was also a veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had participated in the 1648 siege of Prague. Sailing conditions were often difficult in the confined waters of the southwestern Baltic. The *Svan* at an early stage of the voyage accidentally hit a sand bank, suffering some damages in the process, so she had to return to Wismar (and ultimately followed the main fleet back to Stockholm). Uggla reached Frederiksodde 10 days after the Swedish army had taken the fortress (more on which below). Since Fyn was well-defended by Danish units, Wrangel sent Uggla with his three ships to take the little island of Samsø further north, facing the eastern Jutland coast. Having done so, Uggla encountered a significantly larger Danish squadron, apparently seven warships under a Norwegian, Captain Peter Bredal, in the waters east of Aarhus in Jutland. This was the Danish Little Belt squadron. In the ensuing skirmishes, the *Nordstjernan* (40 cannons) was badly damaged by the Danish flagship *Tre Løver* (52 cannons), but Uggla not only successfully escaped but within a week also captured two Danish vessels. Bredal received orders to patrol the Little Belt as long as weather conditions permitted in order to prevent any Swedish crossing to the island of Fyn.[10]

When King Charles in mid December ordered the Swedish main fleet back to Stockholm for the winter, he detached a squadron of five warships (the *Carolus*, *Amarant*, *Västervik*, *Hjorten*, and *Fenix*) under Major Tönnes Specht for continued operations, at least for as long as weather conditions permitted, out of Sønderborg on the island of Als in the southern region of the Little Belt. Specht was another Dutchman in Swedish service. This raised the number of Swedish vessels in the region to 11, since Uggla's auxiliaries *Morgonstjernan*, *Nordstjernan*, and *Samson* remained in the area, together with the auxiliary *Halfmånen* and the two boyers *Fortuna* and *Gäddan* ('Pike').[11] Bielkenstierna's fleet returned to Stockholm in late December.

Ultimately, the naval presence in the Little Belt region had no further impact on the war. By January, ice had forced all vessels into port for the duration of the winter. The Danish fleet disembarked its shipboard troops on Lolland and then sailed to Copenhagen. Bredal sailed to Nyborg on Fyn, apparently pressed by his officers to go into winter quarters. Already in early December, they had formally requested that the squadron go into port, citing

---

10 Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.176, 181–2.

11 Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.183–4.

unfavourable winds, the cold winter, and shortages of supplies and clothes. The demands were reasonable; the winter had quickly become unusually cold and by early January, Bredal disembarked many sailors and soldiers because of illness. He asked the local town authorities for urgent cloth supplies. Following bureaucratic procedure, they forwarded the request to Copenhagen through regular channels. Despite the weather, Bredal refused to lay up his ships in port for the winter. Instead, he allowed them to get stuck in the ice on the roadstead off Nyborg.[12]

---

[12] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.184–5.

9

The Struggle for Scandinavia

The Siege of Frederiksodde

On 3 September, the first units of King Charles's army, by then reportedly reinforced with 2,300 men from Bremen, reached Frederiksodde.[1] King Frederick, who happened to be there, immediately led a sally with Colonels Sehested and Rantzau and 400 horse. However, overwhelmed, the Danes soon returned into the fortress.

During Torstensson's occupation of Jutland during the previous war, he built fortifications on Bers Odde, a promontory in a strategic position facing Fyn. After the 1645 Treaty of Brömsebro, the Danes realised that they needed a fortress to protect northern Jutland. Following Torstensson's lead, they greatly extended the fortifications originally constructed by him and even built a town there, which they in 1651 named Frederiksodde. The usually so well-informed Swedish intelligence system had not paid attention to Frederiksodde, so the Swedes were surprised to find the remnants of Bille's army in such a strong position.

At the time, Frederiksodde may have contained a garrison of as many as 8,700 men, since Bille as well as most men who had served under him fled there. If so, the defenders outnumbered King Charles's Swedish army. Moreover, as soon as the Swedes laid siege to Frederiksodde, it also became obvious that the Danish fortress artillery outnumbered and outperformed the Swedish field artillery. Frederiksodde was easily supplied across the strait that separated Jutland from the island of Fyn, so the garrison could not be starved.

In short, Frederiksodde was a tough nut to crack. Nor could the fortress be ignored. Any delay there was dangerous for King Charles. Denmark lobbied for diplomatic support from other countries, and it was conceivable that relief armies from the Empire and (after the 19 September Treaty of Wehlau) Brandenburg might come to the rescue. Because of the diplomatic activity, King Charles soon left the army, moving into Wismar which was a better location from which to carry out international diplomacy. In the King's absence, Wrangel commanded the army, and led the siege of Frederiksodde.

---

[1] Wolke, *1658*, p.73.

Wrangel also sent expeditions to subdue northern Jutland. On one occasion, some 500 to 700 horse under Major General Böddeker encountered a redoubt at Nabe in Agger manned by 150 Danish cavalry and about 1,500 levies under respectively Lieutenant Colonels Niels Lykke and Friedrich Ziegler. Lykke was off visiting relatives, Ziegler was drunk and quite possibly away from the redoubt, while the levies were unenthusiastic. As a result, many, probably as many as 600, deserted immediately before the Swedes attacked. This reduced Danish totals to, at most, an estimated 150 cavalry and 900 levies. In the ensuing battle, Böddeker's men killed many peasants and soon also captured Ziegler, Lykke, and the rest. The number of dead is uncertain; possibly 80 cavalry and 200 levies, although church records indicate no more than about 60.[2] Either way, the battle shattered popular resistance in Jutland, and Jutland peasants henceforth took no active part in the war.

In November 1657, Wrangel decided to storm Frederiksodde. There is some uncertainty about the numbers of both sides. Wrangel had approximately 8,000 men available for the operation. The Swedes estimated the number of Danes as 5,700. However, King Frederick had early on left Frederiksodde, and Bille had shipped many soldiers to Fyn, in particular his cavalry which proved of little utility in the fortress. For this reason, the Danish numbers at the time of the storm had shrunk to only an estimated 3,000.[3]

The Swedes had not yet learnt enough details of Frederiksodde. For this reason, the military engineer and fortification officer Erik Jönsson Dahlbergh (1625–1703) agreed to undertake the necessary reconnaissance. Dahlbergh was another officer with experience from the Thirty Years' War (although ennobled as Dahlbergh only in 1660, this well-known officer will henceforth be referred to as Dahlbergh for consistency).[4] He worked under Quartermaster General Johann Gorries von Gorgas, a German engineer in Swedish service. With Dahlbergh would go two other officers. They spent a couple of nights spying out the fortifications, at great risk and frequently crawling on all fours to get close enough for observation. By this means, they gathered much intelligence on the layout of the fortress. Most importantly, they realised that the fortification was not yet completed on the shore side. If intruders managed to bypass three wooden palisades that extended into the water, they could easily bypass the low wall that separated the sea from the fortress. Moreover, the moats were dry and could be climbed.

---

[2] Christian Villads Christensen, 'De jyske Kirkebøgers Bidrag til Belysning af Krigen i Jylland 1657–59', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 6: 5 (1894), pp.519–54; Knud *c.* Rockstroh, 'Bemærkninger vedrørende enkelte Afsnit af Krigen i Jylland 1657', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 7: 3 (1900), pp.118–49; C. Klitgaard, 'Nordjylland i Svenskekrigen 1657–60', *Historie/Jyske Samlinger* 3 (1954), pp.93–113.

[3] Ericson Wolke, *1658*, p.105; Kurt Villads Jensen, Knud J.V. Jespersen, and Gunner Lind, *Danmarks krigshistorie* 1: *700–1814* (np: Gad, 2008), p.272.

[4] Dahlbergh had already played an important role in King Charles X's war against the Commonwealth and he would do so again, under King Charles XI, in the Scanian War of 1675–1679. On these wars, see Michael Fredholm von Essen, *Charles X's War 2: The Wars in the East, 1655–1657* (Warwick: Helion, 2022) and Michael Fredholm von Essen, *Charles XI's War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675–1679* (Warwick: Helion, 2019).


De la Gardie
2. De la Gardie's column assaults, takes outlying defences
Berndes
N
1. Berndes's column assaults at dawn but fails to break through
Moat
B
Moat
Wrangel
Moat
A
4. Right column attacks Danes in the rear
3. Part of Wrangel's column bypasses defences by wading through shallows
5. Danes flee; left column breaks through defences
Palisades
Port
Bers Odde
6. Danes take cover in bastion but soon surrender
A Royal Gate
B Mittlager Gate
0
250
500 m

The Storm of Frederiksodde, 1657

As a result of the reconnaissance, Wrangel decided to attack in three columns. Wrangel would lead the first, Lieutenant General Jacob Casimir De la Gardie the second, and Major General Fabian Berndes the third. De la Gardie, a veteran of French service from 1646 including, in 1648, under Louis, Prince of Condé, was the son of the warlike first governor of Swedish Livonia. Berndes had made a name for himself during the war in the Commonwealth as commander of Finnish dragoons. He was a good soldier but a rough man who in his youth had to flee the country for manslaughter and, after this was resolved, found himself officially rebuked and convicted in court for mistreating peasants in his service.

The attack was planned to commence one hour before dawn on 3 November. On the evening before, the officers had dinner with Wrangel. The entertainment continued until midnight, when they fastened wreaths of straw around their arms. From the late 1630s onwards, Swedish soldiers customarily wrapped a wreath of straw around their left arm or put a whisk of straw in the band around their hat as a field sign. Then they joined their units in silence, so as not to alert the Danes. On the appointed hour, the storm began. Swedish cavalry under Duke John George of Anhalt-Dessau rode into the water, rounded the first two water palisades and broke through the third. Only Berndes suffered a minor delay, since he lost several sappers during the assault including the petardier, the artilleryman assigned to handle the petard, who fell, wounded. The Danes defended themselves bravely, but before dawn, Frederiksodde was in Swedish hands. Danish losses included about 1,000 dead, including Bille, mortally


Non eſt Mortale
Quod Opto.
Beſtürmung vnd Einnehmung der New erbauwten Däniſchen, Schantz vnd Vöſtung Friderichsödde, von der Königl: Schwediſchen Haupt Armee, vnter Conduite deß Königl: H: General, Lieutenant Carl Guſtaf-Wrangel Exl. den 24 Octob. 1657.
Die Inſul Fühn.
Bogens
Borning
Billes Gard
Febrhüs
Schantz
Mittelfahr
Sunt
Lyngodde
Stipsodde
Statt Mittelfahr
Berrſode
Proviant hauß
Moraß
T. Vnterſchiedliche Däniſche vnd Hollandiſche Schiff ſo ſich alſo fort bey der Eroberung nach Mittelfarth Salviret.
Erich Dahlberg Delineav.

Print illustrating the storm of Frederiksodde, 3 November 1657. (*Theatrum Europæum*, based on the drawing by Erik Dahlbergh)

Drawing (detail) of the storm of Frederiksodde, 3 November 1657. (Erik Dahlbergh)


T
Proviantbauß
M
M
Moraß
O
O
O
O
A
F
G
R
H
P
Moraß
Erich Dahlberg Delineav.


20 C
44 C
15 C
20 C
15 C
8 C
10 C
14 C
140 C
24 C
Profil der Groſzen wercken zu Fredrichsodde, gegen dem Hohenland
Geſtürmet, von der Königl: Schwediſchen Haupt Armee, den 24 octobris. 1657.
Proſpectus muniminum maiorum Friderichsöddæ, oppugnatorum in
altiori terra à Sueco-regio commilitio, die 24. Octobr. A°. 1657.
Erich Dahlberg Delineavit.

Profile drawing of the storm of Frederiksodde, 3 November 1657. (Erik Dahlbergh) wounded. More than 2,000 surrendered. The Danes also lost 33 colours (some of which were old flags found in storage in the fortress) and more than 80 cannons.[5] Swedish casualties were reportedly 75 dead and 195 wounded. The loss of Frederiksodde was a great shock to the Danes, who blamed it on treason. Public anger, fuelled by propagandists close to King Frederick who wanted to deflect the blame from him, accused the dead Bille of the disaster and had him posthumously sentenced to death. When the Swedes after the battle returned his corpse to the Danes on Fyn with full honours, the court interpreted it as evidence of the late Marshal's treason. Moreover, two Danes who served at Frederiksodde, a Lieutenant and a Corporal, but who later were found with the Swedes, were quickly convicted and executed for treason.[6]

The victory at Frederiksodde completed the conquest of Jutland. But the Danes still retained Fyn.

The Scanian Front

Although King Frederick had prioritised the attack on Bremen, the Danish army in Scania would go on the offensive, too. King Frederick had appointed Axel Urup as overall commander in Scania, unless the King or the Grand Marshal of the Realm be present. Urup was a military engineer with some experience from the Thirty Years' War. We have seen that the Danish Scanian army was smaller than the Holstein army. Urup had some 8,000 men at his disposal (Table 13).

Table 13. The Danish Scanian army, mid 1657. Most figures are estimates.[7]

Cavalry		
Regiment	***Coy***	***Strength***
Retinue of nobles (*Rostjeneste*) of Scania	4	?
Frands Brockenhuus's Cavalry Regiment, also known as the Queen's Life Regiment of Horse (E)	6(?)	600(?)
Axel Urup's Cavalry Regiment (E)		?
Ulrich Christian's Cavalry Regiment (E)		?
Franz Joachim Trampe's Cavalry Regiment (E)		?
Total Cavalry		**3,000 (est.)**

---

[5] Rockstroh, 'Bemærkninger', 134–44. Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, 159, suggests 1,000 Danish dead based on Mardefelt to Jacob Kribbecken, Wismar, 29 October 1657 (O.S.).

[6] Anon. [Philip Meadowe], *A Narrative of the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars betwixt Sweden and Denmark, Before and after the Roschild Treaty: with the Counsels and Measures by which those Actions were directed: Together with A View of the Swedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Germany in the year 1675, with Relation to England* (London: H. Brome, 1677), pp.14–15. Meadowe was a diplomat who participated in the Swedish–Danish peace negotiations from 1657 to 1659.

[7] Rockstroh, 'Indledningen til Krigen', pp.401–2; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.145.

Dragoons		
Regiment	*Coy*	*Strength*
Ulrich Christian's Dragoon Regiment (E)		?
Knud Ulfeldt's Dragoon Squadron (E)		?
Svend Poulsen's Dragoons (primarily Halland peasant freeshooters disgruntled with Swedish rule)	1	100
Total Dragoons		1,000 (est.)
Infantry		
Regiment	*Coy*	*Strength*
Zealand Regiment, except the 2 Fyn companies	6	?
Scanian Regiment and the nobles' battalion (*Adelseskadronen*)	7	?
Christian Friis's Regiment; detached companies only (E)		?
Jørgen Rosencrantz's Regiment (E)		?
Knud Ulfeldt's Battalion (E)		?
Henrik Lindenow's Battalion (E)		?
Total Infantry		4,000 (est.)
Grand Total		8,000 (est.)

When on 15 June the Danish herald handed over the declaration of war to Erik Stenbock, Governor of Halland, the Swedish homeland army seems to have been better prepared for war than both its Danish counterpart in Scania and the Norwegian army further to the north. When he received the declaration of war on the following day, Lord High Justiciar Per Brahe was in Värnamo already organising the Swedish defences. Even though his preparations by no means were completed, Brahe immediately ordered all soldiers in Kronoberg and Jönköping counties to mobilise and march to Markaryd.

The Danish chain of command was somewhat opaque. Urup held overall command in Scania, but King Frederick seems to have given the task of commanding the offensive into Sweden to his illegitimate half-brother, Lieutenant General Ulrich Christian Gyldenløve (1630–1658). Perhaps because of the recurring illness that eventually would cause his death, the latter was not very energetic and took his time. It is hard to escape the conclusion that King Frederick focused so much on the southern frontier that he neglected both the Scanian front and, even more so, the Norwegian one. By mid July, Brahe had gathered 3,850 men at Laholm in the province of Halland – while Gyldenløve had not yet entered Swedish territory.[8] It speaks volumes about the Swedish military machine at the time that Brahe successfully put his army on war footing before Gyldenløve, who certainly had prior knowledge of King Frederick's declaration of war, had prepared

---

[8] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.162.


N
SWEDEN
DENMARK
Ljungby
1. In July, Brahe gathers available forces, advances towards the Danish border
SMÅLAND
HALLAND
Halmstad
4. Again moving against the Danes, Brahe on 10 September fights Urup and Gyldenløve at Genevadsbro
Genevad
Knäred
Traryd
2. Entering Danish territory, Brahe on 28 July and 5 August defeats Danish units under Urup at Ängelholm. Upon arrival of the Danish main army, Brahe returns into Swedish territory.
Laholm
Markaryd
SCANIA
Fagerhult
3. Danish main army under Urup and Gyldenløve pursues, lays siege to Laholm. Brahe retreats towards Halmstad
Ängelholm
Höganäs
Hässleholm
Åstorp
Helsingborg
Helsingør
Fortified towns
0
10
20 km

The Scanian Campaign, Summer 1657

his invasion army. Although King Charles had told Brahe to stay on the defensive, Brahe decided to preempt the Danes by immediately going on the offensive. He had sound reasons for the decision. The Swedes expected that the Danish Scanian army would seek to advance north through Halland to join forces with the Norwegian army in Bohuslän. If the combined Dano-Norwegian army then continued into the Swedish core territories, and a second Norwegian army from Trondheim entered northern Sweden, they might converge on Stockholm. To avert this outcome, it was vital to prevent the conjunction of the Scanian and Norwegian armies. Moreover, much of the population of formerly Danish Halland remained loyal to Denmark and could be expected to rally to the Danish cause – and the province had plenty of food supplies.


N
SWEDEN
HALLAND
SMÅLAND
Ljungby
Halmstad
Genevad
Kattarp
Knäred
Traryd
Laholm
Båstad
Markaryd
SCANIA
Fagerhult
Ängelholm
DENMARK
Höganäs
Åstorp
Hässleholm
Helsingborg
Helsingør
Fortified towns
0
10
20 km

1. Having assumed command, King Frederick sends a Danish corps towards Fagerhult but leads the main army towards Halmstad

2. Moving against King Frederick, the Swedish army, under Stenbock, on 13 October encounters and is defeated by the Danes at Kattarp. King Frederick continues north, while Stenbock retreats into Småland

The Scanian Campaign, Autumn 1657

On 27 July, Brahe led his men into Scania. The leading burghers of Båstad had already embarked with their belongings on eight ships with which they took to sea as soon as their lookouts spotted the first Swedish soldiers pass by. On the next day, approaching the hills that marked the border between Halland and Scania at Himmelslöf, Brahe's men encountered, attacked, and dispersed Svend Poulsen's Dragoons, some 100 freeshooters primarily from Halland who already had carried out some raiding on Swedish territory. The Swedes apparently killed 70 of them. Brahe then pursued the survivors to Ängelholm, where Gyldenløve waited with the cavalry of the Scanian army. Panicking, the Danish cavalry abandoned its camp and supplies and fled to the south, where their panic prompted other Danish units to flee, too. The panic apparently even reached Copenhagen, where King Frederick decided to stay put. Then again, on 5 August, Brahe defeated a Danish force of newly enlisted cavalry at Ängelholm under Axel Urup. He failed to take Ängelholm itself. The Danes then retreated towards Helsingborg, while Brahe returned into Swedish territory. There were problems at home. The Halland levies mobilised south of Laholm, but on behalf of Denmark, not Sweden.

In mid August, Brahe again invaded Scania, but only for a short while. He soon retreated to Laholm, pursued by Danish units in superior numbers. On 30 August, Brahe abandoned Laholm (but he left a garrison in the dilapidated but still functional citadel under Johan Wäsenberg), continuing to Halmstad. The Danes, under Urup, laid siege to the citadel of Laholm, but without effect.

In early September, Brahe finally received reinforcements. Field Marshal Douglas brought some 1,500 or at most 1,700 from his command in Västergötland.[9] Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock brought units from Stockholm. In total, Brahe's army on 8 September 1657 consisted of 6,000 men (2,500 cavalry, 150 dragoons, 3,250 infantry, and some artillery). However, most were recent conscripts, without sufficient training. Nonetheless, Brahe, Field Marshals Stenbock and Douglas, and Erik Stenbock decided go on the offensive against Urup. On 10 September, Brahe moved against a Danish force under Urup and Gyldenløve at Genevadsbro, 10 km north of Laholm. With some 6,500 Danes under Urup, the two sides were fairly equal in strength.[10] Brahe deployed the Swedish army in the customary formation, with Lieutenant General Gustav Banér and Major General Harald Stake in command of the right wing, Major General Erik Stenbock of the centre (the customary place of the national master of ordnance), and Lieutenant General Henrik Horn of the left wing. More an artillery and musket skirmish than a battle, the Danes nonetheless retreated from the field at nightfall. Casualties were low on both sides, not least since neither side appear to have crossed the river that separated them. The Danes also abandoned the siege of Laholm. After this victory of sorts, on 14 September, Brahe handed over command to Field Marshal Stenbock and returned to his duties as chair of the Council of the Realm.[11]

Stenbock found that the Danes had deployed in a strong position behind the river Stensån, 30 km south of Laholm. Although Stenbock wanted to go on the offensive into Danish territory, the Danes blocked his entry into Scania and the supply situation for the Swedish army was deteriorating. Stenbock accordingly retreated to Fagerhult. For a while, operations ceased.

However, additional Danish reinforcements soon arrived. So did King Frederick, who on 11 October personally joined the army in Scania. Danes now outnumbered Swedes, who then may have been 5,000 strong.[12] As a result, Stenbock decided to retreat further north into Halland. During the march, Stenbock's army encountered the Danish army on 13 October at Kattarp, 10 km east of Laholm. Earlier during the campaign, the Danes

---

[9] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.98.

[10] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.163, 165.

[11] Brahe did not go straight to Stockholm. He went first to Gothenburg, then to Visingsborg, to make sure that defences were in order elsewhere as well.

[12] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.172.



Axel Urup, 1655. (Albert Haelwegh; Skokloster Castle)

had been slow to advance. At this point, perhaps because of the presence of King Frederick, they were faster. Believing that the Danes remained far away, Stenbock felt safe, and neglected to send out sufficient patrols. As a result, the surprised Swedish army had to accept battle while still in formation of march.

The Danes (apparently some 7,000 strong) had a strong position at a defile, and the Swedish advance guard fled when it encountered the enemy. Panicking, the fleeing advance guard dragged with them major parts of the main army. Stenbock, an able tactician, ordered four cannons and 200 foot from the Östgöta Regiment up on a hill near the defile. From this vantage point, their artillery and musket fire prevented the advancing Danish horse from pursuing the fleeing Swedes. Failing to charge the weak Swedish force on the hill right away, the Danes allowed Stenbock to move in more infantry from the Södermanland Regiment and additional artillery. The battle ended inconclusively, but Stenbock retreated. Swedish losses were 68 dead, 63 wounded, and 43 captured. Danish casualties were reported as 100 dead and wounded.[13] The Danes made no attempts to pursue.

After the battle of Kattarp, Stenbock retreated into Småland. King Frederick continued to the north to join forces with Iver Krabbe, who was on his way south with the Norwegian army (more on which below). This was a disconcerting moment for Per Brahe, who from Visingsborg instructed the brothers Field Marshal Stenbock and Erik Stenbock to prevent, at any cost, the Danes and Norwegians from joining forces.[14] Unfortunately, neither brother had the means to accomplish this task, had the Danes continued the offensive. Yet, the Lord High Justiciar worried needlessly. The Danish command was probably unaware of how weak the Swedish defences actually were, and for this reason hesitated to proceed too rapidly, lest they might find themselves cut off from their supply lines. Unfortunately, the Danish soldiers also plundered, burned, and murdered in what they considered hostile territory – even though Halland was a former Danish province in which many inhabitants longed for a reunion with Denmark. Some Hallanders had even crossed the border before the war to join Poulsen's freeshooters. As a result, much of the popular support for the Danish cause evaporated. Besides, learning of the Swedish successes in Jutland, King Frederick already on 19 October returned to Denmark. As a result, the Danes ceased operations. Their commander Axel Urup retreated to Scania, where he allowed his men to go into winter quarters. So did the Swedes, in Småland.

---

[13] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.183, 189; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.172.

[14] Brahe to Council of the Realm, 11 October 1657 (O.S.).

The Norwegian Front

Norwegian army commanders began to plan for the coming war much earlier than the Danes in Scania. Already in spring 1657, it was obvious to the inhabitants in Gothenburg and the province of Västergötland that Norway planned for war. Norwegian peasants did not sow the fields close to the border, and they moved their cattle further inland.

Yet, it took time for Norway to go on the offensive. The commandant of southern Norway, Major General Iver Krabbe, was in distant Akershus, the fortress in the capital Christiania, and was in no particular hurry to initiate hostilities. He probably realised that Norway was far from ready for going to war. He only returned to Bohus Fortress on 19 June, but without reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Swedish army retained their defensive posture.

The war can only be said to have begun on the Norwegian front when a Norwegian unit under Major Peter Brun on 24 June demanded tribute from Swedish peasants west of the Göta Älv river. On the following day, Krabbe contacted Governor Per Ribbing of Gothenburg, suggesting a local border truce on the island of Hisingen, shared between Norway and Sweden. Ribbing agreed, since neither side could control the island and it was better for both sides if the peasants thereon could continue food production. The war accordingly began with a truce, of the type which border populations in the north for centuries had used to deal with national war.

The first act of actual hostilities came only on 4 July, when the first Norwegian raid into Swedish territory took place near Hjärtum. This was a minor affair, even though it resulted in some plunder. A week later, a Norwegian raiding party of about 100 men crossed the Göta Älv river from Bohus Fortress, home of the Bohus Regiment. However, they returned whence the came as soon as they found themselves confronted by Swedish peasant levies. Actually, Krabbe played for time. Knowing that his preparations were not yet completed, he was in no hurry to begin the campaign. In fact, by this time he had returned to Akershus and only again showed up in Bohus Fortress a few days after the attempted raid.

However, soon Colonel Johan von Firck's life company of some 170 men pike and shot landed on the Swedish side of the Göta Älv river by way of Tjurholmen ('Bull Island'), which belonged to Norway. Firck's men were supported by a skerry boat armed with falconets. They pushed back a few Swedish cavalrymen and peasant levies, and demolished a redoubt. Two Swedes fell in the skirmish and another was wounded. A few Norwegians then stayed on in the location which they had captured. Then, additional Swedish cavalry and levies arrived, which immediately attacked the Norwegians. Based on the Norwegian accounts, Firck's men repulsed the attack with the help of the falconets on the skerry boat. The skirmish apparently resulted in one dead Swede and a wounded Norwegian under officer.


Skardaleby
REGNI
Dansk Surle
SUECIÆ
PARS
Arx Bahus
Via Wanersburg
Gota Elfw
Iordfall
Pons Suecor. 164
Pons Danor. 1657
Röösboo
Elsbo
Oxehagen
Konghell
Castra Suec. 1645
Mola
via Gohtenburg
Norr Elff
NORWE
GIÆ
PARS
Pohs
Giötered

Contemporary plan of Bohus Fortress (left of image), built on an island in the Göta Älv river

Returning to Bohus, Krabbe immediately ordered his life company of about 126 men of the Bohus Regiment to cross the Göta Älv river in support. The raid was to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frederik von Ahlefeldt, the commandant of Bohus Fortress, and Lieutenant Colonel Johan Wedberg. The latter crossed the river first, in a skerry boat armed with four falconets and several other coastal or river vessels. Next day, Krabbe followed, bringing three regimental cannons. Seeing that the Swedes were assembling river craft, Krabbe ordered his men to build a redoubt to defend the Norwegian bridgehead. Next, Ahlefeldt crossed the Göta Älv river with 160 men in support of Krabbe. However, soon Krabbe learnt that Swedish reinforcements from Gothenburg had arrived in the form of a cavalry company of 150 men under Captain Bryngel Stark and 200 musketeers under Lieutenant Colonel Liborius Mentzer. Finding himself outgunned, Krabbe ordered Ahlefeldt to retreat across the river. Most Norwegians crossed in time, but combat took place between Ahlefeldt who with two officers and 24 pikemen attempted to gain time by resisting the Swedish attack. Since the Norwegians also were supported by the fire of the three regimental cannons and some remaining musketeers, the struggle resulted in several deaths on each side. Ribbing later reported that one Swede had fallen, and five or six soldiers as well as Captain Stark were wounded. Krabbe admitted five wounded Norwegians and no dead. However, the Swedes later took a prisoner who claimed that Norwegian losses were six men. Certainly, the skirmish did not result in great loss of life. Afterwards, the Norwegians retreated across the river, while the Gothenburg units were withdrawn, instead being replaced by two of Major



Drawing of Bohus Fortress, showing its impregnable position high above the island's town. (Erik Dahlbergh)

General Harald Stake's companies.[15] This was the natural thing to do, since Ribbing and Stake shared responsibility for defending against Norwegian intrusions from Bohuslän province.

It is hard to escape the feeling that Krabbe's raid was the result of the imperative to support one of his officers who already had crossed the border rather than the deliberate implementation of an invasion plan. Krabbe certainly knew that the Norwegian mobilisation was not yet completed.

Sure enough, the next act of war was initiated by the Swedes. Aware of the Norwegian threat against the province of Västergötland, Brahe in late July ordered Field Marshal Robert Douglas to assume command there. Another reason for the decision, Brahe noted, was that he did not feel that he needed any senior commanders on the Scanian border, since he was confident in his own abilities to handle the campaign.[16] Brahe seconded some 2,200 men to Douglas: eight companies of Major General Harald Stake's Västgöta Cavalry Regiment (874 men), Colonel Johan Stake's Västgöta-Dal Regiment of Foot (1,002 men), three companies of the Västmanland Regiment of Foot (324 men), two 24-pounders, a field artillery of 18 cannons, and several units of peasant levies.[17]

---

[15] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.82–4.

[16] Brahe to the Council of the Realm, 10 July 1657 (O.S.).

Swedish forces under Douglas immediately went on the offensive. First, Douglas decided to eliminate the Norwegian position on Tjurholmen. He accomplished this goal on 31 July without any particular difficulty, since he was superior in both artillery and numbers. Krabbe, who was on Tjurholmen, had to retreat across the river. Douglas then continued towards Uddevalla with a reconnaissance force of two weak companies of horse and 200 foot. Learning of the Swedish offensive, Krabbe too led his army towards Uddevalla. By then, Krabbe had received reinforcements. He now commanded one company of cavalry (85 men), one company of dragoons (80 men), and seven companies of infantry armed with pikes and muskets. Altogether, he brought possibly some 1,400 soldiers. He also received the support of local peasant levies.[18] After some skirmishes, the outnumbered Douglas retreated. We have already seen that the steady Douglas was more at ease in conventional warfare on the Continent than faced with the fluid and often irregular warfare in Poland, and now it turned out that the terrain features and frontier-like conditions on the Swedish–Norwegian border also did not play well with his experience and recognised ability in conventional operations. After a week, Douglas returned to Swedish territory. He had failed to cut the Norwegian communications line between southern and northern Bohuslän. Raids and skirmishes continued along the border.

When later in the month Brahe ordered Douglas to bring reinforcements to the Scanian front, this left only a small force to defend Västergötland: two or three cavalry companies under the more than 70-year-old veteran Lieutenant Colonel Olof Andersson Silfverlood (*c.* 1584–1676), Colonel Johan Stake with seven companies of foot (800 men), levied peasants, and the garrison of Gothenburg, which consisted of 2,000 men but for obvious reasons mostly had to remain to defend the port-town. Krabbe took advantage of the situation by assembling his forces at Hjärtum: an estimated 1,900 men (two cavalry companies, two dragoon companies, eight companies of pike and shot, two companies of infantry armed with snap-locks, and a field artillery consisting of six cannons – 6-pounders and 3-pounders).[19] Crossing the Göta Älv river, he then went on an offensive against Gothenburg.

Silfverlood, with some 100 Västgöta cavalry and enlisted peasants, encountered the Norwegians soon after the crossing. Silfverlood was an army legend who had signed up already as a boy in 1598, from 1609 fought in Muscovy, Poland, Livonia, Denmark, and Germany, and took part in most major battles of the Thirty Years' War including the first battle of Breitenfeld and Lützen. His name, meaning 'silver shot', derived from a popular tradition which held that once when Silfverlood had run out of shots, he pulled silver buttons from his coat with which he loaded his gun. And this was only one of the stories that circulated about Silfverlood.

---

[17] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.85, 88.

[18] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.92–4.

[19] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.99, 155.



Olof Silfverlood. (Västra Tunhem Church)

Legendary though he was, Silfverlood was an experienced officer and certainly not suicidal. Upon observing the size of the Norwegian army, he immediately sent an urgent dispatch to Governor Ribbing in Gothenburg that reinforcements were needed. Then he prepared to delay Krabbe.

Krabbe was equally cautious. He first moved north along the river in the direction of Vänersborg, staying close to the Göta Älv river at all times. However, soon he encountered Silfverlood, his company of the Västgöta Cavalry Regiment, and those peasants that Silfverlood had been able to muster. Possibly, reinforcements in the form of a company of musketeers from Gothenburg had joined them, too. We do not know their numbers, but it seems unlikely that Silfverlood's force consisted of more than a few hundred men. Silfverlood had prepared the ground with abatis and *chevaux-de-frise*. Krabbe first sent a cavalry patrol to reconnoitre the terrain, but Silfverlood and his men shot all of them dead. On the following day, Krabbe sent a messenger with an offer to bribe his way through Silfverlood's position, offering 300 Reichsthalers if the Swedes kindly would go away. Old Silfverlood refused, replying that 'as long as any Swede still stands, and gunpowder and shot suffice, this will never happen'. In the ensuing skirmish, one officer was wounded on each side, but Silfverlood held firm.[20]

Not wishing to trust to the fortunes of war, or, it seems, his superior numbers, Krabbe accordingly reversed course, instead continuing the offensive still along the river but now towards the south, where he could get reinforcements from Bohus Castle. He reached the vicinity of Gothenburg on 15 September, which resulted in a skirmish in which both sides lost a few men. However, upon hearing a rumour of significant Swedish reinforcements being on the way, Krabbe four days later retreated into Norway, taking refuge on the island of Hisingen near Bohus Fortress, where the border truce still held.

The Battle of Hjärtum

King Frederick had ordered Krabbe to carry out a diversion against the Swedes, that is, to make them uncertain about his intentions so that the Swedes reduced the pressure on the Scanian front. Perhaps for this reason, Krabbe had acted with great cruelty against the civilian population. The Swedes must have wished for revenge. On 5 October, a Swedish army under Erik Stenbock entered Bohuslän. Stenbock brought some 2,300 men and probably eight to 10 cannons. There he encountered Krabbe's army, which by then had received reinforcements in the form of a cavalry company (88 men) and a dragoon company (97 men), which produced an estimated total of 2,100 men.[21] In short, the two armies were comparable in strength and artillery.

---

[20] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.158.

On 7 October, the two sides fought a battle in difficult, rocky terrain at Hjärtum. The battle commenced at 9:00 a.m. with an attack by the legendary veteran Major General Harald Stake who led what was described as a battalion of dragoons (perhaps 400 men) under Lieutenant Colonel Per Lennartsson Ulfsax of the Västmanland Regiment (an infantry regiment, so perhaps these were infantrymen who had received horses), two regimental 3-pounders, and a company of the Västgöta Cavalry Regiment, possibly 100-men-strong, under the other legend, Lieutenant Colonel Silfverlood. The Norwegians counter-charged Ulfsax's battalion, which would have broken, had it not received the support of Silfverlood's cavalry. Both sides then threw their reserves into the struggle, which lasted until nightfall. Sunset occurred at 6:29 p.m., which means that the battle continued for almost 10 hours.

We have fundamentally no reliable information on what happened during the battle, but fighting was intense, and contemporary reports note that the two sides could not distinguish between unit standards of either side because of the vast amount of gun smoke. On the Swedish side, Colonel Johan Stake of Västgöta-Dal Regiment fell at an early stage of the battle. Colonel Stake, a relative of Major General Stake, was reportedly wounded 17 times, and Krabbe later informed the Major General that the Colonel had been taken alive but was then murdered by a former servant of his, now in Norwegian service, who had recognised his former master, whom he hated. Major General Stake had a horse shot under him. Casualties seem to have been fairly large, although preserved roll calls are incomplete which makes them difficult to estimate. Krabbe reported that the Swedes lost a few hundred dead and wounded, which might be a reasonable estimate. On the other hand, Krabbe probably downplayed his own losses, which he described as nine dead and 18 wounded. If estimated correctly, the Swedish losses were notably larger than those suffered at the battles of Genevadsbro and Kattarp in the south, where much greater numbers fought on both sides. Finally, night fell and combat ceased. Although neither side had forced the other off the field, during the night Stenbock ordered a retreat to Vänersborg. There was no pursuit. Krabbe's Norwegians had probably suffered serious losses, too, and were perhaps in no position to pursue. Or, perhaps they were simply satisfied with having won the day and unwilling to hazard another battle. Krabbe remained in the fields between Hjärtum and Bohus Fortress for two weeks, allowing his men to rest and recuperate. Then he ordered the army back to the truce island of Hisingen.[22]

---

[21] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.166, 170.

[22] The battle of Hjärtum is most authoritatively analysed in Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.166–81.


N
Kvistrum
Vänersborg
Uddevalla
Bräcke
Hjärtum
NORWAY
Gamla Lödöse
Bohus
SWEDEN
Gothenburg
Krabbe's raid against Gothenburg, 6-19 September.
Stenbock's retaliatory raid and the battle of Hjärtum, 5-8 October.
Krabbe raids Västergötland, 25 October - 10 November.
Fortified towns
0
15
30 km

The Battle of Hjärtum, October 1657

Soon Krabbe again lead his army into Sweden. His army now consisted of four companies of cavalry, three companies of dragoons, and 14 companies of foot, with an estimated total of 2,800 men (700 horse and 2,100 foot) and some artillery. Soon, he received reinforcements in the form of another two or three companies, which probably raised the strength of the army to 3,000 men.[23] They entered Swedish territory on 25 October, at a time when the Danes in Scania already were going into winter quarters. Although Krabbe first marched south towards Gothenburg, there is nothing to suggest that the offensive was anything more than a large-scale raid. Ravaging the Swedish countryside, Krabbe finally reached Partille, east of Gothenburg, where he learnt that King Frederick had left the Scanian army and returned to Copenhagen. There is nothing in Krabbe's movements to suggest that he had any hopes of joining forces with the Scanian army, and even if he nurtured such hopes, the news about King Frederick must have persuaded him to turn back. He may also have feared to be trapped between Field Marshal Stenbock's army from the south and the Gothenburg garrison and Erik Stenbock's units from the north, if he continued his march to the south. Moreover, Krabbe lacked supplies, which convinced him (he wrote later) to retreat towards Norway, which he again reached on 10 November. Krabbe's assessment was likely correct: having ravaged the border region, food supplies were no longer available. Anything that remained had been moved to safety in the towns, which Krabbe lacked the means to take. By this time, his men deserted in droves, and many of those who did not fell ill. Ultimately, Krabbe had to send home a significant share of his army, since he could not feed them.

---

[23] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.186–7.

Although Harald Stake with some cavalry operated in the area, they were too few to confront Krabbe's army, or to prevent the Norwegian campaign. Instead, the Swedes focused on closing the roads to Vänersborg, Grävsnäs, and Alingsås, so that the Norwegians could not advance further in these directions. Peasant levies were called out to block the roads, and it seems that regular units as well were used for this purpose. So did, for instance, Stake ultimately take up a position in front of Alingsås. For this strategy to work, the Swedish commanders had to abandon parts of the countryside, and these areas were ruthlessly sacked by the Norwegians. The Swedish strategy also included the sending of reinforcements, under Gustav Oxenstierna, from Värmland to Vänersborg, but they arrived only after Krabbe's retreat. By late November, Oxenstierna commanded between 2,300 and 2,800 men in Vänersborg.[24] Moreover, these were fresh and well-supplied troops, unlike those who had fought under Krabbe. Now it was Krabbe who was outnumbered.

Erik Stenbock then handed over command in Västergötland to Harald Stake, instead moving into Halland to resume his formal responsibilities as governor.

Although Krabbe withdrew his depleted units to a safe distance from the border, he was not inactive. Instead, he continued to send raiding parties into Västergötland, as late as on 21–22 November when 400 men from Bohus Fortress carried out a raid in Sweden.[25]

Operations Up North

Fighting also took place in the provinces of Värmland, Jämtland, and Härjedalen. Certainly, Norway wanted to recover Jämtland and Härjedalen, which had been lost to Sweden in 1645. Meanwhile, Värmland was a traditional target of Norwegian invasions.

Yet, our information about operations in Värmland is scant. A Norwegian force from presumably the Oppland Regiment in early September assembled

---

[24] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.197–8.

[25] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.197.



Michael Opitz

at Glomma in Norway. The Norwegians then advanced through Vinger (modern-day Kongsvinger) across the Swedish border, which was defended at Eda. This was a traditional Norwegian invasion route into Värmland which had been used before. However, the Norwegians halted already at Magnor, and then immediately retreated when a Swedish force under Gustav Oxenstierna advanced against them. In hindsight, the Norwegian movement was probably no more than a diversion to bind Swedish units which otherwise could have been of more use in Västergötland. Having already been ordered to detach men for service both in Stockholm and Västergötland, Oxenstierna had few men at his disposal: probably less than 900 regulars divided into one company each of cavalry and dragoons, two companies each of the Mountain County Regiment and Värmland Regiment, a company of retired soldiers, and two 6-pounders and four 3-pounders with crews. To this he could add 300 levies divided into two companies and probably another 560 levies deployed as stationary border guard units.[26] When the Council of the Realm asked Oxenstierna to go on the offensive into Norway, Oxenstierna concluded that with so few men, he would not be able to advance far into enemy territory. If so, only levies would be left to guard the border.

Oxenstierna was right in focusing on the defence, because during the ensuing winter, in February 1658, a Norwegian force of reportedly 309 men from Akershus Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Michael Opitz (1613–1676), a German officer who had been in Norwegian service since the Thirty Years' War, penetrated the border unnoticed and in a bold operation carried out a surprise attack on Eda. The battle lasted for two hours, before the Swedes managed to push back Opitz's men. Casualties were reportedly 25 dead and 20 wounded on the Swedish side, and 20 dead and an unknown number of wounded in Opitz's detachment. When the surprise attack failed, Opitz and his men retreated to Norway, undefeated.[27]

In Jämland and Härjedalen, the Swedish military presence consisted only of the old and superseded Frösö Redoubt, on Frösö island immediately west of Östersund in Jämtland. Work was since 1648 progressing on a new redoubt, at Andersö island just to the west, but it was not yet completed. A company of some 150 soldiers from the Ångermanland Regiment under Captain Anders Harder were working on the project. In July 1657, men from Harder's unit were accordingly sent to put the old Frösö Redoubt in order again. Despite its age, Frösö Redoubt had an artillery park consisting of six 6-pounders and four 3-pounders. While the province also counted three additional redoubts, with a fourth one in Härjedalen, these were small, lacked artillery, and probably also lacked garrisons. Since Jämtland previously had belonged to Norway, many Jämtland peasants supported a return to Norwegian rule. Unsure if soldiers conscripted in the province would be willing to fight against Norwegians, Swedish commanders employed them elsewhere. Any remaining Jämtland conscript units were for this reason ordered to Stockholm already in July. Replacements were difficult to find. By late June, Johan Oxenstierna, the Governor of Västernorrland county which included the provinces of Jämtland and Härjedalen, had only managed to assemble another 100 cavalrymen and dragoons, who under the command of a Quartermaster, Henrik Haneman, in late August were dispatched to the Norwegian border. Oxenstierna found it hard to raise levies, too. Nonetheless, he managed to find some 100 young men who knew how to handle muskets and because of their age apparently felt more affinity to the Swedish cause. Oxenstierna sent them to guard the border and to put in order the remaining small redoubts. Although Oxenstierna was the governor of a huge although sparsely inhabited region consisting of six provinces and one territory (Ångermanland, Medelpad, Hälsingland, Gästrikland, Jämtland, Härjedalen, and the territory known as the Ångerman Lapland, ***Ångermanna lappmark***), in early September his entire regular military force consisted of only 600 men. In comparison, Jørgen Bielke had 3,000 regulars in the Trøndelag region on the Norwegian side of the border. With the Swedish field armies deployed in Finland, the Commonwealth, and the south, Oxenstierna was significantly outnumbered.[28]

---

[26] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.117–18, 120, 121.

[27] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.278–86.

In mid September 1657, Jørgen Bielke led a Norwegian army consisting of some 2,500 men (Table 14) by various roads across the mountains towards the Swedish province of Jämtland.[29]

Table 14. Jørgen Bielke's Norwegian field army assembled for the invasion of Jämtland, September 1657.[30]

Cavalry	
Captain Johan Hülsthorst's Life Company of Horse	90
Dragoons	
Major Knud von Hadelen's Dragoon Company	65–69
Captain Valraven de Graff's Dragoon Company	64–69
Total	**129–139**

---

[28] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.141–6.

[29] The Norwegian invasion of Jämtland and Härjedalen is most authoritatively analysed in Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.203–27.

[30] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.137–8.

Infantry	
Old Trondheim Regiment, Christopher Frederik von Gersdorff	8 coy, 1,173
New Trondheim Regiment, Jørgen Bielke	8 coy, 1,055
Total	2,228
Artillery	
26 men, uncertain number of cannons	
Grand Total	**approx. 2,500**

The only Swedish defensive line of sorts was located at the village Järpsund or Järpen, where the river Järpströmmen provided an obstacle. It was defended by the combined unit of 100 cavalrymen and dragoons under the aforementioned Quartermaster, Haneman. They destroyed the ferry, all available boats, and even any rafts so as to delay the Norwegians. Bielke sent Lieutenant Colonel Frederich Otte Budde with a company of horse and three companies of foot to clear the way. Haneman and his men retreated, pursued by Budde who had the additional advantage of learning of Haneman's movements from local peasants, most of whom still regarded themselves as Norwegians. At first taking cover in the dilapidated and abandoned redoubt at Gällö, where they defended themselves for a while, Haneman and his men ultimately had to retreat towards the south, abandoning the main road from Norway to Jämtland. There were no other Swedish units within reach. The Swedish overall military commander of Västernorrland county which included the provinces of Jämtland and Härjedalen, Colonel Carl Sparre, was not even in the province but in Sundsvall on the coast.

Bielke then advanced against Frösö island, on which was located the sole remaining Swedish military outpost in Värmland. In late September, he laid siege to Frösö Redoubt, which was defended by some 200 men under Major Jon Andersson Myhre of the Hälsinge Regiment, who had assumed command from Captain Harder. The Norwegians had to lay siege to Frösö Redoubt for two months, until by the end of November, the Swedish defenders had no more ammunition. Andersson was forced to negotiate, surrendering the redoubt against the right to free departure. However, the Swedes had to surrender their cannons, personal weapons, standards, and drums. Swedish casualties during the siege were 12 dead and some 70 wounded. Norwegian casualties were higher, but details remain obscure. We know that 15 certainly fell during the siege, with another 19 dead or wounded during the campaign. Probably casualties were higher, since remaining lists do not specify where in Jämtland Bielke's men fell.[31] Nonetheless, the fall of Frösö Redoubt meant that Norway had reconquered Jämtland.

Bielke received additional reinforcements after his entry into Jämtland. In November, Captain Christen Andersen's newly raised company of foot from Trøndelag (the Ålen company, *Ålenske kompani*, of 109 men), and then, in December, Captain Oluf Karlsen Godsche's newly raised Jämtland company (280 men). The artillery crews received another 20 men, and the existing companies were supplemented with new recruits from Jämtland or whoever else was willing to fight for Norway. As a result, by the end of 1657 Bielke's occupation army in Jämtland and Härjedalen reached a strength of close to 3,000 men – a significant force in northern Scandinavia. In addition, Bielke retained 500 to 600 men in his rear, either as border guards or as garrison in Trondheim under Captain Hugo de Meyer, another of the enlisted foreign officers who arrived in June 1657. Moreover, during the war several newly raised companies of the Bergenhus Regiment, too, deployed to the Trondheim region under Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Due.[32]

---

[31] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.146, 224.

Bielke sent men into Härjedalen as well, demanding an oath of loyalty from the population. However, with the main force still at Frösö Redoubt under Bielke, the Norwegians in Härjedalen were never enough to contest full control. Governor Lorentz Creutz of Dalecarlia, with Colonel John Burdon and 600 levied Dalecarlians with muskets, soon moved in from the south to retake the province, which by 3 November again was in Swedish hands.[33] However, as soon as Creutz, Burdon, and the Dalecarlians left Härjedalen, Bielke dispatched more Norwegians from Jämtland, who again received local support.

Was it worthwhile to deploy such a large contingent of the Norwegian army in the Trondheim region and for operations in Jämtland and Härjedalen? We can hazard a guess that Krabbe, the Scanian nobleman, would have preferred if this major contingent had been deployed to his command in Bohuslän. Perhaps he then would have been able to join forces with the Danish invasion army from Scania, which if so possibly would have defeated the Swedes in the, for King Frederick, main theatre of operations in Scandinavia: the region from Bohuslän and Västergötland in the north through Småland to Scania and Blekinge in the south. Be that as it may, Bielke retained the men in his command in the north. Bielke was a Norwegian; perchance he found the chance to reconquer Jämtland and Härjedalen for Norway more appealing than supporting the Danish King's designs in the south.

Having retaken Jämtland and Härjedalen, Bielke made no attempt to carry the offensive further into Sweden. Governor Johan Oxenstierna soon afterwards summarised Bielke's achievements and lack of subsequent activity in sarcastic words: 'And I should commend him for being a fairly polite and discreet enemy since he has not in the slightest attempted to cross the old Swedish borders, and not even caused damage to the value of one chicken.'[34]

---

[32] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.138–40.

[33] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.214.

[34] Oxenstierna to Council of the Realm, 28 December 1657 (O.S.).

The Invasion of Bohuslän

King Charles had already at the outset of war instructed Field Marshal Stenbock to carry out an invasion of Norway during the coming winter, when the frozen ground and snow made travel easier. In December 1657, Stenbock was ready. Yet, it took time for the Göta Älv river to freeze, and his men suffered from epidemic disease. The operation could not take place before the end of January 1658, when the weather suddenly turned very cold. While waiting, Stenbock sent raiding parties into Bohuslän, in the same way that Krabbe sent raiders into Västergötland.

In mid January, Field Marshal Stenbock finally commenced the long-planned invasion of Bohuslän from his base at Frändefors. It is unclear how many men he had at his disposal at the time, but altogether, his army may have included between 3,300 and 3,500 men. Another 600 to 800 horse seem to have arrived as reinforcements in February.[35] With the Field Marshal also followed his brother Erik Stenbock, Gustav Oxenstierna, and Harald Stake. By this time, contemporaries noticed that tensions were growing between the two Stenbocks. Field Marshal Stenbock held the higher rank and had received his command from King Charles. However, Erik Stenbock was the Field Marshal's elder brother and apparently believed that he deserved the same rank – an impossibility unless the King or the overall commander was present. Be that as it may, Field Marshal Stenbock began by dispatching Harald Stake into Bohuslän with 500 cavalry, dragoons, and musketeers, together with two regimental cannons, on the night between 21 and 22 January. Stake soon rode into Uddevalla, where he took several prisoners.

Meanwhile, Krabbe had withdrawn to Kvistrum (modern-day Kviström), the only crossing point over River Kviströmmen on the main north-south road through Bohuslän. Field Marshal Stenbock accordingly entered Norway with the main invasion force along a northern road, bypassing Uddevalla and going straight to Kvistrum. Krabbe retreated further into Norway, towards Halden. He was in severe difficulties; it was freezing cold, both men and officers suffered from frostbite which in some cases led to their death, and yet more worrying, the relentless Stake's cavalry and dragoons pursued the retreating Norwegians. A Swedish source noted that Stake's men killed 50 Norwegians, captured 30, and retrieved a large number of abandoned muskets which Norwegian soldiers had discarded during the retreat.[36]

Even so, Stenbock's army felt the cold, too. As a result, the main army did not continue the pursuit but took up positions from which they could control much of the province and particularly its southern half, including the strong bastion at Uddevalla. The Swedes found that Norwegian peasants had plenty of food which could be taken as contributions. There was another reason as well for Stenbock's obvious caution in pursuing Krabbe. Bohuslän's terrain was difficult, with rocky terrain and narrow valleys through which the few roads passed. The coastline was fragmented, too, constituting the northern

---

[35] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.239–40.

[36] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.247.


Charta öfver Situation omkring Uddevalla Skantz
a. Staden. b. Skantzen, c. Förfallen Tenaillerad linie
Skogsväg
a
b
c
Fiärden

Contemporary map of the town of Uddevalla (right), with its detached, strong bastion (centre).

part of the Gothenburg archipelago. While the terrain was rocky rather than mountainous, reconnaissance was problematic and there was always a risk that an invasion army might be trapped while traversing a narrow valley.

The Swedes controlled most of Bohuslän for almost a month.[37] However, in mid February Krabbe, who had reassembled his forces, began a counteroffensive. On 20 February, Krabbe's and Stenbock's armies lined up against each at Herrestad near Uddevalla. Neither side wished to commence the battle. Two days later, Krabbe received the unexpected news that Stenbock during the night had abandoned Uddevalla and returned to Sweden. Only the bastion at Uddevalla contained a small garrison under Captain Bengt Larsson, but he had just married a Norwegian and was persuaded to surrender three days later.

It seems that Stenbock took the decision to withdraw, which surprised his officers, on his own. The reasons were the poor state of his army, which suffered from the same epidemic disease that devastated much of northern Europe. The epidemic spared nobody; at the time Field Marshal Stenbock, his brother Erik Stenbock, Gustav Oxenstierna, and according to the Field Marshal, indeed almost all his officers developed symptoms. Even the tough-as-nails Harald Stake fell ill. The army was also out of supplies, primarily food but also additional winter garments. Apparently, it had already consumed the food they found upon entering Bohuslän, while Krabbe's men had arrived with fresh supplies from inner Norway. Moreover, and surely at least to some extent in reaction to the Swedish depredations, local peasants began to assemble in the mountains to fight back against the intruders.

---

[37] In February 1658, Douglas was ordered to take command in Värmland, from which he should launch an invasion into Norway from Eda, preferably in cooperation with Field Marshal Stenbock in Bohuslän. However, events moved faster than Douglas's preparations, and in summer 1658 King Charles instead ordered Douglas to Livonia, where he was needed more.

All these were good reasons to withdraw the army, instead of risking its destruction in battle. Besides, there was another good reason not to take excessive risks, of which Field Marshal Stenbock may have been aware. In Denmark, King Charles was already marching on Copenhagen.

10

The March Across the Belts

When the Danish fleet in December returned to Copenhagen for the duration of the winter, King Charles hoped that he would be able to use the transports assembled in Wismar to move the army in Jutland across the water to Fyn. However, within a week, the weather turned cold and ice closed the sea lines.

This was not necessarily bad news for King Charles, since a cold winter invariably facilitated long-distance travel. The Swedish commanders accordingly decided to march across the ice to Fyn, as soon as the ice grew sufficiently thick. The idea of a march across the ice shocked many observers on the Continent as something totally unprecedented. However, such marches were commonplace in northern warfare. The idea to march across the ice to Fyn was first voiced by Field Marshal Wrangel already in October 1657.[1] Yet, it is unlikely that he was the first to consider this option, since there were men in the army who repeatedly had crossed ice-covered water expanses. We have seen (in Volume II) that Swedish units in Finland occasionally marched across the frozen Gulf of Finland when deploying to Estonia or Livonia. Within King Charles's army, some men in Fabian Berndes's Åbo Cavalry Regiment, including quite possibly Berndes himself, were almost certainly among those who crossed the frozen Gulf of Finland on their march to Livonia in 1654. There were almost certainly already-established procedures for regularly measuring the thickness of the ice before a crossing. Although the specific seventeenth-century procedures seem not to have been preserved, with the exception that ice thickness on this occasion should be measured once every hour, later examples show that a Swedish army preparing for an ice crossing measured the thickness at least once per 50 m, expecting a thickness of 5 cm to carry a man, 10 cm a horse, and 15 cm a cannon or supply wagon. A stake or bunch of twigs would be left in each measuring hole to mark the safe passage.[2]

---

[1] Wrangel, 19 October 1657 (O.S.); cited by Björn Asker, *Karl X Gustav* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2010), p.223.

[2] *Lärobok i krigsbyggnadskonst för Kungl. Krigsskolan* (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt, 1909), pp.77–8. Identical guidelines for crossing with horses remained in Swedish army manuals until 1956 and for men on foot yet longer.

Meanwhile, Philip of Sulzbach would stay behind to hold the line against the expected enemy offensive from the Continent. It was not a question of if but when. In December 1657, the representatives of the anti-Swedish coalition – the Empire, Brandenburg, and Commonwealth – met in Berlin to discuss a joint expedition to aid Denmark.

The only question was if the water of the Little Belt that separated Jutland from Fyn, and that of the Great Belt which separated Fyn from Zealand, would freeze sufficiently to allow a crossing. The Belts were located much further south than the Gulf of Finland, and since they separated the North Sea and the Baltic, there was a current in the water which impeded ice formation. There would certainly be ice, but would it be thick enough to allow the crossing of a whole army?

The Swedes could only wait and see. It became a long and anxious wait. Finally, on 9 February at 2:00 a.m., Dahlbergh and other scouts reported to King Charles that the condition of the ice finally allowed a march across the Little Belt. At dawn, the King's army set out, commencing the crossing.

The first force consisted of 3,800 horse, divided into the left wing of 2,300 men under King Charles, assisted by Berndes, and a right wing of 1,500 under Field Marshal Wrangel, assisted by Claes Tott.[3] The two wings each brought some 3-pounders since they expected to end the march with a full-scale assault under enemy fire on the Danish positions on the opposite shore.[4] The Swedish foot, 2,800 to 2,900 men under Jacob Casimir De la Gardie, and the rest of the artillery followed after the horse.[5]

Fyn was well-defended, since the Danes had feared a crossing ever since the Swedes took Frederiksodde. As usual, deployment and chain of command remained somewhat opaque. Overall command was held by Lieutenant General Ulrich Christian Gyldenløve, but he was incapacitated by illness (tentatively identified as malaria by later historians). The possibly most experienced Danish commander was Major General John Henderson, a Scotsman, but he was at Middelfart, which the Danish commanders because of the short distance (one to two kilometres) deemed the most likely crossing point (a faulty conclusion, since the strong current there undermined the ice cover). Elsewhere, Danish units waited in prepared positions, but many were levies and others were deployed in locations which made them unavailable when the crossing actually took place. In total, the Danish army on Fyn probably consisted of some 4,500 regulars and 1,500 levies (Table 15), dispersed on the island. Even though the Danish defences could have been stronger, the Swedes knew that they would have to fight to reach the opposite shore.

---

[3] Ericson Wolke, *1658*, p.143.

[4] Based on Dahlbergh's copperplate depiction of the crossing.

[5] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.184, 186.

Table 15. Preliminary list of Danish units on Fyn[6]

Unit	Coy	Men	Comment
Sten Bille's Cavalry Regiment	9	900	Middelfart (1 company elsewhere)
Ditlev Ahlefeld's Cavalry Regiment	6	600	
Hans (Hinrich?) Ahlefeld's Cavalry Regiment	6	600	
German cavalry company	1	150	
Henrik Sehested's Cavalry Regiment	6	600	
Jens von Löwenclau *genannt* Hadersleben's Cavalry Regiment	8	600	Dispersed (4 coys on Fyn, 1 in Tåsinge south of Fyn, 3 in Langeland)
Ulrich Christian Gyldenløve's Dragoons	?	?	
Infantry	?	?	
Levies	?	1,500 (est.)	
Artillery (4 cannons)			

Where the ice was known to be weak, the horsemen dismounted to lead their horses, maintaining considerable distance from each other. They brought planks, ladders, and straw to reinforce the ice where needed. The common practice in northern warfare was to reinforce the ice by adding straw and slush in weak spots which, as the slush refroze, resulted in a laminated ice cover which supported the crossing better.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to understand how the soldiers felt when ordered to cross, or during the actual crossing. On the one hand, the Scandinavians among them were used to travel on ice. This was, after all, the common way to travel in winter, since frozen rivers were easier to travel than roads, which were generally in poor condition. On the other hand, the Belt was unknown water. Moreover, it was a sea, not a river. The distance was considerable, seven kilometres, with only a small island between the two shores. What the men enlisted on the Continent thought we have no way of knowing. Hugues de Terlon (1620–1690), the French ambassador who travelled in a sledge with King Charles, certainly found the experience harrowing, since there was no way of knowing if the ice would bear all the way to the opposite shore.[7] Crossing a large extent of water on ice always presented some risk. The ice cover would slowly shift and bend, as in a slow wave pattern, there would be sudden sharp sounds due to the pressure which the ice inflicted on itself. Where the water ran swifter under the ice, the ice cover would grow dark and weak, with water emerging from the depths until, perhaps, the entire ice cover cracked open. The knowledge that Danish cavalry and artillery waited on the other side, ready for battle, may have paled into insignificance beside the unknown risks presented by the ice cover. And there were losses. At one point, King Charles's sledge sank through the ice, with its three horses and coachman immediately lost in the dark water. By pure chance, the King had halted the sledge to step out minutes before the tragedy. This saved his life – but probably caused the incident, since the ice might have held if the sledge had continued moving.

---

[6] Stade, 'Krigsrelationen om Tåget över Bält', pp.108–9; based on Danish National Archives, Tyske Kancellis Indenrigske Avd., Inkomne Breve 1658.

[7] Hugues de Terlon, *Memoires du Chevalier de Terlon* I (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1681), p.161. While Terlon wrote this about the Great Belt crossing, the thought no doubt occurred to him already on the ice-covered Little Belt.

When the men finally came within charging distance of the Danish positions on Fyn, at Iversnæs, they again mounted their horses and formed up into units. Wrangel's wing arrived first. Then, the ice cover suddenly broke, unable to take the extra weight on a stretch of ice already weakened by the current near the shore. Some 40 to 50 men of Johann von Waldeck-Landau's Cavalry Regiment tumbled into the ice-cold water and were lost, as well as some others from Königsmarck's Cavalry Regiment.[8]

Observing the tactical situation, King Charles led his wing to attack the Danish position in the flank. This time, the ice held firm. The assault became known as the battle of Tybrind Vig, or Tybrind Bay. Presumably in a hurry to reach the safety of firm ground, the Swedes rapidly stormed the Danish positions, gaining a complete victory. Only some 200 Danes managed to extricate themselves. The rest were mostly captured. The Danes who fell into captivity on Fyn included the overall commander, Gyldenløve (found, incapacited by his debilitating illness, in a coach not far from Odense), five members of the Danish Council of the Realm, 3,000 cavalry including 700 enlisted Germans, 1,500 levied peasants, 60 cannons, and a magazine full of ammunition.[9]

The seemingly miraculous crossing of the Little Belt caused panic in Copenhagen. Having received the news, King Frederick immediately sent emissaries to commence negotiations for peace. The King was insincere. What he really wanted was an armistice, to gain time for the anti-Swedish coalition to go on the offensive against the Swedes from the south. However, King Charles was well aware of these plans. Accepting peace negotiations, but no armistice, he pushed on towards Copenhagen.

---

[8] Manley, *History*, 6, wrote ‘Two troops … and several other single troopers’. Although late Swedish histories claimed that two full companies were lost, the Danish commander Colonel Jens von Hadersleben noted the lower number, which clearly was the correct one. Arne Stade, ‘Krigsrelationen om Tåget över Bält: Den samtida svenska propagandalitteraturen i källkritisk belysning’, Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier I, 1965), pp.67–139, on p.110. A likely explanation is that the Swedish companies were severely understrength.

[9] Manley, *History*, 6; Arne Stade, ‘Engelska memoarer: Manley's *History*, Meadowe's *Narrative* och Carl X Gustafs första danska krig’, Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.19–65, on p.49.


N
2. De la Gardie's infantry, supposed to join the cavalry, is delayed
Abandoned redoubt
Rud
4. Having crossed, King Charles attacks from the north
Danish horse
Tybrind
Weak ice
Weak ice
3. Left wing cavalry under King Charles sets out, joins Wrangel's wing
5. Simultaneously, Wrangel attacks from the south. Danes abandon positions and flee
Eskør
Danish artillery
Redoubt
Iversnæs
1. Right wing under Wrangel crosses first defeats Danish advance guard on the ice
Channel through the ice opened by Danes
Brandsø
0
1
2
3 km

The Crossing of the Little Belt, 9 February 1658


Repræſentatio
prælij d. 30 Ianua. An. 1658
ad Iſwersnäās commiſsi.
Inquo Seren. Rex Sueciæ CAROLVS GVSTAVVS postquam copias ſuas per glaciem
Auxilio Diuino prorsus ſingulari ex Holsatia in Insulam Fyoniam traduxerat, Exercitũ Danorũ cecidit,
et Fyonia tota potitus est. Suecorum Teſsera militaris erat.
ADIUVA IESV.
A. Seren. Rex Sueciæ. B. Illustr. Dn. Archithalaſsus Comes Wrangelius. C. Carolus Magnus Princeps Marchio Baden
sis. D. Illustr. Dn. Comes Claudius Tott Generalis. E. Princeps Anhaltinus. F. Princeps Haſsia Homburgensis. G. Pr. Haſsia Darm
stadensis. H. Dux Saxonia Weim. I. Principis Palatinj Sulzbacensis et Comitis Solmensis Turmæ binas Danor. Turmas fundunt
et in Angusta viarum. K. Persequuntur. L. Turma Marchio Badensis. M. Landgrauij Homburgen. Turma. N. Legio Smalan
dica. O. Legio Uplandica. P. Ser. Reginæ Suec. Legio prætoria sub Ductu Dn. Protribuni Lubeckeri. D. Ioh. Ahlseldium
adoritur. Q. Ex. Dn. Archithal. Legio præt. sub Trib. Bornmanno quæ in Fyoniam præmiſsa, prima Danorum
Agmina in littore ſtantia fudit, u Trib. Seeſted cepit. R. Peditatus Danorum ſub Trib. Ione primum
Sub Dumetis. S. Satis commode positus, ſed a 100. delectis pedibus
inde expulsus in glacie Constitit, vbi ſe Excell. Dn.
Archithalaſso arbitrio Dedidit.
HOL SATIA
Pagus Eskiö
Iſwersnäas
Pagus Heilsn
Insula Brandsoo
Incessus exercitus Suedici ex Holsatia in Fyoniam
Fuga Danorum
Ordo Aciei Danorum ante Aduentum Reg Maiestatis Sueciæ
Ordo Legionum Suecarum ante prælium
Turmæ Suecorum quibus pugnandi Copia non dabatur
Dumeta et ſepes quæ Suecis penetranda et diruenda erant Danos ab altera parte Stantes aggreſsuri
Dumeta et ſepimenta
Dahlbergh ad viu. delin.
Peditatus Suedicus ductore Illust. Dn. Comite Iacobo De la Gardie, qui Stendrupio veniebat, ſed à pugnæ loco aliquod millia paſsuum adhuc aberat.
Pagus Stendrup.
Comitum Waldekij et Konigsmarkij Turmæ quæ fracta glacie non nihil damni fecerunt
S. R. Mtis Rheda vna cum duobus equis rupta glacie absorpta
Tormenta Danica quibus ala Regia et ipsa Reg. Mtis Persona petebantur postea Suecis in prædam relicta
A
B
C
H
I
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S

The battle at Tybrind Bay, after the crossing of the Little Belt, 9 February 1658. (Samuel von Pufendorf)

King Charles entered Odense, the main town on Fyn, on the day after the crossing. He was determined to lead his army also across the Great Belt, from Fyn to Zealand and Copenhagen. There were two possible routes. Shortest but most risky was the direct route across the Great Belt from Nyborg on Fyn to Korsør on Zealand, about 18 km long. Longer but safer was the route from Svendborg on Fyn across the smaller islands of Langeland, Lolland, and Falster to Vordingborg on Zealand. To keep his options open, King Charles sent Wrangel with half the army to Nyborg and Berndes with the other half to Svendborg.

At Nyborg, Wrangel and his men first encountered several hundred abandoned Danish cavalry horses. The cavalrymen had fled across the ice to Zealand, and clearly thought that it was safer to walk on foot. Then, Wrangel found Peter Bredal's Little Belt squadron, stuck in ice in the Nyborg roadstead. Although unable to move, Bredal refused to surrender. He had four warships: the *Svenske Løve* (the formerly Swedish merchantmen, with 36 cannons), *Samson* (40 cannons), *Lammet* (another formerly Swedish merchantman, with 30 cannons), and *Emanuel* (an auxiliary from the Iceland Company, with 24 cannons). King Frederick had ordered Bredal to destroy his ships rather than surrender them. Wrangel brought artillery (presumably only regimental cannons were available) to lay siege to Bredal's stationary squadron. Yet, Bredal had plenty of shipboard artillery, so he easily outgunned the Swedes. Wrangel then sent cavalry across the ice against Bredal's ships, but since Bredal also had grapeshot ammunition, the cavalry soon found that it was suicidal to approach the stationary vessels. Meanwhile, Bredal's men worked around the clock to cut open the ice so that they could move the ships further out, into open water or at least out of range of the Swedish artillery. Wrangel then sent infantry which attempted to build siege works on the ice. However, to remain out there exposed to the bitterly cold winds was difficult, and Bredal's artillery fire made conditions unbearable. Yet, the situation was nervous for Bredal and his men, too, since all his sailors realised that if winds reached gale-force, which under the circumstances seemed likely, their new position was so exposed that they certainly would be crushed against the ice. Dahlbergh described the extraordinary siege as something 'that one never before had seen or heard of'. Moreover, Wrangel now had to move on to more urgent activities elsewhere. Meanwhile, Bredal simply stayed put, stubbornly refusing to surrender.[10]

At the same time, King Charles despatched numerous scouts to ascertain the carrying capacity of the ice in the Great Belt. On 14 February, at 9:00 p.m., first Friedrich von Arensdorff and then Dahlbergh, independently of each other, returned with the latest ice reports. The King had sent Dahlbergh to survey the ice as far out as between Langeland and Lolland, while Arensdorff, apparently following instructions from Wrangel, had crossed from Nyborg to Korsør on Zealand. Although Arensdorff pointed out that ice conditions were dangerous, with numerous soft spots and holes in the ice cover, he had

---

[10] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.185; John Maalø Larsen, *Mindehæfte om Peder Jensen Bredal* (Nyborg: Nyborg Marineforening, n.d.).


Dahlberg delineavit.
Lemcke pinxit.

King Charles and the Swedish army at Tybrind Bay, after the crossing of the Little Belt, 9 February 1658. (Johann Philip Lemke)

nonetheless managed to reach Zealand. Dahlbergh reported that the ice was safe to cross. Finding the route across Langeland and Lolland the safer one, King Charles chose this option.

Yet, the stormy weather that worried Bredal's men at Nyborg also put the planned ice crossing at severe risk. Strong winds in conjunction with mild temperatures might reduce the ice cover. Wrangel sent a patrol across the ice towards Korsør on Zealand, but it returned, reporting that the ice had weakened to the extent that it had broken under their feet and some men had gone through. The Swedish commanders hesitated. Was it still safe to wager the army on the rapidly deteriorating carrying capacity of the ice? But, if the army stayed in place, it risked being trapped on an island too small to supply it, which soon would cause its inevitable destruction. Dahlbergh argued that the ice remained sound, but Wrangel was not equally convinced. King Charles ordered the army to halt, and then proceeded to Svendborg personally to inspect the ice conditions. There, he found that a cavalry detachment under his brother-in-law Margrave Charles Magnus of Baden-Durlach (1621–1658), another veteran of the Thirty Years' War, never received the order to halt – and, apparently upon the initiative of Berndes, had



The battle on the ice between Field Marshal Wrangel's army and Captain Bredal's naval squadron (upper right corner), 10–12 February 1658, as seen from Wrangel's artillery. Swedish cavalry attacks the warships, but without success.

already safely crossed to Langeland. As a result, King Charles immediately ordered a general advance. At the same time, King Charles ordered Wrangel to follow with the infantry and his 14 cannons, or cross directly from Nyborg to Korsør, whatever seemed best at the time.

By then, it had already been dark for two hours. One squadron after the other now set out across the five kilometres to Langeland. Despite the cold night, the upper crust of the ice continued to melt as the men marched. Soon, the melting ice water reached high up the horses' legs. Even so, at dawn King Charles's part of the Swedish army (up to 3,000 cavalry but also 370 foot from the Kalmar Regiment and some artillery) found themselves on firm ground at Langeland.[11] The march continued at noon, and having crossed another 13 km of ice, at about 3:00 p.m. the first units of the army found themselves on Lolland. Within two hours, everybody had crossed without loss of life. This time, the army marched in units, with the cavalry mounted – not dismounted and dispersed as at the Little Belt. There was no Danish resistance. A few hundred levies on the shore abandoned their positions and fled. The fortified town of Nakskov on Lolland, held by 1,500 levies, 75 Scanian freeshooters, and a company of 75 German cavalry, immediately surrendered, without a shot being fired, despite having 40 cannons for the town's defences.[12] Perhaps the lack of regular soldiers made the artillery useless. More pertinent, however, was that the burghers were unwilling to risk their lives, the disgruntled levies refused to fight since the burghers had

---

[11] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, 186; Ericson Wolke, *1658*, pp.143, 144. The number is uncertain, since an unknown number of cavalry remained on Fyn. Ericson Wolke argues for between 2,000 and 3,000 cavalry and 370 foot, while Hedberg suggests a total of 3,400 men and some artillery.

[12] King Charles to Adolph John, 8 February 1658 (O.S.).



Above: The Swedish army begins the crossing of the Great Belt, 15–16 February 1658. Below: detail of the same painting showing King Charles, in the centre with drawn rapier, and his senior commanders. (Johann Philip Lemke)




N
Helsingborg
Helsingør
Horsens
Vejle
JUTLAND
Frederiksodde
Bogense
Middelfart
Kolding
Hejls
Tybrind
FYN
Odense
Kalundborg
Holbæk
Tostrup
Copenhagen
Roskilde
Torslunda Magle
Sorø
Køge
ZEALAND
Korsø
Nyborg
SPROGØ
GREAT BELT
skør
Næstved
Haderslev
Assens
LITTLE BELT
Præstø
Svendborg
Aabenraa
Vordingborg
Rudkøbing
Stubbekøbing
Sønderborg
Naksko
Flensburg
Maribo
Sakskøbing
LOLLAND
Main army under King Charles
Wrangel's corps
Wrangel's corps
0
15
30 km

9 Feb. King Charles crosses the frozen Little Belt

10 Feb. Swedes take Nyborg

15 Feb. King Charles and cavalry reach Svendborg, infantry remain in Nyborg

16 Feb. King Charles crosses th frozen Great Belt

18 Feb. Advance units reach Zealand

Nakskov surrenders; Wrangel and infantry cross the Great Belt

25 Feb. Peace negotiations begin

28 Feb. Preliminary peace treaty concluded

King Charles's Conquest of the Danish Islands, 1658 not fed them, and the low walls facing the ice-covered sea were essentially indefensible, which would have allowed the Swedes to assault across the ice which obviously would not deter them. As usual, the enlisted soldiers were incorporated into the Swedish army. The levies were disarmed. After a day of rest, the army continued across the ice to Falster. On the following evening, the first units, led by the Småland Cavalry Regiment, crossed the ice to Zealand, arriving at Vordingborg.

Within a few days, Wrangel's primarily infantry force of 2,900 men (1,000 horse, 1,700 foot, 200 artillerymen) joined the main army at Vaalse on Falster, having followed roughly the same route as the King across the Great Belt. King Charles's total strength was then some 6,300 men.[13]

Expecting a major Danish counter-attack, King Charles deployed the army for battle on Zealand. However, the approaching Danes turned out to be not King Frederick's army, but emissaries suing for peace. When they produced their credentials, some Swedish officers taunted them, asking if the document was the *Jus Feciale*.

Although all had gone well, King Charles was dissatisfied with the discipline in his army. He wrote to Jacob Casimir De la Gardie, complaining about the numerous reports of looting that had taken place both in Odense and in the countryside. The King did not only complain; in a letter to Colonel Johan von Essen he emphasised the order that the Colonel must take immediate action in case of transgressions and punish any offenders so that others did not repeat the offence.[14]

CAROLUS GUSTAV·D·G·SVEC·GOTH·VANDALOR·Q·REX
AN° 1658
INVIA VIRTUTI NULLA EST VIA
1

King Charles as depicted in a lifelike, commemorative medal struck by Dutch artist Pieter van Abeele (1608–1684). Despite his active life, the King was a rotund man, and no doubt easily recognisable to his men. (National Museum of Finland)

---

[13] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.187. Hedberg writes 6,500 men but his figures add up to 6,300. Ericson Wolke, *1658*, p.146, suggests 5,000 horse and 2,500 foot and artillery.

[14] King Charles to Jacob Casimir De la Gardie, 17 February 1658 (O.S.); King Charles to Johan von Essen, 26 February 1658 (O.S.). In the latter case, the King was apparently more displeased with

Plate A



Left: Veteran Swedish officer, Västgöta Cavalry Regiment
Right: Swedish musketeer, Uppland Regiment
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate B



Left: Swedish Navy under-officer
Right: Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna, 1659
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate C



Left: Swedish Navy sailor

Right: Swedish levied irregular on the Norwegian border

(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate D



Left: Danish musketeer, Eckerich Johann Lübbe's Black Regiment
Right: Norwegian officer, Michael Eckstein's Cavalry Regiment

(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate E



Left: Norwegian Navy sailor
Right: Danish irregular, Scania
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate F



Left: Dutch musketeer, Eustachius Puchler's Regiment
Right: Dutch Navy sailor
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information



Left: Imperial cuirassier, Johann von Sporck's Cuirassier Regiment
Right: Brandenburg infantry officer, Otto Christoph von Sparr's Regiment
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate H



Left: Muscovite Don cossack
Right: Kalmyk cavalryman
(Illustration by Sergey Shamenkov © Helion & Company 2023)
See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate I


CAROLVS GVSTAVUS REX SVECIÆ
PER ARTEM ET MARTEM . 1655

Left: Sweden: Colour of unidentified regiment of foot, 1655–1660

Below: Sweden: Company colour of unidentified regiment of foot, 1658–1660

(Illustrations by Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information


OMINE FA
C·G·R·S

Plate J




FOR VORIS KONGE OCH VOR LAND
SAAHAR VI HIERTE NV OCH HAND

Above: Sweden: Guidon of unidentified dragoon unit, 1655–1660
Below: Denmark: Colour of Jørgen Rosencrantz's Enlisted Regiment of Foot, 1657

(Illustrations by Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

Plate K


Friedrich Wilhelm
Carolus Æmilius

Above: Brandenburg: Cornet of Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Regiment of Horse, 1655–1657

Below: Brandenburg: Guidon of Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Dragoon Regiment, 1655–1657

(Illustrations by Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information


C. Æ. C. L. Z. B.
Der Herr wird dich mit seinen fittichen bedecken

Plate L


PRO GLORIA CRVCIS
SVB TVO PRÆSIDIO



Plate M



Left: Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth: Royal Military Banner of King John Casimir, 1654–1655

Below left: Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth: Colour of unidentified company of King John Casimir's Royal Guard, 1655

Below: Muscovy: Banner of a *Sotnya* ('Hundred'), the Sovereign's Division, 1654

(Illustrations by Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information



Plate N



Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth: Colour of the Life Company of King John Casimir's Royal Guard, 1655

Illustration by Anderson Subtil © Helion & Company 2023

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information

The Treaty of Roskilde

King Charles still refused to agree to an armistice, since he knew that this only would enable the Danes to rebuild their strength and encourage the anti-Swedish coalition to push on. Instead, he continued towards Copenhagen. King Frederick had plenty of soldiers in and around Copenhagen, possibly as many as 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 dragoons and foot, as well as from 2,000 to 3,000 levies, burgher militia, armed sailors, and so on.[15] The Danes certainly had more men than the invaders, but King Frederick feared that they might not prevail against King Charles's experienced army. Moreover, he knew that the fortifications of Copenhagen were in poor condition. King Frederick also realised that the loss of his capital might mean the end of Denmark's independence. On the other hand, King Charles knew that his army was weak in numbers, perhaps too weak to invest and storm a city the size of Copenhagen. As a result, negotiations got underway on 21 February. The war ended with the Treaty of Roskilde on 8 March 1658. King Frederick had to agree to cede, from Denmark, the provinces of Scania, Halland, Blekinge, and the island of Bornholm, and from Norway, the province of Bohuslän and Trondheim County. In an addendum to the Treaty, Denmark in May recognised the sovereignty of Duke Frederick's Holstein-Gottorp.[16]

The scale of the Swedish victory was staggering, as was its speed. From the moment when King Charles set foot on the frozen Little Belt, the entire campaign was over in 20 days.

Most of the Danish army, including all national units, was sent home. King Frederick retained two enlisted cavalry and five infantry regiments in Zealand and a comparable force in Holstein. Four regiments were directly tied to the Crown: the King's and Queen's Life Regiments of Horse and Foot, all raised by the state and led by employed professionals. Most artillerymen were dismissed, and the horses sold, not because the Treaty of Roskilde demanded it but as a means to save money.

However, Article 16 of the Treaty demanded the handover to Sweden of 2,000 Danish cavalry. The Danes tried to resolve this by surrendering two parish cavalry regiments from the already ceded Scania which happened to be on Zealand: Axel Urup's and Franz Joachim Trampe's Cavalry Regiments. On 6 March 1658, the Danes handed over 936 of these men at Køge. Many deserted already on the way to the handover point. The two regiments, or rather what remained of them, were sent to Riga, where they ended up in the

---

the men than their colonel. Johan von Essen af Zellie was promoted to major general after the Belt crossings.

[15] Holm, *Översikt*, 93; Ericson Wolke, *1658*, p.147.

[16] The peace treaties (Treaty of Tostrup and Treaty of Roskilde) stipulated that the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp no longer was a vassal of the Danish Crown in Schleswig. The full sovereignty of the Duke's Schleswig domain was secured by the Convention of Copenhagen (12 May 1658 O.S.) and the subsequent Treaty of Oliva, although Denmark did not admit the claim before the Convention of Altona (30 June 1689 O.S.).

Livonian field army, technically still under Trampe's command but in reality, under that of his Lieutenant Colonel, Dietrich Reinkingk.[17]

When the cavalrymen deserted, Copenhagen attempted to substitute infantrymen and argued for a reduction of the number already agreed upon. The substitution was unacceptable to King Charles, who already in autumn 1657 had ordered Wrangel to conscript 2,000 soldiers in Jutland, and in February 1658 ordered additional conscription, which now also applied to Fyn, where 853 men were called up for the infantry regiment in Riga.[18] Another 200 men from Fyn were sent to Wollin in Swedish Pomerania (where we will see that many of them in September 1659 defected to Starhemberg's Imperial corps). Some 200 men from Aarhus and Nyborg were conscripted into the Swedish navy. Although exact records often are missing and subject to misinterpretation, an estimated 2,200 horse, 2,250 dragoons, and 8,300 foot, in total 12,750 men, from Denmark and the ceded provinces in Denmark and Norway were, or intended to be, taken into Swedish service in one way or another.[19]

The conscription of Danes was a means to raise soldiers, but equally it was a means to drain Denmark of fighting men, so as to reduce the country's capability to rise against Sweden. For the latter reason, King Charles also recommended the deployment of the Dalecarlia Regiment to Langeland, a regiment known for its bellicose attitude to Danes.

Unsurprisingly, the ceded provinces, too, had to provide soldiers. In June 1658, conscripts from Scania and Blekinge (presumably the remnants of the Scanian Regiment of Foot) were sent to the Swedish army in Prussia. Bornholm must provide sailors to the Swedish navy. Trondheim county had to raise a cavalry regiment for Sweden and immediately hand over its two infantry regiments. The cavalry regiment was never fully raised, even though an attempt was made to form a Trondheim cavalry regiment in Jämtland based on two existing companies of the Uppland Cavalry Regiment with enlisted Norwegians and Germans under the aforementioned Captain Henrik Haneman. The two Trondheim Regiments, by then 600 to 700 men each, in September marched to Sundsvall in Sweden for transportation to Livonia. Many deserted along the long road to the Baltic coast; hardly surprising, since the second Danish war by then already was underway. By the end of the year, remnants of the New Trondheim Regiment, under Anders Munck, deployed to Riga, while those of the Old Trondheim Regiment, under Fleming, deployed to Reval. Ultimately, remnants of the two regiments were distributed among Reval, Pernau, Riga, Wolmar, Wenden, Neumünde, and Mitau. When war again broke out between Sweden and Denmark, Norwegian propaganda claimed that the Swedes sent the two regiments 'to be slaughtered by heathens and Turks'. While Norwegian soldiers surely fell in battle in Livonia, they fared no worse than their Swedish counterparts. In fact, two companies of a total of 150 Norwegians were instead sent to Landskrona where they were incorporated into the Swedish Life Guard, the army's most prestigious unit.[20]

---

[17] Finn Askgaard, 'Den korte fred: Mellemkrigstiden 26/2–7/8 1658', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.253–311, on 268; Ericson Wolke, *1658*, p.172.

[18] The infantry regiment in Riga was until 1659 commanded by Simon Grundel Helmfelt (1617–1677), more on whom below. Colonel Stegman (d. 1676) began his career as a common musketeer in 1637.

[19] Rockstroh, 'Bemærkninger', p.141; Lars Ericson, *Krig och krigsmakt under svensk stormaktstid* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2004), pp.128–9.

Since few former Danish and Norwegian soldiers willingly went into Swedish service, most were indeed sent overseas to reduce the men's opportunities for desertion. Many were accordingly destined for Livonia or Ingria which, in addition, had suffered depopulation because of the exit of so many Orthodox peasants. Yet, the same deployment policy applied to all former enemy soldiers enlisted in the army (except those German volunteers who were equally happy to serve in any victorious army which paid their wages). We will see that captured Lithuanian soldiers likewise were enlisted and sent overseas, but in their case to the army in Denmark.

Moreover, it was not the Treaty's insistence on the handing over of soldiers which caused most difficulties. Another and enduring source of contention was the interpretation of Article III, which stated that the parties should jointly close the Strait to 'foreign hostile navies'. King Frederick wanted to interpret this term in its limited meaning, meaning fleets that simultaneously were foreign and hostile. King Charles interpreted the phrase as meaning fleets that were either foreign or hostile, which would establish joint Danish-Swedish naval dominion over the Baltic Sea, in effect turning it into a closed sea (*mare clausum*). Such an outcome was primarily directed against Denmark's ally the Netherlands.

Then there was the particular problem presented by the Swedish colony in West Africa.[21] When the governor of the Swedish Gold Coast colony, Hendrik Carloff, in 1656 fell out with the management board in Stockholm and was replaced, he turned to Denmark, which by then already had plans to establish a West African colony of its own. When Denmark declared war on Sweden, King Frederick gave Carloff first a letter of marque as a Danish privateer and then, in August 1657, an agreement that gave him free hands to conquer any Swedish possessions and ships on the Gold Coast. Carloff accordingly equipped the ship *Glückstadt* with which he sailed to the Gold Coast. With the help of locally recruited African soldiers, he in February 1658 raided and destroyed all the Swedish trading posts. In the final showdown, Carloff and his men received the support of the Dutch Africa Company, which had its own soldiers in the region. Together, they attacked, seized, and plundered the Swedish headquarters Carolusborg, which was claimed for Denmark. Carloff also took the Swedish merchantman *Stockholms Slott* ('Stockholm Palace'), which he found fully loaded with goods in the port. By coincidence, Carloff returned to Glückstadt, laden with booty, immediately after the Treaty of Roskilde. The Swedish Crown accordingly demanded the return of the Gold Coast colony and the handover of Carloff and his plunder. However, tipped off by the Danes, Carloff rapidly fled to the Netherlands, where he had powerful friends, with as much loot as he could bring aboard a smaller ship. Carloff then rebuilt his career, this time as a slaver on behalf of Dutch and French interests.[22]

---

[20] Ericson Wolke, *1658*, pp.163–4; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.219; Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.384–5.

[21] On the events in the Swedish Gold Coast, see Fredholm von Essen, *Lion from the North* 2, pp.222–4.

The Treaty of Roskilde brought repercussions for Denmark's allies. The Commonwealth was still at war with Muscovy and did not wish to see the Swedish main army return. For Frederick William of Brandenburg the peace agreement signified imminent ruin, since he knew that King Charles was likely to come for him before he returned to the Commonwealth. Fearing that Ducal Prussia was at risk, Frederick William again levied additional taxes (the military land tax known as *Kontribution* as well as *Kopfsteuer*, an emergency war tax on all subjects best described as a graduated income tax) without consent from the Estates to reinforce his army – yet another step in Brandenburg's transformation into Prussia.[23]

---

[22] In this venture he was equally successful, so eventually, between 1676 and 1677, the Dutch made him Governor of Tobago.

[23] Sidney B. Fay, 'The Beginnings of the Standing Army in Prussia', *American Historical Review* 22: 4 (1917), pp.763–777, on pp.772, 775.

11

The Imperial Intervention in the Commonwealth

Meanwhile, the war was far from over in the Commonwealth. We have seen how the Empire on 27 May 1657 entered into an alliance with the Commonwealth against Sweden through the Second Treaty of Vienna. The Treaty was concluded by the heir apparent to the Holy Roman Empire Leopold, King in Germania, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and Archduke of Austria, who at this point ratified an agreement signed already on 30 March to send 12,000 men and artillery to assist King John Casimir. The Habsburg Empire did not go to war out of pure benevolence but for solid geopolitical reasons. Moreover, the Treaty stated that the costs of the troops would have to be paid by the Commonwealth. In addition, the Commonwealth had to provide territory and revenues as surety until the end of the war.

As soon as the Treaty was signed, an Imperial expeditionary force consisting of experienced soldiers under Field Marshal General (*Generalfeldmarschall*) Melchior von Hatzfeldt (1593–1658) advanced into Lesser Poland, with Cracow as his first objective. Nobody was happier to see the Imperials arrive than King John Casimir, who by then had set up a headquarters in Częstochowa, near the Imperial border.

The Imperial army was second to none in experience as well as technical and scientific prowess. It had learnt from the Swedish adversary during the Thirty Years' War, adopted such aspects of the Swedish model which had proven its utility, yet retained those aspects of the Imperial military tradition which remained of value in modern warfare. Unsurprisingly, the Imperial army employed forms of organisation and types of tactics of the Continental model. Although the Imperial army had been much reduced after the Thirty Years' War, it remained a formidable and very experienced fighting force.[1]

---

[1] For additional details on the Imperial army during the Danish wars and the wars of the Deluge, see Volume I.

Right: John II Casimir. (Marcello Bacciarelli)



Below: Leopold I, in coronation armor 1658. (Attributed to Pietro Liberi or Guido Cagnacci)



Below right: Melchior von Hatzfeldt



The Imperial Conquest of Cracow

In June 1657, the Imperial expeditionary force under Hatzfeldt commenced preparations for laying siege to Cracow. In July, Imperial units assembled around the city. Ultimately, Cracow seems to have been surrounded by some 11,000 to 12,000 Imperials and ultimately 8,000 Poles under King John Casimir, although numbers remain uncertain.[2]

Cracow, the former capital, had been in Swedish hands since 1655. The Swedish commandant, Paul Würtz, had successfully defended the city from several Polish attempts to retake it. Already during the first winter, quite a few Polish units were captured or dispersed by Swedish sallies as they attempted to lay siege to the city. Finally, Queen Marie Louise attempted to persuade Würtz to surrender the city in exchange for a high position in Commonwealth service. Würtz politely declined.

In accordance with the Treaty of Radnot of December 1656, King Charles handed over control of the city to Prince George Rákóczy of Transylvania, who sent his former envoy to the Commonwealth, János Bethlen (1613–1678), to safeguard his interests there. Formally, Bethlen was in command. However, Sweden had learnt during the Thirty Years' War that it was prudent to appoint an experienced Swedish military deputy to allied foreign princes, to assist them but also to keep an eye on them.[3] For this reason, King Charles appointed Colonel Fabian von Fersen, who already was in Cracow, to assist Bethlen. The plan was that the capable Würtz would then lead the Swedish troops north to join King Charles on the march to Denmark. However, this turned out to be impossible. First, the water level in the river turned out to be too low to allow the shipping of artillery and other heavy goods. Second, Commonwealth forces already blocked the roads to the north. This prevented Würtz and the small Swedish garrison from departing.

As a result, Cracow's garrison in the summer of 1657 consisted of roughly 2,500 Swedes and 2,500 Transylvanians, the latter of dubious value in a siege.[4] The combined Imperial and Polish armies outside Cracow greatly outnumbered the defenders. In addition, the population of Cracow was hostile to Würtz and Bethlen.

As described in Volume II, in late July Prince George Rákóczy agreed to a peace treaty with the Commonwealth and withdrew from the war. At that time, he also sent a letter to János Bethlen, ordering him to surrender Cracow. The order arrived on 4 August, and Bethlen and the Transylvanian part of the garrison accordingly surrendered to the besiegers.

---

[2] Ryszard Dzieszyński, *Kraków 1655–1657* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2019), pp.187–9.

[3] Fredholm von Essen, *Lion from the North* II, pp.36–7.

[4] Numbers are uncertain. We have seen that in July 1657, the Swedish garrison in Cracow consisted of approximately 3,000 men (600 cavalry, 300 dragoons, and 2,100 infantry). Some attrition certainly took place during the siege. The assessment is based on the observations that the Swedish and Transylvanian garrisons originally were roughly equal in strength and that some 2,000 Transylvanians ultimately marched out of Cracow. Dzieszyński, *Kraków*, p.197.



Paul Würtz

This left Würtz and the Swedish half of the garrison in Cracow not only out of contact with other Swedish units but also quite alone. Moreover, Würtz realised that Cracow was too far to the south to be retained indefinitely, even if the defences held. For this reason, he made the saving of the men his first priority. Having negotiated the right to march away with full honours of war, Würtz on 30 August departed from Cracow with his men and the entire artillery and supply train. They were few in numbers. Duke Franz Erdtmann of Saxe-Lauenburg's Cavalry Regiment by then consisted of only 228 men, Major General Claes Tott's Cavalry Regiment no more than 136 men, and Colonel Jacob von Yxkull's Cavalry Regiment only 221 men and 54 wounded. As for the infantry, Paul Würtz's Regiment consisted of only 570 soldiers including 114 wounded, while Colonel Fabian von Fersen's Regiment of Foot counted 676 men including 109 wounded. Other regiments were even smaller, although admittedly, some were very reduced already from the outset. The Swedish force also brought 362 carts.[5] Moreover, aware that Stefan Czarniecki preferred to see the Swedes dead, Würtz made Hatzfeldt provide an escort of 1,000 Imperial and 200 Polish cavalry to see the Swedes safely to the River Oder. Fuming, Czarniecki followed the Swedish retreat from a distance. He attempted to attack the column twice, but the Imperial presence kept him at a distance. Instead, Czarniecki and his men ravaged the parts of Brandenburg which he passed through. We have seen that Würtz's contingent, under Fabian von Fersen, in November joined King Charles's army in Jutland.

After the conquest of Cracow, an Imperial garrison of more than 2,000 men moved into the city.

The Swedish Defensive Line in Prussia

Before King Charles marched to Denmark, he removed most garrisons in Poland and reduced the number in Prussia. By August, most Swedish forces had already left Poland. However, the Swedes did not surrender the well-fortified and easily defensible Royal Prussia, most of which they controlled with Danzig being the only major exception. Thorn (modern-day Toruń) had a garrison of some 2,300 men under Major General Barthold Hartwig von Bülow. Thorn was particularly important, since the town controlled traffic on

---

[5] Dzieszyński, *Kraków*, p.200.


DELIN: OBSIDIONIS CRACOVIÆ, À POLONIS ET AVSTRIACIS FORMATÆ, AC CONSVMATÆ AVGVSTO M.DC.LVII.
Belägerung Cracau, von den Polen und Öſtreichiſchen vorgenommen, und im Auguſto 1657. vollführet worden.
Statt Casimir
CRACAV
Weixsel Fluvius
Scala di milli pasi andanti

Original map of the siege of Cracow, July–August 1657. Note the unconventional direction of north.

the Vistula between Prussia and Poland. For Commonwealth troops to regain Royal Prussia from the Swedes (except Danzig, of course), they had first to take Thorn. Elbing (modern-day Elbląg) had a garrison of some 1,300 men. Marienburg (modern-day Malbork) was defended by at most 1,200 men, and Danziger Haupt (now Gdańska Głowa; the city of Danzig's exit to the Baltic Sea) by some 1,000 men. Montauer Spitze (modern-day Cypel Mątowski, a promontory between the Rivers Vistula and Nogat where Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus had built a fortress in 1626), Graudenz (modern-day Grudziądz), Strasburg (modern-day Brodnica), and Stuhm (modern-day Sztum) were smaller, and none had a garrison of more than a few hundred men. Total remaining Swedish troops in Prussia were accordingly 8,600 men (2,000 cavalry, 700 dragoons, and 5,900 infantry; Table 2, above). Even so, funding was made available to enlist yet more men. The cavalry was tasked to maintain communications between the towns held.

Following the instruction of King Charles, Duke Adolph John in September evacuated the lesser towns (Dirschau, Mewe, Stargard, Schlochau, Lauenburg, Bütow, Konitz, Bromberg, and Kulm) to reinforce the major ones (Thorn, Elbing, Marienburg, Danziger Haupt, Montauer Spitze, Graudenz, Strasburg, and Stuhm). By controlling these strongly fortified towns and strongpoints, the Swedes controlled the Vistula basin and prevented Polish


N
Hatzfeldt
Imperial bivouacs
Montecuccoli
Polish cavalry bivouacs
King John Casimir
Imperial bivouacs
Imperial bivouacs
Imperial bivouacs
Imperial bivouacs
Polish Royal Guard
Cracow
Würtz
Imperial bivouacs
R. Vistula
Kazimierz
R. Vistula
Imperial bivouacs
Sporck
0
½
1 km

Siege of Cracow, July–August 1657



Raimondo Montecuccoli

access to the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the Swedish towns were located along the Vistula, which ensured communications. While none of the Swedish towns was as strong as Danzig, they enjoyed many of the same advantages as that city, hence were difficult to take. The Duke's senior command consisted of General Lorenz von der Linde, the bon vivant, rake, and veteran of the Thirty Years' War who since 1655 was based in Elbing as governor of Royal Prussia, and Bengt Oxenstierna (1623–1702), the Governor General of Swedish-held Poland, who was based in Thorn.

Some Commonwealth observers concluded that the Swedes now were defeated and soon would be pushed out of the country altogether. However, what had happened was a shift in strategy, necessitated by the Danish invasion but no doubt a sounder policy in the long term. King Charles had switched from an offensive strategy in the Commonwealth to a defensive one. No longer advancing deep into southern Poland, the Swedes henceforth opted to establish a defensive zone around their coastal possessions in Royal Prussia. As noted, the Baltic shore was what King Charles ultimately had set out to gain.

The new defensive strategy was less spectacular than the previous offensive one, so the Swedish presence and activities gradually faded into the background of other events. However, the garrisoned towns were carefully selected and strongly fortified. The Commonwealth and Imperial commanders soon found that the Swedish garrisons were not easily dislodged.

In mid October, the Imperials advanced against Thorn. Hatzfeldt had fallen ill, so Field Marshal Lieutenant Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680) assumed command. However, the Imperials managed to gain no more than a bastion outside Thorn before they in late November went into winter quarters between Rivers Netze and Warthe and in Posen.

The perceived Imperial inactivity annoyed the Poles. While the Imperials had played a decisive role in the siege of Cracow, they had seemingly done little since. Already by October 1657, Polish anger was growing with the Imperial troops. The agreement stated that the Commonwealth would have to pay them as well as to provide for their upkeep. Soon it became clear that noble lands and Church lands would have to contribute, too, which resulted in widespread Polish secular and religious resentment against the Imperial allies. Not only were Imperial troops quartered in monastic houses and the homes of parish clergy, the latter lost income because the local peasants no longer could afford to meet tithe obligations. This was exactly the same policy which in spring 1656 led to the uprising against Swedish rule in Samogitia (as described in Volume II). In January 1658, the clergy of the diocese of

Posen wrote an angry protest in Latin, which already in the first line accused the Imperial soldiers of barbarism and insolence. The title of the publication was abundantly clear: 'Complaints of all the clergy in Greater Poland and the Diocese of Posen over the insolence of the barbarian Austrian soldiers towards the Order of the Church and the property of Christ, directed to the Holy Royal Majesty of Hungary and Bohemia.'[6] The nobles complained, too. In March 1658, Commonwealth representatives accused Leopold of moving in more troops than the 12,000 agreed upon merely to make the Poles pay for their upkeep.

Yet, King John Casimir won a significant victory in foreign policy. On 19 September 1657, the Commonwealth and Brandenburg concluded the Treaty of Wehlau (Welawa, now Znamensk). King John Casimir recognised Frederick William and his heirs as sovereign rulers of Ducal Prussia (but not of Ermland) in return for the renunciation of his alliance with Sweden and the provision of military support. It was the late Emperor Ferdinand's son Leopold who mediated the treaty, since he wanted Frederick William to support him in the coming Imperial election.



Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, 1650 or 1651. (Frans Luycx)

Soon after, on 6 November 1657, Brandenburg and the Commonwealth also concluded the Treaty of Bromberg, which incorporated several agreements including the Treaty of Wehlau. In exchange for military support and the return of Ermland, the Polish King granted Frederick William hereditary sovereignty in Ducal Prussia and ceded the small territories of Lauenburg (modern-day Lebork) and Bütow (now Bytów) as hereditary fiefdoms. The Commonwealth also pawned Elbing (which in reality still was held by Sweden) and, for three years, Draheim (modern-day Drahim) to Brandenburg.[7]

The switch in allegiance of Brandenburg effectively meant that Sweden lost its last major ally in the Commonwealth. There was no longer any expectation of Brandenburg-Prussian support against King John Casimir, nor was there any hope to gain the entire Baltic sea shore, unless Sweden also was prepared and able to go to war against, and defeat, the combined forces of Brandenburg and Prussia. Such a course of action would necessitate that Sweden embarked upon an aggressive war into the Empire, which would risk rekindling the Thirty Years' War. We have already seen that King Charles would not fall for such a temptation.

---

[6] Albertus Tholibowski (Bishop of Posen) et al., *Querelae universi cleri in Majori Polonia et Diocesi Posnaniensi super barbara Austriaci militis insolentia, in Ordinem ecclesiasticum et Christi patrimonium exercita ad Sacram Regiam Majestatem Hungariae et Bohemiae* (Posen, 22 January 1658).

[7] In 1660, when the war with Sweden was over and the Swedish garrison had moved out, Polish units marched in to seize Elbing in breach of the Treaty. Poland then refused to hand the town over to Brandenburg. The Poles also planned to seize Draheim, but in 1668 Frederick William moved in troops to preempt such a move.

King John Casimir's offer of full sovereignty to Frederick William was not a new proposition. Commonwealth representatives had offered him sovereignty at least three times: before the Treaty of Rheinsberg (Rinsk) in November 1655, in which the Commonwealth representatives had asked for Brandenburg-Prussian garrisons in Royal Prussia to defend it against the Swedes; and then again in March and June 1656, when things went badly for the Commonwealth and it was desirous to tempt Frederick William away from the Swedes.[8] And, as we have seen, in November 1656 the Treaty of Labiau between Sweden and Brandenburg had already recognised Frederick William's sovereignty in Ducal Prussia.

Following the removal of the Swedish main army to Denmark and the successful deal with Brandenburg, some of King John Casimir's commanders felt eager to go on the offensive. Only three days after the Treaty of Wehlau, Czarniecki led his men into the Empire. Perhaps intending to go on the offensive against Swedish Pomerania, he failed to reach the Swedish territory but successfully ravaged Brandenburg-Prussian Neumark (an act which for obvious reasons was in blatant disregard of King John Casimir's Treaty of Wehlau, as well as the Truce of Zielenzig of December 1656, which was described in Volume II).

In late October, Czarniecki made a new attempt. He led some 5,000 cavalry into Pomerania. Czarniecki devastated the countryside, primarily in Brandenburg-Prussian Pomerania, but this time a unit under Gabriel Woyniłłowicz crossed the River Oder and advanced to the well-defended Stettin in Swedish Pomerania. Stettin was too well fortified for the Polish cavalry to penetrate, so they continued towards the small town of Ueckermünde. Soon, the Poles realised that they lacked the means to take any fortified location, so the entire force withdrew again in early November, three days after the Treaty of Bromberg.[9]

Frederick William must have been upset to hear how Czarniecki raided his territories even after he and King John Casimir had signed the treaties that made them allies. Moreover, King John Casimir wanted a direct attack on Swedish Pomerania. Frederick William was reluctant to support him, since this would be a breach of the Peace of Westphalia. Like King Charles, Frederick William was part of the Empire. The Commonwealth was the Emperor's close ally, but King John Casimir stood outside Imperial politics and had nothing to lose by embarking upon a course of action that might lead to further war. On this issue, Frederick William enjoyed the support of Leopold, who did not wish to risk his election to the Imperial throne though an open attack on Swedish possessions in Germany.

---

[8] Robert I. Frost, *After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.101, with references.

[9] Jan Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Operativ översikt', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973), pp.325–417, on pp.385–6; Paweł Migdalski, 'Das Gedenken an die Pommernzüge des Hetmans Stefan Czarniecki', Robert Oldach and Thomas Wegener Friis (eds.), *Staat – Militär – Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Jens E. Olesen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Greifswald: Ernst-Moritz-Arndt Universität, 2015), pp.387–408, on pp.388-9. Migdalski also describes how the history and myth of Czarniecki's activities in modern days merged in the parts of Pomerania which Poland received after the Second World War.

12

The North-Eastern Front

On the north-eastern front, the mutual raids that had taken place during winter continued into spring. This was particularly noticeable in western Ingria, where Muscovite raiders in May 1657 disrupted the salmon fishing at Jama. The Muscovites were few in numbers, and a handful of Swedish cavalry (perhaps some 30 men) eventually drove them off. In the same manner, Swedish raiders in May and June penetrated into Muscovite territory to attack redoubts and disrupt farming activities there.[1] The raids and counterraids continued throughout the summer, culminating in a battle near Jama in late July, in which Danila Neplyuyev's corps from Pskov was dispersed. Some 30 men on each side fell in the battle.[2]

In Finland and Kexholm County, the vigorous Swedish countermeasures had paid off. The strategy of extermination in the Lake Ladoga region with its focus on killing non-combatants introduced by Major General Erik Kruse and sanctioned by overall commander General Gustav Evertsson Horn had put the Muscovites on the defensive. As noted in Volume II, the Swedish strategy in this region was not representative of Swedish strategy elsewhere, and we do not know what King Charles thought about it, if and when he was informed. General Horn also spent considerable efforts on preparing the defences of Finland itself.

In spring 1657, Finland was better supplied with soldiers than at the outbreak of war. Reinforcements had arrived from Sweden. In southern Finland, that is, immediately available for operations in Ingria and Kexholm County, were 4,011 men. Further north, in Kajana, there were 270, while in Österbotten to the north-west, the total was 864. Altogether, the units in Finland consisted of 5,145 men. However, the units suffered greatly from illnesses, in most cases probably the plague. According to the roll calls, at least 1,337 men were unfit for duty. Nonetheless, the defensive capability was higher than in the previous year. In addition to the regular soldiers, levies were raised and had been armed and trained. All garrisons had been reinforced and the number of artillerymen had significantly increased. In the Ladoga region, the field army consisted of 1,509 men, mostly cavalry. Some 400 infantry garrisoned Viborg.[3]

---

[1] Rainer Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna 1655–1661: Operationer och krigsansträngningar på en bikrigsskådeplats under Carl X Gustafs krig', Arne Stade (ed.), *Kriget på östfronten* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 7:1, 1979), p.114.

[2] S. S. Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba russkikh lyudey Izhorskoy zemli v XVII veke protiv inozemnogo vladychestva', *Istoricheskiye zapiski* 16, 1945 (Moscow), pp.14–57, on p.34.

In Stockholm, the defensive strategy in the east of the previous years was assessed to have worked well. Some enthusiasm began to enter the strategic planning process of the Council of the Realm. A plan was worked out according to which the Swedish army should aim to take and incorporate in the realm Eastern Karelia all the way to River Svir', Lake Onega, and the White Sea. Per Brahe, the Lord High Justiciar, in March sent the proposal to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, Governor General of Livonia. However, the latter thought that this went well beyond his original remit merely to defend the existing border, so he instead directed Gustav Evertsson Horn only to defend Lake Ladoga.[4]

As a result, Horn determined the following operations plan. The inshore component of the fleet should sail upriver to Lake Ladoga, the town of Nyen and the River Neva would be fortified, and the field army would deploy there, so as to be able to prevent any Muscovite offensives from Kaporie to Narva in western Ingria.

Meanwhile, some personnel changes took place on the Muscovite side of the border. In April, the principled Pyotr Pushkin was replaced by Vasiliy Choglokov (d. 1667) as voivode of Olonets.[5] In Lava, the able Pyotr Potyomkin was replaced as voivode by his distant relative Aleksandr Potyomkin (fl. 1656–1657), who immediately began to plan another offensive along the Neva, for which purpose he received reinforcements. In early July, he had assembled 2,703 men.[6] By this time, three additional new formation regiments (infantry and dragoons) had been formed in the region, under respectively Alexander Hamilton, Walter Kormikhel (presumably Carmichael), and Thomas Krafert (presumably Crawford).

Both sides needed Lake Ladoga as a means for supplying their men on the other side of the great lake. In May, Gustav Wrangel set out from Stockholm with his squadron, bound for the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. Because of a shortage of small craft throughout the country, it was difficult to find suitable inshore vessels for operations on Lake Ladoga. In addition to *Jägaren* ('Huntsman'), Wrangel brought the *Höken* ('Hawk', 22 cannons) and the *struts Väktaren* ('Guardian', four cannons). Somewhat later, he also received the kray *Ulfsund* (named after a harbour, four cannons). As in the previous year, Wrangel's squadron departed from Stockholm with skeleton crews, which were

---

[3] Jussi T. Lappalainen, 'Finland och Carl X Gustafs ryska krig: Försvaret av den östra rikshalvan 1656–1658', Arne Stade (ed.), *Kriget på östfronten* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 7:2, 1979), pp.113–13.

[4] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.127.

[5] Yakov Nikolayevich Rabinovich, 'Okol'nichniy Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Choglokov: Stranitsy biografii', *Uchonyye zapiski Petrozavodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 4: 4 (2021), pp.47–58.

[6] Lappalainen, 'Finland', 110; S. S. Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya i Yuzhnoye Priladozh'ye v voyne 1656–58 gg.', *Istoricheskiye zapiski* 11, 1941 (Moscow), pp.236–81, on p.273.



Nöteborg, based on a seventeenth-century print

then reinforced upon arrival in Finland. In total, the squadron was expected to contain 419 men. To this would be added 391 musketeers from Viborg.[7]

When Wrangel in June reached Nyen, he received intelligence that the Muscovites in Lava prepared an offensive along the River Neva. As we have seen, the intelligence was correct. Wrangel accordingly sent 80 horse and 300 musketeers upriver to secure the area so that he could move the inshore squadron to Nöteborg. He then moved his 24 inshore vessels, most of the *lodja* type, upriver to Nöteborg. Apparently, a significant share of them (at least a third) consisted of well-armed naval vessels, which although small were intended for combat operations. A few days later, eight of these vessels, under Petter Holländer Ridder, encountered and defeated 23 Muscovite *lodja*-type vessels from Lava. As far as is known, unlike the Swedish vessels the Muscovite ones either lacked cannons altogether or carried only small-calibre falconets. As a result, the Muscovites had to return for cover at the shore, where they were protected by infantry. Ridder returned to Nöteborg.[8]

In retaliation, Potyomkin's cavalry a couple of days later attempted to surprise the Swedes at Nöteborg. However, the latter had time to find cover on a nearby island, Kyrkholmen ('Church Island'), where the Swedes had built a new redoubt. Finding their enemy holed up in a defensive position and themselves under artillery and musket fire, the Muscovites retreated.

---

[7] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.130.

[8] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.131.

Both sides now prepared for a major battle. In late June, Major General Erik Kruse, who commanded the army units from Viborg, dispatched 200 cavalry under Major Odert Hastfer to locate the Muscovite corps. On the same day, Wrangel dispatched Ridder with 16 *lodja*-type vessels (that is, two-thirds of what now was the Swedish Ladoga squadron) on the same mission but on Lake Ladoga. Meanwhile, Aleksandr Potyomkin had sent 325 cavalry, cossacks, and levied peasants from Lava by the overland route. He had also ordered 1,000 men, apparently regular streltsy, to man his *lodja* vessels, which he now, if not before, also had armed with light cannons.

On land, Hastfer seems to have encountered an outpost with some 60 Muscovites around seven to eight kilometres from Lava. He apparently attacked the outpost, which was then reinforced by the cavalry of the approaching Muscovite corps from Lava. In the ensuing fight, Hastfer lost at least 10 men, after which he retreated to Nöteborg. On the lake, Ridder did not fare better. He encountered what he estimated to be 60 Muscovite *lodja* vessels (probably a correct assessment; soon after, an eyewitness reported 65 small and two large *lodja* vessels at Lava, each armed with three cannons). Finding himself outgunned, Ridder after some artillery fire returned to Nöteborg. In neither case did the Muscovites pursue. Both sides claimed victory.[9]

Two days before the inconclusive battles at Lake Ladoga, Gustav Evertsson Horn set out from Viborg to Nyen. He ordered Colonel Christopher Burmeister (*c.* 1600–1671) to protect the border north of Lake Ladoga. On the way, Horn repaired and added to the redoubt at Nyen so as to prevent Muscovite incursions along the River Neva. However, he lacked infantry, having been able to bring only 200 out of Viborg.

Arriving at Nöteborg, Horn found that his units already there did not perform well against the Muscovites. Essentially, Aleksandr Potyomkin had outmanoeuvred them. He had withdrawn his outposts so as to tempt the Swedish cavalry to advance almost all the way to Lava. However, when the Swedes got there, Potyomkin attacked them with overwhelming force. This was easy, since Lava was his primary base. But for the Swedes, the strategy was perturbing. Having advanced too far with too few men, the fighting invariably ended with the Swedes having to beat an ignominious retreat, with the Muscovite cavalry in hot pursuit. Yet, Potyomkin made sure that the pursuit was interrupted well before his men fell into the same kind of trap as he had set for the Swedes.

---

[9] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.131–2; Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, 168; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.273; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.32. The eyewitness at Lava was the Swedish sailor Per Botelsson from Visby on Gotland. He had been snatched by two Muscovites who enticed him with what looked like an abandoned but saddled horse on the River Neva shore. When Botelsson went ashore for the horse, he was taken prisoner. However, upon learning that he was a Gotlander, that is, derived from a formerly Danish island, the Muscovites released him believing that he was a Dane and thus opposed to the Swedes. Botelsson returned to Nöteborg where he reported what he had observed.

The Battle of Lava

To restore morale and raise confidence in his men, Horn decided that he had to engage in decisive battle and conquer Potyomkin's base in Lava. He devised a two-pronged offensive by land and water. Wrangel would attack across the lake with his entire squadron which by this time consisted of some 30 small vessels. He would land in the rear of Lava so as to cut communications between Lava and Ladoga Town further to the east. Meanwhile, Horn would advance by land to attack Lava itself. He would bring seven companies of the Viborg Cavalry Regiment, five companies of Christopher Burmeister's Cavalry Regiment, the two companies (the original and the newly raised) of the retinue of nobles of Finland, some 200 infantry, and 400 dragoons from various regiments under Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Vietinghoff. In total, Horn brought some 1,700 men. It would be a combined operation intended as a pincer manoeuvre.

Horn set out in early August. He closed in on Lava at night. When there was no Muscovite response, he dug in on a hill behind a clearing. The terrain was unsuitable for cavalry, with dense forest and marshlands.

Meanwhile, Wrangel set out to carry out his part of the operation. On the same day that Horn reached the vicinity of Lava, Wrangel encountered the Muscovite squadron off Lava. A two-hour-long battle followed, but we have few details. No reports from the Swedish side have survived into the present. Based on Muscovite accounts, Wrangel's squadron disengaged, and then continued further to the east, pursued on the shore by Muscovite army units. Wrangel's squadron apparently camped on the shore 20 km east of the estuary of the River Volkhov, which would be 60 km east of Lava, as the bird flies. On the following day, Wrangel returned, attempting to land his men near Kobona, just north of Lava. However, Muscovite units in combination with shallow water and the absence of any suitable harbour prevented the operation. Wrangel's vessels carried only wooden anchors, while Lake Ladoga was the largest lake in Europe, with a size that made weather conditions as dangerous as on the open sea, if a storm struck. After the failed landing, Wrangel returned to Nöteborg. He had achieved a division of Potyomkin's forces, which would help Horn, but he had failed to carry out his share of the pincer manoeuvre.[10]

On 11 August, the very same day that Wrangel attempted the landing at Kobona, Horn attacked Lava, unaware that Wrangel would fail to reach his objective. Since Potyomkin's men had shown no sign of noticing the arrival and preparation of defences by the Swedish corps, Horn began by sending 15 cavalry scouts forward to reconnoitre. The cavalry patrol rode up to the wall of the redoubt at Lava, yet there was no reaction. No Muscovites were in sight, not even on the walls. Only when the patrol leader fired his pistol at the redoubt did the gate open and the Muscovites emerged. As on previous occasions, the Swedish cavalrymen had to flee before the overwhelming numbers. Despite the apparent silence, Potyomkin no doubt knew of Horn's corps. He now marched his entire force out: two companies of cavalry, 425

---

[10] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.132–7; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', pp.273–4; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.35.

Don and other cossacks, 300 streltsy, two companies of dragoons, and one company of infantry, in total 1,300 men accompanied by two cannons.

Horn had dug in on the hill with his 200 infantry, Vietinghoff's dragoons, the regimental cannons, and (probably as a reserve) the two companies of the retinue of nobles. Despite the dense forest, he positioned the remaining cavalry in two wings in the traditional manner, one on the left and one on the right. In the clearing in front of the hill, he deployed an advance guard of 208 men from the Viborg Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Major Johan Bäck of the retinue of nobles. Bäck remained with 108 cavalry in a second line of the advance guard, while he deployed the remaining 100 cavalrymen in front, under the command of Captains Berendt Gröön and Arvid Gyldenär. Finally, Horn positioned a small cavalry unit, 50 men under Lieutenant Berg, between the advance guard and the hill. Horn's battle plan may have been for Bäck to delay and hold the Muscovites as they charged, so that the two cavalry wings could execute a flank attack across the open ground of the clearing.

With 1,700 Swedes deployed against 1,300 Muscovites, the battle of Lava was the greatest battle on the Ladoga front during the war. However, we knew less about Potyomkin's deployment than Horn's. So much is clear that Potyomkin sent forward an advance guard of cavalry. Upon seeing Gröön's and Gyldenär's units in the clearing, the Muscovite vanguard halted while still in the forest, awaiting reinforcements. At this point, Gröön and Gyldenär charged the Muscovites, who retreated in some disorder, taking cover behind the infantry which approached in their rear. Gröön even captured a standard. However, the combat as well as the dense cover disordered Gröön's and Gyldenär's men, too. They retreated into the clearing to re-form their ranks. Then something unexpected happened. Major Bäck, who under normal circumstances would have covered Gröön's and Gyldenär's retreat, instead opened fire on them, after which he turned his horse around and fled from the clearing. In the ensuing panic, his own cavalry as well as those of Lieutenant Berg followed him. While the fleeing cavalrymen took cover among the infantry on the hill, Bäck rejoined his own unit, the retinue of nobles, where he apparently had a nervous breakdown.

What had happened? After the battle, Bäck's behaviour resulted in several complaints and, ultimately, a court-martial. It turned out that Bäck probably already suffered from what presently is known as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Before the battle, Bäck had requested Horn to release him from duty. However, PTSD was not something that the Swedish army then regarded as a valid cause for recuperation. It is possible that Horn put Bäck in command of the advance guard as a means to prove himself, perhaps thinking – incorrectly – that a position of responsibility in the forward line was just the thing to cure Bäck of his unbecoming worries. (Bäck's troubles and the subsequent court-martial lasted for considerable time, but interestingly, several fellow officers displayed some understanding for his condition, so the proceedings ended with a technical reprimand.)

Potyomkin knew nothing about this, but for him, Bäck's breakdown meant an opportunity. Potyomkin now sent his entire force against Gröön and Gyldenär. Driven up the hill, there was little that they could do, even though Gyldenär managed to prevent the Muscovites from retrieving


Cavalry
Dragoons
Infantry
Artillery
Potyomkin
Gröön and Gyldner (100)
Bäck (108)
Berg (50)
Vietinghoff
Burmeister's Cavalry Regiment
(200)
Horn
Retinue of Nobles
(200)
?
Pistolhielm (300)
Not to scale

The battle of Lava, 11 August 1657

Gröön's captured standard. Vietinghoff's dragoons were pushed back as well, abandoning their fortified positions, until Horn led his 200 Viborg infantrymen in a counter-charge, after first executing those Muscovite prisoners of war who had been taken earlier (yet another instance of the habit in this theatre of murdering prisoners when a retreat seemed likely). At that point, some of the Viborg cavalrymen and dragoons rallied, joining Horn's advance. After half an hour of combat, the Muscovites retreated. However, Potyomkin withdrew in good order, so the Swedish cavalry never had the chance to go into action. The Muscovites returned to their redoubt.

The forest cover may well have made the musket fire less efficient than usual. Despite the apparent intensity of the fight, losses were small on both sides. In the evening, Horn reported losses of one lieutenant and four dragoons (possibly, the losses of other units were then not yet known), while Potyomkin reported losses totalling three officers and around 10 common soldiers.[11]

---

[11] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.134–7; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', pp.273–4; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.35.

Since the battle was indecisive, Horn may have contemplated continuing the offensive. He did not yet know that Wrangel had failed to land his men, nor that Wrangel returned to Nöteborg after the landing attempt (standard operating procedure was to return to port at night, since weather conditions otherwise might turn dangerous to small craft). However, already during the evening, Muscovite units began to burn the crops in the area. Horn had relied on acquiring food supplies from Muscovite territory, and this was now impossible. As a result, Horn ordered a retreat.

A few days later, and back on the Neva, Horn learnt from Wrangel that it had turned out to be impossible to move the larger ships upriver to Lake Ladoga. Accepting realities, he ordered Wrangel to return the larger ships to Stockholm. By about this time, Wrangel's squadron received reinforcements: the pinnaces *Näktergalen* ('Nightingale') and *Danske Prinsen* ('Danish Prince'), a longboat, and 17 additional *lodja* vessels. They also carried food supplies, which meant that Wrangel at least could resupply Nyen and Nöteborg, before he returned to Sweden in mid September.[12]

Kexholm County

While Horn had been busy with Potyomkin in the south, Vasiliy Choglokov had prepared an offensive north of Lake Ladoga. Already in early August, before Horn reached Lava, large numbers of Muscovite vessels raided the north shore of the lake. These vessels probably came from Lava, which again shows how smoothly the two Muscovite commands – Olonets and Lava – co-operated.

In early August, Vasiliy Choglokov set out from Olonets by land and water towards Kexholm County north of Lake Ladoga. Choglokov had only limited forces at his disposal. Before the offensive, he had 775 old-style cavalry. Infantrymen had been conscripted, but he was ordered to send 1,008 men to Pskov. As a result, only 770 recently conscripted infantrymen remained for his operation. Choglokov also managed to assemble 400 enlisted dragoons. Altogether, Choglokov had no more than about 1,400 regular soldiers. Of this number, he brought 400 dragoons and 700 foot on the expedition. Choglokov reached Kexholm in late August. Despite the raids earlier in the month, the Swedes seemed not to have anticipated Choglokov's offensive. Horn, still in the Neva region further to the south and perhaps assessing the opportunities for an offensive into western Ingria to secure the land route between Viborg and Narva, learnt of the offensive within two days. Reacting quickly, he dispatched first Erik Pistolhielm with 200 horse and 100 musketeers north, followed by Erik Kruse with the rest of his regiment. It was not only Kexholm which was at risk; the road between Kexholm and Viborg lay dangerously open to the Muscovites. Unsurprisingly, Choglokov had already dispatched Colonel Thomas Crawford (Russianised as Krafert) with 600 men to devastate the country along the road to Viborg. Pistolhielm, closely followed by Kruse, caught up with them there. Crawford's men withdrew into a recently built redoubt. During the day, Kruse and Pistolhielm made repeated attempts to storm the redoubt, but without success. However, during the night the Muscovites abandoned it, retreating towards Kurkijoki, north of Kexholm on Lake Ladoga, while destroying all bridges on the road.

---

[12] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.168–9, 539 n.158.

Choglokov knew that more Swedes would move against him, and he was right. Horn dispatched other units, too, against Choglokov's corps. However, the only units which had the chance to reach the Muscovites were Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Vietinghoff's three companies of dragoons and several units of horse under Major Barthold Daumb. They were reinforced with four recently raised companies from the Åbo Cavalry Regiment, 150 dragoons, and 100 levied peasants. The Swedes finally reached Choglokov while he was embarking his men in Kurkijoki. Choglokov evaded the Swedes, setting a course for Sordavala. However, he had to send Lieutenant Colonel Johann Treyden with 600 dragoons and infantry overland. Vietinghoff and Daumb set off in hot pursuit along the road after Treyden, which resulted in several skirmishes.[13]

At Sordavala, yet another Swedish unit, a unit of dragoons under Major Herman von Burghausen (d. 1676) at Nyslott, finally managed to catch up with the Muscovites.[14] However, Choglokov again successfully disengaged, after which he returned to Olonets in late September.[15] We do not know his orders for the offensive. However, if the objective was raiding so as to draw Horn's units away from Ingria and towards the north, then he succeeded admirably. By autumn 1657, Choglokov had some 1,500 men deployed along the border, out of a total (as calculated in early 1658) of 1,900.[16] It is fair to conclude that although the Swedes had proven their ability to defeat the Muscovites in open battle, the latter had outmanoeuvred their adversaries and also, importantly, retained supremacy on Lake Ladoga. However, the Muscovites were no closer to taking fortified sites such as Kexholm or Nöteborg than in the past. Least noted, but perhaps most impressive, was that both sides had proven able to co-ordinate operations over long distances and very difficult terrain, with few useable roads.

During the autumn, the plague effectively prevented further military operations. Moreover, Choglokov was ordered to send most of his men to Pskov. This was, perhaps, at least in part a response to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie's September offensive against Gdov (more on which below). Be that as it may, the result was that Choglokov's military strength henceforth fluctuated considerably. New men were raised, but when some were ordered away from the Ladoga region, many deserted. Later on, some deserters returned to demand their outstanding pay! As a result, Choglokov was no longer in position to carry out any major offensive. There was a constant need for men in Pskov, and in February 1658 Choglokov received orders to send yet more – which resulted in yet more desertions. (Ultimately, Choglokov sent 700 men to Pskov in spring 1658, leaving only 300 for himself.)[17]

---

[13] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.109; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.269.

[14] Herman von Burghausen was a veteran of the Thirty Years' War from Estonia. Promoted to colonel and commander of the Savolax Dragoon Regiment, Burghausen eventually fell in the battle of Lund during the Scanian War.

[15] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.138–40; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.270.

[16] Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.271.

Aleksandr Potyomkin had personnel problem, too. Although he retained 1,625 men, the majority – 1,175 – were old-style cavalry of little use in the terrain around Lake Ladoga. He had only 424 streltsy and 26 other infantry.[18]

On the Finnish front, the Muscovites in Repola in Eastern Karelia (who operated independently and did not belong to Choglokov's command) made two attempts to go on the offensive into Kajana (Kajaani), northern Finland. Neither attempt consisted of more than, at most, a few hundred men. The first offensive was deflected by the Finnish levies under Zacharias Palmbaum in the battle of Pielis. The second turned back when the raiders heard that Palmbaum had set out against them. Following these incidents, the Muscovites took initiative to a local border truce, which was agreed in Kajana in December 1657.[19] Although a third Muscovite raiding party (the smallest of the three) again disturbed the peace late in year, the local Muscovite officials sent messages that they wished to uphold the border truce no matter how relations developed between the two countries. According to the intelligence available to the Swedes at Kajana, the Muscovite corps on the White Sea consisted of 500 to 600 men.[20]

Further north in Finland and Sweden, a Norwegian offensive across the mountains seemed a more credible risk than a Muscovite advance from Kola, despite intelligence reports that greatly exaggerated the Muscovite forces there (supposedly but improbably 4,000 men). Johan Graan, the governor, himself reported their number as 1,200. In September 1657, Graan accordingly deployed the 150 regular soldiers who remained available for defences in the Arctic to the towns of Torneå, Kemi, Ijo, and Uleåborg on the Gulf of Bothnia. From these positions, they could just as easily move against either a Norwegian or a Muscovite incursion. His only other regulars, who would have to safeguard against incursions from Norway, were no more than 112 foot, of whom 82 were fresh conscripts.[21] The regulars would be used to stiffen the peasant levies, who were expected to handle most border incursions.

The Livonian Front

We have seen in Volume II how Muscovy and the Commonwealth on 3 November 1656 concluded the Treaty of Wilno, agreeing on an anti-Swedish alliance. While agreeing on co-operation against a common enemy was easy, the trust actually to co-operate did not develop effortlessly. Moreover, the Swedes attempted to prevent such an outcome. When in March 1657 snow conditions finally allowed, Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie attempted an offensive into Muscovy, which resulted in a battle around the Pskov-Pechory Monastery. As an offensive, it was a failure. This was not only because of De la Gardie's noted reluctance to take bold action, but because the Swedes suffered greatly from the plague. At times, so many men fell ill that Reval almost was undefended. However, the Muscovites feared the plague, too, and the Tsar cancelled a planned attack on Riga because he wanted to avoid bringing the plague into his field army.

---

[17] Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', pp.271–2.

[18] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.145; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.275.

[19] The border truce held until the general ceasefire half a year later, and ultimately the Truce of Vallisaare agreed on 30 December 1658.

[20] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.110, 128–9.

[21] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.129; Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, pp.151, 216, 307; Graan to Stockholm, datelined Umeå, 2 September 1957 (O.S.).

Yet, the plague did not prevent the Muscovites from carrying the war into the Swedish territories. In spring 1657, some 200 Don cossacks joined the Muscovite army, and they soon began to engage in minor skirmishing, which indeed continued for the rest of the year and into the next.[22] The Swedes remained on the defensive.

The only major battle which took place in Livonia during the year was the Swedish victory at Walk (modern-day Valga) in June. At the time, the Swedish Livonian field army under Major General Friedrich 'Fritz' Löwe (d. 1669) was laying siege to the Livonian fortress Adzele on the border with Muscovy, which early had fallen into Muscovite hands. Löwe was a veteran of the Thirty Years' War who entered Swedish service as a common cavalryman, suffered wounds on 19 occasions, but never learnt Swedish or to read orders written in Swedish. The strength of the Swedish army is unclear. De la Gardie at a later time described it as having consisted of less than 3,000 men, including 300 levied Ingrian peasants 'who were supposed to be dragoons' and numerous recently conscripted and untrained men. According to De la Gardie, not even 2,000 men qualified as trained soldiers.[23] Nonetheless, the Pskov army, 2,546 men (of whom only 2,193 men eventually went into the battle; 353 streltsy and artillerymen never fought) under Matvey Vasil'yevich Sheremetyev (1629–1657), went on the offensive against Löwe. After some manoeuvring, the two armies encountered each other at Walk. The battle began with a Muscovite charge. However, the Swedes defended themselves vigorously, which disrupted the Muscovite attack. The Swedes then counter-attacked, winning the battle, despite the fact that Löwe's right wing never moved into action since the Swedes expected a flanking or rear attack which never came. The Muscovite losses were subsequently reported as 108 killed, 28 wounded, and five captured, including the mortally wounded Sheremetyev, who fell into Swedish hands.[24] Based on what Sheremetyev told the Swedes shortly before he died, his orders had been to force the Swedish field army back to Riga or Reval. Afterwards, he was supposed to devastate Livonia so that the territory could not be used as a Swedish base area for a subsequent attack on Muscovy. This may well have been his instructions, since this suggests a primarily defensive policy. The small size of the two opposing armies shows that by this time neither side prioritised this theatre of operations. After the victory, Löwe was promoted to Lieutenant General. He resumed his attempt to retake Adzele, but its Muscovite garrison stubbornly resisted.[25]

---

[22] Oleg Aleksandrovich Kurbatov, *Iz istorii voyennykh reform v Rossii vo 2-y polovine XVII veka: Reorganizatsiya konnitsy na materialakh Novgorodskogo razryada 1650-kh - 1660-kh gg.* (dissertation, Moscow, 2002), p.83; Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.127 n.283.

[23] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.110.

[24] Oleg Aleksandrovich Kurbatov, 'Russko-shvedskaya voyna 1656–58 gg.: Problemy kritiki voyenno-istoricheskikh istochnikov', *Rossiya i Shvetsiya v srednevekov'ye i novoye vremya: Arkhivnoye i muzeynoye naslediye* (Moscow, 2002), pp.150–66.

In August, the Swedes also laid siege to Dorpat, which refused to surrender (and indeed remained in Muscovite hands until the end of the war).

In September, De la Gardie attempted yet another Swedish offensive into Muscovy. The military strength of the Baltic territories, most of which was deployed in Livonia, then consisted of 2,300 cavalry, 950 dragoons, and 4,203 infantry, in total 7,453 men.[26] This was the lowest Swedish military strength in the Baltic territories during the war. Nonetheless, the plan was to move against the town of Gdov on Muscovite territory.[27] By moving the war into Muscovy, the Swedes hoped that the Tsar would become more amenable to peace negotiations. This goal had been important since the outset of the war but grew yet more urgent with the Danish invasion of Sweden.

De la Gardie's field army consisted of 1,670 cavalry (divided into 52 understrength companies), 950 dragoons (in 20 companies), 250 foot (in four companies), and a field artillery consisting of two 6-pounders and eight 3-pounders, all under the operational command of Löwe. The Swedes crossed the border north of Lake Peipus at Wask-Narva (modern-day Vasknarva), a ruined castle demolished already in the 1610s, on 20 September and reached Gdov on the following day. The Swedes estimated that Gdov was defended by 1,500 horse and 500 streltsy. The Swedes burned several villages as well as the suburbs of Gdov. However, the commandant of Gdov, Bogdan Ivanovich Nashchokin, had no intention to surrender. Moreover, Muscovite reinforcements under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy (d. 1682), Voivode of Pskov, soon arrived. As a result, De la Gardie, always more inclined to politics than war, ordered a general retreat, which began already on 25 September. The Muscovites moved faster, and superior numbers of Muscovites attacked the weak Swedish rear. It looked like an impending disaster, but fortunately for the Swedes, Colonel Reinhold Glassenap managed to organise a rear-guard delaying battle, so that the main army could move out of reach undisturbed. After the battle, both sides highly exaggerated the number of enemy casualties. Moreover, the Swedish commanders reported few details of the engagement and mainly blamed each other for the debacle. It is accordingly difficult to determine the details of the campaign, except that De la Gardie failed in what he set out to do.[28]

---

[25] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.109–10.

[26] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.185.

[27] Based on an older name form, Gdov was known as Augdov in contemporary Swedish sources.

[28] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.115–16, 234.

In October, the Lithuanians too went on the offensive. The circumstances seemed highly favourable. First, the Swedish main army had departed on route to Denmark. Second, Bogusław Radziwiłł, having failed in his ambition to acquire Brest under Swedish protection, had abandoned the Swedes and instead gone into the service of Brandenburg. Finally, the rapprochement between King John Casimir and Frederick William had enabled the Commonwealth commanders to release Lithuanian units for an offensive against Swedish Livonia. For the Swedish Livonian army, the conflict turned into a two-front war, against Muscovites in the east and Lithuanians in the south.

The offensive began in mid October, when the main army of Lithuanian Field Hetman Wincenty Gosiewski (*c.* 1620–1662) advanced into Livonia from the south. De la Gardie later complained that both enlisted cavalrymen and locals defected to the Lithuanians. Gosiewski's Lithuanian dragoons took control over the abandoned and destroyed strongpoint at Kircholm. Meanwhile, Gosiewski's rapidly moving advance guard (the Swedes estimated its strength as some 1,000 men) attempted to surprise and take Cobron's Bastion on the other side of the River Düna. The attempt failed, and the Lithuanians sat down in an attempt to blockade Riga.

During the beginning of the offensive, Gosiewski co-ordinated activities with Afanasiy Ordin-Nashchokin (1605–1680), the Muscovite commander in Kokenhusen. As a result, the Muscovites carried out several raids into Livonia and Estonia, utilising Dorpat and Kokenhusen as bases. However, the Lithuanian successes during the early stages of the campaign led to a deterioration in relations between Gosiewski and Ordin-Nashchokin. The rivalry between the two powers was simply too great to overcome. At roughly the same time, state relations between the Commonwealth and Muscovy grew sour, too.

Based on detailed information available to the able Simon Grundel Helmfelt (1617–1677), Governor of Riga and a former fortification and intelligence officer, the Lithuanian army initially consisted of 4,920 cavalry and dragoons, divided into 82 companies. Gosiewski left a force of 2,100 men to enforce a land-side blockade of Riga. Then, he proceeded further to the north in an attempt to conquer all of Livonia.

Riga was never seriously threatened. Sea lines of communications remained open. Even though the plague severely depleted the garrison, it remained possible to bring in reinforcements from elsewhere. Already in November, Helmfelt began to launch frequent sorties against the Lithuanians, which caused them considerable damage.

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian army under Gosiewski advanced towards Pernau. There were not enough Swedish units to meet Gosiewski head on, so it was decided to abandon the Livonian countryside until conditions improved. The Lithuanians occupied major parts of Livonia, including Wenden and, after a short siege, Wolmar. The Livonian field army, such as it was, retreated into Pernau. Soon Gosiewski's men were in control of much of rural Livonia. From late November they laid siege, although ultimately unsuccessfully, to Pernau.[29]

On the evening of 10 December, the Muscovites launched a decisive attack on Marienburg (modern-day Alūksne), the last Swedish outpost in eastern Livonia. Marienburg had been intermittently under siege, or at least blockade, since the summer, and the Muscovites, this time under Ordin-Nashchokin, renewed their efforts in conjunction with Gosiewski's offensive. The Swedish garrison, depleted from plague, by this time consisted of only a couple of dozen men under the commandant, Mattias Hillgarten. With a garrison too small to withstand an assault, Hillgarten surrendered on 11 December.[30]

At the end of 1657, King Charles appointed the ruthless Gustav Evertsson Horn commander-in-chief in Finland, Estonia, and Livonia. Since Horn already was in charge of Kexholm County and much of Ingria, the assumption was that he would command the entire north-eastern theatre. However, Horn declined the appointment, explaining that Finland alone (with, no doubt, Kexholm County and Ingria) demanded his full attention. The King accepted this, to De la Gardie's disappointment. It was well known that De la Gardie had hoped to be released from his responsibilities in Livonia. As for Horn, he seems to have accepted responsibility for Estonia as well.

---

[29] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.117–23.

[30] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.125–6.

13

The Death of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy and Rise of Ivan Vygovskiy

The death of Hetman Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy (1595–1657) in August 1657 exposed significant divisions within Cossack Ukraine and the Hetmanate government. The widest fissure roughly followed the River Dnieper. To the west of the river, henceforth commonly known as Right-bank Ukraine, allegiances to the Commonwealth remained strong, especially among the gentry and burghers who often were Catholics. In comparison, Left-bank Ukraine had been the epicentre of Khmel'nitskiy's uprising and its Orthodox population constituted the effective base of the Hetmanate government, despite the Hetmanate's professed Zaporozhian origin.

There were other divisions as well. The cossack gentry's dream of Hetmanate sovereignty had proved an illusion. As noted in Volume II, the Hetmanate was not invited to the Treaty of Wilno between Muscovy and the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth's offer of the throne to Tsar Alexis (1629–1676; r. 1645–1676) worried the cossack gentry – since under Moscow, the gentry would no longer enjoy the cherished liberties of the Commonwealth nobility. There were territorial concerns, too. Tsar Alexis had annexed the districts of Novgorod Severskiy, Pochep, Starodub, and Chernigov, so they were no longer under the Hetmanate's control.

Finally, there were valid concerns that Crimean Tatar raiding parties again were crossing the Dnieper. With Mehmed Khan (1610–1674; r. 1641-1644 and 1654–1666) still maintaining an alliance of sorts with King John Casimir, would the raiders move against Cossack Ukraine in conjunction with Polish units? Khmel'nitskiy's policy had been to beseech the Crimean Khan for support by the offer of concessions, but Muscovy was unlikely to accept such an agreement. The cossacks were bound to end up in the middle of any conflict between the Commonwealth, Muscovy, and the Khanate of the Crimea

Before he died, Khmel'nitskiy had planned for his young son Yuriy (1641–1685) to succeed him as Hetman. However, it was obvious to all that the Hetmanate could not be led by a minor. As a result, Khmel'nitskiy's





Above: Hetman Ivan Vygovskiy

Right: Tsar Alexis

chancellor Ivan Vygovskiy (*c.* 1608–1664) was almost immediately elected Hetman of Cossack Ukraine until the majority of Yuriy. Vygovskiy was, like Khmel'nitskiy, a Commonwealth noble. When Khmel'nitskiy's uprising broke out, he had first fought on the side of the Commonwealth against the cossacks. When he fell into cossack captivity in 1649, he changed sides, joining Khmel'nitskiy. Since then, he had fought loyally alongside the late Hetman. However, Vygovskiy took his own counsel on how to rule the Hetmanate. Unlike Khmel'nitskiy, Vygovskiy dispensed with the fiction that the Hetman ruled with the endorsement of the traditional, and increasingly obsolete, Zaporozhian Host. He did not even inform the Zaporozhians of his election until weeks later. Moreover, distrusting Muscovy more than King John Casimir, Vygovskiy soon initiated a pro-Commonwealth policy. Although the cossack rank and file remained very suspicious of the Commonwealth, the cossack gentry as well as churchmen agreed with Vygovskiy that Commonwealth rule allowed them far greater liberties than Muscovite rule.

The dissent caused by Vygovskiy's policy shift almost immediately led to an attempt to overthrow him. The Zaporozhian ataman Yakov Barabash (d. 1658) and Martyn Pushkar' (1598–1658), Colonel of the cossack Poltava Regiment, assumed leadership of the rebels. Vygovskiy's loyalists prepared to strike back. What had begun as an uprising against the Commonwealth had turned into a cossack civil war. Meanwhile, Vygovskiy began to negotiate a secret alliance with Mehmet Khan. Learning of this, Barabash informed Tsar Alexis of what was afoot.

14

The Lithuanians Abandon Livonia

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian attempt to blockade Riga did not fare well. Like the Muscovites before them, they lacked warships to blockade the city from the sea. Moreover, the Swedish governor and commandant Helmfelt made life miserable for them with his aggressive defensive tactics, which he already had displayed against the Muscovites in 1656. In mid January 1658, Helmfelt ordered yet another major cavalry sortie from Riga. The sortie began at midnight and resulted in a battle at Cobron's Bastion, which continued for the entire next day and finally convinced the Lithuanians to abandon the siege. Gosiewski's men further to the north, at Pernau, had no better luck (Gosiewski himself had already abandoned this siege, too, leaving it to his subordinates). In early February, Major General Fabian Aderkas and the entire Swedish cavalry in Pernau (200 men) made a sortie from the town, which produced the same effect as Helmfelt's sallies at Riga. Two days later, the Lituanians abandoned the siege. By this time, Gosiewski had only 1,920 men left for field duties, according to the detailed information available to Helmfelt.[1]

Attrition and plague had taken a toll, and it was increasingly obvious that the Lithuanians were unable to take strongholds such as Riga and Pernau. Moreover, the supply situation was already difficult. Helmfelt's aggressive sorties made the Lithuanian commanders well-aware of the risk that the Swedes might cut their supply lines. By early February, all Lithuanian units had left Swedish Livonia, with the exception of a few strongpoints (Helmet, Wolmar, and Ronneburg). However, these were now exposed to Swedish containment and assaults. So did, for instance, the Lithuanian garrison of Wolmar surrender in August after only a week's siege.

---

[1] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.119.

The Invasion of Courland

We have seen that De la Gardie really wanted to be replaced as supreme commander in Livonia. In April 1658, King Charles chose Field Marshal Robert Douglas as the most suitable officer to assume overall command there. The formal decision came later, after consultation with other commanders, but the King had made up his mind.

One reason for King Charles to want Douglas in Livonia was the need to deal with Courland. Jacob Kettler (1610–1682), Duke of Courland, had long strived to stay neutral in the war between Sweden and the Commonwealth. Duke Jacob was an efficient entrepreneur who had established colonies in West Africa and Tobago, and although he two decades previously had fought in the Smolensk war against Muscovy, he was more interested in commerce than warfighting. Duke Jacob was also a brother-in-law of Frederick William of Brandenburg. However, Courland's neutrality was debatable. Already in 1657, Sweden noted that Denmark enlisted soldiers in Courland destined to fight the Swedish army. Likewise, Muscovy enlisted foreign officers in Lübeck, and when the Swedish navy blockaded the Gulf of Finland, Lübeck merchantmen instead disembarked officers bound for Muscovy in Courland ports. Meanwhile, the ports of Libau and Windau served as transit points for all kinds of sanctioned goods.[2] Although none of these activities constituted formal cause for war, they irritated the Swedish commanders, who from time to time sent warships to put an end to the practices. To be fair to Duke Jacob, Swedish policy towards Courland was imperious – which could be expected from a great power towards a small neighbour – and did not inspire great trust.

Courland was wealthy, but not a military power. It has been estimated that it could raise some 4,800 men, but this necessitated the arming of the Duke's peasant levies, who were serfs and under normal circumstances were not permitted to carry weapons.[3] It was not Duke Jacob's army which constituted the chief military threat to Sweden from Courland but the role which Courland played as a blockade breaker. Besides, the Courland ports already formed part of King Charles's strategic plan to take control over the Baltic shore.

Having been appointed to his new post, Douglas in June departed from the King's headquarters in Gothenburg. He arrived at Neumünde in Livonia in late July. On the following day, De la Gardie explained the disposition of forces in Livonia to Douglas, after which the latter formally assumed command. De la Gardie went to Prussia to lead the peace negotiations with King John Casimir. Douglas realised that he had much to do and he immediately set to work. First, he needed to take back those Livonian strongholds still held by Lithuanians. Most important was to retake Wolmar, since it was perceived at risk of Muscovite conquest. De la Gardie had already sent the Tavastehus Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Wilhelm von Yxkull, to Wolmar to initiate the siege, and Douglas immediately dispatched Gustav Otto Stenbock's Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Jacob von Yxkull, in its tracks. Soon, he also ordered a larger force under Lieutenant General Löwe to follow. On the way, the army liberated Wenden (modern-day Cēsis), which had a Lithuanian garrison of only one officer and 25 cavalrymen. In early August, all units had reached Wolmar. Defended by Lieutenant Colonel Johann Lemke, an experienced officer in Lithuanian service, Wolmar had a garrison of more than 700 men (540 dragoons and 185 Tatars) and had a stronger artillery than the Swedes. The Swedish attempt to storm Wolmar failed, but it persuaded Lemke to negotiate. On the following day, the Lithuanians marched out under terms of free departure. However, Douglas had them all taken prisoner, on grounds of breaking the agreement of surrender. He re-formed the captives into Swedish-style companies and had them shipped to Wismar.[4] The enlisted Germans presumably did not object much, and it is unknown what the Tatars thought about going into Swedish service. Douglas then returned to Riga.

---

[2] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.151.

[3] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.144.

Douglas was greatly displeased with the Livonian state of affairs. It was not a lack of soldiers; following the arrival of reinforcement the Swedish army in the Baltic territories, the bulk of which was deployed in Livonia, in July 1658 consisted of 3,229 cavalry, 419 dragoons, and 7,595 infantry, in total 11,243 men.[5] However, the lawlessness engendered by the military operations was considerable, some nobles and officials had formed what essentially were bands of robbers which terrorised the countryside, and the army was characterised by a shocking lack of discipline, in fact, the worst discipline which Douglas claimed ever to have encountered – and he had been through both the Thirty Years' War and the still ongoing war in Poland. By the end of the year, Douglas in a letter to King Charles admitted that he had been unable to reintroduce proper discipline in the units, mainly because the officers were as bad as the men and refused to rein in them. Moreover, Douglas noted, for as long as the units because of the recurring supply problems had to support themselves through plunder, there was little hope of improving the situation. As for the robber bands, Douglas declared them outlaws, after which he ordered those nobles who remained loyal to gather men to root them out.[6]

However, the key objective with which Douglas had been entrusted remained the Courland issue. King Charles wanted Courland secured and Duke Jacob in custody.

In early September, Douglas marched into Courland with some 2,800 horse and 1,700 foot (Table 16).[7] The operation involved deception, since Douglas at first informed the Duke that they only were marching through on an expedition to northern Lithuania. Suspicious but not in a position to protest, Duke Jacob admitted entry to the Swedish army. Because of the Duke's vigilance, Douglas temporarily postponed the attack on Courland's capital Mitau (modern-day Jelgava), instead continuing the deception, marching into Lithuania. Soon afterwards, however, the Swedes returned into Courland, this time aiming straight for Mitau. To assuage any worries that the Duke may have had, Douglas commenced negotiations about supply deliveries to his army and to the garrison in Riga. This enabled him and several officers to enter Mitau to survey its defences. The town itself did not seem to pose any particular problems, but the castle needed more preparations. Realising that more infantry was needed to take the castle, Douglas again postponed the attack. The negotiations between Sweden and Courland continued. Duke Jacob found himself forced to accept Swedish security guarantees in exchange for Swedish acceptance of Courland's neutrality, subject to future ratification by King Charles.

---

[4] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.145. The soldiers were sent to the Swedish army in Denmark, where they later participated in the storm of Copenhagen.

[5] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.185.

[6] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.147, 235–6, 199.

[7] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.147.

Meanwhile, Douglas made final preparations for a surprise assault on Mitau, all the while claiming that Lithuania was the real target. Because of continuous heavy rain and high water levels in the river, preparations took longer than expected. Claiming that a number of Swedish soldiers were ill and had to be transported to Riga, Douglas borrowed several dozen river barges from the Duke. On 9 October, the Swedes moved in on Mitau. Major General Nils Bååt (1617–1659) with an assault force of 500 musketeers from the Österbotten Regiment embarked on the fleet of barges. The barges would float with the stream so as not to make unnecessary noise. Having reached their destination, the men would emerge to carry out a surprise attack at night on Mitau Castle. At the same time, Colonel Jacob von Yxkull would lead 400 men in an assault on the town gates. He would also block enemy reinforcements from reaching the castle. Colonel Otto Wilhelm von Fersen (1623–1703), yet another veteran of the Thirty Years' War, would bring a small cavalry force to eliminate the observation post which the Duke, rightly suspicious of the Swedish intentions, had deployed at an inn outside the town to provide advance warning of any attack. The well-planned assault succeeded, Courlandian opposition was minimal, and in the morning of 10 October, all of Mitau was in Swedish hands with the Duke, his family, and court in custody. Soon afterwards, Douglas also took the smaller Courlandian towns of Bauske (modern-day Bauska) and Doblen (modern-day Dobele). After a few weeks, the Duke, his family, and key advisors were removed to Riga for safekeeping.

Incidentally, both Lithuanians and Danes managed to intercept enciphered letters between Douglas and King Charles, so both sides knew that Douglas had orders to take Courland, regardless of the security guarantees. It is unknown if the Lithuanians tried to warn the Duke, although if so, there is nothing to suggest that the warning ever reached him. King Frederick of Denmark did send a warning to the Duke, but it arrived too late.

Some Courlanders resisted the Swedish occupation. While a number of peasants fled to Lithuania, several nobles joined the Lithuanian army under the veteran officer, Colonel Samuel Komorowski (d. 1659), who during the Swedish invasion of Lithuania in 1655 had burned the town of Dünaburg to deny it to Swedes and Muscovites alike. In late November, King John Casimir appointed Major General Adam von Berg commander of the Courland military which already operated in conjunction with Lithuanian forces.[8]

---

[8] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.147–51.

Table 16. The Livonian field army, September 1658[9]

Cavalry	Total strength
The Hereditary Prince's Life Regiment of Horse (*Riksarvfurstens* alt. *Arvprinsens Livregemente till häst*), under Colonel Otto Wilhelm von Fersen	347
Tavastehus Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Wilhelm von Yxkull	223
Field Marshal Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie's Life Regiment of Horse, under Colonel Reinhold Glassenap	273
Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock's Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Jacob von Yxkull	394
Duke Ernst Bogislaw de Croÿ's Cavalry Regiment, under Colonel Reitzewitz	496
Lieutenant General Gustav Evertsson Horn's Cavalry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gustav Anrep	263
Lieutenant General Friedrich Löwe's Cavalry Squadron	65
Major General Christer Horn's Cavalry Squadron	118
Major General Bengt Horn's Cavalry Squadron	121
Major General Simon Grundel Helmfelt's Cavalry Company, under Captain Richter	62
Emanuel of Anhalt-Köthen's Regiment, under Colonel Giacomo de Columbo	251
Lieutenant Colonel Reinhold von Ungern's Cavalry Squadron	138
Colonel Franz Joachim Trampe's (former) Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Dietrich Reinkingk (mainly Danes)	135
Colonel Hans Christopher Frölich's Cavalry Squadron (mainly Scanians)	134
Of whom 72 sick and 107 detached cavalrymen	
Total (incl. officers)	**3,020**
Infantry	**Strength excl. officers**
Österbotten Regiment, under Major General Nils Bååt	300
Field Marshal Hans Christoph von Königsmarck's Third Regiment, under Colonel Wenzel	341
Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock's Regiment, under Colonel Jacob Spens	408
Lieutenant General George Fleetwood's Regiment (mainly English)	364

---

[9] Fagerlund, 'Krigetiöstersjöprovinserna', pp.235–6.

Major General William Vavasour's Regiment (mainly English and Scots; Vavasour himself was at Copenhagen)	239
Total	1,652 excl. officers
Detached and sick infantrymen	469
Grand Total	4,672 excl. infantry officers

The North-Eastern Theatre

As noted, King Charles in late 1657 appointed Gustav Evertsson Horn supreme commander in Finland and the rest of the north-eastern theatre, except Livonia which Horn declined. Major General Erik Kruse remained his deputy, despite already having been appointed governor of Viborg. Kruse thereby replaced the old Anders Koskull as governor. Horn also appointed Erik Pistolhielm Colonel of the Viborg Cavalry Regiment, Kruse's former position. We have seen that Horn, Kruse, and Pistolhielm were cast in the same mould. All three were efficient but also ruthless men, in particular with regard to the lives of Orthodox peasants and enemy prisoners, none of whom they regarded as of any intrinsic value.

During the winter of 1657–1658, both western Ingria and Estonia were again ravaged by Muscovite raiding parties. Already in mid October 1657, a Muscovite raiding force under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy, Voivode of Pskov, successfully penetrated Narva. Khovanskiy led a substantial force, with a core consisting of four companies of new formation cavalry under Colonel Venedikt Zmeyev, two companies from Denis von Visin's regiment, a *sotnya* of old-style cavalry, and four companies of dragoons under Alexander Gamont. Aided by Orthodox townsmen who opened several access points in the defences, the Muscovites easily entered the town. The Swedish defenders had to take refuge in the mediaeval Hermann Castle on the river. Having looted the town for three days and burned most buildings, the Muscovites departed, first to Jama and then to Pskov. The town's approximately 350 Orthodox families, in total some 1,000 people, abandoned the town and followed the Muscovites back to Pskov. At the time of the raid, Christer Horn (1622–1692), Governor-General of Ingria, was in the vicinity of Jama further to the east with a field force consisting of some 200 cavalry and 130 dragoons (two companies of Livonian cavalry, his own life company of horse, and what he described as his own 'exhausted and wholly dismounted' dragoon regiment – which tells something about conditions in the field and again illustrates how understrength almost all Swedish units were). From this position, Christer Horn had been unable to prevent the sudden Muscovite attack on Narva.[10]

---

[10] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.45; Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.127.



Prince Ivan Khovanskiy

Under these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the same kind of lawlessness which emerged in first Lithuania and then Livonia by the end of 1657 developed in Estonia as well. With Muscovite raiders already in the vicinity, some Estonian peasants took advantage of the situation to do some raiding of their own.[11]

In December 1657, Aleksandr Potyomkin sent raiding parties of cavalry, cossacks, and streltsy to Kaporie in western Ingria as well as into the Karelian Isthmus. The detachment sent into the Karelian Isthmus defeated what seems to have been a recently formed unit of conscripts from Viborg near the island of Reitskär in a battle at least in part fought on the ice-covered Gulf of Finland. The other apparently disrupted a Swedish cavalry patrol near Kaporie.[12]

The raids were not improvised but formed part of Muscovite strategy. In early January 1658, the Voivode of Pskov, Prince Ivan Khovanskiy, received orders to continue the offensive raiding operations in Ingria to keep the Swedes busy. However, despite or perhaps because of the success at Narva, Khovanskiy was ordered to limit himself to raiding; there would be no major offensives, nor any sieges.[13] The raids constituted a defensive, not an offensive, strategy.

Following orders, Khovanskiy continued the raiding operations, but he had no intention of limiting himself to easy targets. In late January 1658, three Muscovite expeditionary forces converged upon Jama. Khovanskiy sent Prince Mikhail Shchetinin (fl. 1640–1658), Commandant of Pskov, with a corps from Pskov consisting of six *sotni* of hereditary servicemen, 270 Don cossacks, 90 Pskov cossacks, and 200 new formation cavalry. They had orders to join another corps from Pskov commanded by Danila Neplyuyev, who already seems to have been at Jama. Meanwhile, Prince Grigoriy Kurakin, commander of the Novgorod Army, sent Prince Vasiliy Solntsev from Novgorod with a corps of old-style cavalry, 300 Moscow streltsy, and 400 new formation troops to the same location.[14] Upon arrival, the three forces, which also had brought four cannons, immediately laid siege to Jama. The Swedish garrison in Jama consisted of only a lieutenant and a handful of soldiers. In early February, Solntsev successfully stormed Jama. The defenders had to abandon the town and move into the castle keep, which was the sole part of the town still in their hands. Nonetheless, the garrison managed to hold the keep for a month. As noted, the Muscovites had orders not to waste time on sieges, so several Muscovite units were dispatched for raiding elsewhere while others stayed at Jama to contain the Swedes.[15]

---

[11] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.127.

[12] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.157; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.275; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', pp.44–5.

[13] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.45; Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.127.

[14] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.46.

This operation meant that Muscovite units controlled essentially all of western Ingria. Sweden only held Narva, Ivangorod, Kaporie, and Jama, and these strongholds were garrisoned only by a few men in each. Christer Horn argued that he lacked the forces to confront the Muscovites in open battle. Despite his military rank, Horn lacked military experience and moreover, was not known as particularly bright, but his seems to have been a correct assessment. Besides, he had orders to act cautiously, remaining on the defensive. Nonetheless, he (or somebody in his staff) regularly sent out cavalry patrols to learn about the Muscovite movements. In early March Horn received reports that the Jama garrison still held the keep, but now faced a shortage of gunpowder. He probably also learnt that the small garrison had repulsed six Muscovite attempts to storm the keep, and that negotiations for their surrender had commenced. As a result, Horn ordered the dispatch of a relief force. Since he knew that Muscovite agents still regularly received information from Narva, he ordered the town gates to stay closed while preparations for the relief expedition went on. In the evening, as soon as preparations were completed, Christer Horn led 800 cavalry and infantry, with four regimental cannons, out of Narva. Marching throughout the night, the Swedish relief force early in the following morning carried out a surprise attack on the Muscovites at Jama. The Muscovites dispersed, abandoning the siege. The commandant of Jama had planned to surrender and march out on the very same day, but at noon. Either Horn's timing was remarkably lucky, or more likely, he was kept informed about the negotiations and planned the relief operation so that the attack would occur on the very morning when the Muscovites were confident of their success and thus least likely to be vigilant.

Before departing from Jama, additional gunpowder was brought in, while the garrison was reinforced with 40 soldiers and two artillerymen.[16]

Following the successful Swedish relief of Jama, Muscovy in early March withdrew most raiders from western Ingria. They also executed all prisoners; as we have seen a frequent precaution taken by retreating forces on both sides in the Swedish-Muscovite war. Instead, the Muscovites gathered their forces for a renewed attack on Narva. Moreover, Khovanskiy had already before Horn's successful relief operation set out from Pskov to reinforce the Muscovites at Jama. He now changed course, instead advancing on Narva.[17]

The offensive against Narva became the last Muscovite offensive against Swedish objectives. Khovanskiy advanced towards Narva with 1,900 men.[18]

---

[15] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.128.

[16] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.128–30.

[17] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', pp.48–9.

[18] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.50. This number corresponds to the information in early April (22 March O.S.) supplied by Captain Jürgen Troian from Danzig, who served in Khovanskiy's army but was captured and interrogated on this day. Troian informed the Swedes that the Muscovite force by this time consisted of 1,650 soldiers and some levied peasants.

However, Solntsev and his Novgorod men refused to join forces with Khovanskiy, instead moving back towards Jama. In late March, Khovanskiy reached Narva. He sent his Don cossacks and four companies of new formation cavalry to ravage the country between Narva and Reval, and to disperse the peasant levies which the Swedes were raising there.[19] Khovanskiy's intelligence suggested that Horn had 1,600 men in Narva.[20] The two sides accordingly appeared equal in strength. Moreover, soon news arrived that Sweden in early March had concluded a peace with Denmark in Roskilde. This was bad news for Muscovy, which henceforth had to assume that Sweden might deploy far more substantial military forces to the Muscovite front, deployed from those withdrawn from the Danish front. By this time negotiations in Moscow between Russian and Swedish representatives were already in the process of resulting in a ceasefire agreement. Khovanskiy accordingly invited Horn to negotiations. As a result, a local truce was concluded in early April. In late April, Horn revoked the truce. Soon after, Tsar Alexis ordered Khovanskiy to initiate a ceasefire with Horn. A new truce was soon agreed. In early May, Khovanskiy abandoned the blockade of Narva and returned to Pskov. He did not withdraw his garrison at Wask-Narva. Although a few skirmishes took place in May as well, major hostilities ceased.

In Moscow, negotiations between Swedish and Muscovite representatives had continued for some time, and on 10 May, they concluded a general ceasefire agreement, to come into force on 31 May. It was also agreed that armistice negotiations would begin in Narva on 25 June, with peace negotiations scheduled to begin in November. Tsar Alexis sent orders to his outposts to cease combat operations and inform their Swedish counterparts that a ceasefire had been concluded. Because of the poor road conditions, it took some time before the news reached all combatants. However, already in mid May, Muscovite merchants again showed up at Narva with their goods. Christer Horn did not allow them into the town, but they were allowed to trade outside. In late May, Horn received information from Novgorod about the general ceasefire agreement.[21]

The war of raids and counterraids also continued in eastern Ingria and Kexholm County, even though hostile military activities remained very limited on the border with Finland itself. In January 1658, Muscovite raiders from Lava again raided Nyen and Rautus.[22] These were the last operations carried out there by Aleksandr Potyomkin. Even before the return of the raiders, he was recalled and replaced as voivode of Lava by Fyodor Ladyzhenskiy (d. 1676). Ladyzhenskiy had orders to continue the raiding operations in Ingria so as to wear out the enemy forces there.[23] However, the thick snow cover and cold weather already in early January put an end to

---

[19] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.50.

[20] Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.47.

[21] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.131.

[22] Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.275.

[23] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.158; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', pp.44–5.



Nöteborg, as seen from the north, 1650s. (Swedish Military Archives (KrA))

operations east and north of Lake Ladoga. Soon, the deep snow and cold also impeded operations south and west of the lake, in Ingria.

It was only in early April that another battle on the Finnish–Muscovite border took place. Ladyzhenskiy led his men from Lava to Nyen. Few details are known about this offensive. Local peasants alerted the Swedish garrison to the Muscovite presence, and some 80 peasants participated in the defence of Nyen. Ladyzhenskiy had apparently sent scouts during the night to find the best access routes through the outer defences of the new, well-built redoubt at Nyen. They planted 12 small pennants to guide the assault parties, which in the next morning attempted to storm the redoubt. Ladyzhenskiy's soldiers managed to get across the outer defences, although they lost some 40 men in the process, but they could not penetrate the inner defences. After retreating, Ladyzhenskiy fired mortars (loaded with stone projectiles, perhaps pierriers) against the redoubt for a while, but then marched back to Lava.[24]

It is probably significant that no Muscovite attempts at this time were made against Nöteborg. The castle-island was simply too hard a nut to crack with the resources available to Ladyzhenskiy and, for that matter, his predecessors.

The attempt on Nyen was the final major action of the Swedish-Muscovite war, even though lingering suspicions about a Muscovite offensive from the White Sea area lingered in northern Finland for a while (Zacharias Palmbaum at Kajaneborg called up peasant levies to man the border defences, but some of the peasants immediately defected to the Muscovites, informing them

---

[24] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.159; Gadzyatskiy, 'Kareliya', p.276; Gadzyatskiy, 'Bor'ba', p.50.



Plan of Nöteborg, 1650s. (Swedish Military Archives (KrA), Utländska kartor, Östersjöprovinserna, Stads- och fästningsplaner, Nöteborg 1, Geometrischer Grundt Niß der Festung Nöteborgh)

about the Swedish activities[25]). In May, the information from Moscow that a ceasefire had been declared between Muscovy and Sweden reached both Lava and Olonets. Choglokov and Ladyzhenskiy immediately informed the nearest Swedish outposts about the ceasefire, which as noted was agreed to come into force on 31 May.

During the summer, negotiations for an armistice and ultimately a peace treaty got underway more or less as planned, with Bengt Horn, the governor of Estonia, representing Sweden and Afanasiy Ordin-Nashchokin representing the Muscovite side. On 30 December (20 December O.S.), the two parties agreed to a three-year truce in Vallisaare south of Narva. Muscovy signed for 20 years and Sweden for three. The truce included terms that permitted Muscovy to retain its conquests (Kokenhusen, Dorpat, Marienburg, Adzele, Wask-Narva, and several villages) until a peace treaty was agreed.

Following the ceasefire and truce, no further formal hostilities took place between Swedes and Muscovites. However, some limited unauthorised raiding by peasants continued in northern Kexholm County, with soldiers from both sides attempting to put an end to the practice. From 1659 onwards, Kruse and Cheglokov co-operated in these attempts, but since the peasants were under nobody's control, there was little that either side could do.[26]

In hindsight, it is striking that with the one exception of Tsar Alexis's attempt on Riga, neither Sweden nor Muscovy devoted much resources to fighting each other. The Swedish army's primary area of operations was first, the Commonwealth and second and of yet higher priority, Denmark. King Charles never deployed more than a minimal defensive force to protect Sweden's eastern borders. Following the lead of his predecessor King

---

[25] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.159.

[26] Lappalainen, 'Finland', pp.160–1.

Gustavus Adolphus, King Charles realised that Sweden had no territorial interests in Muscovy that had not already been satisfied through the 1617 Treaty of Stolbovo. Meanwhile, although Tsar Alexis would have liked to lay his hands on the wealthy city of Riga, he argued that it was far more important to retain Smolensk and conclude a satisfying peace with the Commonwealth, on his terms, than to send valuable armies into the sparsely inhabited and economically poor borderlands of Ingria, Kexholm County, and Karelia.

15

The Battle for Prussia

As noted, in December 1657, the representatives of the anti-Swedish coalition - the Empire, Commonwealth, and Brandenburg – met in Berlin to discuss a joint expedition to aid Denmark. The coalition army would primarily consist of Imperial and Brandenburg-Prussian units but also include Czarniecki's contingent (by then 3,000 cavalry and 1,000 dragoons[1]). The coalition partners agreed to move out as soon as the rivers froze, which expectedly happened in January 1658. In mid February, Denmark and Brandenburg entered into a secret alliance against Sweden. Ultimately, soon-to-be Emperor Leopold and King John Casimir joined the alliance, too, through the mediation of Frederick William. The secret alliance did not stay secret for long; King Charles learnt about it from intercepted letters between the Danish envoy to Berlin and Copenhagen. Moreover, both January and February passed before the allies were able to assemble the necessary men. And then, the Swedish speed in moving against Copenhagen prevented the intervention because of Denmark's sudden surrender.

In early 1658, the Imperial expeditionary corps crossed the Vistula and moved into winter quarters in Ermland, where it remained.

The collapse of Denmark which resulted in the Treaty of Roskilde in March 1658 caused great consternation among Denmark's allies. The Poles feared that King Charles now would return with the Swedish main army to finish off the Commonwealth, or at least regain full control of Royal Prussia. Czarniecki's contingent was accordingly ordered to the border with Neumark so that it could defend against any Swedish attack on Poland from Pomerania. Moreover, the Poles worried that war with Muscovy would rekindle, since following the death of Khmel'nitskiy the Poles had negotiated with proxies in an attempt to regain the loyalty of Cossack Ukraine. Leopold and Frederick William worried that King Charles now would turn upon them. Frederick William was well aware that he had betrayed King Charles, and he feared the possible repercussions. Leopold feared that the Swedes again might invade the Habsburg ancestral lands in Bohemia, which they had repeatedly done during the Thirty Years' War, and considered the option of a preemptive attack on Swedish Pomerania. He asked Raimondo Montecuccoli to carry out such a joint action with Frederick William. However, the latter who had been in favour of an attack on Swedish Pomerania while King Charles was busy elsewhere, now thought it too dangerous. Leopold went so far as to promise to send 5,000 men for the campaign in Prussia and another 15,000 under Montecuccoli for an attack on the Swedes in Pomerania and Holstein. To no avail; Frederick William did not wish to risk a Swedish counter-offensive. And without the support of Brandenburg, Leopold did not wish to jeopardise either the coming Imperial election, or the peace of Westphalia.[2]

---

[1] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.388.

The Imperial contingent left winter quarters in Ermland in May 1658. In June, Imperial, Brandenburg-Prussian, and Polish commanders met at Montecuccoli's headquarters at Posen. Now King John Casimir, too, wanted to take action against the Swedes in Germany. However, for the reasons already mentioned both Frederick William and Montecuccoli refused.

Instead, the coalition leaders decided to establish four defensive lines. The first would run along the Pomeranian border west of Danzig, in case King Charles would attempt an offensive from the west into Prussia. The second defensive line would run along the River Netze, in case King Charles instead planned an offensive into Greater Poland of the type that Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg had carried out in 1655. To calm Frederick William, who was particularly perturbed by the news of the fall of Denmark since he expected himself to be the next Swedish target, a third defensive line would be established along the River Oder, to protect Brandenburg-Prussian Neumark from attacks from Swedish Pomerania. In the same spirit, a fourth defensive line would be established west of the Oder, in case King Charles instead aimed to invade the Habsburg ancestral lands in Silesia or Bohemia (although such a scenario was regarded as less likely, again because it would place the peace of Westphalia into jeopardy).[3]

Frederick William had good reason for his worries. The Swedish parliament had already approved an attack on Brandenburg, and plans were being made for a joint attack from Livonia and Swedish Pomerania. The field army on the continent had received orders to be ready to march on Brandenburg on 12 May.

Despite the joint interest in maintaining defences against Sweden, relations between the Commonwealth and the Imperial contingent grew increasingly irritated. Many Polish nobles had hoped that the Imperial army would conquer the well-defended Swedish strongholds in Prussia on their behalf but without their involvement. Instead, the Poles wanted to reconquer the Ukraine from the cossacks, which was a task better suited for Polish noble cavalry. Much of the Polish army was accordingly sent into the Ukraine. The conflicting desires led to considerable discord. Many within the Commonwealth, including those who wanted the Imperials to deal with the stubborn Swedes, argued that the Imperial troops cost too much to support and fought too little.

---

[2] Frost, *After the Deluge*, pp.125–6, with references.

[3] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', pp.389–90.

There was also discord among the Swedish commanders. Duke Adolph John and Field Marshal Lieutenant Lorenz von der Linde got along badly. Somebody had circulated anonymous letters with rude comments about Duke Adolph John, and Linde had been unable to find who lay behind them, which resulted in harsh words from the Duke. Although the clash between Duke Adolph John and the Field Marshal eventually subsided, it was a bad omen. Duke Adolph John suffered badly from his damaged knee and, by some later accounts, had become a difficult person to deal with.

Nonetheless, the Duke and the Field Marshal maintained King Charles's strategy to defend the Swedish bridgehead in Prussia and the Vistula basin while the King dealt with Denmark. Retention of these strongholds would also give Sweden an advantageous position in the peace negotiations that were bound to come at some point. Besides, the Swedes had achieved a strong presence there. Moreover, during the summer reinforcements arrived.

The Siege of Thorn

In early July, Imperial units again advanced on Thorn. In late July and early August, additional Imperial and Commonwealth forces concentrated at Thorn. This time, the attempt to take Thorn would be handled more seriously than the one in the previous autumn.

Thorn was the residence town of the Governor General of Swedish-held Poland, Bengt Oxenstierna, but its defences were handled by the capable Major General Barthold Hartwig von Bülow. In similarity to many other Prussian towns, the population primarily consisted of German-speaking Protestants. In Thorn, they supported the Swedish garrison, which in July 1658 consisted of 2,420 men (550 cavalry, 100 dragoons, 1,735 infantry, and 35 artillerymen). The defenders relied on an artillery train consisting of the Swedish garrison's 35 to 40 cannons and seven mortars in addition to the town's own cannons, up to 150 in number in various states of repair.[4]

Soon, Thorn found itself under siege by 4,650 Imperials (3,000 cavalry and dragoons with 1,650 infantry) under General of Cavalry Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches (1608–1682).[5] He was an able French Huguenot who once had deserted from Swedish service. After his desertion, reportedly after having challenged his superior officer to a duel (duels were forbidden in the Swedish army and subject to capital punishment), Souches had joined the Imperial army. He demonstrated his ability as commandant of the Bohemian town Brünn (modern-day Brno), when the town in 1645 successfully resisted a Swedish army.

---

[4] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, p.343.

[5] Jan Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen i Polen under kriget med Sverige 1655–1660', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973), pp.41–101, on p.82; Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.391, 411 n.168.



Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches

Although more skilled and better equipped for siege works, the Imperial army at Thorn was small in comparison to the Polish one, which gradually assembled there under the nominal command of, for a short while, Czarniecki and Jan Fryderyk Sapieha (1618–1664). First to join the siege was the only indispensable Polish force, the Crown artillery under the experienced Crown General of Artillery, Krzysztof Grodzicki, and his deputy, Fryderyk Getkant, who had returned into Commonwealth service and used the occasion to test his new invention, the ground mortar (see Volume I). The Polish artillery train consisted of 40 cannons together with several of Getkant's ground mortars.[6] Surely cognisant of what was necessary and unnecessary during a siege, King John Casimir in September dispatched Czarniecki and his cavalry army to aid Denmark, a more suitable target for cavalry operations. Instead, the King himself joined the coalition army with additional reinforcements. He now commanded some 18,700 Poles (7,000 national cavalry, 2,270 dragoons, and 9,400 infantry).[7] The besiegers by then fielded more than 23,000 men against Bülow's roughly 2,400, that is, a strength of almost 10 to one. Yet, it could have been worse for the defenders, had not significant numbers of Brandenburg-Prussians and some Poles and Imperials by then set out for Denmark instead of joining the siege. Bülow responded to the growing number of besiegers by ordering almost daily sallies, which caused considerable confusion and prevented the besiegers from making full use of their superior numbers.[8]

In November, the besiegers vowed not to take any prisoners and during the night successfully stormed three bastions. The battle was very hard-fought and desperate, and casualties were high, with the attackers losing 400 dead and 600 wounded.[9] The defenders suffered losses, too. In one of the bastions under attack, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bock, was carried back 'mortally wounded, with the arm severed, a musket ball in the shoulder, and a half-pike pushed into the chest above the heart'. Soon after, his replacement, Captain Gabriel Kurck, was wounded in the arm by a half-pike, caught in a grenade explosion, pummelled by stones hitting chest

---

[6] Tadeusz Marian Nowak, 'Det polska kronartilleriet före och under det polsk-svenska kriget 1655–1660', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973), pp.103–129, on p.110.

[7] Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen', p.82; Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', pp.391, 411 n.168.

[8] For additional details on the siege of Thorn and the battle for Prussia, see Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.341–5, 422–46.

[9] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.391.



Fortifications at Thorn, dated 12 December 1657. (O.S.)

and arm, and left for dead; however, he recovered, had a glass of wine, and returned to the battle.[10] Another Swedish officer, Lieutenant Colonel Andreas Zöge, was cited for unusual bravery. With his bare hands, he on several occasions grabbed incoming hand grenades with fuses burning. Then, he threw them back at the Imperials who attempted to storm the bastion, until he was shot through the thigh.[11] Despite the heroics, Thorn's civilian governor, the Governor General Bengt Oxenstierna, realised that he had to initiate negotiations. Meanwhile, he gave the besiegers the impression that Thorn remained fully garrisoned and that supplies were plentiful (they were not). Skilfully, he prolonged the negotiations for weeks. Ultimately, Oxenstierna negotiated the right to march out and depart with full honours of war. Moreover, the agreement of surrender included guarantees that the town's burghers, who had supported the Swedes, would not suffer retaliation after the surrender. On 30 December, the Swedes marched out with full honours. Greatly annoyed, the besiegers noted that the entire Swedish departing force consisted of 350 men, together with 250 wounded who travelled in wagons (another 300 seriously wounded remained in the town, where they according to the agreement would be allowed to stay until they recovered).[12] Voices were heard that the Swedes should be massacred because of their insolent and deceptive behaviour, but this time King John Casimir managed to control his angry subordinates. The Swedes were escorted to Marienburg.

---

[10] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.426–7; Peter Englund, *Den oövervinnerlige: Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2000), p.686; both citing Gabriel Kurck.

[11] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, p.427.

The defence of Thorn tied up most of the Commonwealth and Imperial armies in the region for several months, which relieved pressure elsewhere. Besides, Sweden still held Elbing (with a garrison of several hundred men under the governor of Royal Prussia, Field Marshal Lieutenant Lorenz von der Linde) and Marienburg (commanded by Duke Adolph John, with a garrison of 3,000 men), and would continue to do so for the duration of the wars. Swedish garrisons also held Danziger Haupt (a garrison of 600 to 800 men under Claes Danckwardt-Lillieström) and several small strongpoints: Alt-Weichsel, Liessau, and Montauer Spitze, with garrisons of altogether a few hundred men. More problematic for the Swedish position were the isolated garrisons in Graudenz (500 men under Colonel Johann Puchert) and Strasburg (perhaps 200 men under Colonel Johann Pleitner), which in reality were impossible to defend in the face of a strong adversary. In total, the Swedish garrisons in Prussia consisted of some 5,000 men, including 1,000 horse. They controlled the communications lines, had ample supplies of ammunition, and remained a highly motivated and disciplined force of veterans, despite suffering from diseases and shortages in food supplies.[13]

Besides, the fact that the Swedish commanders in Prussia were supposed to focus on defending their holdings in no way precluded limited offensives. The winter of 1658/1659 was not over yet, and unlike their opponents, the Swedes did not necessarily go into winter quarters. We will see that before winter was over, Paul Würtz from Swedish Pomerania joined Duke Adolph John in Prussia for a joint offensive against the Polish positions there.

All of this was bad news for the Commonwealth, because already by October 1658, the Commonwealth again found itself at war with Muscovy. As in 1654, the war originated in the Ukraine, where on 16 September, Ivan Vygovskiy agreed to the Treaty of Gadyach between Cossack Ukraine and the Commonwealth (more on which below), which rekindled the conflict between the Commonwealth and Muscovy.

---

[12] Barkman, *Kungl* pp.429–30.

[13] Leszek Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg i Kungliga (Polska) Preussen', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds). *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973), pp.295–323, on pp.298, 320 n.57.

We have seen that Sweden and Muscovy by then had agreed on a ceasefire. On 30 December, this was followed by the Truce of Vallisaare between Sweden and Muscovy. The Swedish-Muscovite war was over for this time.

The Devastation of Transylvania

Even though Prince George Rákóczy of Transylvania, following the departure of King Charles and most Swedes to Denmark and several successive defeats, had agreed to a peace with the Commonwealth in July 1657 (see Volume II), his misadventures did not end with the destruction of his army. His invasion army when he entered the Commonwealth had included allied Moldavians and Wallachians. Taking this as an excuse for further operations, the Khanate of the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire moved into these principalities, defeating and deposing the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia who were Prince George Rákóczy's allies. In 1658, the Crimean Tatars and Ottomans invaded Transylvania itself, in September sacking its capital Alba Julia.[14] The Crimeans took numerous captives, which were brought back to the Crimean slave markets. While Prince George Rákóczy managed to come back as ruler of Transylvania, he no longer had the means to engage in the struggle for the Polish Crown.


GEORGIUS RAKOCZII. D. G.
Moldauiæ Dux. Comes
Regni Hungariæ Dominus. et
Princeps Tranſſyluaniæ.
Palatin? Tranſalpinenſis Partium
Siculorum Comes etc.
Ioan Meyſsens ex: Antverpiæ.

George II Rákóczy

Muscovy Resumes Operations in Lithuania and Cossack Ukraine Descends into Civil War

Already in early 1658, Tsar Alexis was growing increasingly impatient over the Commonwealth's failure to confirm his promised position as King John Casimir's successor. When his representatives and their Swedish counterparts in May agreed to a truce, to be followed by formal peace negotiations, this gave the Tsar free hands to renew combat operations against Lithuania.

In May 1658, Tsar Alexis established the Belgorod regional military command or Belgorod Army, in effect Muscovy's first modern-style army group, to safeguard the southern border but also to employ as a strike force against the

---

[14] Alba Julia was known in Hungarian as Gyulafehérvár, 'White Castle of Julius'. In German, the town was called Weissenburg, and in Ruthenian, Belgorod – both meaning 'White Castle'. The devastation of Alba Julia is evident from archaeological finds. In 1661, the town was again sacked, from which it never recovered. Radu Ota, Cristian Titus Florescu, and Bogdan Pâclişan, 'Alba Iulia şi invaziile Turco-Tătare din anii 1658 şi 1661: Reflectate prin descoperiri arheologice recente', *Apulum* 55: 1 (2018), pp.379–89.

Commonwealth. It was a very substantial formation. The Belgorod Army then included about 17,000 garrison troops, which included artillerymen, but also, more importantly, 19,200 soldiers on campaign service in the field armies, of whom 16,600 were new formation servicemen (Table 17).

Table 17. The Belgorod Army, 8 June 1658 (O.S.). Units listed as cavalry, dragoons, or infantry are new formation units.[15]

Unit	Commander	Str.
Great Division (Bol'shoy polk)		
Old-style Cavalry	-	1,000
Cavalry Regiment	Johann von Rosenbach	1,200
Dragoon Regiment	Raphael Korsak	1,329
Dragoon Regiment	Christophor Gundermark	1,299
Belgorod Infantry Regiment	Philipius Albertus van Bokhoven	1,601
Yablonov Infantry Regiment	Jacob Leslie	1,623
Kozlov Infantry Regiment	Jacob Ronart	1,575
Moscow-ranked Streltsy Regt	Klimentiy Iyevlev	600
Total		**10,227**
Second Division		
Old-style Cavalry	-	500
Cavalry Regiment (Squadron)	Ivan Shepelyov	600
Dragoon Regiment	Wilhelm F. von Zeits	1,251
Userd Infantry Regiment	Fyodor Wormser	1,481
Verkhososensk Infantry Regt	Johann Inwald	1,400
Total		**5,232**
Third Division		
Old-style Cavalry	-	500
Cavalry Regiment (Squadron)	Semyon Skornyakov-Pisaryev	600
Dragoon Regiment	Johann von Zager	1,121
Karpov Infantry Regiment	Wilhelm von Hagen	1,522
Total		**3,743**
Field Armies Total		**19,202**
Garrison troops		17,000
Grand Total		**36,202**

---

[15] Field armies: Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.316; garrisons: Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe*, p.34.



Muscovites at Riga, 1656

While Tsar Alexis prepared for a resumption of military operations in Lithuania, he did not realise that the Ukraine meanwhile rapidly was plunging into civil war. Moreover, the Muscovite alliance with the Ukrainian cossacks was disintegrating. We have seen that Cossack Ukraine was a divided society. Perhaps it was inevitable that such a loosely organised state such as Cossack Ukraine would suffer from significant rifts.

In early 1658, the late Khmel'nitskiy's successor Ivan Vygovskiy agreed an alliance with the Crimean Khanate. Since he already had entered into negotiations with Commonwealth representatives, he invited the Commonwealth to join the alliance, too. The Commonwealth was eager to regain control over Cossack Ukraine, since many magnates had lost large land holdings there and wanted them back. Negotiations had accordingly begun between Commonwealth and cossack leaders in order to prepare for the post-Khmel'nitskiy political landscape in the Ukraine. In short, Vygovskiy wanted to reunite Cossack Ukraine with the Commonwealth.

The Muscovites knew about the divisions in cossack society, but Moscow apparently failed to grasp the gravity of the situation. In spring 1658, Moscow issued orders to send small Muscovite garrisons to several towns in Cossack Ukraine, including Poltava, Belotserkov', Korsun', Nezhin, Chernigov, and Mirgorod. Each garrison would consist of 200 to 300 new formation infantry. This was to increase the security of these towns against Crimean attacks. Ultimately, the garrisons were never sent. However, Vygovskiy interpreted the move as a challenge to his own rule, in particular since Martyn Pushkar', Colonel of the cossack Poltava Regiment, already had refused to accept Vygovskiy's assumption of the Hetmanate.

At this point, Cossack Ukraine collapsed. Among the cossacks, the rifts and jealousies between parties who looked to Muscovy or the Commonwealth (or elsewhere) for support rapidly turned into a civil war. The result was the period of Ukrainian history currently known as the Ruin (*Ruina*), a period which modern-day Ukrainians consider as disastrous for the Ukraine as modern-day Poles regard the effects of the Deluge on Poland.

Tsar Alexis had received some reports on the unrest in the Ukraine, but he had not yet been informed of these momentous events. As a result, Tsar Alexis in June appointed Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy commander of the Belgorod Army and decided on a date on which the Belgorod Army would move into Lithuania, with orders to advance all the way to Grodno. Meanwhile, the Tsar ordered Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev to Kiev, where he would replace as commandant Andrey Buturlin, who by then was in Moscow. Tsar Alexis could not know that only days before he issued these orders, Vygovskiy had crushed the opposition to his rule, allied Cossack Ukraine with the Khanate of Crimea and the Commonwealth, and broken with Muscovy.

By this time, the army of Cossack Ukraine consisted of no less than 21 cossack regiments (from Chigirin, Podol'skiy, Kal'nik, Cherkasy, Kanev, Uman', Pavolotsk, Belotserkov', Korsun', Kiev, Bratslav, Ovruch, Turov-Pinsk, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Nezhin, Priluki, Lubny, Mirgorod, Poltava, and the Belarusian Host). Each ranged in strength from 500 to 4,000. The total available cossack manpower remains uncertain, but it was significant. Yet, it did not exceed 50,000 men.[16] Moreover, there was no way of raising that many men at the same time.

The fragmentation of Cossack Ukraine also meant the fragmentation of the army. As we have seen, some regiments refused to acknowledge Vygovskiy as Hetman. Among them were certainly the Mirgorod and Poltava Regiments as well as parts of the Lubny regiment. By mid 1659, the Ovruch and Turov-Pinsk Regiments as well as the Belarusian Host joined the disaffected formations. These regiments stayed loyal to Muscovy, according to the terms of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. The Zaporozhians remained opposed to Vygovskiy, too, which meant that they sided with Muscovy.

Vygovskiy first augmented his military forces. Since he in any case only could call upon some of the cossack regiments, Vygovskiy enlisted additional men to add strength to this army. The new units consisted of some 1,500 to 3,000 Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, Serbs, Moldavians, and Wallachians. These were professional soldiers, serving as cossack-style cavalry, dragoons, and infantry. Serbs, Moldavians, and Wallachians had been hired already by Khmel'nitskiy, so the enlistment of these groups into the cossack army was not a new development. However, the addition of regular units of Poles, Lithuanians, and Germans enlisted in the Commonwealth was a new phenomenon, to which King John Casimir agreed following Vygovskiy's submission to his rule.[17] However, the importance of the newly enlisted units was insignificant in comparison to Vygovskiy's greatest coup, the agreement of an alliance with the Crimean Khanate, which henceforth promised to provide the strike force that Vygovskiy needed to move against his cossack enemies. On 9–11 June 1658, the Crimean Tatar support enabled Vygovskiy easily to defeat the dissidents at Poltava. Martyn Pushkar', colonel of the Poltava Regiment and leader of the revolt, fell in the battle. Afterwards, Vygovskiy's cossacks sacked and burned the town of Poltava while the Tatars raided the countryside. The cossack rebellion was crushed.

---

[16] Igor' B. Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu i bitva pod Konotopom 1658–1659 gody* (Moscow: Russkiye Vityazi, 2015), p.86.

[17] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu i bitva pod Konotopom*, pp.86, 133.

Unaware of the escalating situation in the Ukraine, Tsar Alexis had already fixed 23 June as the date for Romodanovskiy to advance into Lithuania with the Belgorod Army. When finally realising Vygovskiy's break with Muscovy, the Tsar on 22 June had to countermand the order. Instead, he ordered Romodanovskiy to detach some units of the Belgorod Army (the understrength cavalry regiments of Lieutenant Colonels Ivan Shepelyov and Semyon Skornyakov-Pisaryev as well as Colonel Raphael Korsak's dragoon regiment) and send them to support the Kiev garrison under Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev.[18] We will see that this was a prudent move.

Even though the Belgorod Army's planned offensive into Lithuania never took place, fighting nonetheless broke out there. Negotiations for extension of the Commonwealth-Muscovite truce were still ongoing in Wilno, but both sides clearly anticipated a resumption of war. Two Lithuanian armies, under respectively Grand Hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha and Field Hetman Wincenty Gosiewski, advanced to blockade Wilno, even as negotiations there continued. Gosiewski approached from the north, while Sapieha advanced from the south. This, at least, was the conclusion drawn by the Muscovite commanders. As usual, the two Hetmans failed to co-ordinate their movements, so it was hard to discern their strategy.

In October, with the negotiations collapsing, Prince Yuriy Dolgorukov (*c.* 1610–1682) with 8,500 men in a preemptive surprise attack decisively defeated Gosiewski's army of 4,500 at Verkiai, near Wilno.[19] Gosiewski's army was scattered, and he himself taken prisoner. The battle signified the elimination of the Commonwealth threat towards Muscovite-held Wilno. Gosiewski would remain a hostage for four years. However, Dolgorukov did not follow up his success. Instead, he returned to Smolensk so his army could go into winter quarters.

By this time, Muscovy enjoyed little support in Lithuania. Although many Lithuanians remained disillusioned about King John Casimir and the Polish nobility for their failure to support the Lithuanian cause, this did not automatically translate into support for Tsar Alexis, or for that matter, King Charles, whose men still garrisoned several important towns. Besides, many Ruthenians felt affinity to Cossack Ukraine. The cossack colonel Ivan Nechay (fl. 1655–1669), the late Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy's son-in-law, operated cossack units collectively called the Belarusian Host in the Ruthenian parts of Lithuania on behalf of Vygovskiy. As a result, quite a few towns renounced their previous submission to Muscovy.

---

[18] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu i bitva pod Konotopom*, p.79.

[19] Igor' B. Babulin, 'Vazhneyshiye pobedy Rossii v russko-pol'skoy voyne 1654–1667 gg.: Otvet retsenzentu', *Istoriya voyennogo dela: issledovaniya i istochniki* 9 (2017), pp.375–397, on p.389. Available from website <http://www.milhist.info/2017/12/30/babylin_6>.

Muscovy did not intervene in the Ukrainian civil war. The Ruin was a domestic conflict, in which Muscovites only fought in self-defence when they found themselves embroiled in the Ukrainian operations. Yet, the Ruin was a dark period in the Ukraine, especially for the losers of the struggle. During the Ruin, large numbers of Ukrainians felt that migration into southern Muscovy was the only way to escape the fratricide. Tsar Alexis had to grant asylum to whole communities of Ukrainians, who in return entered Muscovite service as cossacks. They never returned to the Ukraine and over time became fundamentally indistinguishable from other cossacks in Muscovy.

Despite Muscovy's defensive posture in the Ruin, with a Muscovite commandant and garrison in Kiev there was no way for Muscovy to avoid the repercussions of the Ukrainian turmoil. Moreover, already before Vygovskiy's victory at Poltava, Yakov Barabash and his men sought refuge with Romodanovskiy, who was not quite sure what to do with them. His previous instructions from Moscow had been to hand over any Ukrainian rebels to Vygovskiy, whom Muscovy had recognised as Hetman. However, under present conditions this seemed counterproductive. Eventually, Romodanovskiy had Barabash sent to Kiev for trial in court. However, on the way the small Muscovite convoy was overwhelmed by Vygovskiy's men, who snatched Barabash. Vygovskiy then had him executed.

By then, hostilities between Vygovskiy's cossacks and the Muscovites had already begun. As noted, Sheremetyev had just been appointed commandant in Kiev, which had a Muscovite garrison of some 6,000 men.[20]. In late August 1658, Vygovskiy's brother, Colonel Danilo Vygovskiy, advanced against Kiev with reportedly 20,000 cossacks and 1,500 Crimean Tatars under Qaplan Murza.[21] However, the cossack siege of Kiev failed, since neither cossacks nor Tatars were equipped to conduct a siege.

Vygovskiy's break with Muscovy became official when he concluded the Treaty of Gadyach (modern-day Hadyach) with the Commonwealth, signed on 16 September 1658 in the town of this name near Poltava. Under this treaty, Vygovskiy intended the Ukraine to become a third and autonomous component of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. The new Grand Duchy would be under the ultimate sovereignty of the King of Poland, but have its own nobility, army, courts, coinage, and treasury. Adherents of the Orthodox faith would enjoy equal rights with Catholics.

In return, King John Casimir called upon the nobles in Muscovy-held Lithuania to join the cossack commander Ivan Nechay in a war against Muscovy. He promised those nobles who joined the cossack army privileges and rewards. He also granted Nechay the rank of a Commonwealth colonel and gave him vast territories in Ruthenian Lithuania as a possession for life.

---

[20] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.93.

[21] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.95.

The territories were redistributed from those whose owners previously had sworn allegiance to Muscovy.[22]

Within days, Tatars and cossacks loyal to Vygovskiy launched attacks into southern Muscovy. In September, they attacked Kamennoye and Oleshnya on the Muscovite side of the border, and soon after, yet other attacks followed on other towns.[23] There was now no doubt that Vygovskiy and his men had changed sides, turning away from Muscovy and returning to the side of the Commonwealth.

By the end of September, Prince Yuriy Baryatinskiy defeated another of Vygovskiy's brothers, Konstantin Vygovskiy (Colonel of the Turov-Pinsk Regiment), and the Crimean commander Qaplan Murza at Vasil'kov.[24] Although Kiev and Vasil'kov were located far from the Muscovite border, where Vygovskiy and his Tatar allies were carrying out attacks, the two victories showed that the Ukrainian war between Vygovskiy, the Khanate, and the Commonwealth on one side and the Tsar on the other by no means was concluded.

Incidentally, the Treaty of Gadyach as written by Vygovskiy was never implemented. The Commonwealth's May 1659 parliament rejected it. Instead, the parliament produced and ratified a new, amended version of the treaty, which excluded Podolia, Volhynia, and Galicia from cossack control (these territories would remain under the Polish Crown) and only accepted the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernigov as part of Vygovskiy's Ruthenia. Moreover, the cossack register would be limited to 30,000 men, the King would choose the Hetman, and the Hetman would not be permitted to engage in any foreign relations without the King's consent. In short, the amended treaty was no more favourable to cossack self-rule than the Treaty of Pereyaslav, and with regard to territorial control and the register it was more restrictive than the agreement with Tsar Alexis.

In late October, the Belgorod Army, under Romodanovskiy, departed for the Ukraine. It then consisted of 8,571 men (Table 18).[25] Among many experienced officers, the field army also included Grigoriy Ivanovich Kosagov (d. 1701). In 1655, he had served in Prince Yuriy Dolgorukov's regiment in the Bryansk army. Transferred to the Belgorod Army, Kosagov became a noted commander of dragoons, Don cossacks and, eventually, Kalmyks in what can be called the small war against the Crimean Tatars.

The Belgorod Army took several towns, including Mirgorod and Lubny. Soon after, the Belgorod Army defeated Grigoriy Gulyanitskiy's cossacks at Piryatin. The presence of the Belgorod Army persuaded some of the left-bank cossack regiments, which in any case never had agreed with Vygovskiy's policy change, openly to break with Vygovskiy. Instead, they elected Ivan Bespalyy,

---

[22] Andrej Kotljarchuk, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century* (Södertörn University College, dissertation, 2006), p.242.

[23] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.101–2.

[24] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.103–5.

[25] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.113, 318.

Colonel of the Uman' Regiment, as Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. The Muscovite advance continued to Varva, where Romodanovskiy in early December learnt that a cossack army from the direction of Kiev in the west approached nearby Priluki.[26]

This was because in early November, Vygovskiy had carried out a second attack on Kiev. Again, he failed to dislodge Sheremetyev's Muscovites.[27] Vygovskiy also wrote to King Charles, proposing a return to the Treaty of Korsun' between Sweden and Cossack Ukraine. Meanwhile, Yuriy Nemirich (1612–1659), Vygovskiy's chancellor, did his bit. Having been one of those Commonwealth nobles who early on surrendered to the Swedish King, he sent a letter of his own to King Charles, asking for Swedish protection of Cossack Ukraine against Muscovy. He also sent a letter to Duke Adolph John, proposing that Sweden conclude a peace treaty with the Commonwealth and instead join in the alliance against Muscovy.[28] At the time, such a proposal was not a viable option, and it merely shows that Vygovskiy's government had taken on more than they could handle.

Having abandoned the attempt on Kiev, part of Vygovskiy's army moved east, towards Priluki. This was when Romodanovskiy in early December learnt of their approach. However, because of the season, Romodanovskiy's army went into winter quarters at Lokhvitsa.

Not so the Poles. In December, King John Casimir dispatched a Crown army (some 3,800 men, primarily cavalry) under Crown Equerry Andrzej Potocki (1618–1663) to aid Vygovskiy. It consisted of 26 cossack-style (*pancerni*) banners, three Wallachian banners, five Tatar banners, and Josef Donczyński's dragoon regiment. The corps crossed the Dnieper in early January 1659, advancing against Kiev.[29] This army remained with Vygovskiy until December 1659, together with the Crimean Tatars serving essentially as guarantors of his rule.

Table 18. The Belgorod Army sent to the Ukraine, October 1658.[30]

Old-style Cavalry	1,621
Wilhelm von Hagen's Cavalry Squadron	791
Ivan Sass's Cavalry Squadron	533
Mixed Reiter and Lancer Companies	150
Johann Inwald's Dragoon Regiment	934
Grigoriy Kosagov's Don cossacks	336
Three infantry regiments (Philipius Albertus van Bokhoven's, Jacob Leslie's, and Johann von Zager's)	4,206
Total	8,571

---

[26] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.117–20.

[27] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.121–3.

[28] Kotljarchuk, *In the Shadows*, pp.242–3 with references.

[29] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.89, 133–4, 334–5.

[30] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.318.

16

King Charles Rekindles the War with Denmark

Having concluded the Danish war, King Charles's next objective was to conclude the war with the Commonwealth under favourable terms. However, he expected King John Casimir only to accept terms if he first was deprived of his powerful allies, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Emperor. For this to succeed, King Charles must strike both of them sufficiently hard to cause them to drop out of the war. However, an overland offensive within the Empire was out of the question, since this would violate the terms of the peace of Westphalia, thus risking a new war in Germany with Sweden as the aggressor. The risk would perhaps have been acceptable had France been prepared to join the campaign, but this was not the case. Moreover, King Charles knew that his adversaries, including the Commonwealth, were preparing for a joint offensive. Under these conditions, where to deploy the Swedish army? King Charles could not withdraw it into Sweden, which lacked resources to supply an army for an extended period. Conditions in Livonia and Estonia were no better, and Finland was out of the question. To deploy the army at home was unsustainable, since this would only consume scarce supplies. Per Brahe had put it eloquently already in 1654: for the army 'to sit still is to wage war against oneself'.[1] Besides, due to the increasing tensions between Muscovy and the Commonwealth, there was little reason to expect another Muscovite offensive against Swedish territory soon. Nor seemed it realistic to move the army to Prussia (not located inside the Empire, thus fair game), because there Frederick William of Brandenburg maintained a strong force, the Commonwealth expected an attack, and the Netherlands would intervene to protect the Danzig trade.

Moreover, the Danes were slow to live up to their treaty obligations. Under the terms of the Treaty of Roskilde, Denmark was supposed to supply the Swedish army until it withdrew and provide it with 2,000 cavalrymen, but most of them deserted before handover. Numerous other issues remained unresolved, too, including suzerainty over the island of Hven in the Strait opposite Landskrona and, farther afield, the Danish and Dutch plundering of the Swedish Gold Coast colony earlier in the year, the booty of which was taken to Denmark. Danish tardiness and evasiveness in complying with the Roskilde terms did not inspire confidence. The Danes, encouraged by the Dutch, also avoided enforcing Article 3 of the Treaty of Roskilde which excluded foreign war fleets from the Baltic. To this can be added the long history of mistrust between King Charles and the Danes. How could he conclude the wars on the Continent, if he left his back open to another Danish attack?

---

[1] *Svenska riksrådets protokoll* 16 (Stockholm: RA, 1923), pp.2–36 (8–12 December 1654 O.S.), on p.5.

We have seen that the Swedish Council of the Realm was aware of and discussed the persistent threat from Denmark in December 1654, before it decided on war with the Commonwealth.[2] In July 1658, the Council again met to discuss the current situation. This time, too, the Council's deliberations can be read in the minutes of the meetings. Discussions began on 17 July in Gottorp. The immediate problem then lay in the Commonwealth, not Denmark. King Charles ('H.M.', His Majesty) began the discussion:

> H.M. talked of Thorn, and how it has been attacked by the Poles [Imperial units under Souches, but surely some Poles were present, too]. And that it was not reasonable to relax our grip on the Danish business in so uncertain a situation. Nor was it advisable to concentrate on securing Thorn, if it should seem to be better to take some other place from the Elector [of Brandenburg] instead. To remain in the area and do nothing was not to be recommended either. If H.M. were to be prevented from relieving Thorn, and as a result of Denmark's temporising were to lose it, H.M. would have good reason to indemnify himself at the expense of Denmark.

General Gustav Banér agreed, concluding that 'if H.M. were to attack Denmark again, he had good grounds for it.'

Lieutenant General Claes Tott expressed the same opinion: 'The King of Denmark had shown no good-will in carrying out the peace terms.'

At this point, only Field Marshal Wrangel disagreed, arguing that 'we should wait for a reply from Denmark.' Wrangel, who recently had been appointed Grand Admiral of the Realm, referred to the demand that King Frederick, as agreed in the treaty, send some of his remaining warships to co-operate with the Swedish fleet in closing the Strait to 'foreign hostile navies', which as we have seen was one of King Charles's key objectives with the peace.

However, King Charles replied that the Danes 'had dragged out the whole business as long as possible, and he did not know whether we could expect anything further from them.'[3]

---

[2] Fredholm von Essen, *Charles X's War* 1, pp.61–66.

[3] *Svenska riksrådets protokoll* 18 (Stockholm: RA, 1959), pp.83–4 (7 July 1658 O.S.). This work reprints the minutes of the Council of the Realm. Translation into English based on the excerpts in Michael Roberts, *Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697: Government; Society; Foreign Policy* (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), pp.169–72.

King Charles had made up his mind; there would be a second war with Denmark. He decided to embark upon another war already during his voyage from Gothenburg to Fyn and Jutland (Middelfart and Flensburg) in mid June.[4] Moreover, the reply from Denmark that Wrangel had awaited arrived on 25 July. Copenhagen again refused to co-operate in closing the Strait to foreign war fleets, thereby inadvertently confirming King Charles's decision that another war was unavoidable. As a result, the King and Wrangel set out to conclude contingency planning for a new war. Both agreed that the overwhelming threat did not emanate from the coalition of Continental and Eastern adversaries, but from the Dutch fleet, which might arrive at any moment.[5] The Danish defensive alliance with the Netherlands remained in force (the Roskilde treaty only prohibited offensive alliances), and King Charles knew that it would be activated if Sweden engaged in aggressive, as opposite to defensive, war against Denmark. For this reason, speed was of the essence. On 28 July, the operations plan was ready: Wrangel would sail from Kiel to Zealand, where he would disembark four cavalry regiments which immediately would ride to Copenhagen to cut the city's supply lines. Meanwhile, infantry would be disembarked or moved from Fyn, on carts if possible, towards Copenhagen to capture the city and the Danish fleet based there. The Swedish fleet would lock the Strait so that King Frederick could not escape by ship. Wrangel should take Kronborg Castle to close the Strait from the North Sea. Afterwards, an army would be sent to Norway to take the capital Christiania.[6]

On 2 August, in another Council meeting, this time in Wismar, King Charles informed the Council of his decision to go to war and explained when he took the decision: 'H.M. asserted, on his conscience, that until he was actually on the road [from Gothenburg], and had observed Denmark's insidious intrigues, he had not intended to take any such resolution.'[7] The act of declaring a new war against Denmark, this time as the aggressor, clearly troubled King Charles, but he saw no other recourse. The King had already asked Wrangel and Banér if he should call off the war in case the Danes, upon realising that an invasion was imminent, suddenly accepted the Swedish demands. Perhaps the King's question was rhetorical. Be that as it may, Wrangel and Banér replied that 'as soon as they [the Danes] get a new opportunity, they will again break the agreement. Now we have, in addition to a cause, a good opportunity to secure ourself which we should not neglect.'[8]

---

[4] Discussion in Finn Askgaard, 'Den korte fred: Mellemkrigstiden 26/2–7/8 1658', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.253–311, on p.309.

[5] Operations planning began already on 4 July, then primarily motivated by the ongoing war with the Commonwealth and its Continental and Eastern allies. Draft protocol of Council meeting between King Charles, Wrangel, and Banér, 24 June 1658 (O.S.) cited in Holm, *Översikt*, pp.205–6.

[6] King Charles to Wrangel, 18 July 1658 (O.S.); cited in Holm, *Översikt*, pp.201–2.

[7] *Svenska riksrådets protokoll*, pp.18, 86 (23 July 1658 O.S.).

[8] Draft protocol of Council meeting between King Charles, Wrangel, and Banér, 24 June 1658 (O.S.) cited in Holm, *Översikt*, pp.205–6, on p.206.

As a result, the Council resolved to launch an attack on Denmark, and unless a final settlement of the treaty demands had not already been reached (the negotiations were ongoing in Copenhagen), the Swedish representatives would immediately be instructed not to conclude one.

Having decided upon war, King Charles also initiated a discussion on Sweden's war objectives and post-war plans. If Sweden won the war, he asked the Council, 'should Denmark not be reduced to the position of a province of Sweden?' Plans were drawn up on how to re-organise the Danish territories into provinces and how to implement a new administration. The dysfunctional Danish social order could be utilised to motivate the regime change. The Danish nobility enjoyed abundant privileges vis-à-vis their subjects, who lacked many of the fundamental rights that Swedish commoners enjoyed. This frequently caused strife between the Danish Estates. Taking this into account, King Charles concluded: 'Probably only the nobility will be against H.M., and not the other Estates, since they will acquire status as free men, which they did not have before. Therefore, the nobility must either emigrate [voluntarily], or H.M. must force them to go: middle courses are of no use here.' The Council had already discussed the possible establishment of new noble estates for the Danish nobility in Ingria, and it was obvious that some Danish bishops would have to leave, too.[9]

With the decision taken again to go to war with Denmark, the Swedish war machine rapidly went into action. The army (all of them veterans from previous wars: 1,200 horse, 4,000 foot, and 50 cannons[10]) was already in Kiel, and at dawn on 16 August, some 60 rented merchant vessels, assembled by Admiral Lieutenant Daniel Strussflycht but commanded by Admiral Henrik Gerritsen, transported the army to Denmark, escorted by 11 to 17 warships.[11] Additional Swedish units remained on Fyn, waiting for the Danes to fulfil their treaty obligations, and the entire Jutland was still held by Swedish troops for the same reason. In Scania, Field Marshal Stenbock had gathered yet more men, so the army was well-prepared. The invasion army landed at Korsør on Zealand already on the next day, exactly according to the operations plan devised by King Charles and Wrangel on 4 and 28 July. Everything went smoothly, and the Danish garrison surrendered without a fight.

Although the King hoped to find carts and wagons at Korsør with which to move the infantry rapidly to Copenhagen, his main reason for landing there seems to have been the possible intervention of the Dutch fleet. If at all possible, King Charles wanted to avoid a war with the Netherlands. It was less likely that any Dutch fleet would appear on the western shore of Zealand than in the Strait. Besides, a landing at, or near, Copenhagen might suffer disaster if confronted by Dutch warships.[12]

---

[9] *Svenska riksrådets protokoll*, pp.18, 88 (7–23 July 1658 O.S.).

[10] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.198.

[11] For a discussion of the number of warships and transports, on which contemporary sources provide conflicting evidence, see Bergman, 'Carl X Gustaf och flottan', pp.248–51; Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.200–201.

[12] Holm, *Översikt*, pp.108, 201–9.


N
Laholm
Markaryd
JUTLAND
SCANIA
Helsingborg
Kronborg
DENMARK
Landskrona
Lund
Copenhagen
Frederiksodde
Roskilde
Malmö
Kolding
FYN
Great Belt
Korsør
ZEALAND
Nyborg
Little Belt
MØN
LOLLAND
RÜGEN
LANGELAND
FALSTER
FEHMARN
Kiel
Stralsund
HOLSTEIN
POMERANIA
0
25
50 km
Wismar

King Charles's Second Danish Campaign, 1658–1659

Immediately after landing, King Charles sent orders to Admiral Gerritsen and navy Major Gustav Sperling (1630–1660) to sail to Copenhagen to enforce a blockade of the Danish capital. The King's main worry remained the Dutch fleet. Was it already on route to Copenhagen? Gerritsen should block the north entrance into the Strait between Helsingør and Helsingborg, while Sperling should block the south entrance including Copenhagen itself. The blockade force should treat arriving ships politely and avoid any kind of violence. They should also aim to prevent news of the Swedish invasion from reaching the Netherlands or England, or indeed the Scanian coast. King Charles also ordered navy Major Specht to sail into the Kattegat on a reconnaissance mission, to look for arriving fleets, be they Dutch or English. If an enemy fleet arrived, he should retreat to Landskrona where Field

Marshal Stenbock would support him. The Swedes again occupied the island of Hven, to support the defence of Landskrona.[13]

King Frederick remained oblivious of the impending attack until King Charles landed at Korsør and began the march towards Copenhagen. Certainly, observers on the Continent noted the Swedish troop concentration in Kiel and the embarkation thereof – but most or all assumed that King Charles was on his way to Swedish Pomerania.

When King Charles planned the new war, he also wanted co-ordinated offensives into Norway from Bohuslän and Jämtland. However, due to shortages of men and supplies this turned out to be a hopeless task. Harald Stake informed the Council of the Realm that he was in no position to go on the offensive, because he had only some cavalry, hardly any foot, and no field artillery whatsoever. Moreover, few officers remained and the garrisons in Bohus Fortress and Gothenburg lacked garments, shoes, money, supplies, and anything but water to drink.[14] Nonetheless, in mid September Stake set out with what he had been able to assemble: some 1,500 men with a few regimental cannons. However, the Norwegians resisted, and since all peasants had fled, no supplies could be had. Ultimately, Stake had to return to Sweden. A month later, Norwegian units reciprocated, invading Bohuslän. Both offensives only resulted in skirmishes before the invaders must retreat.[15] As a result, King Charles's planned offensives were never carried out. Nor did the Norwegians at this time succeed in their ventures against Swedish territory.

Yet, both Kings Charles and Frederick knew that the war would not be decided on the Swedish–Norwegian border. With Sweden as the aggressor, Denmark activated its defence treaties, primarily the 1649 defence alliance treaty with the Netherlands, according to which the Netherlands was obliged to aid Denmark in case of foreign aggression. While we have seen that the Netherlands depended on the Baltic trade, which was an important incitement to make sure that no single power controlled the Strait, there were other reasons as well for the Dutch support to Denmark. Both countries regarded England as a threat. When in 1649 Parliament executed King Charles I of England, Scotland, and Ireland, they did so for domestic reasons, but to King Frederick of Denmark the decision was personal, since King Charles I was his cousin, the English monarch being the son of the late Anne of Denmark, King Frederick's aunt. For this and other reasons, Denmark had supported the Netherlands in the First Anglo-Dutch War of 1652–1654. Now, King Frederick hoped that the Netherlands would come to the aid of Denmark.

When King Charles on 21 August deployed his army outside Copenhagen, he still followed the operations plan he had devised with Wrangel in July. An immediate conquest of Copenhagen would have been desirable and might win the war against Denmark, but it would not necessarily benefit him against his other adversaries. Certainly, the new war in Denmark was greeted with joy on the eastern front. Relieved that King Charles had turned against Denmark instead of his own Brandenburg, Frederick William felt sufficiently secure to go on a joint campaign against the Swedes. King Charles knew that the Emperor and Elector planned to assemble a large coalition army in Mecklenburg, which soon would go on the offensive against the Swedes in Jutland. This coalition army would consist of experienced and battle-hardened soldiers under the probably best commanders on the Continent. To forestall intervention from the coalition, King Charles had already ordered Philip of Sulzbach, now general of cavalry, to gather troops in Holstein and take control over the fortifications on the Elbe. If necessary, Sulzbach would then fight a delaying campaign, until he could fortify himself in Frederiksodde as a last resort. Moreover, King Charles was deeply concerned that the Netherlands at any moment would send a large fleet to support King Frederick. And not only any fleet, but in the King's view the probably strongest and most experienced naval fleet in existence. King Charles could hardly have found a more capable set of adversaries.

---

[13] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.204.

[14] Per Brahe to the Council of the Realm, 25 August 1658 (O.S.); cited in Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.218.

[15] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.219.

A defensive strategy in preparation for the expected coalition intervention in Denmark demanded two strongpoints: Frederiksodde as the means to prevent the coalition army from advancing in his footsteps through Jutland to Zealand, and Kronborg Castle to close the Strait against the Dutch fleet. King Charles knew that the garrison in Frederiksodde currently was very weak in artillery.[16] The King accordingly sent his heavy artillery to Frederiksodde, not Copenhagen, and ordered Wrangel to take Kronborg Castle. Copenhagen seemed ready for the plucking, but the strategic context demanded a defensive strategy and long-term planning.[17] It was not for nothing that King Charles had learnt his trade in the Thirty Years' War under the meticulous planner and brilliant strategist Lennart Torstensson, who famously concluded that '[t]here is nothing more hazardous than to chance a battle. You may lose it through a thousand unforeseen accidents, even when you have carefully taken all measures and steps available to the most flawless military expertise.'

The Coalition Army Marches to Denmark

We have seen that intensive diplomatic negotiations during the winter of 1657–1658 resulted in a coalition against Sweden. The Netherlands announced that it would send 7,000 men and 25 warships in support of Denmark as soon as the ice broke up. Brandenburg-Prussian, Commonwealth, and Imperial armies would join the coalition, too. Frederick William sent an army of some 10,000 men into the field, and he promised to increase its size to 15,000. He also promised to provide all necessary supplies to the Imperial army when it crossed into Brandenburg. Commonwealth representatives promised a Polish army, including hussars.[18]

---

[16] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.200, 205, with references.

[17] King Charles's chief intelligence officer Dahlbergh advocated an immediate assault on Copenhagen, the defences of which he personally had reconnoitred and found weak. However, Dahlbergh had not been involved in the prior planning process and, unlike Wrangel, lacked inside knowledge of the King's strategic plans. Englund, *Den oövervinnerlige*, pp.607–8, seemingly unaware of King Charles's strategic and operations plans preserved in the National Archives, in his eagerness to depict the King as a symbol of militarism and irresponsible adventurism implies that he had no strategic plan when he landed on Zealand and only then, based solely on his mood, decided if or when to assault Copenhagen.

However, the entire, carefully negotiated edifice collapsed when Denmark surrendered, agreeing to the Treaty of Roskilde.

Nonetheless, Sweden's enemies did not give up the plans for a coalition army. When King Charles rekindled the war with Denmark, the coalition members again saw their chance. In September, the Emperor and Elector assembled the coalition army at Parchim in Mecklenburg.[19] The coalition army consisted of an estimated 10,600 Imperials (under Raimondo Montecuccoli, the formal commander of the coalition army and for this reason promoted to field marshal), 14,500 Brandenburg-Prussians (under Frederick William, the highest-ranking commander of the army), and 5,000 Poles (under Stefan Czarniecki).[20]

The Imperial contingent was built around the expeditionary force already in the Commonwealth. However, it was reinforced with several additional regiments, including Raimundo Montecuccoli's Cuirassier Regiment, under Colonel Caspar Holl; Prince Adolph of Schleswig-Holstein's Cuirassier Regiment, under himself; Louis Marquess de Matthaei's Cuirassier Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Aeneas von Caprara; Gerhard von der Nath's Cuirassier Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Carl von Hammerstein; Ludwig von Caraffa's Cuirassier Regiment, under himself; and Franz von Schneidau's Cuirassier Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Victor Teufel.[21] The aforementioned French envoy to Brandenburg, Jean (Johann)

---

[18] Abraham Cronholm, 'Den Europeiska politikens inflytande på kriget och underhandlingarne mellan Sverige och Danmark under åren 1657–1660', *Kongl. Vitterhets Historie och Antiqvitets Akademiens handlingar* 26 (Stockholm, 1869), pp.1–235, on pp.72–7.

[19] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.213.

[20] Historians suggest irreconcilable figures for the Imperial and Brandenburg-Prussian contingents. Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.200, notes 10,000 Imperials, while Holm, *Översikt*, p.113, suggests 11,000. Hedberg, *ibid.*, suggests 16,000 Brandenburg-Prussians, possibly because Frederick William raised additional units during the campaign. Pasek claimed 14,000 Imperials and 12,000 Brandenburg-Prussians. Jan Chryzostom Pasek, *Pamiętniki: Całość* (Cracow: Polska Akademja Umiejętności, 1929), p.25. In early 1659, Montecuccoli, who certainly was in the best position to know, claimed only 8,000 Imperials (4,500 horse, 3,500 foot) and 8,500 Brandenburg-Prussians (5,500 horse, 3,000 foot), possibly after the attrition suffered during the campaign and the ensuing winter or perhaps because some units already were detached for service elsewhere. Montecuccoli to Leopold, 21 January 1659; cited in Stanisław Rosznecki, *Polakkerne i Danmark 1659: Efter Jan Paseks Erindringer* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1896), p.206 n.3.

[21] Alphons von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht: Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, Vol. III (Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1901), pp.528, 529, 531, 532, 548, 564–6.

Frischmann, noted that more than half of the Imperial contingent, about 6,000 men, consisted of horse, while the rest, some 5,000, were infantry.

As noted, the Imperial army was second to none in experience and technical prowess. Surprisingly, considering the Imperial experience and considerable skill in siege warfare, the Imperials only brought a field artillery of sixteen 3-pounders (regimental artillery), six falcons (German: *Falkon*; a long-barrelled cannon larger than a falconet), four long-barrelled 6-pounders (German: *Viertelschlange*), and three petards under Lieutenant Colonel Johan Wilhelm Pauer.[22]

The military forces of Frederick William's Brandenburg-Prussia employed forms of organisation and types of tactics of the Continental model, which since the end of the Thirty Years' War were fundamentally influenced by the Swedish model. Many Brandenburg-Prussian units never reached establishment strength. Yet, Frederick William kept sending reinforcements, and his men were similarly trained as their Swedish adversaries. The Brandenburg-Prussians also brought a significant artillery train, consisting of 34 cannons (of which twenty 3-pounders, four howitzers, and one mortar).[23]

Czarniecki's men were among the most experienced of the Commonwealth soldiers. In addition to 3,500 enlisted cavalry and 1,000 enlisted dragoons, all of them professional soldiers trained and experienced in the forms of organisation and types of tactics of the modern Continental model, Czarniecki for greater glory brought a contingent of 500 noble cavalry from Greater Poland.[24] Czarniecki set out from Draheim in August with as many as 6,000 Poles, but to move faster he abandoned the luggage train at Tempelburg. As a result, many Poles deserted already on the border with Brandenburg. For instance, in Jan 'Sobiepan' Zamoyski's banner of Hussars, everybody deserted except the captain and six nobles.[25]

With a total strength of more than 30,000 men, the coalition army was a formidable fighting force.[26] As soon as it had assembled, the coalition army marched towards Denmark. On 27 September, the first units moved into Holstein, and on 16 October, the army reached Slesvig.

The coalition plan was to drive the Swedes out of Jutland rapidly, and then move the army to Zealand to defeat the Swedish main army under King Charles. However, the coalition army never got that far. Following orders, Philip of Sulzbach fought a delaying campaign with his army of from 3,600 to possibly 5,000 men (the figure is uncertain since some units were deployed in garrisons), slowly retreating ahead of the coalition army. When no longer able to hold the line, he had orders to move into the strongly fortified Frederiksodde. By October, Frederiksodde already had a garrison of 4,200 Swedes under Major General Hans Böddeker and Duke Adolph Willliam of Saxe-Weimar. Other Swedish strongpoints included Kolding, still held by a Swedish garrison of unknown strength, and the island of Als, where Rutger von Ascheberg commanded about 1,000 men in two fortresses, Sønderborg on the coast and Nordborg further inland. If King Charles's plan to employ Frederiksodde to deny the coalition army access to the Danish islands failed, there was also an inner defensive line, in the form of 3,000 Swedish cavalry under General Georg Friedrich von Waldeck-Eisenberg and Lieutenant General Henrik Horn on Fyn.[27]

---

[22] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.214.

[23] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.213.

[24] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.390. Wimmer is uncertain about the Commonwealth numbers. Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.390, states 3,500 enlisted cavalry and 1,000 dragoons, while Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen', p.82, states 4,000 enlisted soldiers and 500 noble cavalry.

[25] Pasek, *Pamiętniki*, pp.20, 21, 22.

[26] For full details on the organisation, procedures, tactics, and equipment of the Imperial, Brandenburg-Prussian, and Commonwealth military establishments, see Volume I.

On 12 November, coalition units took Kolding, the most exposed of the Swedish strongholds. The town was significant, with some 2,800 inhabitants. At the town was also located a citadel, Koldinghus, where the survivors of the Swedish garrison, about 100 men, took refuge, refusing to surrender.

While awaiting the surrender of Koldinghus, the coalition commanders pondered how to deal with Als, or for that matter, the Swedes on Fyn. The coalition army, strong as it was, had no naval capacity. Neither the Emperor nor the Commonwealth had any warships in the Baltic. When the wars of the Deluge broke out, Brandenburg too had no fleet. To remedy this omission, the Elector in the previous year had formed a diminutive flotilla of small vessels, each manned by a few sailors and soldiers, but it did not participate in the Danish campaign.[28] As a result, the coalition commanders had no choice but to wait for the arrival of either Danish warships, of which only few remained in operation, or preferably the fleet that the Netherlands had promised.

The first opportunity arose when Vice Admiral Peter Bredal's Little Belt squadron arrived to support the coalition. The first target became Als. On 14 December, an estimated 700 to 800 Brandenburg-Prussian and Polish cavalry units crossed to Als in small boats, with their horses swimming next to the boats. Because of the cold, the horses emerged from the water onto the shore covered in ice. Unable to counter the artillery fire from Bredal's warships, the Swedes on Als took refuge in Sønderborg and Nordborg, the island's two strongholds. Yet, this was only a temporary solution, since neither contained sufficient supplies. Soon, the Swedes would have to surrender.

Unfortunately for the coalition, Ascheberg was a resourceful commander, and he was in touch with Claes Uggla, now promoted to admiral and in command of a Swedish naval squadron. Ascheberg did run out of supplies, but before then, on 18–19 December, he and his men together with women and children skilfully departed under cover of darkness, embarked upon Uggla's

---

[27] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.200, 213.

[28] The Brandenburg flotilla's greatest success in the war was perhaps when its commander, Colonel Johann von Hille, on 30 July 1658 seized a galiot owned by the Swedish noble Pontus De la Gardie that had sailed to Pillau requesting supplies and water. By pure luck, Hille managed to bring the galiot into port minutes before two Swedish warships arrived off Pillau. For more details on the flotilla, see Roessel, *Die erste Brandenburgische Flotte im Schwedisch-Polnischen Kriege 1658–1660 und ihr Kommandeur Obrist Johann von Hille* (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1903), pp.19–78.



General of Cavalry Johann von Sporck (1600–1679), 1669. Sporck commanded the Imperial cavalry in Denmark. (Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Vienna)

ships which used the darkness to slip in and out below the eyes of the Danes. Disembarking on Fyn, Ascheberg and his men reached Zealand by the end of the year. The successful Swedish evacuation was a double blow to the Danes, since it soon also led to the death of Bredal, who fell in battle while engaging a stranded ship from Uggla's squadron. A small consolation for the coalition commanders was that the other stronghold on Als, Nordborg, was located too far inland to be evacuated, so the Swedes there had to surrender.

Besides, on 25 December Brandenburg-Prussian and Polish units finally took Koldinghus. Among those who stormed the citadel was the Polish noble Jan Chryzostom Pasek, who later described the event in his lively memoirs. The first assaults were repulsed, Pasek noted, but on the final attempt, the attackers gained entrance to the fortress, where they cut down many Swedes. The rest fled to the keep. However, Pasek and his men managed to gain entrance. Capturing the survivors, they threw most of them over the wall to fall to their death. Perhaps wishing to downplay this atrocity while at the same time making the story more dramatic, Pasek in his memoirs instead focused on the explosion of the Swedish gunpowder depot in the keep, which he claimed was accidentally caused by one of their dragoons, destroyed the keep, and killed both defenders and attackers. In reality, the keep was not destroyed, but there seems to have been an explosion. Other contemporary Poles, Jakub Łoś and Wespazjan Hieronim Kochowski, noted that the intruders accidentally set fire to the gunpowder depot, which killed 30 Poles but no Swedes (presumably because none of the latter remained alive).[29] Or, maybe the Swedes had primed the remaining gunpowder supplies for delayed explosion, as had happened on other occasions including at Sandomierz in April 1656.

The conquests of Als and Koldinghus were real gains, but by the end of the year, the huge coalition army had failed to impress, or even reach, King Charles's army outside Copenhagen. Moreover, the coalition army continued the Swedish practice of exacting contributions from the Jutland population, for whom one set of occupants merely replaced another. Already in November, King Frederick wanted a part of the Brandenburg-Prussian army shipped to Copenhagen, to reinforce his defences there. He was also afraid that the coalition army would ruin Jutland if it stayed too long, and based on its behaviour, this risk was real enough. The Danish Council of the Realm accordingly ordered the aforementioned Bredal to sail to Flensburg or Aabenraa to embark a Brandenburg-Prussian army of 3,000 horse and 3,000 foot for transportation to Copenhagen. Unfortunately, we have seen that Bredal fell in mid December and soon afterwards Frederick William informed the Danes that he in any case would not divide his army, and accordingly not ship any units to Copenhagen.

---

[29] Pasek, *Pamiętniki*, pp.27–8; Bent Pedersen, 'Da en polsk blærerøv erobrede Koldinghus', *Kongernes Samling Koldinghus*, website <www.kongernessamling.dk>.

When the coalition army dispersed in Jutland to go into winter quarters, Frederiksodde still blocked the way to Fyn.[30]

The Siege of Copenhagen

This time, the Danes decided to fight for Copenhagen. A primary reason was the good example set by King Frederick. Although he had not exactly distinguished himself in the previous war, this time he stood up to the challenge. Refusing to abandon Copenhagen, he inspired the Danes to fight for their capital. He also promised the burghers substantially increased liberties, if they would only defend the city, most importantly the right to be treated on a parity basis with the nobility in rights to land, public office, and so on.[31]

Having learnt of the Swedish advance against Copenhagen, King Frederick immediately had the suburbs of the city burned and the urgent work to repair the dilapidated fortifications begun. Many Danish officers lived in the city, so mobilisation was easy. The city reinforced the existing garrison of 2,700 men with another 1,300, and the burgher militia, divided into nine companies, raised possibly 3,000 men. There were 50 professional artillerymen, who quickly could train crews from detached infantry, and plenty of cannons. Altogether, some 7,000 men prepared to resist King Charles. In comparison, the Swedes had approximately 5,500 men outside Copenhagen.[32]

The idea to lay siege to and, yet more outrageously, attempt to storm a major city with less men than defended it may seem inadvisable. However, Swedish armies had repeatedly managed the feat, during the Thirty Years' War and in the Commonwealth, so there was no inherent reason to expect that numbers alone formed the decisive factor.

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Wrangel laid siege to the well-fortified Kronborg Castle, northeast of Helsingør and opposite the Swedish stronghold of Helsingborg on the other side of the Strait.

The Danish commander of Kronborg, Poul Beenfeldt (1610–1676), was ordered to blow up the castle rather than surrender. Following weeks of artillery duels, Wrangel ultimately employed a ruse. Spreading rumours that

---

[30] The actual deployment of coalition units is an under-researched topic on which some light can be shed through church records, since quite a few Imperial, Brandenburg-Prussian, and Polish soldiers died or fathered children in Jutland. See, for example, Christensen, 'De jyske Kirkebøgers Bidrag', pp.519–54. Pasek's men ended up in Haderslev.

[31] Manley, *History*, pp.19–20.

[32] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.199, 200.



Kronborg Castle, 1650s.

Copenhagen had fallen, he convinced Beenfeldt that the battle already was lost. As a result, Beenfeld surrendered on 16 September. With the Swedish conquest of Kronborg, the Swedes took an enormous booty, including 80 cannons.[33] Henceforth, Kronborg became the Danish residence of King Charles and Queen Hedwig Eleonora.

Meanwhile, the defenders of Copenhagen began to suffer shortages in supplies. However, help was on the way. The Dutch were finally sending a fleet, while, the coalition army slowly advanced overland. Even so, King Charles still entertained some hope that England might join Sweden in an anti-Dutch alliance. Oliver Cromwell, with grandiose and not always realistic plans of empire-building fuelled by religiosity, was known to be positive to the idea. Already in October 1657, Cromwell had ordered the sending of a fleet of 20 warships in support of Sweden, 'whose affairs are in a dangerous condition, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, [the] Pole, the king of Hungary [Leopold] and Muscovite and the Dane, and fears also the Hollander, who gives money and if need be will send the Dane the ships'. A few months later, in April 1658, Cromwell proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with Sweden against 'the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Poland and the house of Austria', to which he also would invite France, the Netherlands, and others to join. Cromwell wanted the King of Sweden to make an attack on the

---

[33] The siege of Kronborg is most authoritatively described in Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.201–4.



Contemporary depiction of the Swedish siege of Kronborg Castle, 1658. In addition to regular artillery, the Swedes reportedly employed perriers, cannons which fired stones.

Emperor's ancestral lands in Austria, while he would wage war at sea against Habsburg Spain, to which purpose he expected King Charles to furnish naval materials in such quantities and at such rates as might be agreed upon in the articles of the treaty that he had in mind. Cromwell also bound himself to send a fleet into the Baltic, if required.[34]

However, Cromwell died on 13 September 1658, and with him these plans.

Meanwhile, the heavy artillery slowly assembled from those acquired from Kronborg and other locations gradually demolished Copenhagen's fortifications.[35] However, this took time, because the Danes defended themselves vigorously and repeatedly sallied out to attack the Swedes, wrecking siege works and neutralising any cannons within reach – which in turn meant that the Swedes could not deploy artillery close enough for maximum effect.[36]

---

[34] Guernsey Jones, *The Diplomatic Relations between Cromwell and Charles X. Gustavus of Sweden* (University of Heidelberg, dissertation, 1897), pp.62–3.

Before attempting the storm of Copenhagen, King Charles wanted to take control over the island Amager, south of the city and linked to it by a long bridge. This would enable a simultaneous assault from two directions and also deny Copenhagen the food supplies on the island. In mid October 1658, King Charles personally led 300 horse and 1,200 foot onto Amager. However, information then arrived that the Dutch fleet was on its way. This changed the plan; instead of holding the island, it became safer just to ravage it. Most of the Swedes were ordered back to Zealand, while King Charles remained behind with a small unit. At this point a strong Danish sortie of 500 cavalry and dragoons from Copenhagen crossed to Amager. This time, King Frederick personally joined his men to observe the action. For the first time ever, the two Kings met, not in a battle, but certainly a skirmish. However, neither side knew that the opposing monarch was on the island, and there is nothing to suggest that Kings Charles and Frederick actually took part in combat in vicinity of each other. The Danish attack successfully dispersed the Swedish unit, and King Charles barely escaped back to the boats. After this engagement, the Swedes made no further attempt to hold the island.

Within days, King Charles was again in mortal danger. While crossing the Strait to Scania, high waves smashed the small boat in which the King travelled against a galiot, causing it to keel over. Because of the waves and water temperature at this time of the year, several men drowned, yet King Charles managed to grab a rope, so was pulled to safety. He only lost his hat and walking stick.

---

[35] The siege of Copenhagen is most authoritatively described in Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.204–9.

[36] Even Danes in Swedish service often supported the defenders of Copenhagen. Most celebrated was perhaps Jacob Nielsen Dannefer (*c.* 1630–1676), who served as corporal in the German Cavalry Regiment of King John Casimir's Royal Guard, in early 1657 returned to Denmark to enlist as a common cavalryman in Ditlev Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment, after the Treaty of Roskilde went into Swedish service, but on 12 October 1658, when sailing past Copenhagen, together with 10 Danish conscripts aboard hijacked the Swedish transport, bringing it into the city.

17

The Battle of the Sound

On 30 October, the Dutch fleet, commanded by Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam, passed Skagen, the northernmost point of Jutland. Obdam's fleet consisted of 35 warships, six flutes (transports) with soldiers sent to reinforce the Copenhagen garrison, four fireships, and six flutes or more probably galiots with food supplies (Table 19, end of chapter). The fleet was followed by 33 merchantmen, some of which were bound for Norway but most destined for the Strait. The war fleet alone carried 1,270 cannons, 3,993 sailors, and at least some 3,000 soldiers (2,195 destined for Copenhagen and the rest enlisted as marines). The Dutch war fleet consisted of three squadrons: the main one under Obdam on his flagship the *Eendracht* and two others under, respectively, Vice Admiral Witte Corneliszoon de With (1599–1658) on the *Brederode*, and Vice Admiral Pieter Floriszoon (1600/ 1606–1658), on the *Josua*.

In comparison, the Swedish fleet in the Strait consisted of 43 warships and auxiliary armed merchantmen and six galiots and fireships, divided into four squadrons. The Swedish war fleet carried 1,605 cannons, 4,055 sailors, and 2,423 soldiers (Table 20, end of chapter). Grand Admiral Wrangel personally commanded the First Squadron on the *Victoria*. Admiral Bielkenstierna commanded the Second Squadron on the *Draken*, while the recently ennobled Admiral Henrik Gerritsen Siöhielm commanded the third squadron on the *Caesar*. The fourth squadron was commanded by Admiral Lieutenant Gustav Wrangel, who was previously seen fighting Muscovites on Lake Ladoga, on the *Hercules*.

Generally speaking, the Dutch crews were more experienced as sailors than their Swedish counterparts. Yet, about a quarter of the Swedish captains came from the Netherlands including Admiral Siöhielm.[1] Moreover, the Swedes outgunned the Dutch. Besides, in the confined space of the Strait, neither seamanship nor long-distance artillery would prove a certain battle-winner. It was late in the sailing season and weather conditions were hostile.

On 2 November, the Dutch fleet assembled at Lappegrund off Kronborg Castle. Held by a Swedish garrison, nobody there could fail to see the arrival of the Dutch fleet. Although the Dutch intentions were painfully obvious,

---

[1] Ingvar Sjöblom, 'Öresund 1658', Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstedt, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, and Gunnar Åselius (eds), *Svenska slagfält* (np: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003), pp.198–205, on p.201.

Obdam made no attempts to contact his Swedish counterparts, and Sweden formally remained at peace with the Netherlands. King Frederick wrote enthusiastic letters to Obdam, urging the Admiral to attack the Swedes without delay to break the blockade of Copenhagen. Parts of the Danish fleet were available to assist, the King promised.

Meanwhile, the increasingly concerned Wrangel noted that the winds still were favourable for an attack, so on 6 November, he asked King Charles for permission to attack the Dutch fleet. If the wind changed, Wrangel argued, his ships would find it difficult to move against the Dutch in the narrow Strait. However, the King rejected the proposal. Acutely aware of the foreign policy implications, he did not wish the Swedes to be seen as aggressors, which would prejudice the coming peace negotiations.[2] Having said this, King Charles also expressed a wish that 'God give that the wind might become so favourable that the Dutch enter.' War was inevitable, but the King wanted Obdam to lit the fire. Aware of the consequences, King Charles was willing to trade a current tactical advantage for a later strategic one, since he knew that ultimately, Swedes and Dutch would have to negotiate.[3]

Obdam soon obliged him. He had only waited for a favourable wind, and on 7 November, wind conditions seemed to favour the Dutch. However, he barely had time to sound the advance, before the wind changed again. No matter, the favourable wind returned during the night. On the morning of 8 November, the wind favoured the Dutch. At 8:00 a.m., Obdam fired a cannon from his flagship, the *Eendracht*, as a signal to move.[4] The fleet hoisted anchor, and then sailed eastwards towards the Swedish shore, where it intended to turn straight south towards Copenhagen. The plan was to sail as close to the Scanian coast as possible, since Obdam wanted to evade the powerful Swedish artillery



Above: Witte Corneliszoon de With (Abraham van Westerveldt)

Below: Pieter Floriszoon, 1656–1658. (Karel van Mander III, Skokloster Castle)



---

[2] Hugues de Terlon, *Memoires du Chevalier de Terlon* 1 (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1681), pp.299, 301.

[3] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.553 n.94.

[4] The battle is most thoroughly analysed and described in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.241–50. For a recent description of the battle, see Sjöblom, 'Öresund 1658', pp.198–205.


Hydrographisk Charta
ifrån
FALSTERBO och STEFWEN
till
CRONEBORG och KOLLEN.
HELSINGÖR
EN DEL AF SELAND
KÖPENHAMN
Kögebugt
STEFWEN
Hween
Saltholmen
Rännan
Helsingborg
Bataillje Rangering
De Holländske Flott in Bataille
Chartans Anteckningar
Anno 1700

battery at Kronborg. The Swedish town Helsingborg, opposite Kronborg, was deemed the lesser threat.

At 9:00 a.m., Obdam's fleet passed between Kronborg and Helsingborg, where the Strait was most narrow. The Dutch refused the customary salute to the two castles. According to the customs of the time, this was a declaration of hostile intent. King Charles, who was at Kronborg to monitor Obdam's fleet, certainly interpreted the Dutch action as such.[5] According to an eyewitness, he fired the first cannon shot against the Dutch fleet personally.[6] The Swedish shore artillery batteries on both sides of the Sound then opened fire. However, contrary to the King's expectations (as he had expressed already in the aforementioned meeting on 4 July[7]), their impact on the Dutch fleet was limited. The Strait is almost four kilometres wide at this location, which meant that although 24-pounder cannon fire at maximum range might reach the target, its effect would be minimal. Moreover, the favourable wind and the reloading time of heavy artillery meant that only a few rounds could be fired before the fleet passed through. The Kronborg battery was too far away, and the Helsingborg battery was too weak. Obdam had calculated the odds correctly, whereas King Charles had not. Only two of Obdam's ships suffered damage, the *Josua* which was hit from Kronborg, which wounded three men, and the *Juppiter*, which was hit from Helsingborg but suffered no major damage.

Facing page: A map of the Strait, depicting the Swedish landing on Zealand in 1700. The parts of the Strait marked in darker colour denote sand banks, which prevent the operation of large warships. The map shows how confined the Strait is for blue-water fleets. Obdam had previously sailed through the Strait but may have failed to anticipate this problem when he prepared his battle plan. (Photo: Medström)

The Dutch plan was to attack the Swedes with full force and the advantage of the wind. Obdam wanted all three squadrons to move into the Swedish fleet, where the large Dutch warships would be free to engage the largest Swedish warships. He wanted to close with the Swedish warships as soon as possible, board, and capture them. It seems that Obdam expected an easy victory.

However, he failed to take the narrow Strait, which constrained sailing operations, into proper account. While the Strait was large enough to avoid the Kronborg coastal battery, it was too narrow for a fleet to deploy in line. Underwater sand banks hampered operations further. In the ensuing battle, this caused serious difficulties for both sides.

On the Swedish side, Wrangel seems to have attempted to deal with the problem by deploying his fourth squadron in reserve. Yet, as he had predicted, it was difficult for the Swedes to advance, since they now had the wind against them. Instead, the wind favoured the Dutch approach towards Copenhagen while causing the Swedish fleet to fall into disorder. A few Swedish ships even stranded on the Scanian coast, which prevented them from joining the action. But the Dutch fleet became disordered, too. At one point, the flagships *Eendracht* and *Brederode* almost collided.

---

[5] So did the other spectators at Kronborg: Sweden's Queen, Hedwig Eleonora of Holstein-Gottorp; King Charles's sister Maria Euphrosyne, who was the wife of Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie; the King's brother-in-law Prince Christian Albert (1641–1695) of Holstein-Gottorp, who was the eldest son of Duke Frederick; the French Ambassador, Hugues de Terlon; and the attending ladies and gentlemen of the royal court.

[6] Hugues de Terlon, *Memoires du Chevalier de Terlon* 1 (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1681), p.302.

[7] Draft protocol of Council meeting between King Charles, Wrangel, and Banér, 24 June 1658 (O.S.); cited in Holm, *Översikt*, pp.205–6, on p.206.

When the Dutch passed through the narrowest part of the Strait, Wrangel on the *Victoria*, apparently followed by the first squadron, attacked Obdam's flagship *Eendracht*. Witte de With, on his flagship *Brederode*, moved in against the *Victoria* to support Obdam. Perhaps the ships of Witte de With's squadron then engaged the Swedish first squadron together with those of Obdam's squadron, because for a while, Wrangel had to fight alone against the Dutch flagship *Eendracht*, the *Brederode*, and probably as many as three other Dutch warships. After about half an hour, the Swedish flagship had taken so much damage that she had to leave the battle to take cover under the Kronborg batteries. Wrangel, who only had suffered 11 dead and himself no more than a wooden splinter behind the ear, probably thought that he could repair the damage quickly and return to the fight. However, repairs took longer than expected, and neither Wrangel nor the *Victoria* entered the battle again.

Meanwhile, Bielkenstierna on the *Draken* led the second squadron against Witte de With on the *Brederode*. After an artillery battle of two hours, during which Lou's *Wismar* positioned herself in front of the *Brederode*'s bow, the *Brederode* had taken so much damage that she began to lean dangerously. Bielkenstierna closed in to board the Dutch flagship, with grenades and concentrated musket fire causing massive casualties on the *Brederode*'s deck. Hit in the thigh by a musket shot, Witte de With sat down on a chair from which he continued to lead the battle. But the Swedes now boarded the *Brederode*, and Witte de With was again wounded, this time mortally, by another musket shot. He surrendered to the Swedes, and died on the *Draken*. Soon after, the *Brederode* keeled over and sank. By Danish accounts of uncertain veracity, before he surrendered Witte de With ordered the cannons released on one side, enabling them to roll onto the other side of the damaged *Brederode*, causing her to sink. Whatever, happened, the Brederode sank very suddenly. (After the battle, Wrangel hired a diver to recover her cannons, which seems to have succeeded.)

At this point, the *Eendracht* was in trouble, too. Now surrounded by three Swedish ships – the smaller *Morgonstjernan* and *Leoparden* on her port side and the large *Kronan* at some distance behind her – she suffered significant damage from cannon fire and hand grenades from the *Morgonstjernan*.

Obdam described his personal experience of the battle:

> For at least two hours we were surrounded by the enemy's largest ships, for a while at anchor because we feared to run aground, for a while drifting with our lieutenant and some of the crew sent aboard the *Morgonstjernan*, half of our men dead or wounded, the forecastle on fire, the shroud, tacks, braces, and bowlines shot to pieces, our sails in shreds, and five or six feet of water in the hull, the lower cannon ports only three fingers above the water-line, and the ship beginning to heel over.[8]

---

[8] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.248; Sjöblom, p.204.

At this point, the large Dutch warship *Wapen van Rotterdam* hastened to the rescue. She now attacked the port side of the *Leoparden*. After a hard struggle, both the *Wapen van Rotterdam* and the *Leoparden* were so badly damaged by cannon fire that both had to disengage and withdraw from the battle. However, by chance both then drifted between the *Eendracht* and the *Kronan*, which shielded the *Eendracht* from the *Kronan*'s fire. Moreover, with the disappearance of the *Leoparden*, the *Eendracht* could finally overpower the smaller *Morgonstjernan*, which by then was sinking. With the Swedish crew abandoning the *Morgonstjernan*, the Dutch briefly attempted to capture her, but it was too late.

The *Leoparden* eventually drifted aground on the island of Hven, where the surviving crew abandoned her. The ship was then so badly damaged that even the deck had collapsed. On the following day, the Swedes salvaged her cannons, after which they set fire to what remained (although perhaps with excessive haste; later the Dutch captain Claes Aldersse claimed to have recovered yet more cannons and again set fire to the remains). This was a prudent move; another Swedish ship, the *Pelican*, also drifted aground on Hven, where she was boarded and captured by the Dutch.

Meanwhile, possibly the Third Squadron under the recently ennobled Admiral Siöhielm attacked Floriszoon's squadron. Floriszoon fell in the battle, and his ship *Josua* disengaged. However, Siöhelm, wounded by a musket shot in the left shoulder, and his flagship *Caesar* had to withdraw from the battle, too.

The small Dutch warship *Breda* caught fire in a battle with several Swedish ships. Both her commander Adriaen Bruynsvelt and Lieutenant La Vacquery, who commanded the marines, perished. She was abandoned by most of her crew, but 14 survivors stayed on board, managed to put out the fire, and eventually brought her back to the rest of the fleet.

Although records of the combat on board some ships were preserved, most actions during the battle remain undocumented. Moreover, the confined space of the Strait and the lack of visibility must have caused considerable command and control difficulties for both sides. As a result, only minor details of the battle can be reconstructed. Because of the confined space, the fourth squadron seems to have been unable to play more than a limited role in the battle. The battle lasted for about five to six hours, with most combat apparently concluded at some point between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. Casualties were considerable. The Swedes lost five ships (the *Morgonstjernan* and *Leoparden*, both of which were destroyed, and three others which were captured by the Dutch: the *Pelican*, *Förgylda Rosen*, and *Delmenhorst*), some 500 dead and wounded, in Wrangel's estimate, including the wounded Siöhielm, five fallen captains (Anders Krabat, Johan Hoijwagen, Erik Helsing, Hans Kloppert, and Otto von Nüssen) and one seriously wounded (Johan Lång), The Swedes also suffered an estimated 400 captured including three captains (Nils Eriksson, Peter Corneliusson, and Wilhelm Kuyl). Total crew casualties may well have been higher, in particular on the ships that were lost. In addition, the flagships *Victoria*, *Draken*, and *Caesar* suffered considerable damage, and at least the *Kronan*, *Fenix*, *Fides*, and the auxiliary *Samson* needed major repairs, too. No records have survived of other damages, but we can assume that more ships needed repairs.

The Dutch lost one flagship (the *Brederode*), all four fireships, at least 439 dead including two admirals (With and Floriszoon) and five captains (Adriaen Bruynsvelt, Dirck Krijnen Verween, Claes Arentsse Sloodt, Dirck Boogaert, and Jacob Hoeck), and approximately 270 captured. Again, total casualties may be higher, since surviving records are incomplete. The number of wounded Dutchmen overwhelmed Copenhagen's capacity to care for them, so King Frederick ordered emergency facilities and quarters to be prepared in the buildings of the Iceland Company, the Hall of Brewers, and private homes, for all of which Obdam ultimately had to pay from his war chest and commercial loans since King Frederick did not. In addition, at least 13 Dutch ships suffered serious damages, none more so than the almost ruined *Eendracht*. The *Dordrecht*, *Princesse Louyse*, *Josua*, *Breda*, *Rotterdam*, *Staveren*, and Jan Aertse Verhaeff's *Rotterdam* were badly damaged, too.[9] Before he died, Witte de With reportedly said that, despite having previously fought Turks, Arabs, Portuguese, Spaniards, French, and English, this battle was more hard-fought than any other, since 'the Swedes did not fight in a reasonable manner.' Dutch prisoners complained that the battle had been 'not a normal but a murderous struggle'.[10]

King Frederick had promised Obdam the support of a part of the Danish navy. There was indeed a Danish squadron of seven warships and possibly two fireships under Admiral Henrik Bielke in Copenhagen with, perhaps by chance, all the country's very best and most experienced naval commanders (Table 21, end of chapter). When the battle began, the Danes prepared to set out. Because of contrary winds (the same winds that hampered the Swedes), the Danish squadron never actually took part in the battle. However, its appearance on the scene (reported as '9 to 10 fresh ships from Copenhagen') convinced King Charles, contrary to the advice by Wrangel, that a continuous pursuit of the Dutch was inadvisable. Moreover, another six Danish ships (the *Lindormen*, *Victoria*, *Spes*, *Tre Kroner*, *Justitia*, and *Sorte Rytter*) lay in Copenhagen reportedly equipped for action, under the responsibility of Niels Juel who had assumed command of the shipyard, although they could not set out because of crew shortages. Their readiness for action was perhaps not quite what it was made out to be; only three weeks after the battle the Danes themselves sank the obviously condemned *Justitia* in a failed attempt to block the sailing channel leading into the Swedish port of Landskrona.[11]

From a tactical viewpoint, the Battle of the Sound was something of a draw. In light of King Charles's worries how his navy would fare against the professional Dutch sailors, the Swedes had done well. The number of seafaring countries that had the means and skill to hold its own against a major Dutch fleet were easily counted, and in northern Europe, it was before the Battle of the Sound only England that held this distinction. Yet, for the Dutch, despite the significant losses suffered, the battle even though a tactical draw was a resounding strategic victory. While the warships were dealing out destruction to each other, all the Dutch merchantmen managed to pass through the Strait almost without loss and enter Copenhagen with much-needed men and supplies. Moreover, after the battle the Swedish fleet, except for a few vessels which took up positions under the artillery cover of Kronborg, moved into Landskrona for repairs, where it soon was bottled up by the Dutch, and accordingly unable to move out again for a month. Yet, the maintenance of the blockade was difficult for the Dutch. They had just concluded a long sea voyage and fought a bloody battle, and now they had to spend yet more weeks at sea in the unpleasant November weather of the southern Baltic. Soon, both Obdam and Puchler complained that a major share of the crews and soldiers suffered from illness and fatigue.

---

[9] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.250–56; Sjöblom, pp.198, 205.

[10] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.249–50; Sjöblom, pp.198, 205.

[11] King Charles to the Council of the Realm, 31 October 1658 (O.S.); cited in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.558 n.144. On the failed attempt to block Landskrona, see; Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.262–5.

Characteristically, King Charles soon set out in a small boat to reconnoitre the Dutch fleet off Landskrona. The plan was to hide in the mist, but suddenly the weather changed, so the Dutch directed cannon fire against King Charles's boat. The shots landed so close that King Charles was drenched in water when he returned.

In hindsight, many have concluded that the Battle of the Sound was the turning-point in King Charles's second Danish war. Contemporary observers did not necessarily draw this conclusion. For sure, the battle reduced King Charles's chances of taking Copenhagen. The addition of a large number of Dutch regulars not only significantly reinforced the Danish defences, their arrival also raised Danish morale. King Charles tried to take advantage of the changed mood among the defenders by lining up his army in order of battle outside Copenhagen, hoping to entice the defenders into moving out. However, Danes and Dutch wisely refused. King Charles then temporarily abandoned the siege of Copenhagen, instead moving into an armed camp at Brønshøj, three kilometres north-west of Copenhagen. He moved his headquarters to the small village Utterslev, from which he could monitor developments. Eyewitnesses reported that King Charles seemed unconcerned about the Dutch presence in the Strait (nor did he worry overmuch about the coalition army's presence in Jutland), because the Dutch presence did not translate into control. On 26–27 November, and again on 1 December, King Charles himself crossed the Strait from Kronborg to Landskrona, and back again, without difficulties.[12] Although he probably crossed at night, there is nothing to suggest that the Dutch–Danish fleet had any means to block Swedish movements across the Strait, or even the departure of entire Swedish naval squadrons bound for other theatres. Swedish squadrons remained active in the seas between the Danish islands. During such expeditions the weather often proved a more difficult adversary than the Dutch–Danish fleet. In short, the Dutch victory at the 1658 Battle of the Sound relieved Copenhagen, but it did not translate into a command of the sea. Rather, the tactical draw in the battle remained in the form of a stalemate at sea, in which neither side enjoyed a decisive advantage over the other.

---

[12] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.265, 267.

However, the Battle of the Sound may have been a turning-point in the modernisation of European naval tactics. For Obdam, the battle must have been an eye-opener. In the customary manner, and despite the confined waters of the Strait, he had sent in his fleet with orders to engage the enemy at short range. Although he achieved his objective in enabling the transports to enter Copenhagen, the Dutch warships suffered major losses. Henceforth, Obdam would instead aim for defensive tactics, arguing against aggressive tactics such as boarding in favour of long-distance artillery fire. Following his lead, the Dutch navy entered the gradual transition from boarding to line of battle tactics based on long-distance artillery fire instead of short-range combat.



Large fragment of a two-tailed Swedish naval flag, captured by the Dutch at the Battle of the Sound, 1658. Blue with a yellow cross, the fragment suggests a royal crown in the upper neck. This is the oldest preserved Swedish naval flag. (Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)

Table 19. The Dutch fleet, 8 November 1658[13]

Table key: A = Admiral, VA = Vice-Admiral, RA = Rear Admiral
When no rank is mentioned, the commander held the rank of captain. The soldiers mentioned in the list were marines separate from the infantry companies carried on the transports which were destined for Copenhagen.

Advance Guard				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Brederode	Witte Cornelisz. de With (VA)	220	50	54
Landmand	Evert Anthoniszoon	136	50	40
Zeeridder	Adriaen Banckaert	75	25	28
Princesse Louyse	Jacob Boshuysen	120	?	36
Cogge	Willem Jan Stoffelszoon	109	30	40
Windhondt	Gilles Janssen	67	25	23
Prins Willem	Jan Duym	75	25	28
Wapen van Medenblick or *Alckmaar*	Adriaen d'Hautthuyn	124	?	36
Wapen van Enckhuysen or *Magd*	Dirck Gerrits Pomp	102	?	27
Castel van Medenblick	Claes Corn. Vale Hen	92	-	28
Groeningen	Laurens Degelingkamp	100	15	34
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Fireship	?	?	?	-
Fireship	?	?	?	-
Total (known figures only)		**1,220**		**374**
Main Force				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Eendracht	Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam (A) Egbert Meuwszoon Cortenaer	250	75	72
Rotterdam	Jan Aertse Verhaeff (RA)	91	20	34
Son	Dirck Krijnen Verween	115	24	40
Wapen van Rotterdam	Aert van Nes	130	30	40
Dordrecht	Jan de Liefde	130	30	42
Halve Maen	Jan van Campen	106	30	42
Duyvenvoorde	Paulus Egbertszoon Sonck	150	?	40
Staveren	Joris Coullerye	90	37	40

---

[13] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.235–7, 551 n.78

Deutecum	Abraham de Weerdenburgh	54	11	22
Wagh	Sibrandt Janssen Mol	107	30	40
Goude Leeuw	Reynst C. Sevenhuysen	105	?	38
Hoorn	Claes Aldersse	105	?	28
Princesse Albertina	Auke Stellingwerff	112	?	36
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Fireship	?	?	?	-
	Total (known figures only)	**1,545**		**514**
Rearguard				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Josua	Pieter Floriszoon (VA), Jacob Hoeck	150	?	50
Eendracht	Gerrit Femse	125	?	38
Breda	Adriaen Bruynsvelt	96	?	28
Caleb	Cornelis Slordt	125	?	42
Juppiter	Cornelis Jac. Boer	111	55	32
Jonge Prins	Govert Corn. ‘t Hoen	97	?	30
Alckmaar	Jan de Groot	110	?	38
Wapen van Monnikendam	Claes Arentsse Sloodt	92	?	26
Westfriesland	Dirck Boogaert	100	-	28
Munnickendam	Jan Samplon	97	-	32
Hollandia or *Wapen van Holland*	Claes Backer	125	-	38
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Galiot (supplies)	?	?	?	?
Fireship	?	?	?	-
	Total (known figures only)	**1,228**		**382**
	Grand Total (known figures only): 35 warships, 4 fireships, 6 galiots	**3,993**		**1,270**
Transports				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Judith	Jarck Hiddesse van Harlingen	?	?	24
Vergulden Haen	Galle Gallesen van Harlingen	?	?	24
Liefde	Jan Janssen Kleyn	?	?	23
Medea	Claes Hillebrandtszoon Pronck	?	?	23
Perel	Dirck Janssen Waterhout	?	?	16
Fruytboom	Eleman Severeynssen	?	?	22–24

Table 20. The Swedish fleet, 8 November 1658[14]

Table key: GA = Grand Admiral, A = Admiral, AL = Admiral-Lieutenant, M = Major, L = Lieutenant

When no rank is mentioned, the commander held the rank of captain.

First Squadron, under the Grand Admiral of the Realm				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Victoria	Carl Gustav Wrangel (GA) Hans Clerck (M and Master of Ordnance) Rolof Johansson	250	120	72
Kronan ('Crown')	Daniel Strussflycht (AL) Olof Willman	200	126	74
Mercurius	Gustav Sperling (M) Erik Ulfsparre	107	67	36
Månen ('Moon')	Jöran Olofsson Barck (M) Johan Bäck	87	62	40
Svärdet ('Sword')	Jesper Svensson	130	60	40
Mars	Karl Körning	140	64	42
Morgonstjernan ('Morning Star')	Hans Kloppert	125	54	44
Örnen ('Eagle')	Arvid Björnram	110	56	32
Pelican	Peter Corneliusson	110	70	40
Samson auxiliary ship	Otto von Nüssen	62	36	28
Falken ('Falcon') Gothenburg	Lorents Johansson	58	29	24
	Total	**1,379**	**744**	**472**
Second Squadron, under Admiral Bielkenstierna				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Draken ('Dragon')	Claes Bielkenstierna (A) Anders Cruus Erik Nilsson	160	136	60
Carolus	Claes Uggla (M)	90	97	50
Falken ('Falcon')	Johan Welamsson Hoijwagen	96	50	38
Samson	Matts Mårtensson	58	55	34
Nordstjernan ('North Star')	Hans Hysing	85	64	40
Konung David ('King David')	Johan Henriksson Lång	67	44	42
Leoparden ('Leopard')	Anders Krabat	85	68	32
S:t Johannes ('St John') Gothenburg	Vincent Beckman	73	66	38
Delmenhorst	Nils Eriksson	65	46	30
Rafael	Erik Eriksson	100	45	30
Jägaren ('Huntsman')	Jan Jansson Kock	46	24	22
	Total	**925**	**695**	**416**

---

[14] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.239–40.

Third Squadron, under Admiral Siöhielm				
Name	***Commander***	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Caesar	Henrik Siöhielm (A) Peter von Edam	120	97	50
Amarant	Tönnes Specht (M)	189	65	38
Wismar	Lorents Frantsson Lou	80	51	36
Västervik	Johan Olofsson Berg	95	42	38
Apollo	Didrik Thijssen	93	60	32
Fides	Henrik Tomasson	80	32	30
Östergötland	Jorits Reinkis	50	26	36
Svan ('Swan') auxiliary ship	Henrik de Letter	72	31	36
Södermanland	Christer Boije	60	25	32
Halfmånen ('Half-moon')	Johan Simonsson	50	40	26
	Total	**889**	**469**	**354**
Fourth Squadron, under Admiral-Lieutenant Gustav Wrangel				
Name	**Commander**	***Sailors***	***Soldiers***	***Cannons***
Hercules	Gustav Wrangel (AL) Claes Corneliusson Loos	165	97	52
Maria	Ture Turesson (M)	82	70	39
Svenska Lejonet ('Swedish Lion')	Tering Henriksson	91	55	40
Fenix ('Phoenix')	Erik Olofsson Helsing	66	39	30
Hjorten ('Stag')	Johan Bär	65	38	30
Svan ('Swan')	Ewert Holm	55	33	28
Förgylda Rosen ('Gilded Rose') auxiliary ship	Wilhelm Jonsson Kuyl	70	46	32
Salvator	Bengt Larsson (L)	70	39	22
Fortuna	Jacob Jansson von der Svan	71	23	24
Småland	Enne Dodes de Ville	71	40	44
Höken ('Hawk')	Johan Bockhorn	56	35	22
	Total	**862**	**515**	**363**
6 galiots and fireships (unknown affiliation)	?	?	?	
	Grand total: 43 ships, 6 galiots and fireships	**4,055**	**2,423**	**1,605**

Table 21. The Danish squadron from Copenhagen, 8 November 1658[15]

Table key: A= Admiral, VA = Vice-Admiral, L = Lieutenant
When no rank is mentioned, the commander held the rank of captain.

Name	*Commander*	*Sailors*	*Soldiers*	*Cannons*
Trefoldighed ('Trinity')	Henrik Bielke (A) David Dannel Fit Jansen Ertman Marquor Rodsten Hans Lauritsen (Larsen) (L)	300	?	54
Hannibal	Nicolai Helt (VA) Thomas Didriksen (L) Jacob Albertsen (L)	280	?	54
Tre Løver ('Three Lions')	Peter Bredal (VA) Hans Nissen (L) Cornelius van Dam (L) Jørgen Rickersen (L)	280	?	54
Norske Løve ('Norwegian Lion')	Gillis Lennertsen Christopher Høyer	230	?	42
Grå Ulv ('Grey Wolf')	Peter Jansen de Koningh Cornelius van Sonten (L)	150	?	34
Skt. Johannes ('St John')	Søren Orning Søren Hansen (L)	80	?	20
Højenhald	Peder Jensen Morsing	60	?	16
	Total: 7 warships	**1,380**	**200**	**274**

---

[15] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.248.



The Battle of the Sound, as painted by the eyewitness Willem van de Velde the Elder. In the left foreground a Swedish ship is shown in a bow view, probably Claes Uggla's *Carolus*, firing at Obdam's flagship *Eendracht*, visible in stern view on the starboard side of the *Carolus*. The *Eendracht* is also in action with a Swedish ship believed to be Gustav Sperling's *Mercurius*, which in turn is engaged on the port side with, on the far left, the *Rotterdam*. (Royal Museums Greenwich)


See Treſſen zwiſchen den Schweditchen, vnd Holla chen Flootten, dúrch den He:
Reichs Admiral Wrangel, vnd He: Admirael Leüt: Opdam, ſo ge im Súnd, Anno 1658. im 9bris
Landſcron
Elſingbúrg
Vranibúrg
Valſterbon
Cronenbúrg
Coppenhagen
Elſeneür
ENDRACHT

Contemporary copperplate depiction of the Battle of the Sound, as seen from the north. In the confined space of the Strait, it was difficult for both sides to carry out complex maneuvres. In the foreground to the left, the *Eendracht* is defending herself against two Swedish ships, while, to the right, the *Morgonstjernan* is sinking. The strong castle of Kronborg is visible in the background, with Copenhagen further back, to the right. (Jaan Claeszoon Visscher, *Theatrum Europæum*)



Grand Admiral Wrangel's flagship *Victoria* in battle with several Dutch ships. The *Victoria* flies the blood flag (Dutch: *bloedvlag*) from the stern, showing a naked arm holding a straight or curved sword on a red field, an ensign of Dutch origin for 'no mercy'. It was hoisted in the Swedish navy when the commander gave the order to commence battle. (Samuel von Pufendorf)

18

The Siege of Trondheim

In May 1658, the Governor of Dalecarlia, Lorentz Creutz, arrived in Trondheim with 50 horse and 480 foot divided into six companies to take control of the town according to the terms in the Treaty of Roskilde.[1] Soon, reinforcements from Hälsingland, Medelpad, and Ångermanland joined him. A new governor, Claes Stiernsköld, was installed, while a commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Axel Posse, was appointed to defend the new Swedish territory with a total contingent of eight officers and 606 men. Shortages throughout Sweden of cannons, ammunition, and gunpowder meant that Posse never received much of these commodities.

With the outbreak of the second Danish war, the Norwegian commander Jørgen Bielke, now the overall military commander in Norway, immediately set out to retake Trondheim (Krabbe, a Scanian, accepted Swedish nationality together with his native province). Bielke now raised two new regiments: the Dale (*Tønsbergske*) Regiment in August and Vesterlen (*Vesterlenske*) Regiment in October.[2] He arranged for two expeditionary forces, one from Akershus, which marched overland, and another from Bergenhus, which moved by sea. On 9 September 1658, possibly 2,500 Norwegians from Bergenhus landed at Trondheim, supported by artillery as well as shipborne artillery from the sea. On 8 October, the corps from Akershus arrived, too. Posse and his men, among whom many then were ill, did their best to defend the town, which lacked fortifications. Soon the burghers, too, rose against the Swedes. The ammunition supplies were low to begin with, and the defenders had to reuse lead shots fired into the town, or alternatively, buy them from business-minded Trondheim burghers who by one means or another acquired them from Norwegian supplies. After a siege of 15 weeks, with only three hours' gunpowder left, shortages of everything else, and freezing temperatures which meant that the water barriers soon no longer would protect the garrison, Stiernsköld on 21 December negotiated an honourable surrender for his remaining 341 men, of whom 153 were too ill to move. A few days later, the survivors of the Swedish garrison marched out with full military honours.[3]

---

[1] Johnsen, *Krabbekrigen*, p.324.

[2] Lind, *Hæren*, p.101.

[3] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.219–21.

The Swedes faced problems elsewhere as well. In mid December, a local uprising on the island of Bornholm enabled Danish units to reoccupy the island. Fighting also took place along the southern sections of the Swedish-Norwegian border, but this resulted in little.

Winter at Sea

Although the Swedish navy, when need be, operated throughout the year, there were good reasons to move into port during winter. Since the ships lacked means to heat crew quarters, the winter cold invariably caused many sailors to succumb to disease. On 26 December, Uggla, whom we last met evacuating Rutger von Ascheberg and his men from Als and before then in the battle of the Sound, reported that more than 50 men already had died from disease since he set out, only 15 fit men out of 70 remained on board the *Salvator*, and only 10 out of 55 endured on the *Svan*. Moreover, his soldiers were close to mutiny. Uggla did not dare send them ashore to protect a landing party tasked to find fresh water, since the soldiers had sworn never to return, if they only could reach dry land. On 30 December, the situation had deteriorated further. Uggla then reported the number of fit crewmen on board as follows: 40 on the *Amarant*, 23 on the *Månen*, 24 on the *Rafael*, 13 on the *Wismar*, 30 on the *Höken*, 18 on the *Salvator*, and six on the *Svan*. Crew strengths had fallen dramatically, sometimes to as little as 10 to 20 percent of establishment strength. Possibly Uggla found a bleak hope in the fact that a few men on the *Salvator* apparently had recovered. Yet, Uggla also noted that 'each night a few of the ill freeze to death, I pity the poor people'. Even routine activities became problematic; the crew on the *Svan* were too few to raise the anchor, so he had to provide men from other ships. On 5 January 1659, after numerous difficulties Uggla finally managed to reach the port of Nyborg on Fyn, where supplies were available. During the next night, temperatures fell further, and his ships stuck in the ice. On 16 January, he received a five-day-old order from the King to continue to Kronborg or, if possible, the Swedish west coast. Amazingly, Uggla and his crews managed to get their frozen ships out to sea again (earlier, he had reported that 'the sails are like a cuirass, the rigging is frozen stiff, so for what one man can do in summer, we now need four'). Surviving repeated storms and ice, some of which they only managed to break through by force and speed after raising all sails to catch a good wind, they reached the Gothenburg area, where they again got stuck in the ice on 1 February. At one point, only 15 fit crewmen remained on the *Amarant*, with an establishment strength of almost 200 men. On 10 February, Uggla's squadron finally entered Gothenburg, having sawed a channel through the ice all the way into port.[4]

---

[4] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.275–80.

19

The Storm of Copenhagen

In December, England had finally sent a fleet towards the Strait as a means to apply pressure on the Dutch. However, the cold and adverse winds soon caused it to return to port. Yet, the attempted English intervention, accompanied by French diplomacy, persuaded the Netherlands not to send additional forces to Denmark at this time. Even so, neither England nor France wanted to risk a war with the Empire, nor did they wish to see Sweden annex Denmark which would give Sweden full control over the trade through the Strait.

With the coalition army in Jutland, the Dutch in Copenhagen, and without allies of his own, in early 1659 it seemed to King Charles that his best hope to end the war soon under favourable conditions was to take Copenhagen. If Copenhagen fell, the Dutch fleet would lose its best naval base in the region, and King Frederick would have to sue for peace. Moreover, the operation was urgent. It could only be carried out while the ice made it possible to cross the moats. Moreover, the Swedes had noted that 16 Danish ships had set out. Since the Swedes knew that King Frederick tried to persuade Frederick William of Brandenburg to send reinforcements to Copenhagen, they believed that the ships would return with Brandenburg-Prussian soldiers (in reality, they sailed to the islands of Møn and Bornholm to bring much-needed food supplies into Copenhagen).

Copenhagen was a major city with a population of some 25,000 people. The Danes had evacuated the city's outer defences when the Swedish army arrived in August 1658. Instead, they concentrated their men on the inner defences, which, already strong, they in recent months had reinforced. The Danes also positioned numerous obstacles in the form of *chevaux-de-frise*, caltrops, sharpened poles, and similar defences wherever the Swedes may attempt an assault. The Danes had added wooden palisades in front of the walls and moats as well as in the water outside the port and in other weak spots. When the moats froze in winter, the Danes opened up channels in the ice so that intruders would be unable to cross on the ice cover. They also poured water over the outer face of the city walls so as to build up a layer of ice – a customary northern method of preventing assaults, since the ice made climbing the walls all but impossible.

However, the Swedish commanders thought that they had one ace up the sleeve. In August 1658, Erik Dahlbergh, well aware that war would break out soon again, assisted by two other fortification officers, Abraham Falkengréen and Gideon Barendijk, disguised as his servants, had carried out clandestine reconnaissance in Copenhagen. They had produced a map of the city's fortifications.[1] Days later, when King Charles resumed the war, Dahlbergh pointed out that there were weak spots in Copenhagen's southern defences, including a postern gate.

In early 1659, King Charles ordered his men to get ready to storm Copenhagen. In late January and early February, additional units were brought in both from Sweden and the occupied parts of Denmark. Storming parties were formed, with a combined strength of 1,800 sappers (mostly sailors), 6,250 foot, and 2,800 horse (Table 22, end of chapter).[2]

At the time, Copenhagen was defended by no less than 11,000 men, including more than 3,700 Danish regulars, 2,000 Dutch foot, almost 4,000 burgher militia, and a variety of others, ranging from sailors to university students, the latter few in number but easily recognisable in their black, clerical garments and hats. The defenders also had 386 cannons at their disposal, with loads of ammunition, trained crews, and the most experienced artillery officers in the country, including Colonel Bertram de la Coste, Lieutenant Colonel Wilckens, and the resourceful Peter Kalthoff (Table 23, end of chapter). In addition to the cannons on the walls, the Danes had outfitted a barge as an artillery platform of seven cannons. The Swedes called it the *Svintråget* ('pig's trough'), because of its location under the cannons of the *Svinebatteriet* ('pig's battery') at the Royal brewery. Nearby was a stationary warship with 12 cannons, the *Højenhald*. Although both were stuck in the ice, they controlled the southern approaches to Copenhagen. There were also two (or based on a contemporary illustration, possibly three) other, decked artillery barges, one of which known to the Swedes as *Stumpade Hunden* ('tail-docked dog') and to the Danes as *Ark Noæ* ('Noah's Ark'), but they were located at the northern entry point to the Citadel, played only a minor role in the fighting, and their artillery load is unknown. In September 1658, the *Ark Noæ* had a crew of 59 men under navy Captain Søren Orning.[3] Further out, the Danish and Dutch fleets could bring yet additional firepower to bear on the Swedes.

---

[1] For more details on Dahlbergh's map, see *Att illustrera stormakten: Den svenska Fortifikationens bilder 1654–1719* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2001), pp.126–7. Falkengréen (1630–1677) was the son of a scribe who joined the army, rose in the ranks, and was ennobled. Both father and son was involved with intelligence work, and Abraham continued until he was mortally wounded in the battle of Landskrona 1677. Barendijk was a German of whom less is known.

[2] The most detailed treatises of the storm of Copenhagen remain Lars Tersmeden, '"Stormen för Köpenhamn": Planen för det svenska anfallet natten till den 11 februari 1659 och orsakerna till dess misslyckande', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.313–61; and Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.372–80. For a recent study, see Lars Ericson, 'Köpenhamn 1659', Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstedt, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, and Gunnar Åselius (eds), *Svenska slagfält* (np: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003), pp.206–14.

[3] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.228.


N
4. Banér takes the outer defences at Vartov, aims for the Citadel but attacks Østerport
3. Rooth's feint assault on Norreport
Citadel
Copenhagen
Outer city
Inner city
Postern gate?
Abandoned defences
Højenhald
Christianshavn
Svintråget
2. Tott simultaneously assaults Christianshavn
1. King Charles attacks the Svintråget and Højenhald, followed by a failed assault on Slotsholmen
0
250
500
750
1,000 m

The Storm of Copenhagen, 21 February 1659



Abbildung der Statt Coppenhagen
Nebenſt der Königl: Schwediſchen
ATTAQVE vnd Stürmlauff,
ſo ſich den 11 Febr. 1659
hat zü getragen.

A. Das Königl. Schloſs. B. Zeughauſs. C. Brawhauſs. D. Königs Baterie. E. Lühngang. F. Halbe Bolwerck. G. Weſterthor. H. Norder thor. I. Oſterthor. K. Neue Fortification. L. Zoll vnd Zeughauſs. M. Beurſe. N. Auſſenwercke ſo nicht beſetzet geweſſen, vnd die Schweden zum vortheil gehabet, wie den bey O. Batterien darein geſencket worden, vnd bey P. das Läger vor die Infanterie geſtanden. Q. Approchen ſo ſehr ſtarck waren, aber nach ankunfft der Hollender wurde alles verlaſſen. R. Batterien ſo auff die Pramen geſpielet. S. Das Orlogſchiff dar auff auch geſtürmet worden. T. Auſſenwercke ſo inweren der Belägerung gebawet worden. S.C.D.E.F.G. iſt der Orth da die erſten Attaquien geſchehen, ſo angefangen vmb 1. vhr biſs früh vmb 4. Die letzte Attaque geſchahe bey I. war aber auff V. gemeinet. 1. Hollandiſche Flotte. 2. Pramen. 3. Königliche Schiffe 4. Königl. Schiffe ſo nicht gebraucht worden. 5. Waſſerkunſt. 6. Königin garten. 7. groſſe brille. 8. Abgebränte Vorſtätte vnd Gärten. 9. Ladgarten 10. Wartau. 11. Runde Kirche. 12. Königs garten. 13. Fuſs volck 14. Granaten auſs Muſqueten. 15. 3. auſgerüſtegräben.

Castell
Christians Haven
der Holm
AMAK
Kastrup.
Dragor
Lille Maglebye
Sunbye
Hollander dorp
Torneoye
Weg nach Helsingör
Schwed. Lincker flügel
Bebling
Weg nach Fridrichsburg
See
S. Görgen See
Schw. Haubt Quartier
Schw. Infanterie
Brons hoy
Schw. Rechter flügel.
Weg nach Rotschild
Walbye
N
O
W
S

Contemporary map of the storm of Copenhagen. Upper right: Dutch fleet at anchor, with no less than three artillery barges close to shore. Centre: the Danish fleet at anchor in the inner port, those marked with the number three in service, those marked with four no longer in working order. Left: Christianshavn and the island of Amager.



Erik Dahlbergh's map of Copenhagen's defences, 1658

The number of men detailed to the storming parties roughly corresponded to those who defended the Danish capital. If the Swedish cavalry reserves are excluded, the storming parties consisted of fewer men than the defenders. They were significantly more experienced as soldiers, but the Danes had the advantage of fighting from a well-fortified city. Besides, the Danes had a stronger artillery park than the Swedes, something which had become painfully obvious to King Charles during the siege.

For planning the operation, the Swedes relied on Erik Dahlbergh's map to pinpoint the weak sections of the Danish defences. Artillery was of little utility because of the geographical situation of Copenhagen. The artillery lacked the range to support the storming parties with direct fire. This had been obvious already during the autumn, when the artillery fire was found to have little effect on Copenhagen's strong defences. With the exception of a few long-range mortars (including the 300-pounder known as 'Erik Hansson'), with a range of around 1,000 m, Swedish artillery would play a minor role during the assault. Instead, storming parties of foot would break through the fortifications. Afterwards, according to a letter by Dahlbergh, the Swedish plan was to bring in cavalry to mop up the resistance inside the city. This plan was not as strange as it might sound. Most of the interior of Copenhagen was fairly open, consisting of gardens and similar semi-rural areas. Cavalry would be ideal to gain control over the city, as long as an entry could be forced.

The Swedish commanders decided to storm Copenhagen from three directions. In the south, a main force of some 5,850 foot under King Charles would attack the defences on the southern shore of Slotsholmen ('Palace Island'). They would gain entrance through the postern gate noted by Dahlbergh the previous summer with a petard. But before this, a part of the force would disable the warship *Højenhald* and the artillery barge *Svintråget* which although stuck in the ice carried cannons which directly threatened the flank of the storming party.

Meanwhile but also in the south, a smaller party of 750 men under Lieutenant General Claes Tott, would cross to the fortified Christianshavn and Amager Island. Since the plan at first was for Tott's main force exclusively to consist of two cavalry squadrons, the assault on Christianshavn was almost certainly first planned as a diversion or feint to distract the defenders of Slotsholmen. Perhaps King Charles hoped that Tott's column would draw some artillery fire from the primary target Slotsholmen. However, the plan later changed. When the assault took place Tott commanded musketeers and dismounted cavalrymen. Unlike the other assaults, Tott's column did not advance in silence but with beating drums and substantial clamour, which suggests that the primary objective still was a diversion. However, Tott's force had perhaps also received a secondary objective. Tott's men brought, on sledges, specially prepared boats with mortars, rockets, and other pyrotechnics that probably were intended to be used against the Dutch and Danish warships anchored off Copenhagen.

In the west, Colonel Nils Rooth would lead 150 men past Ravnsborg to take the three bastions at Norreport ('North Gate'). This was certainly a diversion so as to disguise the location of the main attack, because Rooth's force consisted of, in this operation, second-rate men: dismounted Scanian cavalrymen (that is, former Danish soldiers) and Tatars (a unit of 185 Lithuanian Tatars surrendered at Wolmar in 1658, from which they were sent to Wismar; they likely served dismounted at least in this context), together with what was described as a 'rabble' consisting of men from the supply train, officers' servants, and so on to give the appearance of greater numbers.

In the north, General Gustav Banér would command 2,200 men who would take the fortifications at Vartov so that his men then could fight their way towards the Citadel (*Kastellet*). Banér's storming party was supposed to break through the defences, enter Copenhagen, and take the Citadel (which was not yet fully completed) or at least prevent Danish units from fleeing into the Citadel, assuming that the main assault in the south succeeded.

As a sign for initiating the operation, the Swedes had positioned two barrels of tar that would be set ablaze at the appropriate hour, which was first planned to be midnight.

Since heavy casualties could be expected when storming a city such as Copenhagen, King Charles ordered his enlisted units to deploy in front, where losses would be greatest, followed by the national units in the rear. This precaution for obvious reasons did not spare the sappers. King Charles's storming party should be headed by an advance party of sappers: sailors who brought along two portable, wheeled bridges, assault ladders, and appropriate tools to cross the channels in the ice, bypass palisades, and climb the city walls, with 30 musketeers for protection. The portable bridges employed by the storming parties varied in size, the smallest being 8.9 m (30 ft) long and 1.48 m (5 ft) broad, while the largest were sufficiently broad to enable three horses in line to cross.

Next would follow 20 sailors with axes and other tools to break through palisades. After them would follow a navy lieutenant with 80 sailors carrying 10 double and 10 simple assault ladders and for each ladder two sacks of padding to protect the upper part of the ladder when it hit the wall. Then followed under-officers or common soldiers with 10 thick protective shrouds to throw over any sharp log heads in the palisades.

The advance party of sappers would be followed by eight detached musketeers, each with eight musket grenades. Their task was to provide cover to the party which first climbed the assault ladders: 12 artillery sergeants and six specially trained soldiers – probably musketeers – who each carried eight grenades (6- or 3-pound grenades) which they would throw against the defenders.

The sappers would wear white shirts and white hoods over their clothes to provide some camouflage against the snow. So as not to slip on the ice, the men were supplied with frost-nails for their footwear.

The Swedes commandeered up to 400 Danish peasants for the assault. Their task was to move heavy materials, evacuate casualties, and perhaps also provide manual labour when breaking through palisades.

During the night between 18 and 19 February, the Swedish army moved into position to carry out the assault. However, before the Swedes could deal with the city walls, they had to deal with the gun ships, the warship *Højenhald* and the artillery barge *Svintråget*. During the night, a Swedish infantry detachment under Lieutenant Måns Håkansson, who over 25 years had risen from the ranks in the Kronoberg Regiment, managed to take and burn the artillery barge. Wearing white camouflage, no Swede was lost due to Danish fire, but the ice cover was weak so a few went through the ice near the barge. Among them was the Admiralty's Master of Ordnance, who led the sappers in the attack, but he managed to climb out of the freezing water. Others did not, so drowned. Having taken the barge, the Swedes threw some of its cannons overboard. Later, the Danes recovered three of them which had not gone through the ice. Moreover, the crew of the *Højenhald* stubbornly resisted. By dawn, the warship was not yet taken, so the general assault had to be aborted. When the Swedes retreated, the Danes extinguished the fire on the artillery barge, but it was apparently too badly damaged to be used, so they did not man it again.

King Charles was not in a hurry to withdraw the storming parties, probably because showing them to the city's defenders formed part of psychological warfare against them (the King also allowed an English mediator to reveal to the defenders that an assault was imminent). On the following day, the men rested. In the evening, the men again moved into position to storm Copenhagen. However, this time reconnaissance took longer than anticipated, so the operation was again aborted. King Charles again ensured that the defenders would see that the assault was imminent.

Finally, on the evening of 20 February, everything seemed to be in order. Again, the men moved into position. At about 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on 21 February, King Charles launched the operation.

As planned, the first wave consisted of sappers, armed with grenades in addition to their regular weapons. In the south, the detached column of 250 men under Schmidt and Bär (sometimes spelled Behrn) found the artillery barge *Svintråget* still unmanned, and after hard fighting, they successfully took, for a while, the warship *Højenhald*, defended by navy Captain Peter Morsing. Schmidt fell during the assault. Neutralising the *Højenhald*'s 12 cannons opened up the way for the main storming party to reach the primary objective, Slotsholmen.

Major General Fabian von Fersen led the first wave in the attack on Slotsholmen. Expectedly, the Danes were on full alert when the assault began. There had been no way to hide the preparations and the aborted assaults during the previous nights, and as we have seen, King Charles had not tried to. The Danes had lit numerous fires for visibility, and their artillery opened fire as soon as the Swedes approached. In this sector, the resourceful Peter Kalthoff commanded the Danish artillery. Swedish casualties rapidly grew shockingly high, as the Swedes entered the devastating crossfire of artillery and musket fire and grenades thrown from the walls. Although Fersen's men nonetheless moved forward, and successfully crossed the channels in the ice with the help of portable bridges, upon reaching the city walls they found that the postern gate upon which the plan hinged had been bricked up when the Danes reinforced the city's defences. It was no longer possible to enter this way, even with a petard. The formerly weak spots were no longer weak. And casualties kept rising. When National Master of Ordnance Erik Stenbock crossed one of the portable bridges leading units from the Jönköping Regiment in an attempt to locate another means of entry, he fell mortally wounded hit in the chest with grape-shot against which the shot-proof breastplate he presumably wore proved insufficient.

As a result, Fersen followed the wall to the west, until he found what seemed like a better objective for the assault. However, the Danes had poured water on the rampart before the bastion, which resulted in a thick ice-cover which was very hard to climb. Moreover, when the Swedes still attempted the climb, the Danes threw grenades into the densely packed groups of Swedish soldiers at the edge of the wall and poured boiling lye, tar, and oil over them. Numerous Swedes were killed. Finally, two Swedish officers with two of their men against all odds managed to reach the bastion and climb its walls. However, this sector of Copenhagen was entrusted to Lieutenant General Claus Ahlefeldt (1614–1674), a veteran of Wallenstein's Imperial army during the Thirty Years' War and the previous war with Sweden. Ahlefeldt fought in the front line, personally killing one of the Swedish officers with a partisan, while his men pushed back the other Swedes whence they came.[4] At dawn, after hours of intensive battle, King Charles had no choice but to abort the assault.

Meanwhile, Tott's storming party attacked Christianshavn three times, but was repulsed. The sledges with boats loaded with rockets and pyrotechnics broke down during the advance, so could not be deployed. Ultimately, Tott and his men had to retreat.

Things did not go much better for the Swedes elsewhere. Colonel Rooth led his men to the city's western walls, but since his was only a diversion, he lacked the men to carry out a decisive assault.

To the north of the city, Banér and his men began their assault at 4:30 a.m. They took the outer defences at Vartov, but then got lost in the darkness and by mistake assaulted Østerport ('East Gate') instead of the Citadel. Unfortunately for them, they now found that the Danes had widened the channel in the ice, so that the portable bridges no longer reached across the moat. As a result, a great number of Banér's men were killed when the Danes opened fire with grapeshot into the densely packed ranks halted just beyond the moat. Ultimately, Banér, too, had to call off the assault. The storm of Copenhagen had failed.

The total number of casualties is uncertain. The Swedes lost an estimated 1,700 men, including at least 900 wounded (the only figure which apparently derives from roll calls mentions 895 wounded). Modern estimates based on the few figures available suggest that the storming parties lost from 20–30 percent of their numbers during the assault. Among the dead was National Master of Ordnance Erik Stenbock, a veteran of the Thirty Years' War and the war in the Commonwealth who once had commanded the Life Guard at the battle of Lützen 1632. In Banér's storming party, the fallen included Major General William Vavasour, a Yorkshire Royalist who for the last 30 years had alternated between Swedish service and the civil wars at home (Cromwell had twice requested, apparently unsuccessfully, that King Charles pay Vavasour's arrears), as well as Johann von Vietinghoff and Lentzman. Colonels Gengel and De la Voyette fell, too, as did Colonel Johann Schmidt who perished during the attack on the *Højenhald*.[5] Many other officers were wounded, including

---

[4] The name and rank of the officer killed by Ahlefeldt is uncertain. He is generally described as a cavalry captain named either Neuhusen or Douglas.

[5] Manley, *History*, pp.50–51.

Ascheberg who suffered a leg wound. Danish losses are unknown but were certainly comparatively few.

The assault was prepared for some time, and the men were experienced. So, why did it fail? First, the Danes had carried out major defensive works since the siege began. The weak spots in Copenhagen's southern defences which Dahlbergh and his men had discovered half a year earlier were no longer there. The Swedish mistake was to assume that the Danes had failed to spot the problems, or done nothing to rectify them. We do not know whether Dahlbergh's men attempted to verify whether the weak access points remained before the assault began, or whether an investigation even was possible during the ongoing siege. Either way, the Swedes relied on Dahlbergh's six-month-old intelligence, and this time, it was dated.[6]

Second, not only had the weak spots in the southern sector been reinforced, they were strongly defended, including by 69 cannons (10 of them of large calibre) and three mortars on the walls, in addition to the 19 cannons on the *Svintråget* and *Højenhald* and the 54 cannons at nearby Christianshavn. This was the strongest concentration of Danish artillery in Copenhagen. Moreover, the cannons were positioned so that they could engage the storming parties from the sides as well as from the front. The walls in this sector were manned by almost 2,000 men, most of whom were highly motivated. The storming parties were met by devastating barrages of grape-shot or canister shot from the artillery, a heavy volume of musket fire, and grenades and pyrotechnics thrown from the walls.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that if King Charles had chosen to focus the assault on one of the other access points, the storming parties might have broken through. If this would have resulted in the fall of Copenhagen is a question that cannot be answered by an historian. However, King Charles chose what he thought was the least defended sector, which this time turned out to be the strongest one. Another problem, Dahlbergh later suggested, was that the Swedish soldiers, who already suffered from cold and hunger, were exhausted after spending the two previous night's preparing for the assault. Possibly so, but it seems likely that commanders as experienced as those in charge would have taken measures to give their men the opportunity to rest in daytime.

Table 22. The Swedish storming parties, Copenhagen, 21 February 1659
Sappers included sailors and other specialists able to handle necessary tools and heavy equipment such as field bridges, assault ladders, and so on. Formally, the Swedish Life Guards of Horse and Foot had remerged on 30 November 1657 but still operated separately.[7]

---

[6] Conspiracy theories, some of which are still being repeated, blame either Corfitz Ulfeldt or the conveniently fallen French Colonel Louis De la Voyette, or both, for betraying the battle plan, for which there is no evidence and surely was no need, since ongoing preparations would be impossible to hide.

[7] Tersmeden, 'Stormen för Köpenhamn', pp.332–5, 351–61.

Primary Storming Party, under King Charles

Left column (advance guard, under Lieutenant Colonel Genneck, followed by 5 battalions under respectively Henrik von Delwig, Fabian von Fersen, Johann Gorries von Gorgas, Per Larsson Sparre, and Carl Larsson Sparre)

550 sappers

2,000 foot incl. 60 Drabant Guard, in battalions from:

- Delwig: Enlisted regiment
- Fersen: Enlisted regiment
- Gorgas: Östgöta Regiment
- Per Sparre: Södermanland and Hälsinge Regiments
- Carl Sparre: Kronoberg Regiment

Delwig's and Fersen's battalions were commanded by Major General Fabian von Fersen, while the battalions from the national regiments formed a second wave under the personal command of King Charles, Field Marshal Stenbock, and Erik Stenbock.

Right column (5 battalions, under respectively Johan Wilhelm Gengel, Philip Hegstereich, Louis De la Voyette, Rutger von Ascheberg, and Nils Kagg)

650 sappers

1,800 foot, in battalions from:

- Gengel: Enlisted regiment
- Hegstereich: Enlisted regiment in 1656 handed over from Brandenburg which included many Poles
- De la Voyette: Newly-raised Blekinge Regiment, the colonelcy of which he just received, and an enlisted regiment
- Ascheberg: Dismounted enlisted cavalry regiment
- Kagg: Jönköping Regiment

Gengel's and Hegstereich's battalions were commanded by Major General Johan von Essen, while the other battalions formed a second wave under the personal command of King Charles, Field Marshal Stenbock, and Erik Stenbock

Detached column under Colonel Johann Schmidt and Navy Major Johan Bär (tasked to attack the warship Højenhald)

- 50 sappers, under Hans Clerck, the Admiralty's Master of Ordnance
- 200 foot, incl. 30 Life Guard with half-pikes

Infantry reserve (2 battalions, from the Life Guard under Lieutenant Colonel Barthold de Mortaigne, Uppland Regiment under Nils Brahe, and Skaraborg Regiment under Johan Hård)

600 foot

Cavalry reserve (6 squadrons, divided into an advance guard and a reserve), under Philip of Sulzbach

1,900 horse, from:

- Advance guard: Life Guard of Horse under Lieutenant Colonel Fredrik von Buchwald, Åbo Cavalry Regiment under Fabian Berndes, and Tavastehus Cavalry Regiment under Johan Galle
- Reserve: Uppland Cavalry Regiment under Erik Planting, Östgöta Cavalry Regiment under Ludwig WierichLewenhaupt, and Frederick of Hesse-Homburg's Cavalry Regiment (enlisted)

Total
1,250 sappers
4,600 foot
1,900 horse

Tott's Storming Party
100 sappers
250 foot (musketeers and dismounted horse)
400 horse (2 squadrons from Overbeck's and Pringel's Cavalry Regiments (enlisted))

Rooth's Storming Party
150 foot (50 Scanians and 100 Lipka Tatars, all dismounted)
Assorted 'rabble' (men from the supply train, servants)

Banér's Storming Party
Left column (advance guard and 3 battalions)
350 sappers
1,000 foot, from:

- Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Staël's unit (200 men primarily from the Uppland Regiment)
- Sulzbach's Dragoons
- Gorgas's Dragoons
- Güntersbergh's (also known as Douglas's) Dragoons

Güntersbergh's and Gorgas's dragoons were commanded by Major General William Vavasour; he was presumably expected to command all units which managed to penetrate the citadel

Right column **(1 battalion)**
100 sappers
250 foot, in reality dismounted cavalry from several enlisted cavalry regiments, under Lieutenant Colonels Lentzman and Johann von Vietinghoff

Cavalry reserve **(2 squadrons)**
500 horse, from Bornemann's and Banér's Cavalry Regiments (enlisted)

Total
450 sappers
1,250 foot
500 horse

Grand total ('rabble' not included)
1,800 sappers
6,250 foot
2,800 horse

Table 23. Defenders of Copenhagen, February 1659[8]

King's Life Regiment of Horse (formerly Kay Lykke's, then Hans Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment); 7 coy, 825

Danish dismounted dragoons and infantry:
- King's Life Regiment of Foot (6 coy)
- Zealand Regiment (5 coy + 5 weak coy)
- Schack's Regiment (7 coy)
- Gyldenløve's Jutland Dragoons (6 coy)
- **Total: 2,890**

Dutch infantry, 2,000
Danish artillerymen, 400 (in battle supplemented by sailors and infantry)
Danish and Dutch sailors, 450
Drabant Guard and armed royal servants, 150
Burgher militia, 3,760
Armed journeymen, 300
Armed students, 160
Armed shop servants, 115
Total: 11,050

Cannons on the walls, 386
- 319 cannons in Copenhagen, ranging from 1-pounders to 31-pounders
- 13 mortars, ranging in calibre from 8-pounders to 100-pounders
- 54 cannons at Christianshavn

Other cannons
- 7 cannons on the artillery barge Svintråget
- 12 cannons on the warship Højenhald
- Unknown number of cannons on the artillery barge Ark Noæ and her sister(s) north of the Citadel

Dutch and Danish fleets, anchored off Copenhagen

---

[8] Primarily Tersmeden, 'Stormen för Köpenhamn', p.315, 348–50; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.225.



Left: Claus Ahlefeldt. (Abraham Wuchters, 1640s)

Right: Ahlefeldt's partisan during the storm of Copenhagen, presently on display in the National Museum of Denmark. (Photo: Knud Winckelmann)



The storm of Copenhagen, as seen from the primary storming party, with the warship *Højenhald* (centre left) between the Swedes and Slotsholmen, and in the background, the masts of the Dutch fleet at anchor.



Tott's storming party attacks Christianshavn, with Slotsholmen and its bridge (centre) and the warship *Højenhald* (left) still resisting the Swedes. (Photo: Medström)

20

King Charles Regains Supremacy at Sea in the Baltic

While a Swedish victory at Copenhagen might have changed the outcome of the war, the failure to take the city did not appreciably change the strategic landscape. King Charles expanded the camp and fortifications at Brønshøj, which was named Carlstad ('Charles's town'). The camp had a diameter of approximately one kilometre, which made it comparable in size to Copenhagen or, in Danish eyes, even larger. Inside, the Swedes built everything from houses to dugouts and stables. The camp was surrounded by an about two-metre-high wall and a dry moat. An eyewitness noted that it looked as if the Swedes would remain for a hundred years.

Meanwhile, King Charles embarked upon offensives on the smaller Danish islands which provided food supplies for Copenhagen, which made them vital for the war effort. Planning had begun already in December 1658, and King Charles first wanted to send men across on the ice in January. However, when the units were in place, the ice did not bear, so the plan had to be postponed.[1] On 29 March, Field Marshal Wrangel from his base on Fyn took Langeland. This was a major undertaking, with warships, horse, and foot, divided between two landing sites. Langeland was strongly defended, and Wrangel's first attempt to land on the island, on 17–18 February, had failed. This time, after some initial difficulties, Wrangel succeeded in taking the island.

In early April, the Swedish main fleet of 25 ship, under Bielkenstierna, moved out of its winter port of Landskrona. The Dutch–Danish coalition made no attempt to confront Bielkenstierna. Yet, fighting at sea went on elsewhere. A few days later, an inconclusive naval battle was fought off Æro Island between Wrangel's squadron from Fyn under navy Major Tering Henriksson and a stronger combined Dutch-Danish squadron of 12 ships under Vice Admiral Nicolai Helt. Three days later, Bielkenstierna's fleet reached Langeland. Faced with the superior numbers of the Swedish fleet, Helt's squadron then withdrew into the protected Flensburg Firth (Flensburger Förde), which meant that Sweden regained superiority at sea in the western

---

[1] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.366–70, 380–81.



The fortifications at Brønshøj, henceforth named Carlstad, 1658.

Baltic Sea. The strategic situation again favoured King Charles. The setbacks in the battle of the Sound and the attempted storm of Copenhagen had been negated. For sure, Danes and Dutch still held Copenhagen, but Copenhagen and its soldiers and sailors depended on outside food supplies, in particular those from the islands of Lolland, Falster, and Møn, which henceforth were exposed to Swedish warships.

On 22 April, soldiers from Wrangel's squadron attempted to storm Sønderborg on the island of Als on the entrance to the Flensburg Firth. Sønderborg apparently had a garrison of only 140 men. However, muddy roads prevented the Swedes from bringing artillery to bear on the fortress, so three days later Wrangel had to abandon the attempt. This contributed to the decision also to abandon the attempt to take Flensburg and thereby also the Dutch–Danish naval squadron under Helt, which had taken refuge there. The Flensburg Firth was too well defended by fortifications and bastions, too narrow for manoeuvring, and in case the fleet moved in, too exposed in case Dutch reinforcements arrived from the Baltic Sea.

Instead, Wrangel and his senior officers Bielkenstierna and Gustav Wrangel decided to move against Lolland, Falster, and Møn. Copenhagen and the Dutch would have to starve if the Swedes denied them supplies from these fertile islands.[2]

The first target became Falster. In early May, King Charles travelled from Kronborg via Korsør to Nyborg on Fyn, from which he three days later set

---

[2] The campaigns are perhaps best described in Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.381–98.



Plan of the fortifications at Brønshøj, or Carlstad, 1658. (Erik Dahlbergh, who planned the layout of the camp and its fortifications)

out with the main fleet. On 7 May, he landed horse and foot units, in total some 2,000 men, on Falster opposite Guldborg on Lolland, taking the island without encountering any resistance.[3] From Falster, it was only a brief step to Lolland, where King Charles on the following day landed his army. Danish soldiers under Colonel Joachim Kørber resisted but were rapidly pushed back, reportedly without the loss of a single Swedish soldier. Kørber retreated across the island to the fortified town of Nakskov. This did not avail him, because within days, the Swedes initiated a blockade of Nakskov, in which Kørber fortified himself with 300 horse, 400 foot, 25 artillerymen, 300 burgher militia, 130 levies, and 43 cannons. Over the coming days Swedes took the rest of Lolland. Kørber stubbornly held out for more than two months, until when in late July, in an untenable position and lacking ammunition, he had no choice but surrender. Field Marshal Stenbock accepted his capitulation, and Kørber and his men marched out with full military honours.[4]

---

[3] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.232.

[4] On the siege of Nakskov, see Johan Nordentoft, *Nakskov og Svenskerna 1658 og 1659* (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1937); Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.391–8; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.232–5.

During these weeks, Dutch-Danish naval squadrons certainly operated in the theatre, yet their admirals showed no inclination actually to confront the Swedes. As we have seen, the Dutch-Danish presence did not prevent Swedish ships from passing freely across the Strait and in the seas between the Danish islands.

One of those who had reason to applaud the Swedish conquest of Naksov was the Scanian noble Ebbe Ulfeldt. We have described how in a previous war against Sweden he reformed the old Scanian levy system into units of voluntary freeshooters who would operate as guerrillas against Swedish interests. However, he had left Denmark in 1652 because of King Frederick's displeasure. King Charles arranged a Danish pardon for Ulfeldt in conjunction with the Treaty of Roskilde, after which Ulfeldt willingly became a Swedish subject. Unfortunately for Ulfeldt, he happened to be in Copenhagen during the outbreak of the second Danish war, so King Frederick threw him in prison. Ulfeldt was only released when Nakskov, where he was imprisoned, surrendered in the following year. Back in Scania and this time in the service of his adopted country, Ulfeldt repeated his previous feat by forming a special counterinsurgency unit of former members of free-shooter and *snapphane* units who were willing to operate against those of their former colleagues who still resisted the Swedes. Meanwhile, a similar function was carried out by Georg Henrik Lübecker, a veteran of the Thirty Years' War formerly of Her Royal Majesty the Queen's Life Regiment of Horse (which he led across the Belts). In 1659, Lübecker set up the Scanian Cavalry Regiment, comprising not Scanians but men enlisted in the Swedish heartland whose primary role became to fight brigands and insurgents (incidentally, a feat that Lübecker would repeat also in the subsequent Scanian War). Meanwhile, Ulfeldt and his men systematically searched every parish of Scania, identifying and capturing or killing all remaining guerrillas they could find. Since both Ulfeldt and his men knew exactly how the enemy operated and already were accustomed to rough methods, they were highly successful. Some insurgents were killed on site, but most were taken to courts, which sentenced and executed them as brigands, a method which Ulfeldt considered both more legal and effective, since it discouraged others from joining the guerrillas.

Among the islands that hitherto had supplied Copenhagen, only Møn remained. Yet, this island had to wait until 8 June, when Swedes from Zealand under Philip of Sulzbach waded ashore on the island, gaining full control of it on the next day.

The Battle of Rødsand

One reason for the comparative lack of Dutch-Danish naval activity was that King Frederick and Obdam found it difficult to refurbish and man the combined fleet. Unlike in peace-time, the number of sailors available in Copenhagen was insufficient. On 1 May, King Frederick demanded that all sailors should be enlisted under terms that included a full month's salary in advance. Moreover, the King wanted Admirals Niels Juel and Jørgen Biørnsen to press into duty any sailor, 'regardless of nationality', who might be of use to the fleet. Any former sailor presently employed by a burgher must be pressed into service, too.[5] In addition to sailors, the Dutch also needed marines, so Puchler was ordered to embark parts of his infantry on the warships, as replacements for those marines who had been lost. To add to his motivation, King Frederick on 8 May appointed Puchler Colonel General of the Danish army, with an annual stipend to follow.

When the combined fleet finally set out, it was commanded by Obdam and Bielke. Their orders were to defeat the Swedish main fleet and then ship the coalition army that still waited in winter quarters in Jutland to Fyn. Then, they must move supplies from Lübeck and the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Copenhagen. Instructions were sent to Vice Admiral Helt in Flensburg, too, ordering him to move out to join his squadron to the combined coalition fleet.

On 10 May, the adversaries came within sight of each other around 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. at some point between Lolland and Fehmarn in the engagement commonly known as the battle of Rødsand.[6] The number of ships available to each fleet is somewhat unclear. Bielkenstierna reported that the enemy fleet consisted of 26 warships and seven galiots, while his own fleet consisted of 20 warships and a boyer. Obdam, however, reported that the Swedish fleet consisted of 24 ships including two fireships. Based on this and other information, it is commonly estimated that Bielkenstierna had 20 warships, two burners, and a few galiots, while the coalition fleet consisted of 19 Dutch warships, three Danish warships, and several flutes or galiots for transportation.[7] The coalition fleet was accordingly slightly larger than the Swedish fleet, but not so large as to give it a decisive advantage. However, the coalition fleet had a manpower advantage. The Swedish fleet had already been at sea for more than a month, while the coalition fleet only had been in operation for three days. As a result, the coalition crews were significantly better fed and rested than their Swedish counterparts. Moreover, the coalition ships had a full complement of soldiers aboard, while the Swedish fleet had disembarked most soldiers for the ongoing conquest of Lolland.

Despite these odds, Bielkenstierna, on the *Victoria*, was determined to fight. Admiral Gustav Wrangel commanded the advance guard, while Tönnes Specht on board the *Hercules* led the rearguard.

Obdam, on presumably the *Eendracht*, commanded the main force of the coalition fleet, while Bielke commanded the advance guard on presumably the *Trefoldighet*. The rearguard was probably under the command of the Dutch rear admiral, Verhaeff.

Having learnt his lesson from the battle of the Sound, Obdam wanted a long-distance artillery battle. However, strong winds prevented his ships from opening the lower-deck gun ports, which naturally reduced coalition firepower.

---

[5] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.329.

[6] Most thoroughly described in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.333–5. In Swedish histories the battle of Rødsand is often called the battle of Fehmarn.

[7] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.333.



Edward Montagu, 1666.
(Peter Lely)

The winds also dispersed Gustav Wrangel's advance guard, so that he suddenly had only two ships with him, the *Månen* and *Småland*. When these came under strong cannon fire, Bielkenstierna moved in to support. By ill chance, Bielkenstierna was then hit and badly wounded in the side by a round shot. Against all odds, he survived and eventually recovered, but he could do no more in this battle and had to walk with crutches for the rest of his life. The *Victoria* suffered much damage, too.

At this point, the two fleets had passed each other. Turning around, they made another approach. This time, the two fleets came closer, which gave the Swedish gunners an advantage, in particular since the Dutch and Danish ships still did not dare to open the lower-deck gun ports. Since the two fleets by then had reversed their position vis-à-vis each other, we do now know why this problem with strong winds only affected the coalition fleet, it this indeed was the case. Possibly, the coalition ships were heavier in the water because of their full load. Be that as it may, the effect of the Swedish cannon fire increased because of the reduced distance. Several coalition ships suffered serious damages, and it seems that the *Trefoldighet* was most badly shot up, effectively being reduced to drifting with the current. If Obdam's fleet continued on its course, then Bielke and the *Trefoldighet* might be captured by the Swedes. To prevent such a dishonourable outcome, Obdam regrouped his fleet around the *Trefoldighet*. During this moment of vulnerability, it was the Swedes who found themselves hampered by the strong winds. Gustav Wrangel, who had assumed command, wanted to attack, but his ships remained separated and disordered. He lost valuable time while he got his formation in order, and then the strong winds finally forced the Swedes as well to close the lower gun ports. Soon, both Gustav Wrangel and Obdam realised that with the winds increasing towards gale strength, it was impossible to continue the battle. At around 7:00 p.m., the two fleets separated. The Swedes moved into the Great Belt, while Obdam and Bielke took refuge in Flensburg Firth. The outcome of the battle can only be described as yet another draw.

Losses were small on both sides, presumably because of the rough weather which prevented the fleets from closing with each other. On the Swedish side, besides Bielkenstierna Tönnes Specht suffered wounds, too, in the thigh and hand. Casualties included 12 dead and 26 wounded. In the coalition fleet, we only know that Captain Sonck on the *Duyvenvoorde* lost his leg to cannon fire in the first phase of the battle and died on the following day, and that another six men were wounded on his ship. The losses on other ships are unknown.

Having moved into the Great Belt, the Swedish fleet again met up with Grand Admiral Wrangel, who led the fleet onwards to reunite with the Swedish ships at Kronborg and in the Strait. There they found that an English fleet under Edward Montagu (1625–1672), General at Sea and Earl of Sandwich, finally had arrived in the Strait. Wrangel and Montagu congratulated each other. Afterwards, and with the coalition fleet at anchor far away in Flensburg Firth where Vice-Admiral Helt's squadron remained, too, the Swedes resumed the blockade of Copenhagen.

Stalemate at Sea

Meanwhile, the coalition army in Jutland had moved out of winter quarters and advanced against Frederiksodde, to which they laid siege. Frederiksodde's garrison was much reduced, lately also by the plague. In early 1659, the garrison only consisted of 504 dragoons and 833 foot who were fit for duty (by this time, 697 men had died and 709 were sick). The large fortress could not be defended with only 1,300 men. On 9 April 1659, the Swedes accordingly abandoned most of Frederiksodde, transferring the remaining garrison into the Citadel on Bers Odde. On 27–28 May, Major General Hans Böddecker abandoned the Citadel, too, instead shipping his men to Fyn during the night. Before they left, the Swedish artillerymen as usual mined the Citadel which exploded the following day, after a coalition unit had moved in.[8] The Swedes had tied up the powerful coalition army in Jutland for more than half a year. After the Swedish evacuation, units of the coalition army, apparently mostly Czarniecki's men, moved into Frederiksodde.

---

[8] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.235–6.



Michiel Adriaenszoon de Ruyter. (Hendrik Berckman, 1655)

While Bielke and the Danish officers argued for operations in support of beleaguered Danish garrisons such as the one in Nakskov, Obdam instead wanted to help the coalition army which understandably was reluctant to cross the sea to the Danish islands without naval support. The coalition army commanders feared that if the Dutch fleet withdrew, they would then be left to face the Swedes alone, without access to supplies. Ultimately, Obdam's decision prevailed.

Bielke's wish to go on the offensive together with the Dutch fleet was soon also thwarted by the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. On 21 May, the First Concert of The Hague took place, during which France, England, and the Netherlands initiated peace negotiations between Sweden and the Commonwealth. As a result, Obdam received instructions from The Hague to discontinue offensive operations against Swedish-occupied islands, even though he still should defend King Frederick and Copenhagen. Obdam wrote back that the new order 'made me quite mystified, and I wished that God grant me more comprehension than I have to understand it'.[9] Ultimately, Obdam interpreted his orders to mean that he was free to bring the Danish troops wherever the Danish commanders wanted, but he was not supposed to employ his own men during any contested landing. If Danish ships were attacked, he would defend them.

Montagu, too, had received somewhat vague instructions, which essentially said that his task was to preserve the balance of power between Denmark and Sweden and prevent the coalition army from taking Fyn, Zealand, or other islands held by Swedish units. With him travelled 25 naval officers and some 300 crew on the way to take service in the Swedish navy, attracted by the high pay then offered to experienced foreign naval officers which was almost four times those of the corresponding Swedish ones.[10] However, Montagu was strictly ordered not to initiate a war between England and the Netherlands. Montagu's fleet, which arrived in the Strait in mid April, consisted of 44 warships, 1,980 cannons, and 9,140 men (Table 24). It accordingly constituted a substantial addition to naval strength in the region. Yet, neither side knew exactly what they could expect from Montagu. Would he join forces with the Swedish main fleet, or would he remain neutral? King Charles had high hopes that Montagu would support him against the Dutch, but the latter's instructions precluded this.

Soon, the English fleet was followed by a second Dutch fleet, under Michiel Adriaenszoon de Ruyter (1607–1676), one of the most experienced Dutch naval officers and sometime soldier. He went to sea as a boy and rose from the ranks. In the treaties between the Netherlands and Denmark, The Hague had promised Denmark a fleet but also 6,000 infantry.[11] We have seen that Obdam brought 2,195 foot to reinforce Copenhagen's defences. Since this fell short of the agreement, The Hague now sent more. A new fleet was accordingly equipped, with 39 warships, four fireships, 1,743 cannons, and 7,689 sailors, with 4,000 additional soldiers (Table 25). Ruyter received his instructions in mid May. Essentially, he should deliver the remaining soldiers to Denmark. If the Swedes tried to prevent this, he should fight them. However, he should at all costs avoid a conflict with Montagu's English fleet. If Montagu asked for his intentions, Ruyter should point out that he would receive his instructions from Obdam.

On 1 June, Ruyter's fleet entered the Strait, where also Montagu's fleet awaited developments. On the same day, the Swedish fleet in the Strait resumed the blockade of Copenhagen. Meanwhile, Obdam's and Bielke's combined fleet lay in the Great Belt, within easy reach. The waters around the Danish islands thereby became the centre for a concentration of naval strength of a size and power never seen before. Suddenly, almost 150 warships, many of them of the largest types, from four countries operated in the vicinity of each other. The Netherlands had deployed three-quarters of its substantial navy to the region, evidence of the importance of the Baltic trade to The Hague.

---

[9] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.347; citing Obdam's journal, 29 May and 30 May 1659 (O.S.).

[10] This was the biggest intake of naval officers from the British islands during the wars. In total, King Charles enlisted one admiral, some 30 captains and lieutenants, more than 40 artillery constables, a few under officers, and almost 400 sailors, most of them English. Höglund, *Skeppssamhället*, pp.66, 68.

[11] The defence alliance of 3 August 1645 and 29 September 1649 and the ampliation treaty of 17 June 1657 (all dates O.S.). In addition to men and ships, the Netherlands also paid subsidies to Denmark. The alliance, so important for Denmark, was negotiated by Corfitz Ulfeldt, before King Frederick drove him into exile.

Sure enough, by the end of the month Obdam moved the combined Dutch and Danish fleets to engage the Swedish fleet of 28 warships under Grand Admiral Wrangel, which then had departed the Strait on a course north of Zealand to the Little Belt. In response, Montagu on 27 June lined up his fleet with that of Wrangel between Jutland and Zealand. For a while, it looked like the four fleets would engage in battle. But Montagu sent a dispatch to the Dutch, proposing that they extend the ceasefire agreed by the First Concert of The Hague. Ultimately, Obdam agreed. Wrangel's fleet returned to the Strait.

The result was essentially a stalemate at sea. With the English still being non-combatants, the combined Dutch and Danish fleets were certainly stronger than the Swedish one. The English contribution is difficult to assess. Certainly, the presence of a potentially pro-Swedish fleet kept the Dutch on their toes, and the influx of additional naval officers and crews strengthened the Swedish navy. On the other hand, the ongoing diplomatic negotiations meant that neither Dutch nor English were eager for a major battle.

Having said this, the Dutch faced a special problem. The 4,000 Dutch infantry were still embarked on board Ruyter's ships, where they had now spent more than a month. This caused problems both for morale and their general state of health. Yet, the ongoing negotiations seemed to preclude landing them since the Swedes held all the Danish islands. What to do?

In early July, Obdam and Ruyter sailed to Copenhagen. Soon, they agreed with King Frederick that the ceasefire negotiated in The Hague was over. King Frederick ordered Obdam and Bielke to relieve Nakskov (which unknown to him already had fallen), reconquer Langeland, Lolland, Falster, and Møn, and transport the Brandenburg-Prussian army in Jutland to Fyn and Zealand. King Frederick also planned landings at Ystad in Scania and at Køge, south of Copenhagen, but these only took place in September and led to nothing.

Table 24. Montagu's English fleet, 1659[12]
Table key: VA = Vice-Admiral
When no rank is mentioned, the commander held the rank of captain.

First Squadron			
Name	*Commander*	*Men*	*Cannons*
Naseby	Edward Montagu, General at Sea Roger Cuttance	660	80
Triumph	Robert Clark	350	66
Speaker	Eustace Smith	300	60

---

[12] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.355–6.

Tredagh	Thomas Teddiman	300	60
Torrington	John Harman	260	58
Newbury	Robert Blake	250	56
Leopard	Jonas Pool	220	52
Centurion	Francis Parker	170	44
Ruby	Robert Kirby	180	44
Newcastle	Edmund Curtis	190	48
Reserve	Robert Plumley	170	46
Maidstone	Thomas Penrose	170	46
Basing	Richard Hodges	120	26
Dragon	Philip Holland (?)	140	30
Hind (ketch)	-	40	8
Wexford (fireship)	-	40	8(?)
Second Squadron			
Name	***Commander***	***Men***	***Cannons***
Swiftsure	William Goodsonn (VA)	400	66
Dunbar	Edward Blag	300	66
Plymouth	Edward Witheridge	260	66
Bridgewater	Anthony Earning	250	66
Worcester	Robert Nixon	250	50
Winsby	Joseph Ames	170	48
Portsmouth	Robert Sansum	150	44
Assistance	Thomas Sparling	150	40
Advice	Francis Allen	160	42
Jersey	John Simonds	160?	42
Elias	Mark Harrison	150	38
Success	Thomas Fleet	150	38
Bradford	Peter Bowen	120	28
Truelove (fireship)	-	120	28?
Third Squadron			
Name	***Commander***	***Men***	***Cannons***
London	Richard Stayner (VA)	400	70
Rainbow	Anthony Young	320	70
Gloucester	William Whitehorne	250	60
Lion	John Lambert	240	58
Essex	John Hayward	260	58

Indian	Charles Wager	200	44
Preston	Robert Robinson	180	44
Nantwich	Bernard Gilpin	180	44
Elizabeth	John Grimsditch	160	40
Adventure	Valentine Totnell	130	38
Great Charity	Bartholomew Ketcher	150	40
Expedition	Edward Thompson	120	36
Forrester	Anthony Archer	120	28
Cornelion (fireship)	-	120	28?
	Grand Total : 44 ships	**9,140**	**1,980**

Table 25. Ruyter's Dutch fleet, 1659[13]
VA = Vice-Admiral
When no rank is mentioned, the commander held the rank of captain.

First Squadron			
Name	***Commander***	***Men***	***Cannons***
Huis te Zwieten	Michiel de Ruyter (VA)	280	64
Oosterwijk	De Wild	250	60
Kruiningen	Pieter van Braakel	230	54
Tijdverdrijf	Willem van der Zaan	225	54
Stad en Landen	Dirk Schey	225	50
Hilversum	Jacob van Meeuwen	225	52
Vreede	Jacob Swart van Amsterdam	190	40
Hollandia	Barent Kramer	190	44
Burg van Leiden	Jan Roetering	190	40
Kampen	Allart Matthijszoon	190	40
Raadhuis van Haarlem	Henrik Gotskens	190	40
Gelderland	Hendrik Adriaanszoon	190	40
Marsseveen	Albert Klaszoon de Graf	190	40
Fireship	Jan Leenderszoon	?	-
Fireship	Jacob Wiltschut	?	-
Second Squadron			
Name	***Commander***	***Men***	***Cannons***
Schip van Zeelandia	Jan Evertszoon (VA)	263	54

---

[13] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.365–6.

Vlissingen	Cornelis Evertszoon	175	42
Uitrecht	Frans Mangelaar	175	44
Veere	Leyn Pikke	175	42
Dordrecht	Jan Thijszoon	175	40
Middelburg	Jacob Pens	175	42
Zierixzee	Bastiaan Tuineman	175	40
Prins Maurits	Marinus de Klerk	191	44
Uitrecht	Jacob Simonszoon de Wit	191	44
Gelderland	Adriaan Pols	175	40
Oostergo	Hendrik Brunsvelt	200	54
Westergo	Jan Janszoon Vijselaar	157	45
Kleen Hollandia	Laurens Heemskerk	212	48
Fireship	Jan Claaszoon	?	-
Third Squadron			
Name	***Commander***	***Men***	***Cannons***
Oranjeboom	Jan Cornelis Meppel (VA) Jan Noblet	140	36
Amsterdam	Jan GideonszoonVerburg	225	54
Steeden	Albert Pieterszoon de Boer	190	42
Koeworden	Isaak Sweers	225	50
Prins te Paard	Gerbrand Schatter	225	52
Gouda	Ijsbrand de Vries	190	40
Dom van Uitrecht	Jacob Swart van Edam	190	40
Provincien	Jan van Amstel	190	40
Zuiderhuis	Jan Richewyn	190	40
Tromp	Jacob van Berchem	190	40
Haarlem	Jan de Haan	190	40
Doesburg	Hugo van Nieuwhof	190	40
Leeuwarden	Joost Verschuur	150	36
Fireship	Huijbert Schoonevelt	?	-
Grand Total : 39 warships and 4 fireships		**7,689**	**1,743**
Infantry	Colonel William Killigrew	4,000	

21

The Struggle for Fyn

In June and July, the coalition army made several failed attempts to cross the sea to Fyn. Each attempt resulted in serious casualties, even though the two first Swedish attempts to reinforce Fyn in face of the landings failed because of unfavourable winds and unexpected encounters along the way with the Dutch fleets. On the second attempt, at Middelfart, even the Imperial commander Montecuccoli suffered a wound, when a nearby round shot hit sent a wooden splinter into his thigh.

Moreover, on 2 August a Swedish squadron of seven warships, a fireship, and a galiot under navy Major Owen Coxe, on *Nordstjernan*, in a surprise attack defeated the coalition squadron of five warships off Æbeltoft in Jutland and destroyed a major part of its transports. The attack was facilitated by the fact that Frederick William of Brandenburg, who was in command at Æbeltoft, had failed to deploy army artillery to cover the coalition's warships. Instead, he had trusted the Dutch fleet to prevent any Swedish intrusion, even though the Dutch were unavailable because of their ceasefire. The crews on the coalition ships (the two Danish warships *Grå Ulv* and *Skt. Johannes* under the experienced Koningh and Orning, whom we last met during the storm of Copenhagen as the commander of the artillery barge *Ark Noæ*, and the three Dutch warships *Prins Willem*, *Wapen van Enckhuysen*, and *Wapen van Monnickendam* under respectively Duym, Pomp, and Slordt) panicked, most fled to the shore, and only Koningh's *Grå Ulv* defended itself effectively. However, Koningh was badly wounded, reportedly losing both legs, after which his crew surrendered. Some reports claimed that Koningh's wound was mortal. *Wapen van Enckhuysen* caught fire and, according to some accounts, exploded. The other four ships were captured. Among the captives was Slordt, who refused to abandon ship when his crew fled. The transports, reportedly some 30 in total, were taken, too, and burned before the Swedes departed, since Coxe did not have the crew to man them all. The soldiers on them either fled ashore or fell into captivity. The total number of soldiers was reportedly 600 Brandenburg-Prussians and 400 Imperials, but if so, most successfully escaped. Coxe brought back 150 captured soldiers.[1]

---

[1] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.390–92. On the number of coalition soldiers, see Manley, *History*, 57, who possibly exaggerates the number.

In reward of his victory, he was later naturalised and ennobled as Siölöw. A few days later, Frederick William had his men abandon the island of Fænø during the night, for the time being also abandoning the attempts to take Fyn. Soon afterwards, Swedish units under Colonel Johann von Waldeck-Landau raided and burned yet more coalition transports at Kolding, Jutland. Frederick William's attempt to take Fyn had ended in disaster.

On the same day that Coxe defeated the Dutch off Æbeltoft during their attempt to land coalition troops on Fyn, Obdam's fleet finally set out from Copenhagen, intending to go on the offensive against the Swedes on all the Danish islands. Yet, already on the next day Obdam received countermanding orders. He must abort the offensive because of the negotiations currently ongoing during the second concert of The Hague. The Dutch had declared another ceasefire. And a few days later, the third concert of The Hague resulted in yet another Dutch ceasefire. Obdam ordered the 4,000 Dutch soldiers to be disembarked at Amager, near Copenhagen. They had then spent three months in the cramped space on board Dutch ships, suffered food shortages, and presumably were as happy to get ashore as the sailors were to see them leave.

By then, the Danish commanders were quite upset over what they interpreted as Dutch hesitation to go into action. On the same day that news of the third concert of The Hague reached Copenhagen, an exasperated Bielke wrote that 'I believe that the Dutch intention is that after Denmark is ruined, they wish that Sweden likewise must be ruined, so that their intention and that of the English is nothing but having all shipping [through the Strait] at their advantage'.[2]

King Charles and Wrangel were not sad to see the Dutch agree to a ceasefire. As long as the Dutch ceasefire lasted, Sweden retained its supremacy at sea. Sweden was not bound by the Dutch ceasefire to cease operations against Denmark, and by this time the Swedish navy was significantly superior in strength to what remained of the Danish navy. While King Charles ordered that his warships should not attack Danish ships when they were accompanied by Dutch escorts, since such an action might trigger the Dutch to go into battle, unaccompanied Danish warships and transports were fair game.[3]

The coalition army in Jutland suffered from other tensions as well, beyond those of the Dutch ceasefire. When in mid August, Souches' Imperial army moved against Swedish Pomerania from the south (more on which below), expectations grew high among the coalition commanders. Jutland was already ruined, and everybody instead wanted a piece of Pomerania. On 18 August, Frederick William departed from Jutland with his main army (13,000 men, primarily Brandenburg-Prussians), bound for Pomerania.[4] Frederick William left at most some 5,000 to 6,000 men behind.[5]

---

[2] Bielke to Gersdorff, 8 August 1659 (O.S.); cited in Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.373.

[3] King Charles to Wrangel, 28 May 1659 (O.S.); cited in Gersdorff, 8 August 1659, p.377.

[4] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.400. Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.239, suggests 18,000 Brandenburg-Prussians and coalition partners in Frederick William's army.

[5] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.239.


IMPERATOR. ÆTAT. LII. AN. M.DC.LXII.
HANS. SCHACK. SERENISSIMI. DANIÆ. NORUEGIÆ. &c. REGIS SUPREMUS BELLI

Hans Schack. (Jeremias Falck, after painting by Karel van Mander I)

King John Casimir had already on 2 July ordered Czarniecki to return to the Commonwealth in anticipation of offensives into both Swedish Pomerania and Swedish-held Prussia, and in early September, Czarniecki's corps, too, left Denmark, returning along the same roads that the previous autumn had brought them to Denmark. Of the Poles, only Colonel Kazimierz Piaseczyński (1630–1659) remained with his cavalry regiment. The Danes were eager to see this particularly rapacious set of allies leave their country. A contemporary chronicle described how the Poles plundered and laid waste buildings, stole horses, cows, and clothes, and raped women.[6] While we do not know if the Poles really were the worst offenders (because of King John Casimir's religiously inspired propaganda, they had a history of offences against Protestants), their activities certainly left a long-lasting imprint on Danish collective memory.

Montecuccoli, too, left Jutland to go to Pomerania with some Imperial units including the field artillery (after Montecuccoli departed, another Imperial field artillery unit of 14 cannons was raised for service in Jutland – henceforth, three Imperial field artillery units operated in the war, one each in Poland, Pomerania, and Denmark).

Yet, the remaining, more junior coalition commanders prepared for a new attempt to move the war onto Fyn. This time, King Frederick appointed Field Marshal Hans Schack (1609–1676) commander of the expedition, and a coalition army under his command bound for Fyn assembled in Kiel. Schack was a German veteran of the Thirty Years' War who, after a moment in the Danish army, had been in Swedish service from 1630 to 1635 followed by French service until 1651. King Frederick had made him commandant of Copenhagen. Field Marshal Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein (1605–1676) would lead another coalition army, which from Jutland would land on Fyn. Eberstein was another German veteran of the Thirty Years' War who had fought on every side, including in Imperial and Swedish service. King Frederick had enlisted him, too. Units for both expeditions were taken from Copenhagen, the Dutch fleet, Holstein, and Jutland. Altogether, the two armies would encompass more than 11,000 men.

King Frederick took draconian measures to ensure that the expedition succeeded. First, he ordered Schack to commandeer all vessels in the port able to transport men or horses, whether the owners were Danes or foreigners, and destroy any vessel whose owner refused. Then, King Frederick ordered all available privateers with Danish letters of marque, regardless of the terms of their contracts, to escort the commandeered transports on their way to Kiel, where the coalition army was expected to embark. The King also allocated a Danish warship, the *Spes* under Marquor Rodsten, to accompany the transport fleet. When it turned out that the skipper of the *Spes* had deserted, King Frederick commandeered an experienced burgher in Copenhagen to assume the position. Finally, following a request from Schack, the King also ordered Henrik Bielke and his three warships *Trefoldighed*, *Tre Løver*, and *Svanen* to join the convoy. Of course, the Dutch fleet under Obdam and Ruyter would come along, too, to ensure the convoy's protection. Nothing would be allowed to go wrong.

---

[6] Christian Solinus and Adam Olearius, *Holsteinische Chronica* 5 (1674), p.130.

In early October, the Dutch fleet under Ruyter and a transport fleet embarked Schack, as overall military commander, and the Dutch and Danish infantry in Copenhagen. The transport fleet already carried a significant military force. The Dutch contingent consisted of what remained of the 4,000 foot who had arrived with Ruyter (40 companies of in average 100 men each), under Colonels Killigrew and Puchler. Their remaining strength at this time seems to be unknown, but there had certainly been some attrition, so a realistic estimate might be 3,000 men or slightly more. In addition, the fleet carried a sizeable Danish contingent under Schack. An estimated 1,000 men strong, it consisted of six companies of foot from Friedrich Ahlefeldt's Regiment, the available two companies of the King's Life Regiment of Foot, and four companies of Lieutenant General Claus Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment, as well as some artillery. In total, Schack commanded an estimated 500 horse, 3,500 foot, and some artillery.

The plan was to add cavalry from the coalition armies in Jutland and Holstein, which had assembled in Kiel. This included Danish cavalry from what remained of the three cavalry regiments enlisted in Jutland, presently under Colonels Ove Brockenhuus, Mogens Kruse, and Hans Friis, about 1,000 horse from the remnants of the Holstein Cavalry Regiments, presently under Franz Joachim Trampe (d. 1682), and the other companies from Claus Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment.

On 11 October, the fleet sailed to Kiel, to embark the additional cavalry. The plan was not only to bring most of the Danish cavalry and infantry in Jutland and Holstein but also significant numbers of coalition horse. In addition to the Danish cavalry, as many as 2,000 coalition cavalry and 200 coalition dragoons were assembling in Kiel. However, it turned out that the transport fleet lacked capacity to embark them all. Some 30 of the small vessels pressed into service by King Frederick had either absconded or got lost due to stormy weather on the way to Kiel. As a result, the contingent to be embarked was reduced to 1,200 coalition horse (400 Imperials, 400 Brandenburg-Prussians, and 400 Poles). However, there were still not enough vessels to transport them all, so ultimately the entire contingent of coalition horse had to move overland, and accordingly ended up in Eberstein's army in Jutland.

King Frederick gave Schack a broad mandate. He could operate wherever he found circumstances favourable, and he was authorised to demand contributions in cash and supplies as well as to conscript or enlist soldiers wherever he went, as needed. There seems to be no certain sources on the



Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein, wearing the white insignia of the Order of the Elephant, which he, like Hans Schack, was awarded in 1663, suspended from a blue sash. The allonge wig was coming into fashion during the war but remained fairly uncommon in the army.

exact strength of Schack's army, but based on its strength after the landing on Fyn, it seems likely that it consisted of an estimated 2,700 Danish cavalry, 3,500 mostly Dutch foot, and 28 cannons.

Meanwhile, Eberstein's army in Jutland consisted of some 5,000 men (4,000 horse and 1,000 foot) and 14 cannons from the Imperial field artillery. The cavalry was perhaps divided into four regiments of Imperial cuirassiers under Colonel Gerhard von der Nath (1622–1689; later Dernath), four regiments of Brandenburg cavalry and dragoons under Major General Albrecht Christoph von Quast (1613–1669), and one regiment of Polish cavalry under the aforementioned Colonel Kazimierz Piaseczyński. The artillery consisted of 3- and 6-pounders.[7]

Schack would land on the east coast of Fyn, while Eberstein, supported by a naval squadron, would cross at Middelfart. Then, they would unite their forces on Fyn.

On 6 November, the Dutch fleet under Ruyter, reinforced with a Danish squadron under Bielke and a squadron of privateers in Danish service, set out from Kiel with Schack's army on board. Two days later, Schack's Dutch–Danish army attempted a landing at Nyborg. The plan was to have the Danish warships, under Bielke and Helt, accompany the transports which carried the infantry and artillery. Landing parties were formed, with a total strength of 2,000 musketeers. Upon reaching the shore, the Dutch fleet would send 10 large longboats each armed with a cannon to support the landing. The Danish infantry would land first, immediately followed by the field artillery of eight regimental cannons and the Dutch infantry. The Danish infantry would perhaps land from the aforementioned 10 Dutch longboats, although we do not know for sure. The Dutch infantry was divided into three temporary brigades. The first two, under Colonels Killigrew and Alwa, would each be transported in 10 Dutch longboats, which would be rowed ashore. The third brigade, under Colonel Meteren, would follow later, on board Ruyter's galiots and the merchantmen. The landing parties did not constitute the entire infantry force, since some would remain on the ships in reserve. Moreover, the entire fleet, including the privateers, was ordered to support the landing with cannon fire. The cavalry would land last.[8]

---

[7] Lars Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv: Carl X Gustaf, Philip av Sulzbach och slaget om Fyn hösten 1659', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965), pp.363–97, on p.365; Karl-Erik Frandsen, 'Polakkerne i slaget ved Nyborg', Janus Møller Jensen (ed.), *Slaget ved Nyborg 1659: Historie, arkæologi og erindring* (Kerteminde: Østfyns Museer, 2009), pp.31–7, on p.34. Tersmeden points out that the numbers for both Schack's and Eberstein's armies suggested by different sources and authorities are uncertain and often irreconcilable.

Unfortunately for the landing parties, Schack could not find any local guide. Moreover, Swedish artillery fire damaged several of the Dutch warships. Finally, unfavourable winds hampered the operation. The landing parties became separated from each other even before reaching the shore, and the soldiers had to spend a chilly night in the boats. On the next morning, hearing that more Swedish units were on the way, Schack abandoned the attempt. Instead, he decided to land in Kerteminde further to the north. One of the Danish captains, Peter Petersen Kierteminde, came from this town and knew the geography. Schack sent him on a reconnaissance mission to his old home to measure the water depth. Two days later, the invasion force successfully landed at the appointed location. Swedish cavalry and dragoons from Nyborg hastened there to oppose the landing, but with massive artillery support from the Dutch fleet the 800 coalition musketeers of the first wave landed and waded ashore without difficulty and took the town. Captain Petersen Kierteminde guided the landing party ashore from the first boat, which also carried Colonel Heinrich Volrath Both of the King's Life Regiment of Foot who led the infantry.

Nonetheless, the landing did not lack its dramatic moments. Schack followed in one of the first longboats, and he personally led his men as they waded ashore. Ruyter led the naval operation from another of the longboats, and two sailors in it were killed before they reached the shore. However, there were few Swedish soldiers in Kerteminde, and the town was essentially indefensible for reasons of geography. Losses were few on both sides. About 10 Danes including Major Sirck from the King's Life Regiment of Foot fell, together with about 11 Dutchmen including a major. Another 10 to 11 men were wounded during the operation. Swedish casualties are unknown, but 14 men fell into coalition captivity.[9] Having gained a secure bridgehead, Schack landed the rest of the army. The landing was completed two days later.

In response, Philip of Sulzbach, the commander on the Swedish army on Fyn deployed his men at Ulriksholm outside Kerteminde to await the expected attack. It never came. Instead, Schack dug in at Kerteminde.

Meanwhile, Eberstein assembled his army at Kolding in Jutland. Two days later, the first units of Eberstein's coalition army (Dutch, Danes, Poles, and Brandenburg-Prussians) crossed to Fyn at Middelfart. The ease of the operation is shown by the fact that the first wave consisted of only 60 musketeers in 13 fishing boats. The landing was supported by two 7-pounders. The only Swedish force available on the scene was a cavalry patrol which could do nothing to prevent the crossing.[10] Four days later, Eberstein ordered a strong cavalry force to Odense, which dominated central Fyn.

King Charles had not expected the coalition army in Kiel to land on Fyn, since he thought its destination would be Zealand. An attack on Fyn was strategically pointless, he argued. Probably King Charles expected his enemies to do what he himself would have done, that is, aim for a decisive strike against the Swedish primary base on Zealand from which Copenhagen remained under threat (his adversaries agreed; within days King Frederick asked the coalition to move the operation to Zealand, and both Eberstein and Quast later in the month argued in favour – but Ruyter refused because supply shortages and approaching winter conditions precluded another naval operation[11]). As a result, King Charles had withdrawn units from Fyn to Pomerania, by now under threat from both Imperials and Brandenburg-Prussians, and even moved a few units from Fyn to Zealand.

---

[8] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.416–17.

[9] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.418–19, 599 n. 307.

[10] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.419–20.

Because of this, questions early on arose why the coalition focused on Fyn, not Zealand. Possibly, the Dutch at this point did not wish to see Sweden utterly defeated since this would result in another period of Danish domination of the Strait, yet wished to deliver a strike that would persuade King Charles to accept a peace treaty. Although such an explanation corresponds to what is known about Dutch strategy at the time, there seems to be no archive document to support this explanation. Possibly, Fyn was chosen merely because an invasion there was feasible, and an attempt against King Charles on Zealand would have been a significantly riskier proposition.

With Pomerania under attack (see below), King Charles had sent Field Marshal Wrangel there. Instead, he promoted Philip of Sulzbach to field marshal and gave him the task to defend Fyn and Langeland. This was not an honorary promotion; Sulzbach had begun his military career in the Duchy of Lorraine and in 1655 entered into Swedish service with an enlisted regiment, which he brought to the Commonwealth. Moreover, the King tasked Lieutenant General Henrik Horn to assist Sulzbach, in accordance with the Swedish tradition since the Thirty Years' War of making sure that any senior foreign prince in his service also had an experienced and able Swedish officer as second-in-command. In fact, Sulzbach was not short of experienced men. His command also included Major Generals Hans Böddeker, Adam von Weiher, and Johann von Waldeck-Landau, who had served under the King since the outbreak of war in the Commonwealth. The Swedish forces on Fyn totalled some 4,000 horse, mostly enlisted Germans apparently organised into 11 cavalry and four dragoon squadrons, and about 1,500 foot drawn from numerous regiments, most of them national in origin. The fortunes of war meant that for practical reasons, battalions customarily included companies from different regiments, on this occasion with major contingents from the Kronoberg and Kalmar Regiments.[12]

Sulzbach was an attentive commander. He correctly gauged the direction of the Dutch fleet, and as we have seen, he successfully preempted Schack's first landing. Sulzbach also identified Kerteminde as the fleet's secondary target, and he was there when the fleet arrived. However, Kerteminde lacked fortifications and because of the poor conditions of the road following the

---

[11] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.422.

[12] Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', p.369. As noted, the numbers suggested by different sources and authorities are uncertain and often irreconcilable.



Operations on Fyn Island, November–December 1659

14-18 Nov. Eberstein lands on Fyn and continues towards Odense

21-22 Nov. Schack and Eberstein join forces in Odense, advance towards Nyborg

10 Nov. Schack lands at Kerteminde

Sulzbach deloys at Ulriksholm

16-18 Nov. Sulzbach retreats to Nyborg

24 Nov. Battle of Nyborg

8 Nov. Schack attempts landing at Nyborg

N
JUTLAND
GREAT BELT
Frederiksodde
Middelfart
Kerteminde
Ulriksholm
Odense
Korsør
Nyborg
LITTLE BELT
Assens
FYN
LANGELAND
Faaborg
Svendborg
Swedish Corps
Schack
Eberstein
Coalition army
0
10
20 km



Philip Florinus of Sulzbach. (Abraham Wuchters, Gripsholm Castle)

autumn rains it proved impossible to move artillery there in time to prevent the landing. Afterwards, Schack's superior numbers and strong position convinced Sulzbach that he could not dislodge the invader.

For Sulzbach, the presence of Schack's army on the island was bad enough. The arrival of Eberstein's army made his already tenuous position in Fyn yet more insecure. Sulzbach accordingly devised a plan to prevent the two coalition armies from joining forces at Odense, hoping to be able to defeat first Eberstein and then Schack in separate engagements. This was a risky strategy, but the only one available under the circumstances. However, Sulzbach abandoned the endeavour and already on 18 November, three days before Schack and Eberstein joined forces at Odense, retreated to the better-fortified Nyborg, which was vital for communications with the main army on Zealand and the supply of provisions therefrom. Sulzbach later explained that neither opponent was willing to move out from his fortified position, and that his own army was too weak, out of supplies, and too exhausted from the constant marches back and forth across the island to storm a fortified site. The rain-sogged roads still prevented the movement of artillery, so Sulzbach retained his infantry in Nyborg. Sulzbach's mobile forces probably counted no more than at most 3,500 horse, which was significantly less than either of his opponents. However, the crux of the matter seems to have been Sulzbach's focus on holding Nyborg which prevented him from concentrating his army in a more central location, such as the strategically advantageous Odense. Why did Sulzbach follow such an overly cautious strategy, which by this time was not in line with how Swedish commanders typically operated? Soon after assuming command on Fyn, he had received an order from King Charles that stated: 'In case the enemy succeeds in getting ashore, it is necessary to see to the conservation of the troops and not risk them needlessly'.[13] With his men exhausted, Sulzbach now interpreted the word 'conservation' as the key communication of the King's order. We can be certain that King Charles had not intended his order to be an excuse for passivity, and more likely would have regarded 'needlessly' as the gist of the matter.

In fact, King Charles was already displeased with how Sulzbach handled the defence of Fyn. Even before intelligence on the matter arrived, the King realised that Eberstein would bring a strong army to Middelfart, from which it would be easy for him to join forces with Schack. Although Pomerania remained under threat, the King knew that Wrangel now was there to handle the situation. Fyn was a different matter. The loss of Fyn would threaten the Swedish position on Zealand. King Charles accordingly decided to send reinforcements. He also recalled Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock from Scania with the intention to have him assist Sulzbach. It was more difficult to send army units, and in particular cavalry. Although the Swedish forces on Zealand, Lolland, Falster, and Møn together constituted almost 10,000 men, the King presently lacked ships for transporting men and, in particular, horses.[14] Those few transports that were available were either in the Grønsund Strait between Falster and Møn or in Stralsund in Pomerania, to which they had brought Wrangel and his men. King Charles wrote to Wrangel that 'God give that I had more shipping capacity, so that I could at the same time transport 1,000 horses; if so, I could act appropriately.'[15] It was also dangerous to carry out the shipping operation piecemeal, since the Dutch fleet still patrolled the seas around Fyn. As a result, King Charles made preparations to send infantry and supplies, and to ship these reinforcements across to Fyn at night to avoid risking their loss to Dutch naval patrols. By these means, some 1,500 additional infantry crossed from Zealand to Fyn on 15 November. Sulzbach henceforth had almost 7,000 men at this disposal (4,000 horse and 3,000 foot), together with a field artillery of 18 cannons and additional artillery in the fortified locations.[16]

---

[13] King Charles to Sulzbach, Landskrona, 8 September 1659 (O.S.); cited in Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', p.375.


Feldmarſchall Henrich Horn G.
Gouverneur in den Herzogthumen Bremen
und Vorden.

Henrik Horn. (Matthäeus Merian)

King Charles also sent letters to Sulzbach, which included advice and orders. The letters, even though dispatched at different times, reached Sulzbach in one batch on 16 November. Sulzbach was not a poor commander, and in fairness, he had already acted according to much of the advice he received. However, the King's last letter ended with a postscript: 'Do what you can, so that you save the men, because within six weeks I hope either to reinforce them from here or to ship them here.'[17] Most likely, King Charles added these words to

---

[14] Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', pp.376–7.

[15] King Charles to Wrangel, Korsør, 2 November 1659 (O.S.); cited in Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', p.377.

[16] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.246–7.

[17] King Charles to Sulzbach, Korsør, 5 November 1659 (O.S.); cited in Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', p.379.



Dutch sailors on small boats, mid seventeenth century. (Willem van de Velde the Elder)

his relative in haste because he knew that Sulzbach was downhearted because of his lack of success and needed some encouragement. It is known that the King at the time discussed a number of strategic options, but none of them included the evacuation of Fyn. However, the dejected Sulzbach seems to have interpreted the postscript as a way out of his present predicament. Had not the King already in September told him to conserve his forces? Henceforth, the words 'conservation' and 'evacuation' came to dominate Sulzbach's strategy.

Paradoxically, King Charles on the day after Sulzbach received his orders was informed that Sulzbach had decided to attack Eberstein, who only a few days earlier had landed on Fyn. The messages between Sulzbach and the King had passed each other in transit. As a result, King Charles expressed his hearty approval of Sulzbach's decision. Again, the letters passed each other in transit. Two days later, the King received a despatch from Sulzbach informing him that the latter had decided not to attack after all but instead had retreated into Nyborg. The King knew that Nyborg lacked supplies, and to allow oneself to be locked up under such circumstances invited defeat. Shocked and annoyed, King Charles immediately sent Field Marshal Gustav Otto Stenbock to advise and assist the dejected Sulzbach. Stenbock crossed the Great Belt the same night.

But it was already too late. On the same day, 19 November, Schack reached Odense. Earlier in the day, Eberstein set out from Middelfart to join him there. Two days later, Schack's and Eberstein's coalition armies joined forces in Odense. The two field marshals could not agree on who was in overall command. The only solution was for them to alternate in command so that Schack commanded on the first day, Eberstein on the second, Schack again on the third, and so on. Following this system, the two on the following day continued the march towards Nyborg. On the same day, the combined Dutch–Danish fleet moved from Kerteminde to Nyborg, which it henceforth blockaded.

The fortifications at Nyborg were insufficient to withstand a siege, in particular when also threatened from the sea. On 23 November, Ruyter landed men outside Nyborg who took Knudshoved Bastion, which either was already abandoned or surrendered without a fight. The Swedes were now trapped. Even though winter conditions eventually would persuade the Dutch fleet to go into port, there was no reason to believe that they would depart until after another five or six weeks. As a result, Sulzbach and Stenbock on the following day moved out to meet the coalition army in battle.

The Battle of Nyborg

On 24 November 1659, the Swedes confronted the combined Dutch-Danish army at Nyborg.[18] On the day of battle, it was Eberstein's turn to hold overall command of the coalition army, while Schack commanded the reserve. The battle began at approximately 11:00 a.m.

Sulzbach and Stenbock attempted to compensate their inferiority in numbers by deploying in terrain that provided some protection, such as behind streams and ditches and in broken ground. They anchored the right flank on a wood, the left on a marsh-like lake, and made sure that the rear was protected by a forest which would enable an orderly retreat to Nyborg, in case things went wrong.

The battle commenced when the coalition right wing attacked the Swedish left wing. The coalition centre and left wing then advanced, too. However, the coalition army was halted and pushed back by Swedish artillery and musket fire, or perhaps by Swedish cavalry charges. Yet, the Swedes failed to dislodge either the coalition infantry or artillery, which remained in position. The battle continued, back and forth, for about two and a half hours.

Eberstein and Schack then reformed their cavalry, which again charged the Swedish left wing. This time, the coalition cavalry was more successful, in a short but bloody engagement disrupting the Swedish cavalry which retreated all the way to Nyborg, pursued by the coalition cavalry. This exposed the Swedish infantry, most of whom were cut down, and artillery, which was captured. A primary role was played by Colonel Kazimierz Piaseczyński's Cavalry

---

[18] Recent research includes Bjørn Westerbeek Dahl, 'Carl Heinrich von der Osten og Pufendorfværkets plancher af Slaget ved Nyborg 1659', *Militärhistorisk Tidskrift* 1994, pp.7–23; Janus Møller Jensen (ed.), *Slaget ved Nyborg 1659: Historie, arkæologi og erindring* (Kerteminde: Østfyns Museer, 2009); John Maalø Larsen, 'Hvor stod slaget? Et nyt gammelt kort fra Slaget ved Nyborg 1659', *Nyborg Før & Nu* (2010), pp.28–39; and the online notes from the battlefield archaeology project of Østfyns Museer and Odense Bys Museer <https://www.facebook.com/Slagmarksark%C3%A6ologi-1521918654710553/>. Thanks to Henrik Tjørnelund Brandt who provided this information. Many documents relating to the battle were published in Louis Ferdinand von Eberstein (ed.), *Kriegsberichte des Königl. Dänischen General-Feldmarschalls Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein aus dem zweiten schwedish-dänishen Kriege* (Berlin: Gustav Schenk, 2nd edn 1891). See also Tersmeden, 'Strategisk defensiv', pp.387–92.

Regiment, the only remaining Polish unit in the army.[19] Colonel Piaseczyński fell in the charge, but depending on the source, either his charge shattered the Swedish line, which enabled the coalition victory in the first place, or his men mopped up the remaining Swedish resistance after a general coalition cavalry charge determined the outcome.[20] Either way, the Poles determinedly cut down all opponents without giving pardon. A Dutch eyewitness described how 'the Poles were inhuman, killing all whom they found'.[21]

Our vague knowledge of the battle of Nyborg results from the personal rivalry between the commanders who fought it, who in their respective accounts contradict each other on numerous details. Each coalition commander was keen on presenting himself in a favourable light at the expense of the others. Even the orders of battle provided by these sources differ in important ways. It may no longer be possible fully to reconstruct the details of the battle. The Swedish relations are no more credible. So was Sulzbach described as fighting with great bravery, personally killing eight opponents including Colonel Piaseczyński and Lieutenant Colonel Josias Breide Rantzau of Eberstein's Life Regiment of Horse (formerly Ditlev Ahlefeldt's Cavalry Regiment). Yet, a Polish relation described how Piaseczyński fell hit by three shots when he led his regiment's first charge.[22] While there are no means to determine the veracity of either story, the latter sounds more credible.

Swedish losses in the battle were significant. Major General Böddeker fell at an early stage in the battle.

The surviving Swedes retreated into Nyborg, which by then already was under artillery fire from Ruyter's Dutch fleet. However, as King Charles had predicted, the town could not be defended. In the evening, Sulzbach ordered the remaining troops to surrender at dawn, and then, together with Stenbock, made his escape in a small boat to Zealand. The two field marshals left Lieutenant General Henrik Horn to negotiate the surrender and go into captivity. Based on roll calls, as many as 1,677 infantry, 80 standards of cavalry, and 17 guidons of dragoons surrendered – vague figures which have been estimated as adding up to a total of 5,000 men.[23] Another estimate suggests that 2,300 Swedes fell in battle (against 500 Danes) and more than 3,000 surrendered at Nyborg.[24] Neither estimate seems to correspond very well to the number of men who marched out on the day of battle. We can only conclude that the battle of Nyborg was a decisive Swedish defeat. Numerous experienced and up-and-coming officers became captives of war, including Major General Adam von Weiher and Johann von Waldeck-Landau and 12 colonels including Johan Benedikt von Schönleben, a veteran of the Thirty Years' War who would make a name for himself during the next war with Denmark. Coalition losses were not trivial, and included Colonel Both of the King's Life Regiment of Foot, who had led the landing party ashore at Kerteminde, and Major General Quast, who had survived the battles of Breitenfeld, Lützen, and Jankow in Swedish service, was seriously wounded.

---

[19] The strength of Piaseczyński's Cavalry Regiment is described by various sources and authorities as consisting of some 600, 1,000, or 2,000 men. The lower figure derives from a contemporary source and seems more credible. 600 Poles: Manley, *History*, p.101. 1,000 Poles: Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen', p.85; Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.400. 2,000 Poles: Karl-Erik Frandsen, 'Polakkerne i slaget ved Nyborg', Jensen, *Slaget ved Nyborg*, p.34.

[20] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.306.

[21] Frandsen, 'Polakkerne', p.35.

[22] Frandsen, 'Polakkerne', p.36.

[23] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.248; citing roll calls.

[24] Kjeld G. H. Hillingsø, 'Karl Gustav krigene pp.1657–58 og 1658–60: Det landmilitære aspect med hovedvægt på slaget ved Nyborg 14. november 1659', Janus Møller Jensen (ed.), *Slaget ved Nyborg 1659: Historie, arkæologi og erindring* (Kerteminde: Østfyns Museer, 2009), pp.68–79, on p.76.

Sulzbach was later criticised by contemporaries because he failed to prevent the landing on Fyn or because he failed to engage Schack and Eberstein before they joined forces.[25] However, King Charles did not rebuke Sulzbach and Stenbock for the defeat. He probably recognised the difficult situation in which they had been placed. Roger Manley, who met King Charles shortly after the battle, relates how the King continued to trust both men:

> His reception of the *Palsgrave* [Sulzbach] and *Steynbock* [Stenbock] immediately after their defeat, had nothing of harsh in it; and his treating of them afterwards, shewed him rather a just recompenser, than a despiser of unfortunate vertue: for he continued the one in his Government of *Schonen* [Scania], and intrusted the other with the Command of his Armies, and the Isles in *Denmark* in his absence ... [When I asked about the defeat] His Majesty thereupon was pleased to tell me the whole manner of the Battle, and what Regiments, and what particular persons did well: concluding, that no body was a Master of Fortune, and nothing was more casual than War: but the blow was not great, and not meanly repaired, in the satisfaction he had, that his men had fought well.[26]

The King's cool assessment was not far off the mark, because the coalition commanders did not follow up on their victory. The Netherlands preferred to see both Denmark and Sweden equally weak, so that the Strait would not be fully under the control of either power. Ruyter's fleet accordingly departed to Lübeck to acquire supplies, since none remained on Fyn. In December, Eberstein and part of Schack's army returned whence they came, to Jutland and Holstein. By January 1660 they had all left Denmark. The surviving Poles returned with Eberstein, on the way home to Poland (which they reached in February).

In early January 1660, King Charles went to attend a Parliament assembly in Gothenburg. In his absence, he gave Sulzbach overall command in Denmark, with instructions to retake Fyn as soon as the Great Belt had frozen.

---

[25] Manley, *History*, p.100.

[26] Manley, *History*, p.112.



The Battle of Nyborg, 24 November 1659

1. Dutch-Danish fleet bombards Swedish positions

2. Dutch-Danish bombardment silences Swedish artillery at Knudshoved, but the Swedish artillery in the camp and the bastion east of Nyborg continues the battle

3. The coalition army advances towards the increasingly shaken Swedes. Finally, Piasecyński's Cavalry Regiment charges the Swedes, shattering them. The surviving Swedes withdraw into the bastions, after which they surrender

N
Swedish army
Sulzbach
Stenbock
Horn
Eberstein
Schack
Coalition army
Piaseczyński
Nyborg Bastion
Nyborg
Knudshoved Bastion
Ellensburg
Iuleby
Winning
0
1
2 km
(Approximate scale)


Situs locorum circa
NEOBURGUM
in Fionia, et positus exercituum vtriusq; partis, ante
Conflictum d. 14. Nouemb. 1659.
Nomina legionum exercitus Confœderatorum.
1. Legio prætoria Regis Daniæ. 2. Legio prætoria Reginæ
Daniæ. 3. Leg. Polonica Passasinsky. 4. Mathei. 5. Caraffa.
6. Schultze. 7. desultores. 8. Mathei. 9. von der Natt. 11. Gulden-
lew. 12. Schach. 13. Brakenhusen. 14. Horleff. 15. Egg-
erich. 16. Ieſenaht. 17. Killegre. 18. Allewa. 19. Metern. 20. Grewe
21. Quast. 22. desultores. 23. Metern. 24. Eberstein. 25. Kan-
nenberg. 26. Frieſe. 27.
Cruse. 28. Trampe.
FRETI BALTHICI
MAIORIS PARS
Reigstrup
Acies Danorum et Confœderatorum
Ala sinistra
Ala dextra
Barnegard
Neoburgum
Munimentum
Paludes
Castra
Promont Canuti
Slibshauen
Munimentum
Portus Neoburgicus
Danorum et Batauorum Classis
Iuleby
Winning
Via Swenburg
Ellensburg
N. 98.

Map of Nyborg with surroundings, showing the battlefield on the left


FRETUM BALTICUM MAJUS
Promon torium Canuti
INSULÆ FYONIÆ PARS
Slithaven portus
SINUS NEOBURGICUS
Hellensbug
NEOBURGUM
Fioniæ oppidum, una cum delineatione
Terrarum vicinarum vsque ad Fretum Balticum et Promontorium Canuti An. 1659.
100. 200. 300. 400. 500. 600. 700.
Scala 700. perticarum Danicarum quarum ſingula continet ſex vlnas Sialandicas ſive pedes duodecim. bis mille vero perticæ conſiciunt vnum milliare ſeu 1200. ulnas.
NEOBURGUM.
Arx
Sialandia
Insula
Corsöör
Fretum
Sproo
Balticum
Majus
Promontorium Canuti

Map of Nyborg. (Erik Dahlbergh)



The battle of Nyborg, 24 November 1659, as seen from the Coalition side. The Coalition cavalry on the right wing is in the process of breaking through the Swedes, who have begun to flee towards Nyborg.


Project
Von dero zu Dennemarck Norwegen königl. Mayst. FRIDERICO tertio, gegen dero zu Schweden königl. Mayst. CAROLO GUSTAVO glücklichen Victorisirten Batallie in Fühnen, Geschehen den 14. Novembris Anno 1659.
Schwedischer rechter flügell
Schwedischer linker flügell
Dänischer linker flügell
Dänischer rechter flügell
71
71
69

The battle of Nyborg, 24 November 1659, with the Coalition lines below and the Swedish lines above, taking advantage of the forested terrain. (Map prepared by the eyewitness Wilhelm Brochman, 1662)



The Dutch fleet takes Nyborg and the Swedish surrender, 25 November 1659

The Swedish–Norwegian Border

In August 1659, Preben von Ahnen (1606–1675), the Governor of Norway's Nordland, led a raiding party of some 100 men across the bare border mountains to the small settlement Silbojokk, the site of the refinery for the important silver mine at Mt. Nasa. The Norwegians burned the church, the buildings, and the refinery facilities. Silbojokk had few inhabitants, and no armed guards, so there was no resistance. Thus was King Frederick's plan from 1657 finally brought to fruition. Ahnen and his men then backtracked towards the border to the silver mine itself. They plundered the mining facilities and destroyed what they could not take. This brought an end to mining operations at Mt Nasa, which remained deserted for more than a century, until 1770.

In late October 1659, a Norwegian army again moved into Bohuslän. In mid November, it reached Kvistrum and Uddevalla, where the offensive stopped. Major General Harald Stake had too few men to stop the offensive, so King Charles ordered him to retreat to Vänersborg, which he must hold at all costs to retain the communications line between Gothenburg and central Sweden. Then, when the winter cold had frozen the ground, the King wanted



Contemporary depiction of the siege of Halden, January–March 1660. While the town (centre left) ultimately did not surrender, fighting was hard, and Kagg's men took the bastion on the mountain Rødsberget (centre right, marked C) and the rocky terrain overlooking the town (left). Kagg's primary camp is marked, too (extreme right).

Stake to go on a counteroffensive into Norway. Stake gathered an army of 1,500 horse, 1,350 foot, and 10 regimental cannons.[27]

King Charles was willing to secede Trondheim County, but only if he received Akershus County instead. To show that he was serious, in late 1659 he ordered old Field Marshal Lars Kagg to go with Harald Stake on the offensive into southern Norway to take Akershus by force. Kagg, whose first wars had been the Kalmar War against Denmark in 1611 and the campaign against Pskov in Muscovy, was yet another experienced commander. After his early wars, he had been trained in the Life Guard of Maurice of Nassau for three years, and then gone into the service of Frederick V of Bohemia. In 1621, he was back in the Swedish army, fighting at Riga, Dirschau, and Stralsund. He had then served throughout the entire Thirty Years' War, including in the war with Denmark and Norway, when he and Stake in 1645 together pushed back a determined Norwegian offensive against Gothenburg. Yet, Kagg was unwilling to go, since he was 64 years old and suffered from numerous old wounds. Stake was 61.[28] Nonetheless, the two veterans in January 1660 marched towards Norway with 4,700 men (2,000 cavalry, 800 dragoons, 1,600 foot, and 300 artillerymen with at least 14 regimental cannons and eight heavier ones, plus a mortar).[29]

Perhaps feeling that Kagg would need a younger man at his side, King Charles appointed the 45-year-old General of Cavalry Gustav Evertsson Horn, until then in Finland, to be the Field Marshal's deputy. Yet, Major General Stake was already at Kagg's side. They suffered from cold and lack of supplies. Reaching Halden, a small but fortified town in Swedish sources often called Hall, Kagg on 23 January laid siege. The small garrison, led by Tønne Huitfeldt, refused to surrender. Running out of supplies and seeing little utility in the venture, on 3 March Kagg abandoned the siege and returned to Sweden.[30]

---

[27] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.254.

[28] We have already seen that Harald Stake was a legend within the army, yet he was also a legend in his native Västergötland. Old people told stories about him and his first wife Magdalena Sparre (1612–1656), who had dealings with the Elves of the deep forests. Once, they said, Lady Magdalena lent her bridal dress to an Elf lady, who in gratitude returned it set with gold and pearls, and also gave her a ring of the finest gold set with costly stones. The Elven ring became an heirloom in the Stake family.

[29] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.262.

[30] On the campaign for Halden, see Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.262–7.

22

The Swedish Offensive into Prussia

We have seen that even during the Danish wars, the Swedish defensive strategy against Muscovy in the northeastern theatre and in Prussia did not preclude going on the offensive with small armies when conditions were favourable. In early February 1659, Paul Würtz led 2,173 cavalry and dragoons from Swedish Pomerania into Prussia. There he joined forces with Duke Adolph John who moved out of Marienburg with 1,500 horse, 700 to 800 foot, two 3-pounders, and a 60-pound mortar.[1] The frozen Vistula enabled the Duke to cross even with his artillery. While the limited artillery and infantry which the Duke brought meant that no major siege works would be possible, the Swedish armies consisted of experienced men who were second to none in Prussia. Joining forces at Hammerstein (Polish: Czarne) on the River Schwarzwasser (Polish: Czarna), the Swedes immediately went on the offensive. It is generally assumed that their aim was to strike at Ducal Prussia in order to force Frederick William to agree to a separate peace treaty, or at least to withdraw his units from Jutland, which would benefit the Swedish strategy in Denmark.[2] As noted, Frederick William also needed to look out for Swedish incursions from Courland, where Field Marshal Douglas commanded a corps.

It was a daring operation, since the Swedes went on the offensive despite being greatly outnumbered. In Prussia, there were 5,750 Polish soldiers, the Danzig Army of 3,500 men, an Imperial regiment of 1,000 horse under Gottfried von Heister, and some 5,000 Brandenburg-Prussians. Levies raised the total yet higher. The combined Swedish field army of approximately 4,300 men faced an estimated 18,000 adversaries (5,900 cavalry, 2,000 dragoons, and

---

[1] Pierre des Noyers, *Lettres de Pierre des Noyers* (Berlin: B. Behr, 1859), p.490; Patrick Gordon, *Tagebuch des Generalen Patrick Gordon, während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen vom Jahre 1655 bis 1661, und seines Aufenthaltes in Rußland vom Jahre 1661 bis 1699* (Moscow: Prince M. A. Obolenskiy and M. C. Posselt, 1849), p.181. See also; Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.397; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.242.

[2] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', pp.300–301.



Dirschau, 1659. (Samuel von Pufendorf)

more than 10,000 foot).[3] However, what spoke in favour of the bold offensive was that the adversaries were dispersed and, moreover, the majority had gone into winter quarters. Most of the Poles and Heister's Imperial regiment were quartered in Thorn or thereabouts, while the Danzig Army remained in Danzig and the Brandenburg-Prussians were in the eastern parts of Ducal Prussia, keeping an eye on what Douglas might do in Samogitia.

As a result, the Swedish offensive enjoyed several initial successes. In February, the Swedes retook Konitz. They also took Schwetz, Kulm, and then proceeded into Ducal Prussia, where they took Marienwerder, Saalfeld, Liebstadt, and Mohrungen. They moved north towards Braunsberg, but there the offensive stopped, because the ice of the River Passarge (Polish: Pasłęka) was too weak to cross. Duke Adolph John then returned to Marienburg, since he did not want to risk an attack from Danzig against his rear. In March, the Swedes instead retook Dirschau (modern-day Tczew), defended by 300 men

---

[3] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.395.



Polish nobles on horseback. (Commonwealth envoys to Paris, 1645)

from Butler's Regiment under Colonel Beaulieu. Danzig prepared to send reinforcements, but Dirschau fell in three days. This was unsurprising, since Duke Adolph John brought siege artillery from Marienburg. This severed Danzig's line of communications with inner Poland. Major General Barthold Hartwig von Bülow then took Stargard with 2,600 men in a surprise night attack and looted Danziger Werder, where he surprised and defeated a Brandenburg-Prussian contingent. Then, he also attacked and defeated a contingent of the Danzig Army, which lost 60 men.[4] For both sides, it was important to hold strongpoints in Prussia. Wise from his experiences during the Thirty Years' War, King Charles knew that he needed a favourable position to gain enemy concessions in the peace that both sides eventually would have to negotiate.

However, the Swedish offensive could not be carried further. In March, Crown General of Artillery Krzysztof Grodzicki managed to reassemble some Polish units. This force, supported by 400 Imperial dragoons from Gottfried von Heister's Regiment, went on a counter-offensive. So did Major General Joachim Ernst von Görzke, with 1,800 cavalry and 1,000 dragoons from Brandenburg. Together, they began to roll back the Swedish gains. Duke Adolph John and Würtz ordered the small garrisons from several less important strongholds pulled out, since they were indefensible.[5] If the strategic objective of the Swedish offensive was to push Frederick William out of the war, it failed. On the other hand, the Swedes had, for the time being, severed the route between Danzig and Poland. The Swedish offensive had also tied up major Commonwealth and Brandenburg-Prussian resources at a time when they would have been more useful elsewhere, in particular in Denmark. The Swedes had also displayed that they were both more hard-hitting than the Polish units and, surprisingly, also more maneuverable. In comparison to the speed of the Swedish offensive, the Poles and Brandenburg-

---

[4] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.303.

[5] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.303.

Prussians responded slowly. This was a far cry from Czarniecki's operations ahead of King Charles's line of march the previous year. The conclusion was, perhaps, that the Polish cavalry needed significantly more open terrain than was available in Prussia to make an impact not only on the battlefield but also on the march.

Moreover, Poles, Brandenburg-Prussians, and Imperials could not agree on strategic goals. In March, negotiations between the three collapsed. Many Poles wanted the Imperial troops to be withdrawn, and it soon turned out that neither of the three powers shared goals beyond the obvious, that of containing the Swedes to the extent that this was possible.

Meanwhile, the Brandenburg-Prussians wanted to preserve their own forces. Frederick William feared that the Swedes would return, but he also distrusted King John Casimir, who might want to revise the terms that granted the Elector independence in Prussia. In Ducal Prussia, defences consisted of the Brandenburg-Prussian field army under Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł, which consisted of 2,244 cavalry, 1,540 dragoons, and 3,475 foot, mostly based in Königsberg. There were also garrisons in Königsberg, Pillau, and several other towns.[6] However, Radziwiłł and the other Brandenburg-Prussian commanders were cautious over the presence of Douglas's Swedish army in Samogitia, so were somewhat unwilling to operate in support of their coalition partners in Royal Prussia.

Even so, in May Joachim Ernst von Görzke attempted to blockade Duke Adolph John's headquarters at Marienburg with 2,700 men. However, this was futile, because Sweden was still able to bring in supplies and reinforcements by sea. Moreover, the Swedes continued to carry out limited offensives against their adversaries, including one against Oliva by Duke Adolph John with 4,000 men, and another, led by Würtz and consisting only of cavalry, against Putzig (modern-day Puck) to gain cattle and food supplies.[7]

The Struggle for Courland

Following the Truce of Vallisaare between Sweden and Muscovy, Field Marshal Robert Douglas was free to focus his attention on the resistance in Courland. As a result, he continued the offensive until he in January 1659 had re-taken control of the entire territory, except the port-towns of Libau (modern-day Liepāja) and Windau (modern-day Ventspils). The Brandenburg-Prussian reinforcements to the Courlanders were defeated, too. In mid March, Swedes under Major General Fabian Aderkas defeated a major combined Polish and Courland corps under respectively Colonels Ernst Johann von Korff and Ewald von der Brinck at Hasenpoth (modern-day Aizpute), Courland. Korff and Brinck first retreated into the town, and then surrendered.[8]

---

[6] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.299; citing Curt Jany, *Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum Jahre 1807*, Vol. I (Berlin: Karl Siegismund, 1928), p.124.

[7] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.305.

[8] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.151–2.

Courland remained exposed to Lithuanian units, however. In April 1659, Douglas led the remaining Livonian field army, at this point consisting of only some 1,800 cavalry and 1,300 infantry with both heavy and light artillery (the latter 3- and 6-pounders), towards the border with Samogitia, south of Courland.[9] On the road, he took both Windau and Libau, which completed the Swedish conquest of Courland.

Fighting then moved into Samogitia. The Commonwealth situation there improved significantly in early May, when the Commonwealth commanders managed to conclude a local truce for three months with the Muscovites in Čedasai (Polish: Czadosy). Colonel Samuel Komorowski made sure to inform Douglas about the truce, since he expected the news to put Douglas on the defensive. More tangibly, the truce freed several Lithuanian units which now could move into Courland to fight the Swedes. While Douglas had a reputation for steadiness rather than derring-do, Komorowski's plan did not work. In mid May, Douglas defeated Komorowski's Courland–Lithuanian army at Schoden (Polish: Szkudy; modern-day Skuodas). The Lithuanians withdrew, but because they still blocked the way further into Samogitia, Douglas's failure to eliminate them nonetheless marked the end of the Swedish offensive in Samogitia.

Moreover, then Douglas received new orders from King Charles. Henceforth, he should not aim for further conquests in Lithuania but instead focus on safeguarding Courland and the Baltic Sea ports. For a while, Douglas and Komorowski continued to manoeuvre against each other, but neither gained a decisive advantage. In late May, Komorowski retreated into Lithuania to consolidate his forces.[10]

For more than two months, the joint Courland–Lithuanian army under Komorowski remained passive. Possibly, uncertainty around the validity of the local truce with the Muscovites made him reluctant to commit himself to another offensive.

Meanwhile, Douglas sent repeated reconnaissance parties into Lithuania to monitor the situation. In late June, Major General Aderkas led 250 cavalry into Lithuania. Encountering a hostile force greatly superior in numbers (some 1,000 men, he reported), Aderkas informed Douglas that he would observe only, without engaging, until Douglas's reinforcements arrived. However, Aderkas then anyway fell for the temptation to attack – and promptly was lured into an ambush. His unit was dispersed, and Aderkas himself together with several officers taken prisoner.

By then, Komorowski's army of 3,000 to 4,000 men had received reinforcement from Brandenburg: two cavalry regiments and two dragoon companies, in total some 3,000 men.[11] Douglas, on his side, awaited promised reinforcements from Finland of almost 1,500 horse under Lieutenant

---

[9] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.244.

[10] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.153–4.

[11] Komorowski's army: Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.398; Brandenburg reinforcements: Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen', p.85.

General Erik Kruse. Meanwhile, both sides sent out reconnaissance parties which frequently clashed.

Then, Komorowski again went on an offensive. On the night between 2 and 3 August, his combined Courland–Lithuanian army in a surprise attack took the town of Mitau. Only the castle remained in Swedish hands. The Courlanders liberated Duke Jacob's officials and destroyed some of the newly built fortifications. It was a major victory. Komorowski's army then abandoned Mitau, continued towards Livonia, seemingly ready to carry the offensive further. However, despite his victory at Mitau, Komorowski never crossed the River Düna (Russian: Dvina; modern-day Daugava). Instead, he again retreated into Lithuania. Soon, the Swedes returned to resume control of Mitau.[12]

Komorowski did not wait long before he left the safety of Lithuania to pounce again. In mid August, Komorowski laid siege to Goldingen (modern-day Kuldīga) in Courland. In addition to his own army, Komorowski had received reinforcements in the form of more than 3,000 men under Aleksander Hilary Połubiński (1626–1679), the Lithuanian Field Scribe. In late August, Komorowski's own force had thus grown to 6,000 to 7,000 men, even without counting the Brandenburg-Prussians who also were ready to move into Courland.[13]

In early September, Douglas attempted to relieve Goldingen. However, the lack of supplies and the breakdown of his three heavy cannons made him abandon the attempt. Moreover, by then the other Swedish garrisons in Courland suffered difficulties, too. Doblen surrendered to what seems to have been Courland irregulars. Douglas easily retook the castle, which he then had demolished. Bauske was under siege, too, but the besiegers were easily routed. Far more serious was the surrender of Goldingen to Komorowski in mid September. Although the agreement had granted the garrison free departure, Komorowski broke his pledge, imprisoned the officers, and enlisted the men into his own units. This posed few problems, since at least a quarter of the Swedish soldiers were Poles, Danes, or Norwegians (the rest belonged to Finnish regiments). Komorowski also took all artillery in Goldingen.

Douglas now faced two major problems. First, there were hardly any supplies left anywhere in Courland. Second, he received conflicting information on whether the local truce between the Commonwealth and Muscovy would be renewed, or already had been renewed, or not. If the Lithuanians also would have to consider the risk of Muscovite operations, he would have the opportunity to recoup the losses in Courland. But if not, and in light of the poor supply situation, there was little hope for such a venture. For a while, Douglas made sure that the garrisons in Mitau and Bauske remained well-supplied. The rest did not fare so well. Windau surrendered in late September, following the mutiny of the garrison which consisted of conscripted Danes or Norwegians. In mid October, the Swedes at Schrunden surrendered to Komorowski. On the same day, the Swedes at Grobin (modern-day Grobina) surrendered to Bogusław Radziwiłł's

---

[12] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.155–6.

[13] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.156–7.

Brandenburg-Prussian army which had marched up from the south. By late October, only Mitau and Bauske remained in Swedish hands in Courland. Douglas's field army then retreated into Livonia.[14]

In hindsight, Douglas's retreat may look premature. He did not lack experienced soldiers. In November 1659, after the arrival of the Finnish reinforcements, the Swedish military strength in the Baltic territories, the bulk of which was deployed in Livonia, consisted of 2,936 cavalry, 458 dragoons, and 5,365 infantry, in total 8,759 men.[15] However, the lack of supplies effectively ruled out further operations.

The Simultaneous Offensives into Swedish-held Prussia and Swedish Pomerania

In August, King John Casimir's coalition army went on the offensive against the remaining Swedish strongholds in Prussia. Crown Field Hetman Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski commanded a field army which consisted of some 1,000 German cavalry, 2,450 national cavalry (hussars, Tatars, and cossack-style cavalry), 1,900 dragoons, and 5,240 German infantry. Then there was the Imperial army: some 2,000 Imperial cavalry and dragoons as well as an artillery corps of 30 to 40 cannons. There was some Polish artillery, too, again commanded by the able Crown General of Artillery, Krzysztof Grodzicki. In total, the coalition army which at this point went on the offensive in Prussia consisted of approximately 12,600 men. To this can be added the existing garrisons in Prussia, which consisted of 3,250 men, and the Danzig Army which by this time consisted of 3,000 to 4,000 men. Finally, a Brandenburg-Prussian army of some 7,200 men was available too.

In total, King John Casimir's coalition army consisted of 26,000 to 27,000 men, mostly experienced soldiers with quite a few veterans. In August, peasant levies under the insurgent leader Michałko joined the army, primarily to carry out manual labour during the siege operations. This was approximately five times as many men as the Swedes at this time employed in Prussia (an estimated 5,200 men, if field army and garrisons were added together).[16]

But Prussia was not the only Swedish-held territory then at risk. Pomerania, too, was under threat, and this time from Imperial troops under Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches who advanced from the south. There is good reason to conclude that the two offensives were coordinated in time, because at the same time, King John Casimir recalled Czarniecki's corps from Denmark, and many Brandenburg-Prussian and Imperial units returned, too. Because of the danger posed by the Imperial offensive, Paul Würtz returned from Prussia to Stettin to lead the defensive operations. Duke Adolph John accompanied him to Stettin. The threat to Pomerania was real, but the Duke's voyage had nothing to do with this threat. After a previous, personal visit to Pomerania in early August, Duke Adolph John returned to Prussia only to hand over command there to Linde and Bülow in mid August. The Duke's personal reasons for leaving command remain unknown, but his old knee wound (see Volume II) may have been a contributing factor.[17] Be that as it may, the Duke's decision angered King Charles, who like other Swedish officers at the time felt that unhealed wounds constituted a poor excuse for relinquishing command (indeed, the army was full of men of all ranks who for better or worse remained in service despite severe disability, lingering illness, or advanced age). King Charles never again gave his brother any military command.

---

[14] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', pp.158–9.

[15] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.185.

[16] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', pp.306–9. Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', pp.398–9, offers similar but not identical figures.

The need to reinforce Pomerania means that henceforth, Swedish field units available for duty in Prussia were scarce: only 12 companies of horse and 750 infantry.[18] As a result, units of Lubomirski's army already in late August successfully stormed Graudenz, defeating the Swedish garrison under Johann Puchert. The attack was facilitated by the Scotsman, Patrick Gordon, who now was in Polish service but knew the town well since his time in the Swedish army. Gordon pointed out the weakest point of the town wall. Lubomirski's men set numerous fires during the assault, the conflagration spread out of control, and as Graudenz burned, the Poles sacked the town, murdered civilians, and raped women. The Swedes, having lost 200 men, withdrew into the castle. They agreed to surrender, but only to the Imperial troops. This turned out to be a wise decision. Of the town's 2,000 to 3,000 inhabitants, no less than 700 lost their lives during the sack. Barely 15 houses and a church survived the fires. Puchert managed to escape with 20 of his men. The Poles suspected that Imperial officers had allowed them to leave, and that Puchert had bribed the Imperials to let the few remaining Swedes escape. While this remains a possibility, the Polish suspicions of underhand payments may just as well have been a reflection of the growing mutual distrust between Poles and Imperials.[19]

In September, Lubomirski also retook Dirschau, which had been abandoned by the Swedes as indefensible under present circumstances. This restored the communications line between Danzig and Poland. The Poles also retook several other minor strongpoints, including Stuhm and Montauer Spitze, from which the small Swedish garrisons had been withdrawn. With the limited number of men available, the Swedes could not hold all towns at the same time. However, while the Swedish strategy was defensive, it still did not preclude limited offensives. At the same time as the governor of what remained of Swedish Royal Prussia, Field Marshal Lieutenant Lorenz von der Linde, abandoned positions which he held as indefensible, he also dispatched cavalry units to devastate Polish territory, in particular in Ermland, and to gain additional supplies.

---

[17] Lange, *Karl X Gustavs bror Adolf Johan*, p.132.

[18] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.305.

[19] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.310.


Profijlernes Schala Rehnlendsche foot.
5
10
20
30
40
50
60 footen.
Profijlen aff den Sidan åht Landet.
Profijlen aff de Siderne åht Watnen
Anno 1657 d. 2 Xber à Abraham Hoffman

Profile views of the Swedish defences at Montauer Spitze with moat, palisades, and abatis, 1657. Scale in Rhineland feet (1 foot = 31.39465 cm).

Lubomirski then divided his forces, laying siege to Danziger Haupt as well as Marienburg. However, he lacked the means to lay siege to two strong fortifications at the same time. In October, he focused his attention on Danziger Haupt, the smaller of the two.

In late October, Czarniecki's corps from Denmark returned to the area, with more than 4,000 men who also joined the siege. However, the major role was played by the Danzig Army under Colonel Valentin von Winter. The Danzig artillery fired more than 85 shots per day during the siege (5,162 projectiles), which can be compared to the about 16 to 17 shots fired by the Swedish artillery every day (1,072 projectiles). Meanwhile, the Crown army and the Imperial units mostly limited themselves to blocking the stronghold. Danziger Haupt surrendered on 22 December, following a stubborn defence by Claes Danckwardt-Lillieström. The survivors of the garrison, over 600 men with 16 cannons, marched out with full military honours and were later shipped from Danzig to Sweden.[20]

Meanwhile, a corps under Colonel Heinrich Dönhoff (*c.* 1585–1659; Polish: Henryk Denhoff) consisting of an infantry regiment and several cavalry banners from the Crown army blockaded Strasburg. He was assisted by Brandenburg-Prussian units under Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł. Strasburg was defended by a garrison of about 100 Swedes under Colonel Johann Pleitner, a former fortification officer who was well versed in siege warfare. However, cut off from both reinforcements and supplies, Pleitner on 10 December accepted to surrender with the right of free departure to Elbing. However, since Pleitner had surrendered to the Crown army, Radziwiłł, who served Brandenburg, did not feel bound by the terms (a slightly strained but legally defensible interpretation), so he rounded up the surviving Swedes and made them prisoners of war.[21]

---

[20] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', pp.312–15. On the artillery exchanges, see Peter Voget, *Wahrhaftiger und gründlicher Bericht von Belagerung und Eroberung der Haupt-Schanze in der Danziger Nährung* (Danzig: David Friedrich Rhete, 1661), p.235.

[21] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.316.


Pictus A° 1649 Ætatis suæ 36.
Frid. v. Akrel Sculps. Holmiæ 1779

Claes Danckwardt-Lilliestrӧm.

By the end of the 1659, only Marienburg and Elbing of the strongholds in Prussia remained in Swedish hands, under the overall command of Lorenz von der Linde. However, the two towns were strongly fortified. Moreover, since the garrisons of the indefensible towns were evacuated into Marienburg when they moved out, Marienburg and Elbing remained well-defended. Supplies could, as before, be brought in by river. When the Crown army in late September approached to lay siege to Marienburg, Linde had a garrison of some 3,000 men at his disposal. Lubomirski's first 8,000, then 10,000 besiegers were not sufficiently strong to make an impact. In early January 1660, Lubomirski abandoned the siege and instead sent the army into winter quarters.[22]

---

[22] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', pp.316–17.


Ichnographia
Castelli ad Caput Vistulæ vulgo
Hoft Schantz tribus Dantisco milliarib.
a S.R.M. Sueciæ 19. Maij An. 1656. exstrui cœpti, nec non Castrorū ab Excell. Dn. Campi Marescallo
Com. Steenbokio eodem anno ibi positorum.
Nomina Propugnaculorum.
A. Carolus Gustavus. B. Adolphus Ioannes. C. Ericus Oxenstiärna. D. C.G. Wrangelius. E. Arfwidus Wittenberg. F. G.O. Steenbok
Nomina Legionum & Equitatu
1. Statio Prim. Ill. D. Com. Stenbokij. 2. Statio Ill. D. C. Iacob. dela Gardie. 3. Prætoria S.R.M. ... 4. Turmæ. 4. Leg. D. Cancellarij Regni 8. Turmæ. 5. Leg. Pr. Megapolitani ... 8 Turmæ. 6. Leg. D. C. Stenbokij ... 8. Turm. 7. L. Landgraf Haſsiæ Homb. .. 8. Turm. 8. L. D. C. Königsmarkij. 9. Drag. Landgr. Haſsiæ ... 2. Centur.
Nom. Leg. Pedit.
10. Prætor. S.R.M. ... 4 Cent. 11. Leg. Dalkarleorū ... 8. Cent. 12. Leg. Westrogothica ... 8. Cent. 13. Finnorū. Gertenij ... 8. Cent. 14. L. C. de la Gardie ... 8. Cent. 15. Finnorū. Mallinij ... 8. Cent. 16. Leg. Ser. Elect. Brandenb. .. 8. Cent. 17. Opera vetera tempore Regis Gust. Adolphi magni erecta. 18. Novi Reductus, Circumvallationes et Suggestus circum Castra. 19. Pons Navalis.
20 40 60 80
80. pert Rhinl.
E. D. B. del.
Lapointe sc.
Castra Reg. Suec. et Statio primaria ad pagum Stibelau in Campis Gedanensibus ab Illustr. C. Gustavo Ott. Steenbok posita d. 15. Martij. relicta a. d. 4 Apr. A. 1656
A. Statio primaria Ill. D. Steenbokij
B. Statio Ill. D. Com. Iacobi de la Gardie
C. Statio Ill. D. C. Tottij
D. Sta. Rei Tormentar.
E. Sta. Legi. Westrogoth. Trib. Lillichöök
F. Leg. Dahlkarlia.
G. L. Finnonica Pleutnerij
H. Leg. Fin. Gertenij.
I. Leg. Germanica. Com. de la Gardie.
K. Leg. Burdonij.
30 60
60. Pert. Rhinl.
50. ped. Rhinl.
Vistula
Dantiscum
alluens
Vetus
Vistula
Habum
recentem
intrans

Danziger Haupt, 1656


N
N
Schur
Winter
Brand
Danckwardt-Lilliesström
Thompson
Siebers
Polish Crown Army
Swedish fortifications
Coalition (Brandenburgian-Polish) fortifications
Swedish fortifications taken by Coalition units
Coalition siege artillery
0
250
500 m


Griffenhagener ZollSchantz erobert den 21 Aug. 1659.
DIE ODER
a. Steinerner Thurn.
b. Bruſtwehr und Wahl
c. Palisade
d. Wacht haus
e. Batteria.
Moras
Moras
Graben
a. der Wahllgang
b. die Bruſtwehr
c. Creutz Pallisaden
d. Spaniſche Reutte
Moras
Greiſſenhager groſse Schantz belägert und erobert durch der Rom: Kay: Mayeſt: General-Feldzeugmeiſter Herrn Baron de Souches: Anno 1659 den 21. Auguſti.
Moras
Moras
DIE ODER

Above: Greifenhagen Customs Bastion and Great Bastion, 1659

Left: The siege of Danziger Haupt, December 1659



N
Souches' Imperial army
Frederick William's Coalition army
Wrangel's Swedish corps
Rügen
Stralsund
Damgarten
Tribsees
Greifswald
Wolgast
Demmin
Loitz
Güstrow
Malchin
MECKLENBURG
BRANDENBURG
Strasburg
Templin
Usedom
Sweinemünde
Kammin
Wollin
Ückermünde
HINTER-POMMERN
Stettin
Damm
Gartz
Greifenhagen
Pyritz
0
10
20
30
40
50 km

1. Souches enters Pomerania from the south

2. Souches takes Damm on 17 September, after which main army on 29 September advances to Stettin

3. Meanwhile, a detached Imperial Corps takes Kammin on 21 August, advances to Wollin on 30 August, and storms Wollin on 6 September

4. Frederick William's Coalition army from Denmark enters Pomerania on 26 September, reaches Loitz on 28 September, and advances to Greifswald

5. Wrangel's Swedish corps lands on 2 October

6. Wrangel relieves Wolgast and Greifswald; the invasion army returns to Demmin to which it lays siege on 25 October

7. Swedish relief corps shipped to Stettin; Imperials abandon the siege on 15 November

The Pomerania campaign, September–November 1659


Divenauer Schantz. erobert den 30 Aug. 1659.
a. der wahll iſt holl von eitel blockwerck
b. die Bruſtwehr
c. Palliſaden
d. Commendanten Hauſs.
Sand
Sand
Hügel
c
b
a
d
Die See
Divenau Flus
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Schritt
Scala

The Bastion at Dievenow, 1659. With just one rampart and two lines of outer palisades, the bastion had little chance of resisting a determined Imperial assault.

Meanwhile, the port-town of Elbing, with 14,000 inhabitants who supported Swedish rule, was just as well-defended as Marienburg. Moreover, for political reasons neither Poles nor Brandenburg-Prussians would lay siege to the town. According to the hurried 1657 Treaty of Bromberg between the Commonwealth and Brandenburg, the Polish King pawned Elbing to Brandenburg in exchange for the military assistance provided, but only if the Brandenburg-Prussian army captured the town on its own. Unfortunately for both Poles and Brandenburg-Prussians, the Brandenburg-Prussian army lacked the strength to take Elbing. Since the acceptance of Polish support for the conquest would deprive Frederick William of his claim, Brandenburg refused to allow the Crown army to share in the venture. By this time, Elbing's Swedish garrison consisted of an estimated 1,000 men (down from some 1,400 in 1657), well-supplied with cannons and food supplies.[23] To this could be added the pro-Swedish burgher militia. It would take far more to capture Elbing than either Frederick William or King John Casimir could muster alone.

---

[23] Podhorodecki, '1659 års fälttåg', p.317.



Swine Redoubt, 1659. Not all Pomeranian fortifications were modern or very strong. Swine Redoubt had straight walls and only one rampart, instead trusting to its location on a sandy hill.

Both Marienburg and Elbing remained in Swedish hands until the war was over.

We have seen that at the same time when King John Casimir's coalition army went on the offensive against Prussia, other coalition armies advanced against Swedish Pomerania. Like the offensive into Prussia, the offensive against Pomerania began in August, when Souches led an Imperial army into Pomerania from the south, through Brandenburg. The army consisted of some 17,000 men.[24] Upon reaching Landsberg an der Warthe in Pomerania, Souches sent an advance party of some 1,300 men to take Greifenhagen in southern Swedish Pomerania. The town had no garrison, so was easily occupied, but the so-called Great Bastion and Customs Bastion on the River Oder resisted until 31 August. Another detachment of some 600 Imperials laid siege to the castle Wildenbruch (modern-day Swobnica), defended by a diminutive garrison with two 3-pounders. Wildenbruch surrendered, but only after six days, after the defenders had used up the 80 shots available in the castle arsenal. Meanwhile, the Imperials continued towards Damm, where they soon took the three outlying bastions. Another Imperial corps, some 1,000 cavalry and three regiments of foot under Johann Reichard Starhemberg, took Kammin and Wollin further to the north. In mid September, after finally having received some much-needed siege artillery, Souches took Damm itself. Its remaining garrison of 160 Swedes marched out with customary military honours.[25] However, any Germans, Danes, and Poles within the garrison were enlisted in the Imperial army in the customary manner.

---

[24] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.400.

When Souches moved into Swedish Pomerania, Frederick William still remained in Jutland with his coalition army. He did not wish to be left behind when the Imperials took possession of Pomerania, or at least this was what he feared might happen. A week after Souches entered Pomerania from the south, Frederick William departed with his main force (13,000 men, primarily Brandenburg-Prussians but also some coalition units including Imperials and even Danes), bound for western Pomerania.[26] It took him more than a month to reach the western border of Pomerania, but then things speeded up. Frederick William gained control of Warnemünde and took Tribsees, Clempenow, and Loitz, neither of which had strong defences. Damgarten had no garrison, so was merely occupied. However, the well-fortified Greifswald resisted his attempts to conquer.[27] Still, by the end of September, it seemed that both Souches and Frederick William were well on the way to reaching their goals in Pomerania.

Unfortunately for them, however, in early October Field Marshal Wrangel landed in Pomerania with some 2,000 Swedish reinforcements from the Danish island of Falster. Wrangel had sailed from Falster in winds approaching gale strength, for which reason his ships reached Pomerania already in the evening on the same day when he set out. However, the strong winds also meant that it took several days to disembark. Yet, when the corps had safely landed, it rapidly dispersed those coalition troops who attempted to resist them, both the Imperials in the east and the Brandenburg-Prussians in the west. Wrangel's men relieved Greifswald and Wolgast and also took Swinemünde.

Frederick William and Wrangel had become friends while on the same side in the three-day battle of Warsaw. Cautious about the threat posed by his old friend, and having abandoned the attempt to conquer Greifswald, Frederick William in late October retreated to Demmin, where Field Marshal General Otto Christoph von Sparr joined him with reinforcements. The Brandenburg-Prussians then set out to reduce Demmin instead. Even so, it took a month of siege to force the small garrison to surrender with free departure and full military honours.

Meanwhile, Souches laid siege to Stettin with some 5,000 men. However, Stettin was defended by Paul Würtz who previously had defended Cracow so efficiently. Würtz had a garrison of some 2,600 men (according to the roll calls, 2,771 men: 262 cavalry, 2,414 foot, and 95 artillerymen, but many were ill[28]) and a strong artillery consisting of 17 heavy and 19 light cannons and four mortars. Souches had received Brandenburg-Prussian reinforcements: 2,000 Brandenburg-Prussians under Lieutenant General Friedrich zu Dohna (two regiments of cavalry and three of foot: Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Boguslaw von Bonin's Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Baltzer von Russow's Cavalry Regiment, Johann Sigismund zu Lynar's Regiment, Major General Heinrich von Uffeln's Regiment, and Hans Christoph von Burgsdorff's Regiment) and yet more importantly, siege artillery from Spandau. However, even this was insufficient to reduce Stettin's defences.[29]

---

[25] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.237–9. More details on the Pomeranian campaign can be found in Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.406–22.

[26] Wimmer, 'Polens krig med Sverige', p.400; Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.239, suggests 18,000 Brandenburg-Prussians and coalition partners in Frederick William's army.

[27] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.239.

[28] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, p.412.

With only 2,000 men in reinforcements, Wrangel faced two enemy armies of a total strength of some 30,000 men, engaged in two major siege operations: at Stettin and Demmin. He could only move against one at a time, so he chose Stettin. In early November, the small corps sent by Wrangel managed to send in some 160 men by fishing boats to reinforce Würtz's garrison. The reinforcements arrived in two batches: first, an ensign and 46 men from the Västgöta-Dal Regiment. A few days later, yet more men followed.[30] This enlivened the spirits of the defenders to the extent that within days, they sallied out in a well-prepared operation, destroying much of the Brandenburg-Prussian siege artillery. Later in the same day, Wrangel himself arrived in Stettin.

Souches then chose to abandon the siege. Frederick William did likewise. It was not only the threat posed by Wrangel which clinched the decision. The Imperials and Brandenburg-Prussians had devastated the territory in which they operated and were out of supplies. Even in the best of times, Pomerania usually had to import food. To this was added the arrival of Wrangel's relief force, which certainly was small but had revived the will to fight among the defenders. As a result, in November both Imperials and Brandenburg-Prussians abandoned the campaign and withdrew from Pomerania. Retreating into Brandenburg, they went into winter quarters.

We have seen that Czarniecki too left Denmark, and he followed in the tracks of Frederick William through Swedish Pomerania. He personally also visited Souches' camp during the siege of Stettin.[31] However, neither he nor his men took part in the combat operations of the campaign.

---

[29] Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, pp.239–41. Incidentally, Friedrich zu Dohna's younger brother Christoph Delphicus zu Dohna was in Swedish service at the time, and Frederick William had unsuccessfully attempted to enlist him, too.

[30] Barkman, Lundkvist, and Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2, pp.416–17.

[31] Migdalski, 'Das Gedenken an die Pommernzüge', p.389.

23

The Battle of Konotop

Meanwhile, events had continued to unfold in Cossack Ukraine as well. Since Ivan Vygovskiy already had failed to take Kiev twice, King John Casimir in late 1658 dispatched Crown Equerry Andrzej Potocki with a Crown army to aid Vygovskiy. In early January 1659, Potocki crossed the Dnieper, advancing towards Kiev. However, Kiev remained defended by Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev, the Muscovite commandant, and Prince Yuriy Baryatinskiy, who together already had beaten off the attacks of Vygovskiy's men twice.

For Sheremetyev, there were greater threats than Potocki's venture. In January, he informed Moscow that he had learnt that Vygovskiy had sent an emissary to the Khan of the Crimea, asking him to lead his army into the Ukraine, where Vygovskiy would provide the necessary supplies.[1]

Moscow had already sent a proposal to Vygovskiy for renewed negotiations at Pereyaslav in February. Vygovskiy rejected the invitation. Instead, he in January held his own cossack assembly in Chigirin, where he declared war upon both Muscovites and Zaporozhians.

Soon after, Vygovskiy marched east. At Pereyaslav, he was joined by his chancellor Yuriy Nemirich with the enlisted foreign units. Then he continued to Chernukhi, where a Crimean army of 15,000 Tatars under Prince Selim Geray (1631–1704) joined forces with Vygovskiy's men.[2] The sources are confused about both the number of Tatars and the names of their commanders, so only an estimate is possible. However, the Tatar army seems to have been stronger than Vygovskiy's cossack army. Vygovskiy's own forces have been estimated as some 6,000 cossacks (the Uman', Chernigov, and Korsun' regiments) and 3,000 enlisted foreign soldiers.[3]

The two armies continued to Mirgorod, where they arrived in mid February. Vygovskiy intended a decisive strike against those cossacks who remained loyal to Muscovy, namely, the Mirgorod and Poltava Regiments and parts of the Lybny regiment, as well as the Zaporozhians.[4]

---

[1] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.134.

[2] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.142, 149.

[3] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.142.

[4] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.141.

In February, Selim Geray and Vygovskiy took Mirgorod.[5] They also took Poltava and other towns, and laid siege to Zen'kov, which was held by the Zaporozhians under Ivan Silka. Finally, they sent a cossack corps under Colonel Skorobogatenko to attack Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy, Commander of the Belgorod Army, and Ivan Bespalyy, Acting Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, at Lokhvitsa, but this attack failed.

Clearly, Tsar Alexis had to do something about the Ukrainian turmoil. In March 1659, he sent reinforcements from Sevsk under the trusted Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy (1600–1680) who also was ordered to take command of the Muscovite armies in the Ukraine. Trubetskoy would join forces with Romodanovskiy's Belgorod Army and Bespalyy's cossacks.

Meanwhile, Vygovskiy's men were based at Konotop, from where they dispatched raids against Muscovite border towns such as Putivl', Ryl'sk and Sevsk.

To prevent such raids, Trubetskoy in February gathered his 12,000-strong army at Putivl'.[6] Moving into the Ukraine, Trubetskoy received reinforcements from Sevsk, Belgorod, Ryazan' and other locations. Then, Trubetskoy laid siege to Konotop. By then, he commanded a conglomerate of three Muscovite armies consisting of several divisions of widely varying strength, namely, Trubetskoy's own (strong) division and Andrey Buturlin's (weak) division (together constituting the Sevsk Army); Prince Fyodor Kurakin's (fairly strong) Ryazan' Division and Prince Semyon Pozharskiy's and Prince Semyon L'vov's (weak) combined division (together constituting the Ryazan' Army); and Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy's (strong) Belgorod Army. Trubetskoy's force also included Acting Hetman Ivan Bespalyy's Ukrainian cossack army. Although archival records of these armies have survived, their interpretation is not straightforward since they derive from different times and places. Recent research suggests that Trubetskoy's total forces in July 1659 consisted of, at most, some 35,000 men (See Table 26). This was a significant force of men. However, attrition had taken place, and numbers may have fallen.[7]

Table 26. Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy's armies at Konotop, July 1659[8]

Sevsk Army	
Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy's division	
Andrey Buturlin's division	
Total	**17,000**

---

[5] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.148.

[6] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.161.

[7] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.207–10, 327–30; based on the data presented in Babulin, *Bitva pod Konotopom, 28 iyunya 1659 goda* (Moscow: Zeughaus, 2009), pp.7, 11, 13, most modern descriptions of the Muscovite army at Konotop suggest that Trubetskoy commanded 28,600 Muscovites and 6,660 Ukrainian cossacks. However, see Babulin's nuanced discussion in *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*.

[8] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.207–10, 327–30.

Ryazan' Army	
Prince Fyodor Kurakin's division	
Prince Semyon Pozharskiy's and Prince Semyon L'vov's division	
Total	4,000
Belgorod Army	
Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy's division	
Total	7,333
Ukrainian Army	
Acting Hetman Ivan Bespalyy's cossack division	
Total	6,660
Grand Total	Approx 35,000

However, Ivan Vygovskiy, too, commanded a significant army, in early July consisting of eight regiments with an estimated total of 16,000 men and enlisted units consisting of from 1,500 to 3,000 men.[9] Even so, the cossacks were still outnumbered by the Crimean Tatar army. In early July, Mehmed Khan arrived with significant reinforcements to assume command of the Crimean Tatar army which operated in conjunction with Vygovskiy's men. The Crimean Tatar army's strength is customarily assessed as having been some 30,000 men (Table 27).[10] However, this assessment is based on older data, which may not even have been correct at the time of recording. In fact, there is almost no reliable information on the Crimean contingent, except that it was very strong. The Crimean army was commanded by Mehmed Khan himself, together with Nureddin Sultan Murad Geray and most Geray princes. Mehmed Khan also brought Noghai Tatars, Budjak Tatars, Azov and Temryuk Circassians, and what an observer described as 240 Ottoman janissaries based in the Crimea.[11] Perhaps the so-called janissaries instead were *seghban* mounted musketeers. Meanwhile, the Khan sent another corps of an estimated 5,000 men under Prince Ahmad Geray, his eldest son, to protect the border with Muscovy against Don cossack intrusions.[12]

---

[9] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.336–7; Babulin, *Bitva pod Konotopom*, pp.13–14, does not include Babulin's full discussion.

[10] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.335; Babulin, *Bitva pod Konotopom*, p.15, raised the possibility of there having been 35,000 Crimeans which seems unlikely.

[11] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.210.

[12] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.210; citing the official Crimean report which he reprints. Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.386.

Table 27. Crimean–cossack coalition at Konotop, July 1659. Vygovskiy controlled four additional regiments, deployed elsewhere: the Chigirin Regiment under Gerasim Kaplonskiy, Korsun' Regiment under Ivan Krekhovetskiy, Kiev Regiment under Pavel Yanenko, and Bratslav Regiment under Mikhailo Zelenskiy.[13]

Crimean Tatar Army	
Cavalry units in the traditional array	
Mounted musketeers (reportedly 240 janissaries and possibly 400 *seghban*; however, the reference likely refers to the same unit, which would then be the *seghban*, 240 in number)	
Grand Total (under Mehmed Khan)	**Appr. 30,000**
Ukrainian Army	
Pereyaslav Regiment, under Timofey Tsetsyura	
Kanev Regiment, under Ivan Lizogub	
Dniester (Podol'skiy) Regiment, under Ostafey Gogol'	
Priluki Regiment, under Pyotr Doroshenko	
Uman' Regiment, under Mikhailo Khanenko	
Cherkasy Regiment, under Fyodor Dzhulay	
Pavolotsk Regiment, under Ivan Bogun	
Belotserkov' Regiment, under Ivan Kravchenko	
Total	**Appr. 16,000**
Konotop Garrison	
Chernigov Regiment, under Anikey Silich	
Kal'nik Regiment, under Ivan Verteletskiy	
Nezhin Regiment, under Vasiliy Zolotarenko	
Total	**Appr. 4,000**
Vygovskiy's Enlisted Companies	
Polish and Lithuanian Cavalry Companies	
Ivan Vygovskiy's Regiment (Polish and Lithuanian cavalry and German dragoons)	
Yuriy Vygovskiy's Regiment (Polish and Lithuanian cavalry and German dragoons)	
Serb, Moldavian, Wallachian cavalry companies	
Total	**Appr. 1,500–3,000**
Grand Total (under Hetman Ivan Vygovskiy)	**Appr. 21,500–23,000**
Grand Total (Coalition)	**Appr. 51,500–53,000**

---

[13] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.210–14, 335–7.


N
Muscovite
Ukrainian Cossack infantry and foreign enlisted cavalry
Crimean Tatar
Polish
Camp
Kurakin
R. Yezuch
Redoubts
Konotop
Romodanovskiy
Gulyanitskiy
Popovka
Camp
1. Trubetskoy lays siege to Konotop
Trubetskoy & Bespalyy
Romodanovskiy
Podlipnoye
Camp
Shapovalovka
Sosnovka
Pozharskiy
R. Kukolka
Donczynski
2. Tatars draw Pozharskiy's cavalry into pursuit through feigned flight
Karash Bey
Vygovskiy
Murad Geray
Malyy Sambor
3. Trapped in difficult terrain, Pozharskiy is captured
Mehmed Khan
Velikiy Sambor
0 1 2 3 4 5 km

The Battle of Konotop, 8 July 1659 (Map 1 of 2)



4. Surrounded by Tatar units, Romodanovskiy's cavalry is defeated

5. Tatars and cossacks are free to engage Muscovite infantry

N
Muscovite
Ukrainian Cossack infantry and foreign enlisted cavalry
Crimean Tatar
Polish
Camp
R. Yezuch
Kurakin
Redoubts
Konotop
Romodanovskiy
Gulyanitskiy
Popovka
Camp
Trubetskoy & Bespalyy
Podlipnoye
Camp
Murad Geray
Shapovalovka
Karash Bey
Romodanovskiy
Sosnovka
Vygovskiy
R. Kukolka
Mehmed Khan
Malyy Sambor
Velikiy Sambor
0
1
2
3
4
5 km

The Battle of Konotop, 8 July 1659 (Map 2 of 2)

Mehmed Khan's Tatars and Vygovskiy's cossacks attacked the Muscovites at Konotop. Perhaps overconfident from his previous successes, Trubetskoy neglected reconnaissance and accordingly failed to see through the enemy plan. The Tatars drew the cavalry of Prince Semyon Pozharskiy (*c.* 1611–1659) into pursuit through a feigned flight Trapped in difficult terrain, the over-confident Muscovites were attacked by the main force of the combined Crimean–cossack army. The result was a disaster for the Muscovites. The Tatars and cossacks decisively defeated Trubetskoy's army.[14] Moreover, it was the flower of the old-style cavalry which perished. Of 4,769 Muscovite soldiers known to have been lost in the battle and its aftermath, almost half (2,276 men, including 243 of Moscow rank, which signified ranking nobles) were hereditary servicemen of the old-style cavalry. Bespalyy reported the loss of an estimated 2,000 of his cossacks.[15] The number of Tatars and Vygovskiy's cossacks who perished is difficult to estimate, but was significant, too.

Although Muscovite losses were shockingly high, the survivors nonetheless managed to withdraw in good order. Trubetskoy retreated towards Putivl' with his men. Those who had surrendered faced a worse fate. As usual, the Crimeans were the senior partner, so expectedly, they took charge of the Muscovite captives. While at least one of the Muscovite leaders was put to death (the proud Prince Semyon Pozharskiy spat in the Khan's face, so was beheaded), the other captives ended up in the Crimean slave markets. Two years later, an envoy to the Crimea identified 141 captives from the battle of Konotop. Most were hereditary servicemen but the group also included nobles and new formation soldiers.[16] Others had probably died on the way there or could not be found. Pozharskiy's defiant action may well have been intentional; he had fought the Tatars before and knew what to expect from Crimean captivity. The Ukrainian captives were more fortunate; they were drafted into Vygovskiy's regiments.

The defeat at Konotop signified the end of Muscovite operations in the Ukraine for the season. Sheremetyev remained behind, isolated in Kiev. But most importantly, and no doubt the outcome desired by Mehmed Khan, the victory exposed the western end of the Belgorod Line, which enabled the Crimean army to bypass the defences altogether. As a result, in August, the

---

[14] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.156–306; Oleg Rumyantsev and Giovanna Brogi Bercoff (eds), *The Battle of Konotop 1659: Exploring Alternatives in East European History* (Milan: Ledizioni, 2012; available online at <http://books.openedition.org/ledizioni/369>). Modern-day controversies over Konotop remain evident, in particular in Tatjana Yakovleva-Tairova's highly emotional and polemical contribution to the latter book which is full-scale denunciation of Babulin's short, early work *Bitva pod Konotopom* ('old clichés, more similar to political propaganda or to a poor paper written by a student rather than to a scholarly publication'). Regardless of differences in opinion which have more to do with modern politics than history, Babulin's monograph *Bor'ba za Ukrainu* is the currently best military history of the campaign.

[15] Babulin, *Bitva pod Konotopom*, pp.23, 37; Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.339–40. In Babulin, *Bitva pod Konotopom*, p.340, Babulin notes minor errors in reprints and original archive documents, which gives a total of 4,763.

[16] Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, p.268.



Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy

Tatars raided 18 Muscovite districts, including some as far east as Voronezh and Usman'. They burned 4,674 farmsteads and carried off 25,448 prisoners destined for the Crimean slave markets.[17] Such a deep incursion into Muscovy had not taken place since 1633, before the completion of the Belgorod Line. The campaign was a great Tatar success.

In comparison, the junior partner in the Tatar–cossack alliance, Vygovskiy, was unable to take advantage of the spectacular victory. Muscovite garrisons held out in several Ukrainian towns. Besides, the Tatars soon returned to the Crimea, which now in turn was raided by Zaporozhian cossacks loyal to Muscovy. Furthermore, yet another cossack rebellion broke out against Vygovskiy's rule, this time led by Ivan Bogun, who had played an important role in the victory at Konotop. The leaders of several cossack regiments were dissatisfied with Vygovskiy's acceptance of the amendments to the Gadyach Treaty, which significantly reduced cossack freedoms. They also disliked having to maintain and provide billets for Vygovskiy's Polish, German, and Serb soldiers. Colonels Vasiliy Zolotarenko (d. 1663) of the Nezhin Regiment, Timofey Tsetsyura (d. 1671) of the Pereyaslav Regiment, and Anikey Silich (d. 1663) of the Chernigov Regiment now rose against Vygovskiy. Among other cossack commanders, Colonel Ivan Yakimovich of the Kiev Regiment remained opposed to him, as were the Zaporozhians, whose ataman Ivan Serko (*c.* 1610–1680) conducted raids near Uman' and Chigirin, as well as against the Crimea. Loyalists of young Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy (1641–1685), too, took part in the latter raids, while Ivan Bryukhovetskiy (1623–1668), one of his father's commanders, began to agitate for the removal of the usurper Vygovskiy and the restoration of the Khmel'nitskiy line.

As a result, by early September 1659 the Ukrainian cossacks were divided between those who followed young Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy (and his backers, chief of whom was Bryukhovetskiy) and those who followed Vygovskiy. The rivalry did not last long. Soon Vygovskiy was disavowed and shouted down by a cossack assembly at Germanovka, south of Kiev. The continuous uprisings against Vygovskiy's rule became too much for him. Deposed from real power due to the defection of so many cossack colonels, Vygovskiy soon after resigned the position of Hetman in favour of young Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy.

---

[17] Brian L. Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1774* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p.131; Babulin, *Bor'ba za Ukrainu*, pp.277–81.

This was not necessarily an auspicious outcome for Cossack Ukraine, since young Yuriy to some extent was under the control of Ivan Bryukhovetskiy. Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav on 27 October 1659.

Upon surrendering the office of Hetman, Vygovskiy retired to Poland. In return for his services, the Commonwealth appointed him Voivode of Kiev in 1660. This was an honorary post only, since Kiev was held by Muscovite troops. Nonetheless, Vygovskiy retained this position until his death in 1664 (charged with treason, arrested, and executed without trial by a Commonwealth colonel).

Yet, for Muscovy the position in the Ukraine remained perilous, despite the support from Bryukhovetskiy's faction. In late 1659, additional Polish units (10,500 cavalry, 4,300 dragoons, and 2,700 infantry) were dispatched to the Ukrainian front.[18]

---

[18] Wimmer, 'Armé och finansväsen', p.85.

24

The Sieges of Mitau and Bauske

We have seen that when Douglas withdrew his field army from Courland, only the capital Mitau and the town of Bauske remained in Swedish hands. As soon as Dougles moved out, two Lithuanian armies moved in, the main one under Aleksander Hilary Połubiński, who assumed overall command in Courland following the death of Komorowski, and a smaller one under Michał Kazimierz Pac (1624–1682). In late November, Połubiński marched into Mitau, the burghers of which welcomed the Lithuanians, and laid siege to the castle, which remained defended by the Swedish garrison. Meanwhile, Pac laid siege to Bauske, strategically located on the border with Samogitia.

In early January 1660, the Swedes at Mitau agreed to surrender. The Swedish garrison of 415 men (including 72 sick) marched out on 10 January. However, at Bauske the Swedish commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Didrik von Essen (1620–1678), refused to surrender. The garrison of Bauske repulsed at least three attempts to storm the town. In early February, Pac abandoned the siege. Bauske remained in Swedish hands until the war was over.[1]

Lithuania and Cossack Ukraine

At the beginning of 1660, the Muscovites were set to go on the offensive both in Lithuania and in the Ukraine. The Muscovite offensive in Lithuania had already begun in late 1659, following the end of the local truce there agreed earlier in the year. In mid January 1660, the Novgorod Army under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy stormed Brest, burning the city in the process. Other Muscovite units were detached to lay siege to the strong fortress of Lyakhovichi, located between Minsk and Brest and defended by a Lithuanian garrison under Mikołaj Stanisław Judycki (*c.* 1610–1670). The Muscovites failed to breach the fortress, and Lyakhovichi became famous as the only fortress of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that withstood them.[2]

---

[1] Fagerlund, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna', p.160.

[2] Igor' B. Babulin, 'Moskovskiye 'legiony' na gravyure 'Osada Lyakhovich v 160 godu'', *Istoriya voyennogo dela: issledovaniya i istochniki* 3 (2012), pp.297–320. Available from the website

Nonetheless, and before he realised that the siege would fail, Khovanskiy prepared for the final thrust towards Warsaw.

Meanwhile Vasiliy B. Sheremetyev mustered a field army of 15,000 men at Kiev. The Muscovite field army departed in late August, leaving Prince Yuriy Baryatinskiy as the new commandant of Kiev with only 4,288 Muscovites to garrison Kiev and defend its surroundings.[3] Sheremetyev's plan was to advance against L'vov, supported by Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy's and Timofey Tsetsyura's cossack armies. If Muscovy could gain both Warsaw and L'vov, the Commonwealth would have to sue for peace.

Neither plan would succeed. The 3 May Treaty of Oliva between Sweden and the Commonwealth (more on which below) enabled the latter to concentrate its forces against Muscovy.

As soon as the Treaty of Oliva was concluded, King John Casimir launched two offensives against the Muscovites. Lithuanian Grand Hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha, with 8,000 to 9,000 Lithuanians, and Stefan Czarniecki, with 4,000 to 4,200 Poles, rode into Lithuania. On 27 June, they defeated Khovanskiy's 8,500 Muscovites at Połonka. Both sides had some 4,000 foot, but the Commonwealth forces enjoyed superior numbers of cavalry.[4] It was a decisive victory. Khovanskiy escaped, but he lost much of his army. Sapieha and Czarniecki then continued into Lithuania, where they captured several towns but failed to retake Mogilyov. The Muscovite campaign was halted in its tracks, and for the rest of the season, there was little the Muscovites could do in Lithuania beyond defending Wilno, Brest, and Grodno, which they still held.

Meanwhile, Crown Field Hetman Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski brought his army out of Prussia and into Volhynia, while Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław 'Rewera' Potocki assembled his army at Ternopol' in Galicia. A small cossack contingent of some 1,400 men under Ivan Vygovskiy accompanied Potocki. Joining forces, Potocki and Lubomirski advanced further into the Ukraine with a combined army of from 26,800 to 28,800 men, not counting Ivan Vygovskiy's cossack contingent.[5]

In early September, a large Crimean army of perhaps some 15,000 cavalry, under Nureddin Sultan Murad Geray, joined the Poles near Medzhibozh.[6]

<www.milhist.info/2012/11/27/babylin>.

[3] According to available records, Sheremetyev's army consisted of 15,031 men. Igor' B. Babulin, 'Sostav russkoy armii v Chudnovskom pokhode 1660', *Reytar* 28 (2006); available from *Oderint dum probent* blog, <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com/2014/07/1660.html>.

[4] Marcin Gawęda, *Połonka-Basia 1660* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2005), pp.194–5; Aleksandr V. Malov, *Russko-pol'skaya voyna 1654–1667* (Moscow: Zeughaus, 2006), p.32.

[5] Łukasz J. C. Ossoliński, *Kampania na Ukrainie 1660 roku* (University of Warsaw, dissertation, 1995, 2000), suggests the lower figure. Romuald Romański, *Cudnów 1660* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1996), pp.14–15 suggests the higher figure, which is the traditional view of an army of 12,400 cavalry, 1,800 German cavalry, 4,600 dragoons and 9,800 foot.

[6] As usual, there are no remaining records on the size of the Tatar army. The estimate is based on Babulin, 'Sostav russkoy armii'; Romański, *Cudnów 1660*, p.17.



Michał Kazimierz Pac

Sheremetyev was over-confident. He had set out despite his lack of reliable intelligence on enemy forces (the same error committed by Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy at Konotop in the previous year). Granted, Timofey Tsetsyura with six regiments of cossack infantry (possibly 15,000 or 20,000 men[7]) marched with Sheremetyev, but the cossacks had hardly any horse, so they were unable to carry out reconnaissance duties. In a separate column marched Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy with reportedly 30,000 cossacks.[8] The plan was for the armies to meet near Slobodishche.

Sheremetyev was at first unaware of the approach of the opposing armies. In late September, Potocki and Murad Geray attacked Sheremetyev's and Tsetsyura's combined army near Lyubar. Their plan was to defeat the Muscovites before Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy's army arrived to support them. About 30,000 Muscovites and cossacks suddenly stood against more than 40,000 Poles and Tatars. The odds were not good for the Muscovites, so while cavalry kept the opponents busy by skirmishing, Sheremetyev withdrew in good order towards Chudnov. Having reached his destination, Sheremetyev deployed his men in a wagon fort defended by artillery. For several days, the two sides exchanged artillery fire while the Muscovites ran out of supplies. Eventually, Sheremetyev attempted to break out towards Slobodishche, 40 km to the east, but his men only managed to move a short distance.

Meanwhile, Lubomirski's Poles attacked Khmel'nitskiy's wagon fort which already had deployed at Slobodishche. Meanwhile, Murad Geray's Tatar army moved to block Khmel'nitskiy's retreat. Although the Poles and Tatars failed to penetrate the cossack wagon fort, their presence persuaded Khmel'nitskiy to pledge allegiance to the Commonwealth and sign an agreement on 17 October. This was the Treaty of Chudnov which contained similar terms to that of Gadyach, except for the creation of a Grand Duchy of Ruthenia which Khmel'nitskiy now had to renounce. This extinguished all hopes for a cossack state, even within the Commonwealth. Moreover, Khmel'nitskiy was obligated to abandon Sheremetyev's Muscovites to the Poles and Tatars.

---

[7] There are no certain records of the number of cossacks. They were likely no more than 15,000. Ossoliński, *Kampania na Ukrainie*. The traditional but probably exaggerated figure is 20,000. Romański, *Cudnów 1660*, p.19; Babulin, 'Sostav russkoy armii'.

[8] Babulin, 'Sostav russkoy armii'.


N
R. Styr
R. Horyn
R. Slluch
25 Aug
Lutsk
Lubomirski
Rovno
Dubno
L'vov
Potocki
Ternopol'
Trembovlya
Chornyy Ostrev
1 Sep
Murad Geray
9 Sep
Starokonstantinov
14 Sep
Lyubar
27 Sep - 1 Nov
Chudnov
Zhitomir
Sobieski
Sheremetyev
17 Aug
Kotel'nya
Slobodishche
Baryatinskiy
17 Oct
Kiev
R. Dnieper
Belotserkov'
Khmelnitskiy
Southern Bug
Vinnitsa
Bar
Bratslav
Uman'
R. Dniester
R. Zbruch
March of Polish army to the concentration area
Concentration areas of Polish troops
March of the Tatar army
Concentration areas of Tatar troops
Concentration areas of combined Tatar-Polish army
Operations of combined Tatar-Polish army
Polish offensive towards Kiev
Battles
Concentration areas of Muscovite troops
March of Muscovite troops
Operations of Muscovite troops
Concentration areas of Cossack troops
March of Cossack army
0
20
40
60
80
100 km

The Chudnov Campaign, 27 August to 4 November 1660

The Muscovite siege of Lyakhovichi, 1660


Signa seu indicationes locorum
Ad Maiorem Dei gloriam et Virginis Deiparæ honorem.
Demonstratio uera Arcis et Fortalitij LACHOWICZE, nuncupati, in Provincia Magni Ducatus Lithuaniæ Nowogrodensi et Celeberrimæ obsidionis, quam singulari beneficio Dei et protectione Deiparæ a die 27 mart. ad 28 Iun. egregia uirtute et heroica industria Gnosi Stanisl. Mich. Judycki Tribuni Rzeczycen. Gubernatoris sui sustinuit donec in peruigilio Principu Apslorum Illustr. Joannes Sapieha Comes in Bychow, Dnus in Lachowicze Palat. Vilnen. Exercituum S.R. Mtis Supr. in M.D.L. Generalis, et Stephanus Czarnecki Palat. Terrarum Russiæ auxiliariu Regni copiaru in eodem M.D.L. Ductor, clarissimo illo ad Oppidum Polonka prælio Campestri, Exercitibus M. Ducis Moscoru et Ducibus eorum Chowanski, Zmiciow, et Szczerba ad internecionem profligatis dictam obsidionem soluissent Año Christi MDCLX.

Having learnt of Khmel'nitskiy's surrender, Timofey Tsetsyura and his cossacks defected, too, instead pledging allegiance to the Commonwealth. Out of supplies, abandoned by his allies, and still at Chudnov, Sheremetyev had no choice but to surrender, which he did on 4 November. He negotiated free departure for his army, to which the Poles agreed. Most Germans in Muscovite service were enlisted into the Polish foreign regiments. However, even at this point Potocki and Lubomirski were not the senior partners in the alliance. Murad Geray had come for slaves, and during the night, he ordered Potocki and Lubomirski to break their pledge, instead allowing the Crimeans to enslave or massacre the surviving 8,000 Muscovites. Those Muscovites who survived the roundup were marched to the Crimea to be sold into slavery. In addition, Lubomirski agreed to hand over to the Tatars Sheremetyev, too, who at the time was detained in the Polish camp. Sheremetyev would remain a Tatar prisoner for 22 years, despite repeated attempts by Tsar Alexis to ransom him. Sheremetyev never saw his family again. He was only released to return home in 1682, and by then, both his wife and son had died. In poor health Sheremetyev, too, died within months.

The Crimean–Commonwealth victory at Chudnov did not resolve the differences among the Ukrainian cossacks. Although Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy enjoyed a degree of support in some left-bank towns such as Poltava, Priluki, and Mirgorod, the Zaporozhians under Serko opposed him. So did Colonels Yakov Somko of the Pereyaslav Regiment, Vasiliy Zolotarenko of the Nezhin Regiment, and Anikey Silich of the Chernigov Regiment. Moreover, Muscovite garrisons remained in some left-bank towns, and Prince Yuriy Baryatinskiy still defended Kiev. The Ukrainian and Lithuanian wars were far from over.

25

The Death of King Charles

King Charles had found that the Commonwealth was easy to conquer but difficult to control. Already by the end of 1655 Sweden controlled all major Polish towns, yet found it hard to gain a decisive victory. And as Sweden's primary attention moved to Denmark, the remaining Swedish garrisons in Commonwealth towns stayed on the defensive. King Charles expected eventually, after the Danish war was successfully concluded, to resume an offensive strategy in the Commonwealth, but only to secure the important Prussian shore.

However, he never got the chance to carry out this plan. On 23 February 1660, King Charles suddenly died after a brief illness. The King who had survived so many daring adventures and deadly battles with barely a scratch died in bed. The cause of death is believed to have been pneumonia, probably caught while out inspecting his artillery for too long on a cold day. On his deathbed, King Charles called his friends and family to bid them farewell. Among them was Admiral Bielkenstierna, walking with crutches. King Charles thanked him with the words 'Farewell, my honourable Bielkenstierna! Thank you for each day that we spent together!'

A regency government was established for the duration of the minority of his son, young King Charles XI.

Control of the Strait

The King's death did not signify the immediate end of the war. Naval activities resumed in mid March, when units of Ruyter's Dutch fleet in Copenhagen set out to initiate a blockade of Landskrona. Since only a few warships were involved, the blockade cannot be described as more than limited in scope. On the very same day, Admiral Bielkenstierna arrived in Landskrona to assume command of the Swedish main fleet from Admiral Strussflycht who had been in charge while Bielkenstierna recuperated from the wounds he sustained in the battle of Rødsand almost a year earlier. Not yet fully recovered, he could still reassume command.

The regency government instructed Bielkenstierna not to act too aggressively, since this might disrupt the ongoing peace negotiations. Nonetheless, major components of the fleet were put in order for a new campaign season, just in case negotiations would break down. In fact, the negotiations were at constant risk of breaking down, and this was reflected in the naval operations in and around the Strait.

Because of the ongoing negotiations, Ruyter, too, was instructed not to act too aggressively. Feeling abandoned by The Hague, King Frederick accordingly attempted to goad Ruyter into action by a personal appeal (he also awarded Ruyter an annual stipend). The King embarked on a Danish privateer (by this time hardly any Danish warships remained able to set out to sea), sailed to Ruyter who was with the Dutch fleet off Landskrona, and there attempted to persuade the Dutch Admiral to carry out an immediate joint attack on the Swedish fleet. It would be a joint attack, King Frederick argued, since two Danish warships operated within Ruyter's fleet. When Ruyter still declined, despite King Frederick's exhortation, the King asked the Dutch at least to continue the blockade. Otherwise, he argued, the Swedish fleet would surely set out to initiate a blockade of Copenhagen.

However, already on the next day the Dutch and Swedish representatives engaged in the peace negotiations agreed to a ceasefire. Importantly, the Danes were not a party to the ceasefire, which only would be in operation between Dutch and Swedes. As a result, Bielkenstierna immediately sent a message to Uggla whose squadron remained based in Korsør on Zealand, informing him of the ceasefire with the Dutch, but also ordering him to continue operations against Danish vessels and in particular transports.[1]

A few days later, Ruyter ordered the termination of the blockade of Landskrona. He seems to have done so unwillingly. The Swedish fleet remained a threat. Ruyter could not know that, in a separate development, Bielkenstierna already on the following day reported that key components of the Swedish fleet in Landskrona would be ready for combat operations within a couple of days. And he was right; two days later, on 22 March, the recently-promoted Admiral Lieutenant Gustav Sperling set out from Landskrona with a squadron of seven warships (the *Draken, Hercules, Carolus, Amarant, Göteborg, Mercurius*, and *Monikendam*).[2] Within days, he initiated a limited blockade of Copenhagen. By the end of the month, Bielkenstierna sent reinforcements, so that before the end of March, Sperling's squadron was reinforced with six more warships (the *Scepter, Caesar, Maria, Svenska Lejonet, Andromeda*, and *Apollo*). Sperling extended the blockade of Copenhagen, seizing two Danish ships on the way into port. Landskrona sent supplies as well. Sperling's only complaint was that he was out of beer, but fortunately plans were underway to send kegs to the warships by coastal vessels.[3] Sperling now had 13 warships in the Strait, which, Bielkenstierna argued, would be more than enough to handle the small remaining Danish fleet.

---

[1] In early 1660, Montecuccoli fell ill. He was then replaced as Imperial commander by Prince Rupert (1619–1682) of the Rhine, who after his better-known employment in the English Civil Wars had gone into Imperial service. However, with the war almost over, the new appointment had no appreciable impact on the outcome. By then, Imperial units were leaving or had already left Denmark.

[2] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.453–4.

[3] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, p.456. Beer came in two varieties: a weak one for the crew and a stronger variety for the officers, known as *kajutöl* ('cabin beer'). Incidentally, the medium-sized

By early April, Swedish naval operations were ongoing elsewhere as well. Swedish warships, probably from Uggla's squadron, as part of an operation against Danish privateers took the opportunity also to destroy two Danish supply ships in Heiligenhafen, Holstein. A few days later, probably the same warships attempted a landing on the island of Fehmarn, primarily to take supplies, although this attempt failed.

Ruyter grew increasingly concerned over the Swedish blockade of Copenhagen. Despite the ceasefire, he instructed his fleet to patrol the entrance to Copenhagen to prevent Swedish warships from seizing Danish ships, thus effectively breaking the Swedish blockade. This immediately raised the stakes that the ceasefire would be broken, during a sensitive impasse in the peace negotiations, so on 20 April, Bielkenstierna ended the Swedish blockade of Copenhagen.

Although the Danish navy was powerless to hold its own in the Strait, a few Danish ships remained in operation elsewhere. Most seem to have been privateers, although subject to the authority of the Admiralty. Already in late March, King Frederick's field marshal, Eberstein, had laid siege to Tønning, the stronghold of the King's hated rival the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Essentially, King Frederick wanted to pressure the pro-Swedish Duke into renouncing the full sovereignty he had gained in 1658 for his Schleswig domain. But Tønning could only be cut off from the outside world if a blockade also was enforced at sea, and for this purpose, two Danish privateers, each with six cannons, arrived to blockade the stronghold.

Moreover, the Dutch fleet continued to support the Danes in various ventures, in particular transportation. This sometimes caused yet other tensions. In mid April, two Swedish warships east of Zealand took a Dutch galiot with Field Marshal Hans Schack and Lieutenant General Hans Ahlefeldt on board. Either no Danish transports had been available, or they had expected that the Swedes would not interfere with a Dutch galiot. Nonetheless, the Swedes seized the galiot, and the two Danish commanders were taken captive and sent to Malmö.

In early May, Ruyter ordered 10 Swedish ships in the Strait bound for Stockholm seized. The matter was sensitive; the ships were mainly old warships in need of refurbishment but they were loaded with plunder from Denmark and additionally carried the personal goods of Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Sweden. Ruyter seized the ships as a means to put additional pressure on the Swedish negotiators. Soon after, he also deployed nine Dutch warships and a fireship under Rear Admiral Schram at Landskrona with the intention again to enable a blockade of the port. As yet, there were no open hostilities. Problems soon emerged when the supplies on the 10 seized Swedish ships began to

---

Maria and *Apollo*, both built in 1648, remained in service until 1677, when they were worn out and deliberately sunk at the entrance to Stockholm near Vaxholm. Both wrecks were found in 2019, a boon for marine archaeologists who until then only knew the wrecks of the biggest vessels and small craft.



Two Dutch merchantmen under sail near the shore, possibly an East India fleet returning from a successful voyage, *c.* 1660. (Willem van de Velde the Elder; Royal Museums Greenwich)

run out. With Dutch permission, the commander of the seized ships sent a longboat to Zealand for fresh water, but there it was attacked by Danes, who to Ruyter's irritation wounded one crewman and murdered another.

Meanwhile, Major Uggla continued to operate in the southern Baltic. Having embarked 200 men from Wismar as reinforcements, he attacked a Danish supply depot in Neustadt. However, the supply depot was commanded by the one-eyed Major Schack, who refused to surrender. Afterwards, Uggla's men ran into and exchanged fire with an Imperial unit in the neighbourhood. The two sides soon realised that this was a case of mistaken identity, so, in light of the recently concluded Treaty of Oliva (more on which below), Swedes and Imperials then shared a meal. The food engendered mutually good relations, and the Imperials advised the Swedes that if they needed supplies, they could always attack the Danes on the island of Fehmarn. Finding the suggestion a good one, Uggla soon afterwards landed Swedish soldiers (at least 120 cavalry, some dragoons and musketeers, and four 3-pounders) from Wismar under Major General Conrad Mardefelt (*c.* 1610–1688) on Fehmarn. Mardefelt was an experienced fortification officer who at the time also served as commandant of Wismar. Although Mardefelt's men soon gained control over the island, the Danish defenders took cover in a redoubt. In the ensuing combat, Mardefelt suffered a wound in the foot. Ultimately, Mardefelt had to withdraw from

Fehmarn, having failed to take the Danish redoubt but with fresh supplies from the island and 12 prisoners of war.[4]

End of the Deluge and the Danish Wars

King Charles's death and the relative caution of Bielkenstierna and Ruyter paved the way for the treaties that ultimately ended the wars. The regency government displayed a more flexible approach to the negotiated terms than the late King, who had insisted on territorial gains along the Baltic shore before a peace could be concluded. France supported the Swedish position, in part because of its own rivalry with the Habsburgs but also because as a guarantor of the peace of Westphalia, it was obligated to protest the Imperial and Brandenburg-Prussian attacks on Swedish Pomerania. As a result, France had already in late 1659 threatened to intervene, if Frederick William and Emperor Leopold did not cease their aggression against Sweden's German possessions (in return, France had informed King Charles that Sweden would have to drop its demands for restitution from Brandenburg and the Emperor and accept a peace treaty in Germany based on the status ante bellum).

Emperor Leopold, who in addition to his concerns over France and Sweden also had to consider the threat from the Ottoman Empire, saw no benefit in reinforcing Brandenburg's position, since in the long term he assessed (correctly) that the Elector's rise in power would be at the expense of his own lands. For these reasons, the Emperor was inclined to peace. England and France had already for considerable time pushed for a negotiated peace, and they had compelled the Netherlands to accept peace negotiations. When the other members of the anti-Swedish coalition one after the other agreed to a peace agreement, Brandenburg followed them. Frederick William did not wish to stand alone against Sweden, which still had military might to spare. Sweden remained a first-rate military power, had not yet mobilised all of its considerable capacity (in Gothenburg, Parliament had authorised additional conscription), and was sufficiently intimidating that the faint hope of King Charles's death weakening his army's resolve failed to persuade Sweden's adversaries that another offensive might secure a more decisive victory. The parties soon found themselves in agreement, and peace between Sweden, the Commonwealth, the Habsburgs, and Brandenburg was concluded through the Treaty of Oliva on 3 May (23 April O.S.) 1660. The Commonwealth recognised Livonia north of the River Düna as part of Sweden, while Sweden restored its few remaining strongholds in Poland. The King of Poland also renounced his family's claim to the Swedish throne. The treaty thus ended the 62-year state of war between Sweden and the Commonwealth, originally caused by the dynastic dispute of 1598. In addition, the Treaty of Oliva confirmed Frederick William's assumption of full sovereignty over the Duchy of Prussia.[5] No other territorial changes took place.

---

[4] Askgaard, *Kampen om Östersjön*, pp.471–2.

[5] In this regard, the Treaty of Oliva merely confirmed the Treaties of Wehlau and Bromberg.

The Swedish regency government was more accommodating than King Charles with regard to Denmark, too, accepting to drop the late King's demand for Akershus instead of Trondheim. On 6 June (27 May O.S.) 1660, peace between Sweden and Denmark was concluded through the Treaty of Copenhagen. For the Netherlands, the primary effect of the Treaty was that Article 3 of the Treaty of Roskilde which would have established joint Danish–Swedish naval dominion over the Baltic Sea was removed. Instead of a closed sea (*mare clausum*), the Baltic would remain a sea free (*mare liberum*) to all naval powers.

Sweden restored Trondheim County and the island of Bornholm to Danish rule but retained its other conquests, including the economically important Scanian region of modern-day southern Sweden and the island of Hven in the Strait. The full sovereignty for the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's Schleswig domain was retained, too. The Treaty of Copenhagen established political borders between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden which have lasted to the present day. For Sweden, the territories gained from Denmark were far more important, with regard to population numbers, revenue, trade, and long-term sustainability, than what might have been achieved in the Commonwealth. Although the two treaties technically were unrelated, it was obvious that the Swedish regency government regarded them as linked, especially so as the negotiations took place simultaneously.

The war between Sweden and Muscovy ended with the Treaty of Kardis (modern-day Kärde) of 1 July (21 June O.S.) 1661. At first unwilling to return any captured territories, Muscovy agreed to return to the situation as determined by 1617 Treaty of Stolbovo when faced with the re-mobilisation of the Swedish army, which now was freed from its former and simultaneous commitments in Denmark and the Commonwealth. Still tied up in the Commonwealth, Tsar Alexis realised that he lacked the manpower to defeat two major powers at the same time. The Thirteen Years' War between the Commonwealth and Muscovy was far from over and would continue until 1667, both in Lithuania and the Ukraine. Neither Sweden nor Muscovy made any territorial, or other, gains. After peace was concluded, the Muscovites returned the occupied parts of Kexholm County, Ingria, and Livonia (Kokenhusen, Dorpat, Adzele, Marienburg, and Wask-Narva).

The End of the Thirteen Years' War

Space only permits some details and a rough outline of the continuing warfare between the Commonwealth, Muscovy, the Khanate of the Crimea, and the remnants of Cossack Ukraine.

In April 1661, Prince Grigoriy Romodanovskiy marched to Nezhin with the Belgorod Army, while Grigoriy Kosagov marched to Poltava with a second army.[6] These significant Muscovite reinforcements enabled Colonel

---

[6] In May 1660, Kosagov's army consisted of 4,074 old-style cavalry, 250 new formation cavalry, 200 Don and Oreshkovo (Belgorod) cossacks, 837 new formation infantry, and the Akhtyrsk

Yakov Somko of the Pereyaslav Regiment and Colonel Vasiliy Zolotarenko of the Nezhin Regiment to root out the supporters of Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy in their respective areas.

From spring 1661 onwards (until summer 1662) Stefan Czarniecki and Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy carried out repeated raids into Left-bank Ukraine. During the summer, Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy made a final attempt to conquer the left bank, this time through an offensive against Pereyaslav with the support of both Polish and Crimean cavalry. Meanwhile, the Crimeans supported Czarniecki's and Khmel'nitskiy's raids into the left bank, while at the same time also raiding the right bank, at least until Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy managed to conclude an agreement with the Khan in October 1661.

However, in July 1662 the Muscovites, under Romodanovskiy, and Ukrainian cossacks loyal to Muscovy under Yakov Somko, decisively defeated Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy at Kanev. Romodanovskiy and Somko mustered a total of 28,000 men for the battle, while Khmel'nitskiy fielded 14,000 cossacks, supported by 4,000 Poles and 2,000 Crimean Tatars, in total 20,000 men.[7] This put an end to the Commonwealth and Ukrainian cossack raids across the Dnieper and neutralised this threat to Muscovy's rule over Left-bank Ukraine.

The Crimeans wisely abstained from offering further assistance to Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy, who fled back to Chigirin. He abdicated the position of Hetman in January 1663 and became a monk. Pavel Teterya succeeded him as Hetman of Right-bank Ukraine.

In June 1663, Ivan Bryukhovetskiy was elected Hetman of Left-bank Ukraine. In September, he had his rivals Somko and Zolotarenko arrested and executed.

In the autumn of 1663, King John Casimir personally commanded an offensive into Left-bank Ukraine. He was supported by the Right-bank cossacks, under Pavel Teterya. The Crimean Tatars provided significant support, too, under Dedysh Agha. The plan was that the King would conquer Left-bank Ukraine while the Lithuanian army under the newly appointed Lithuanian Field Hetman, Michał Kazimierz Pac, would take Smolensk and then penetrate into Muscovy itself. The two armies would then meet at Bryansk.

The Crown army crossed the Dnieper in late November. With Romodanovskiy's Belgorod Army back in Muscovy, he encountered little resistance, although Bryukhovetskiy's cossacks harassed his foragers. The King took several smaller towns (Voron'kov, Borispol', Gogolev, Ostyor, Kremenchug, Lokhvitsa, Lubny, Romny, and Priluki), while bypassing those with significant Muscovite garrisons (Kiev, Pereyaslav, Chernigov, and Nezhin). Among the captives were Ivan Bogun, who had remained loyal to Muscovy but now was offered freedom in exchange for changing sides.

---

regiment under Ivan Gladkiy. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Rogozhin, 'Dumnyy dvoryanin general-poruchik G. I. Kosagov', *Voprosy istorii* 9 (2011), pp.132–41, on p.133.

[7] Igor' B. Babulin, *Kanevskaya bitva 16 iyulya 1662 goda: Zabytaya pobeda* (Moscow: Russkiye Vityazi, 2015), p.39; Babulin, 'Vazhneyshiye pobedy', p.389.

However, the offensive did not go so well in Lithuania, where Pac failed to achieve his objectives.

Although King John Casimir benefited from the support of a Crimean contingent, most Crimean Tatars were then busy elsewhere, since their core territories repeatedly were attacked by Kalmyk units. In October to December, Muscovite dragoons and Don cossacks under Grigoriy Kosagov, Kalmyk cavalry under Erket Aturkay, and Zaporozhian cossack infantry under Ivan Serko raided Tatar settlements and attacked Perekop twice, which forced the Crimeans to return to defend their own territories.[8]

Unfortunately for King John Casmir, in late January 1664 the Crimeans accordingly abandoned the campaign, returning home with their captives. By then, King John Casimir laid siege to Glukhov, which was defended by Colonel Vasiliy Fyodorovich Dvoretskiy, a Ukrainian cossack from Kiev. Ultimately, King John Casimir abandoned the siege. He did not reach further, and the failed offensive became the Commonwealth's last attempt to retrieve Left-bank Ukraine.[9] Retreating, the King also had Ivan Bogun executed, suspected of treason for collusion with the Muscovites. In late February Romodanovskiy arrived with the Belgorod Army, which together with the cossacks under Bryukhovetskiy defeated the King's army at Pirogovka. Other Muscovite armies mobilised, too. The Sevsk Division, under Pyotr Vasil'yevich Sheremetyev, moved out through Putivl'. Prince Yakov Cherkasskiy and the main Moscow army assembled at Kaluga, from which it could prevent any Lithuanian offensive. The Novgorod Army, under Prince Ivan Khovanskiy, moved into Lithuania. Without Crimean support, King John Casimir lacked the means and the manpower to renew the offensive.

During the summer, things finally began to look brighter for the Commonwealth campaign in Lithuania. On 16 June, Lithuanian Field Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac defeated Prince Ivan Khovanskiy and his Novgorod Army at Vitebsk. Soon Lithuanian units advanced into Muscovite territory, for operations around Pskov, Novgorod, and Voronezh. Although these raids gained no permanent results, they signified the end of major Muscovite offensives into Lithuania. However, Commonwealth forces failed to make headway in the Ukraine, where cossack rivalries effectively prevented any solution.

The campaigns of 1664 meant that war between the Commonwealth and Muscovy essentially ended in a deadlock. King John Casimir lacked the resources to regain the territories already lost in the Ukraine and eastern Lithuania, while Tsar Alexis had to abandon his designs on the Polish crown and heartlands and lacked the strength to embark upon major offensives in Lithuania.

---

[8] V. T. Tepkeyev, '"Ot nego, krymskogo khana, pravdy i postoyanstva net": Nabegi kalmytskikh otryadov na Krym vo vremya Russko-pol'skoy voyny 1654–1667 rr.', *Novyy istoricheskiy vestnik* 4 (38) (2013), pp.9–28, 18–22.

[9] Igor' B. Babulin, 'Oborona Glukhova protiv pol'skoy armii korolya Yana Kazimira v 1664 g.', *Slavyanskiy al'manakh* 2019, pp.213–36.

A further complication was the civil war which broke out in the Commonwealth in the following year. Commonwealth domestic politics remained as divisive and tumultuous as ever, and tensions had been growing for some time. Already in 1659, Commonwealth nobles within the army had begun to form confederations, refusing to fight unless they received their pay.[10] The 1660 offensives were made possible because the 1659 parliament agreed to raise taxes with which to pay the men. However, in 1661 new confederations were formed in both the Lithuanian and Crown armies. By then, political tensions also grew between King John Casimir and much of the Commonwealth nobility over the issue of royal succession. The King's plans for an election of his successor while he was still alive, as a means to ensure political stability, was deemed to infringe upon noble liberties and ultimately collapsed. The immensely wealthy Crown Field Hetman, Lubomirski, played a key role in the opposition to King John Casimir, since he regarded himself as something of a kingmaker. In 1664, the exasperated King John Casimir impeached Lubomirski for treason. Lubomirski was subsequently sentenced to death, confiscation of property, and loss of honour. As a result, he fled into Silesia. However, in the autumn of 1665 Lubomirski returned to raise a rebellion against the King. He defeated the Crown army at Częstochowa in 1665 and at Mątwy in 1666. Finally, in July 1666 King John Casimir and Lubomirski signed the Agreement of Łęgonice, which declared an amnesty for the rebels and the termination of the King's political, governmental, and fiscal reform programme in exchange for a written letter of apology from Lubomirski. However, failing to secure his rehabilitation, Lubomirski then again withdrew into Silesia, where he died in January 1667. Incidentally, Lubomirski's rebellion meant that Stefan Czarniecki finally was appointed Crown Field Hetman in 1665.

As a result of the deadlock between the major parties in the conflict and political turmoil within the Commonwealth which complicated the decision process, the war between the Commonwealth and Muscovy was only concluded by the Truce of Andrusovo on 9 February (30 January O.S.) 1667. According to the terms of the Truce, Lithuania ceded Smolensk and several border districts (including Dorogobuzh, Belaya, Nevel', Sebezh, Krasnoye, Velizh, and Starodub districts). Muscovy returned the occupied towns of Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Dünaburg. Further south, Muscovy and the Commonwealth divided the Ukraine along the Dnieper River. The Commonwealth ceded Chernigov with surroundings, Left-bank Ukraine, and, for a period of two years, Kiev, but retained Right-bank Ukraine. Zaporozhia was recognised as a condominium of both the Commonwealth and Muscovy.

---

[10] Confederations, that is, temporary associations of nobles who resisted a certain policy or felt that their rights were infringed upon, was not a new phenomenon in the Commonwealth. We saw in Volume II how Polish resistance to King Charles often expressed itself in the formation of confederations. Nor was the practice limited to Commonwealth armies. Similar confederations were formed by German colonels of enlisted units in the Swedish army already during the Thirty Years' War when they were dissatisfied with conditions of service or their payment did not arrive in time.

26

The Aftermath and Legacy of the Deluge and the Danish Wars

Because of the Deluge and the Danish wars, King Charles left Sweden greater than it had ever been, in territory as well as security. He left his little son and heir, King Charles XI, in the care of a regency government. Although a previous regency government had served Sweden well during the minority of Queen Christina, this time the outcome was different. The new regency government ignored the instructions in the King's last will, soon grew complacent in the perceived security of the country's status as a great power, and its members spent more efforts on promoting their own interests than those of the country. But this is another story, which had nothing to do with King Charles X.[1]

With regard to the Thirteen Years' War between the Commonwealth and Muscovy, the Truce of Andrusovo turned out to be no more than a temporary solution. The ramifications of the cossack uprising which caused the war, in disputes based on territorial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic issues, remain evident even in present times, four centuries later.

It is hard to make an objective assessment of who won, or lost, the wars of the Deluge. Most participants achieved some of their objectives, but with possibly one exception, none achieved all they set out to do. For the Commonwealth, Sweden, and Muscovy, the war in many ways simply petered out, ending as a stalemate. Although losses had been great, all three retained significant military strength. If two could have agreed to team up against the other, they might have achieved a substantial victory. However, the Commonwealth, Sweden, and Muscovy were the main powers of north-eastern Europe, and none trusted the others.[2] As a result, co-operation

---

[1] The results of the regency government's complacency are described in Michael Fredholm von Essen, *Charles XI's War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675–1679* (Warwick: Helion, 2019).

[2] In December 1653, Tsar Alexis proposed an alliance with Sweden against the Commonwealth. However, the then Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, declined, perhaps because of his life-long mistrust of Muscovy.


Brandenburg-Prussian territory
Habsburg territory in 1648
Polish-Lithuanian territory lost to Muscovy, 1667
Swedish territory in 1648
Swedish territory acquired in 1658
Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
N
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Stockholm
MUSCOVY
Riga
DENMARK
North Sea
Baltic Sea
LITHUANIA
Smolensk
Königsberg
Minsk
Ravensburg
Pomerania
DUTCH REPUBLIC
Bremen
Berlin
POLAND
Cleve
Mark
Cologne
BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Magdeburg
Silesia
Kiev
Bohemia
Moravia
UKRAINE
FRANCE
Breisgau
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Styria
Buda
Pest
Transylvania
Tyrol
Carinthia
Carniola
Croatia
HUNGARY
CRIMEA
Karlowitz
SWISS CONFEDERATION
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Black Sea
Adriatic Sea
Balkans
0
200
400
600 km

Border changes after the Treaty of Oliva 1660 and the Truce of Andrusovo 1667 became impossible. Besides, the stalemate was a powerful motivator for peace negotiations.

King Charles did not succeed in his ambition to add the Prussian ports to Sweden's overseas territories. On the other hand, he gained Sweden's two key objectives, which he had inherited from earlier rulers: he forced King John Casimir to renounce his family's claims to the Swedish Crown as well as all claims on Swedish Livonia. Moreover, King Charles made huge and lasting territorial gains in his wars with Denmark. While most Swedish troops had withdrawn from the Commonwealth long before the Treaty of Oliva, some garrisons remained, undefeated. King Charles's withdrawal of the Swedish field army from the Commonwealth when Sweden was attacked by Denmark persuaded many later historians that the Commonwealth had defeated King Charles militarily and successfully pushed out his army. On the surface, such a conclusion looks obvious – to the historian who chooses to isolate the military operations of the Deluge and Danish wars under the labels of different, fully separated conflicts: Sweden versus the Commonwealth; Muscovy versus the Commonwealth; the cossack civil wars; Muscovy versus Sweden; Denmark versus Sweden; and so on. However, it has been shown that neither of these conflicts took place in a vacuum. They were all played out at the same time and on the same grand chessboard – which consisted of Scandinavia and eastern Europe from the Arctic to the Black Sea. The removal of a field army from one theatre of operations to another, more urgent theatre does not necessarily signify its defeat. The military situation in the Commonwealth at the time of the Danish attack on Sweden was a stalemate. The Deluge did not end in a Swedish defeat, but neither can Sweden claim the operations in the Commonwealth as a lasting conquest. Arguably, the question is if anybody at the time could be said to be in full control of the territory of the Commonwealth. The ease with which almost any significant population group, not least the Polish and Lithuanian nobility, the German-speaking Prussian Estates, and the Ruthenian cossacks, changed allegiance and swore oaths of loyalty to virtually any conqueror or foreign strongman at the tip of a hat (as long as he promised to respect their liberties, that is) suggests that royal rule over the Commonwealth was a mutable prospect. King Charles had not anticipated these difficulties. Eventually, he concluded: 'The Polish and Muscovite wars are more difficult for me and my kingdom than the Danish war. Because nothing can be achieved with these barbarians, regardless of how many times one defeats them.'[3] Nonetheless, we have seen that King Charles made lasting conquests elsewhere, and Sweden retained its reputation as a first-rate military power.

King John Casimir lost his claims on Sweden, his claims on the Duchy of Prussia, and eventually, with the Truce of Andrusovo, Smolensk with surrounding districts and major parts of Ukraine. Yet, he managed to retain his throne, and the core territories of the Kingdom of Poland and most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were eventually liberated by Commonwealth commanders more or less loyal to him. The Deluge did certainly not end in a Commonwealth victory, but neither can the outcome be described as a decisive defeat. On the other hand, it was obvious that politically, the Commonwealth remained a weak entity, with its continued stress on noble liberties at the cost of national unity, economic development, and modernisation. The death of Queen Marie Louise in 1667 affected King John Casimir deeply. The personal loss as well as the Commonwealth's inability and unwillingness to reform itself ultimately became too much for him. In 1668, he abdicated, withdrew to France, where he received a pension from King Louis XIV, and retired as abbot of St Germain-des-Prés in Paris.

---

[3] King Charles to Count Schlippenbach, 25 July 1657 (O.S.); cited in Holm, *Översikt*, p.65; and Hedberg, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid*, p.122.

Tsar Alexis failed to gain access to the Baltic Sea. The attainment of this goal would have to wait for another generation, decades later. On the other hand, Tsar Alexis gained Smolensk with surrounding districts as well as a major part of the Ukraine, which also increased Muscovy's security versus Crimean Tatar raids. Tsar Alexis failed to make a major impact on Sweden but was victorious against the Commonwealth. This was proof that modernisation, and in particular the new formation army, provided the means to make Muscovy a yet stronger power. But the struggle had been long and hard, and there had been temporary reverses, which might have broken a weaker power than Muscovy.

Bogdan and Yuriy Khmel'nitskiy, Ivan Vygovskiy, and the other Ukrainian cossack leaders were largely unsuccessful in their bids for power and autonomy. Despite the occasional spectacular victory, they failed to unite, failed to establish a lasting state, and failed to prevent the division of Ruthenia into different domains, under different, non-Ruthenian sovereigns.

King Frederick failed in all his objectives, yet paradoxically he emerged personally stronger from the war. Denmark could still not accept its territorial losses, which the present wars had failed to restore. Copenhagen was no longer geographically located in the centre of the Danish kingdom, but henceforth lay on the very border with Sweden. As a result, the Danish commanders immediately began to modernise the army with the aim of retaking the lost territories, an attempt which a generation later resulted in the Scanian War. Moreover, in January 1661 King Frederick issued the Act Concerning Absolute and Hereditary Government which transformed Danish kingship from an elective monarchy to an absolute and hereditary monarchy that explicitly was freed from constraints. The nobility lost its tax-exempt status and its monopoly of many offices. A belief of the divine right of kings was introduced. Although the revolution from above, because a revolution it was, seemed more the culmination of a series of long-term developments that resulted from Denmark's experience in the previous wars, it undoubtedly offered King Frederick more choices and opened up for a new assertiveness in Danish foreign policy. This development also heralded the disappearance in the Danish military establishment of the old-style military entrepreneurs, who raised and provided military resources (regiments) as a business venture, and their replacement by officers employed by the state who organised but did not provide military resources raised by the state.

Prince George Rákóczy failed miserably to reach his objectives. Hemmed in by the Ottoman Empire and other major powers, Transylvania was beginning to feel its lack of development and resources.

Emperors Ferdinand and Leopold invested little in the wars of the Deluge and the Danish wars. They were neither winners nor losers; for them, the Deluge was merely another crisis which had to be handled, and which they handled well.

The Dutch had good reasons to be satisfied with the outcome of the war. Their only concern in the region was to ensure that the profitable Baltic trade could get underway again, without excessive customs duties and other obstacles to hard-working merchants. It was never in their interest to give any one country sole control over the Strait. The present outcome, with the Strait divided between Danes and Swedes, suited the Dutch admirably. And with peace in the east, the lucrative Danzig trade could continue, too. Finally, King Charles's proposal that Danes and Swedes together should close the Strait to foreign war fleets was gone forever, and guarantees had been made that Dutch and other foreign merchants would not pay higher customs duties than Swedes and Danes.

Mehmed Khan lost out on the personal level, since his Ottoman masters in 1666 again deposed him. Choosing a life of religion, Mehmed Geray retired to live as a Sufi in the Caucasus, or to be more specific, in the Shamkhalate, a Lezghian vassal state to the Khanate in northern Daghestan, where he was granted an estate. When Mehmet died, his ashes were returned to the Crimean capital of Bakhchisarai for burial. For the Crimean Khanate as a state, the wars constituted a series of tactical victories. The Tatars gained much plunder and numerous slaves, and this was the life-blood of the Khanate. Yet, in the long term it was obvious that the Khanate was in decline. History was moving away from equestrian nomadism, and a century later there would be little space for the Crimean Tatars. The war had shown that the Khanate still could defeat other eastern states, such as Transylvania and Cossack Ukraine, but when faced with a first-rate, modern military such as that of Sweden, the Crimean cavalry skills no longer sufficed. This was a lesson learned for Muscovy in particular, but also for the Commonwealth.

Frederick William of the House of Hohenzollern, the Elector of Brandenburg and now sovereign Duke of Prussia, was the most successful of the contenders in the wars. Indeed, the growing power of the House of Hohenzollern, which primarily was based on its efficient standing army, in 1701 led Frederick William's son and successor, Elector Frederick III (1688–1713), to proclaim the Kingdom of Prussia with himself as King Frederick I. If there was any clear winner of the wars of the Deluge, it was Frederick William.

For the rest of the participants in the Deluge, the war was much like any other. Some profited, while others lost their fortunes, or lives. While the horrors of war during the Deluge were real enough and should not be downplayed, over time the stories grew in the re-telling, especially when written by Polish churchmen with religious agendas. The horror stories gained additional impact when retold by nineteenth-century novelists, including Henryk Sienkiewicz, a Nobel Prize laureate. In modern-day Polish popular historiography, the Swedish Deluge (*potop szwedski*) remains an evocative symbol of suffering, perseverance, and national redemption. The war forms part of national school curricula and has had a major impact on Polish popular culture. Some local Polish historians have claimed, with a certain amount of hyperbole, that the 'cataclysm of the Swedish Deluge can be compared with the barbarity of Hitler's Nazis in the Second World War'.[4] And despite the passing of almost four centuries, and the destruction caused by later, far more devastating wars fought on Polish territory including two world wars, some Polish legislators still regularly voice demands for financial compensation from Sweden for the destruction of the Deluge.[5] In a similar manner, modern-day Ukrainian, Russian, and to some extent Belarusian popular culture and, more significantly, some current political agendas often mirror and indeed magnify the seventeenth-century rivalries of the Commonwealth, Cossack Ukraine, and Muscovy. Each side then portrays the struggle as a fight for freedom, or as a means to regain lost territories, and blames the destruction during the wars of the Deluge on the others.

Yet, the wars of the Deluge, devastating as they were, were no more destructive than the preceding Thirty Years' War. The very same strategies were used in both conflicts, by most participants, which is unsurprising since so many of the leading commanders in all armies were veterans of the Thirty Years' War. Not only Swedes, Brandenburg-Prussians, and Imperials, which could be expected, but also the Commonwealth's most efficient military leaders, including Stefan Czarniecki, had fought in the very same battles in Germany. It is thus hardly surprising that Czarniecki employed the same ruthless strategies as other veterans, whether on his own territory or elsewhere, including in Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Denmark. These methods included raiding and looting on a large scale. Such methods were the logical outcome of a deliberate strategy to win the war by applying pressure on the enemy in the ongoing or expected peace negotiations, but they were also, equally importantly, a means to retain and feed the army. In the context of mid-seventeenth century warfare, raiding was a deliberate strategy to gain specific military objectives, not merely random looting. We should not close our eyes to the fact that raiding also was a means for commanders and others to enrich themselves. Swedish officers were notorious in their aim to gain valuable art objects and books since Sweden had little of the kind, and they often did so on orders from the Crown, but soldiers of all nationalities acquired portable wealth. Meanwhile, common soldiers who received neither pay nor supplies had to make a living as they could.

These comments should not be interpreted as suggesting that the wars of the Deluge were a pleasant tour of duty for the parties involved, whether soldiers or civilians. The Commonwealth and Denmark were overrun by domestic and foreign enemies of all kinds, and all took their toll of the riches.

---

[4] Krzysztof Nawrocki, *Pod Żarnowem – w czasach szwedzkiego 'potopu': Kolejna rocznica historycznej bitwy* (website <http://hs.xon.pl/portal_zarnow/informacje/zrodla/bitwa_pod_zarnowem.pdf>).

[5] See, for example, 'Poseł Ruchu Palikota chce odszkodowania za... Potop', *Wprost weekly*, 16 January 2013 (website <www.wprost.pl/kraj/384448/posel-ruchu-palikota-chce-odszkodowania-za-potop.htm>).

Livonia, Prussia, Pomerania, and Bremen suffered a similar fate, as did the Swedish and Norwegian borderlands, much of the Ukraine, and indeed the Muscovite and Tatar borderlands. In the Swedish army, soldiers stuck in devastated territory were notably unhappy about their circumstances. When King Charles in 1658 prepared for war with Denmark, he remarked that 'I feel how my officers and men abhor the Polish war' and accordingly would be happier fighting elsewhere. In the same breath, he mused about bringing the war to the Habsburg ancestral lands by sending an army there, as a means to attract a Polish relief force into Habsburg territory which surely 'would ruin Austria more than I myself could do, and nurture and increase the enmity and hate between them'.[6]

In the Commonwealth, the depredations of war eventually rallied most factions around the Crown. Elsewhere, this might have led to necessary domestic military and political reforms. In other European states, the crises of the late sixteenth- and most of the seventeenth-century stimulated the introduction of more effective systems of government. Sweden emerged as a regional great power, despite a background of civil conflict and extensive wars with Denmark, Muscovy, and the Commonwealth. Muscovy emerged from the Time of Troubles and the subsequent wars with the Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate as one of the major powers in Eurasia, sufficiently strong to take on and eventually eclipse Sweden. Further to the west but at the same time, France emerged from the wars of religion and the civil wars of the Fronde stronger than ever and a dominant power in Europe. So did England, again out of a background of civil wars. Not so the Commonwealth. Despite having rallied around the Crown during its time of need, the Commonwealth failed to reform its political and military structures. Divisions in Commonwealth society were already widespread, and as soon as the war was over, domestic tensions immediately rose again. Although occasional sparks of brilliance from time to time relit the glory of the Commonwealth, its divisions had grown so great that unity no longer was possible. As a result, the Commonwealth gradually grew into a pawn of other powers and, ultimately, was partitioned out of existence. The causes of this decay had nothing to do with the wars of the Deluge and the downward slide took place despite the Deluge, not because of it.

In Kexholm County and Ingria, the wars resulted in a major exodus of the Orthodox population. Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, it seems that at least 16,000 and possibly as many as 33,000 people relocated to Muscovy. Recent research suggests 14,000 in Kexholm County alone and 6,500 to 7,500 in Ingria. In their stead, large numbers of Lutheran Finns moved in, claiming the abandoned farmsteads. This changed the demography of the region for centuries to come. From a military viewpoint, the Swedes drew one important conclusion. The most versatile soldier in the borderlands was the dragoon, able to move and fight both on horseback and mounted. As a result, Sweden already in 1665 authorised Herman von Burghausen to set up a new unit of dragoons, the Savolax Dragoon Regiment.[7]

---

[6] King Charles to Mattias Biörenklou, Sweden's representative at the Imperial election in Frankfurt-am-Main, 2 March 1658 (O.S.); Carl Adlersparre (ed.), *Historiska Samlingar* 5 (Stockholm: Fr. B. Nestius, 1822), pp.177–92, on p.184.

In Denmark, we have seen that the wars resulted in a total population loss (not deaths, the number of which was higher) of an estimated 80,000 people. Moreover, for years stories continued to be told about all the rapacious armies, whether allies or enemies, that had marched up and down the country, plundering and murdering. And with the territorial losses sustained in the peace treaties, Denmark never again rose to the status of a regional power.

The borderlands between Sweden and Norway suffered much the same fate. In particular those of Bohuslän and Västergötland saw continuous and relentless fighting. Although population loss figures are unknown, the same provinces and towns were plundered again and again. Both Norwegians and Swedes essentially repeated the same campaign plan year after year, which was terrible and often deadly to those who lived through the experience but to the historian with the advantage of hindsight merely appear tedious. The armies which carried out these campaigns were significantly larger than raiding parties, but smaller than what would have been needed to function as occupation armies. Moreover, the border provinces were too poor to sustain the extended stay of an occupation army, or for that matter, a friendly army. Sweden ultimately gained key provinces, which remain part of Sweden to this day, but not really because of military success but because King Frederick was willing to surrender them to achieve peace for his Danish core territories. Records show that when peace was declared, many inhabitants of primarily Bohuslän and Jämtland could not understand why they, who won more battles than they lost, now had to cede their lands to Sweden.

It only remains to tell how the saga of the Swedish Gold Coast colony played out. We have seen how its former governor, Hendrik Carloff, fled to the Netherlands with as much loot as he could bring. Meanwhile, in the Gold Coast, Carloff's former deputy, Samuel Schmidt, upon hearing the news of Sweden's victory over Denmark in the first Danish war, in April 1659 rapidly sold the entire Gold Coast colony to the Dutch for a bargain price. He then went into hiding in Angola with the money which he had been paid. However, this was not the end of the story. On the Gold Coast, the Swedish operation had effectively been a joint venture with a local ruler, the King of Efutu (often written Fetu or Fante in modern historiography). Now the King was dissatisfied with developments. He wanted the Swedes back. As a result, the King in May 1659 sent his field commander Acroissen Tay (a man known to the Swedes as Johan Claesson) with several hundred men to retake Carolusborg. The Efutu soldiers overwhelmed the Dutch, and Acroissen Tay henceforth held the fort on behalf of the Swedes, not neglecting to fly a Swedish flag and firing cannons in salute on the appropriate occasions, until the first Swedish ship after the war arrived in late 1660 and the colony was returned into Swedish hands. But the Danes did not have to leave empty-handed, because on 30 December 1659 King Aduafo of Efutu signed an agreement with King Frederick which granted the Danes another location for a fort and trading post.

---

[7] Lappalainen, 'Finland', p.164.

Since the three volumes of this book have focused on King Charles's wars, it makes sense to end the narrative with a question. Had there been no war with Denmark, would King Charles then have continued the campaign in the Commonwealth, and if so, what would have been the likely outcome? An historian cannot answer these questions with anything resembling certainty. However, based on King Charles's character, as displayed in his campaigns, it seems unlikely that he would have abandoned the project to gain the Prussian ports. Certainly, his soldiers and officers disliked campaigning in the Commonwealth, and it was surely obvious to the Swedish King that regardless of how many times he defeated King John Casimir and occupied Warsaw, he lacked means to control the vast territory of the Commonwealth. Perhaps we can chance a guess that had there been no war with Denmark at the time (and a Danish war was sure to break out sooner or later), the Swedes would probably have returned to the original plan, grabbed hold of major parts of the Baltic Sea shore (but not Danzig, the strength and determination of which made conquest impossible), and established a Swedish dominion there, much as they earlier had done in Pomerania. This would have been greatly facilitated by the already conquered strongholds in Prussia still held by Swedish garrisons, some of which remained undefeated when the peace treaty finally was signed, and the popular support Sweden enjoyed in many of Prussia's German-speaking towns. Such an outcome might not decisively have changed the history of the Commonwealth, but it would surely have delayed, perhaps indefinitely, the development of Brandenburg into the Kingdom of Prussia.

Colour Plate Commentaries

Figures

Plate A

Veteran Swedish officer, Västgöta Cavalry Regiment
Swedish officers procured their own armament and equipment. A cavalryman was expected to wear a helmet and cuirass, consisting of a shot-proof breast- and backplate. Many cavalrymen, including officers such as this one, wore a buff coat below the cuirass, which may explain why cavalry units seem not yet to have dressed in garments of uniform colour. The colour of the clothing was simply not much visible under the cuirass and buff coat. This veteran officer has picked up several items of Polish origin, including a set of expensive hussar armour. Although not shot-proof, it looked striking and provided some additional protection for arms and shoulders. Another item of Polish origin is the flat sabretache container originally intended for carrying ammunition but often used for letters, documents, and money. This officer is armed with a rapier with a hand guard for added protection, which was the most common type of rapier at the time of the Danish wars. He would also carry two pistols, in saddle holsters.

Swedish musketeer, Uppland Regiment
Like most other Swedish national infantry and dragoon units, the soldiers of the Uppland Regiment were issued uniforms (in their case, red coats and breeches) before the war. However, on campaign a soldier would dress in whatever was available, and especially so during winter conditions. There is accordingly no relationship between what he wears now and what he received at home back in 1655. The fur coat and fur hat of the *karpus* type, a round woollen cap with flaps that could be turned down to protect the eyes, ears, and neck, are particularly noticeable, both of which must have been helpful during a cold winter. Armed with the army's standard 10 bore matchlock musket, he belongs to one of the many units which at this time were in the process of replacing the old-style bandolier with wooden bottles for gunpowder with paper cartridges, each containing a measured charge of gunpowder. A soldier would carry his paper cartridges in a cartridge box of leather. As a sidearm, this musketeer relies on a modern-style rapier with hand guard. He has discarded the regulation-issue musket fork rest, probably for good or possibly because he is engaged in a siege operation, when fork rests were less useful.

Plate B

Swedish Navy under-officer

Prepared for combat, this navy under officer has added a buff coat for additional protection and some embellishments as a symbol of rank. He is armed with a snaphance boarding pistol of the type commonly used in the navy, since snaphance weapons were less of a fire hazard. navy pistols were generally hung on the wall inside the ship, so as to be ready for use. Optionally, a man might carry several snaphance boarding pistols hanging from a bandolier. This under-officer relies on a rapier as sidearm, of the modern type which was not issued to common sailors.

Admiral Claes Bielkenstierna, 1659

Swedish navy officers, even nobles of high rank, commonly dressed in far more comfortable and plain clothes at sea than they were expected to wear on land. We know how Admiral Bielkenstierna dressed when he commanded the Swedish fleet in the 1659 battle of Rødsand, because his garments then are preserved in the Royal Armoury, Stockholm. The clothes consist of jacket and breeches of plain woollen cloth, without any decoration or traces thereof. In appearance, the Admiral's dress was almost identical to that worn by commoners, except for the baldric, which consisted of expensive materials as was expected of an officer. The baldric was only worn for battle, and it is unlikely that the Admiral would so arm himself for daily shipboard activities. An admiral would carry a ceremonial broadsword as a symbol of office. However, in actual combat most would certainly rely on the more functional rapier.

Plate C

Swedish Navy Sailor

Most Swedish navy sailors were conscripts, even though the Crown also enlisted some professionals, in particular from the Netherlands. The Crown provided navy sailors with clothing. As a result, they ended up dressed in much the same way as sailors of merchant ships. This sailor wears a jacket and breeches of a style based on archaeological finds from the warship *Wasa*, which sunk in 1628, as well as a *karpus*. Although this kind of headgear, too, was found on the warship *Wasa*, this particular headgear is based on a painting of the battle off Fehmarn in 1644. Similar ones are also depicted as worn by the crew from a votive ship from about the same time in Kållered Church, Västergötland. In winter, the *karpus* might be fur-lined. Sailors' dress changed little during the seventeenth-century. This man has added a long coat to provide additional protection against the cold. Armed with a carpenter's axe, he is ready to take on either shipboard repairs or enemy boarders.

Swedish levied irregular on the Norwegian border

The Swedish Crown customarily levied irregulars among the peasants. This was done through a quota that the peasants had to fill. Levies would not be trained, and they had to pay for their own weapons and supplies. On the other hand, they were only required to serve at home, even though the Crown from time to time might call for volunteers who accepted to fight outside their own province. Most levies functioned as a kind of border guard. Like other levies, this man is dressed in his usual daily clothes, including a pair of well insulated shoes of the Lapp style which were much desired for operations during winter conditions, not only in northern Scandinavia but within the army as well. He is armed with a snaphance musket which he ordinarily would use for hunting.

Plate D

Danish musketeer, Eckerich Johann Lübbe's Black Regiment

Lübbe's Black Regiment was an enlisted regiment from Germany with possibly black uniforms, or at least black colours. In Danish service for years, Colonel Lübbe established the regiment in 1644. This musketeer is dressed and armed in the manner of any Continental musketeer, except that he still carries the regulation-issue musket fork rest and an old-style bandolier with wooden bottles for gunpowder. As a sidearm, this musketeer relies on a rapier with hand guard.

Norwegian officer, Michael Eckstein's Cavalry Regiment

Dressed and armed like any Continental cavalry officer, there is no way of knowing whether this man is a Norwegian or an enlisted foreign officer. However, significantly more officers and most men in the Norwegian army were of national origin, so we can assume that he is a Norwegian. Armed with a rapier and protected by a shot-proof breast- and backplate over a buff coat, his armament is equally up-to-date as his dress.

Plate E

Norwegian Navy sailor

Denmark and Norway had separate armies, but the navy was a common undertaking. King Frederick's navy was mostly crewed and officered by Danes and Norwegians, with a significant share of Dutchmen. This ensured that the navy was abreast with technical and tactical developments in naval warfare, as it was practiced on the Continent. Norwegians were particularly prominent, both as officers and sailors. Norwegian navy sailors dressed in much the same way as sailors of merchant ships, not least because many of them in times of peace served on merchantmen. This man might be one of those who before they, together with their ships, were drafted into the navy served aboard one of the large merchantmen of the Iceland Company or the Greenland Company. He wears a jacket and breeches of the customary style and a *karpus* woollen cap.

Danish irregular, Scania

The irregulars who served in the Danish free-shooter companies were not always former peasants but most dressed as rural countrymen, since they often tried to pass as locals to avoid discovery. This irregular is armed with a musket and a long fighting knife of the type commonly used by brigands of the *snapphane* variety. A probably typical such knife preserved into the present has a 37 cm long blade reminiscent of the later Bowie knife. Others used rifled hunting weapons and probably operated as snipers.

Plate F

Dutch musketeer, Eustachius Puchler's Regiment

Dutch musketeers were dressed and armed in the Continental manner. This musketeer is no exception. Armed with a matchlock musket (but no fork rest) and a rapier as sidearm, he relies on an old-style bandolier with wooden bottles for gunpowder. He might be of Dutch or German origin.

Dutch Navy sailor

Dutch sailors looked little different from other sailors. In reality, there is nothing to distinguish him from those who served in the Danish and Swedish navies. Many Dutchmen served aboard Danish and Swedish ships already from the outset, and they were often well-paid. Then there were the unlucky ones who in times of war were pressed into service on Danish warships, regardless of national origin.

Plate G

Imperial cuirassier, Johann von Sporck's Cuirassier Regiment

The Imperial army's premier type of fighting unit was the cuirassier regiment (*Cürassier-Regiment*). By this time, all Imperial cavalry regiments were known as cuirassiers, even though they no longer wore heavy armour of the old cuirassier type. Like most mid-seventeenth century cuirassiers, this cavalryman wears a breast- and backplate, to which he has added some additional armour around the waist, over a buff coat, together with a lobster-tailed pot helmet of the type which in German was known as *zischägge*. He is armed with a rapier and a pair of pistols, and might also carry a carbine. It is unclear if Imperial cavalrymen wore uniforms, but the colour combination illustrated here is typical of Imperial military dress.

Brandenburg-Prussian infantry officer, Otto Christoph von Sparr's Regiment

Officers provided their own dress, equipment, and armament. Many Brandenburg-Prussian officers had been in Swedish service, so this man is basically indistinguishable from a Swedish infantry officer.

Plate H

Muscovite Don Cossack

Muscovy regularly solicited the services of the free cossacks who lived along the Don, Volga, and Dnieper rivers in exchange for money, weapons, cloth, and grain. Cossacks served under their own leaders. Although free cossack units were frequently hired to serve in the southern steppes, in particular as a defence against Tatar raids, because of their experience with river craft many also served as boatmen and naval infantry on the rivers and great lakes in the north. This Don cossack belongs to those employed for boat operations in the Lake Ladoga area. For this reason, he is dressed and armed in the traditional Muscovite style employed by many old-style Muscovite soldiers, including town cossacks and provincial streltsy. In battle, he would likely carry a musket and possibly a pistol or two.

Kalmyk cavalryman

From 1644 onwards, the first bands of Kalmyks (western Mongols) appeared in the River Terek region north of the Caucasus range. The Kalmyks were traditionally based far to the east, near the uppermost River Yenisey. Within a few years, Muscovy entered into an alliance with the Kalmyks and gave them grazing rights. Henceforth, Kalmyks regularly contributed cavalry when Muscovy went to war. This Kalmyk cavalryman carries a Mongol-type matchlock musket with an attached forked, A-shaped rest in addition to his regular composite bow, which is held in a bow-case at present barely visible behind him. Inner Asian muskets were often so long that typically, such a rest was attached to the stock for greater ease in firing. This rest, about 0.5 m long, was pivoted to a projection on the lower side of the stock. Many Kalmyk nobles were crack shots, since this was a skill useful in hunting, even though the traditional composite bow remained in widespread use and indeed was regarded as the more dangerous weapon. Some Kalmyks even learnt how to fire the matchlock from horseback while at full gallop, in a similar way to the bow. It was not unusual to see Kalmyks armed with a weapons pack consisting of spear, matchlock (carried on the back or between the saddle and the horse, under one's leg), sword, and bow. This Kalmyk cavalryman wears a chainmail and plate cuirass over a quilted coat, a helmet of traditional Mongol design, and vambraces. The quilted coat may consist of brigandine armour (*kuyak*), a garment of cloth or leather reinforced with metal plates from both sides, of the type commonly used by Mongols and adopted from them by the Muscovites.

Flags

Plate I

Sweden: Colour of unidentified regiment of foot, 1655–1660

Unknown Swedish infantry colour taken in the war by a Muscovite unit. Made of silk, it has a breadth of about 200 cm and a length of 173 cm. The cloth is described as consisting of four horizontal lines, two pale (the upper and third) and two orange (the second and lowest). The painted devices include green branches and a brown cannon. The upper Latin text is CAROLUS GUSTAVUS REX SVECIAE ('Charles Gustavus King of Sweden') while the lower one is PER ARTEM ET MARTEM 1655 ('Through Art and War 1655').[1]

---

[1] Depiction identified by Vladimir Velikanov's *Oderint Dum Probent* blog, <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com>.

Sweden: Company Colour of Unidentified Regiment of Foot, 1658–1660

Swedish infantry company colour made by Peter Blom in Hamburg in 1658 for the 4th company of the same unknown regiment illustrated in Vol. II (Plate A2). Although the regiment has not been positively identified, several of its company colours remain in the Army Museum, Stockholm. The cypher of King Charles (C G R S, Carolus Gustavus Rex Sueciae) is painted on a yellow base. The painted device is a golden crown with red, surrounded by a golden laurel wreath. Swedish colours were flown even with battle damages, at times being reduced to little more than broken rags yet remaining in service. The colour has a breadth of 187 cm and a length of 170.5 cm.[2]

Plate J

Sweden: Guidon of unidentified dragoon unit, 1655–1660

Later depiction of an unknown Swedish dragoon guidon taken in the war by a Muscovite unit, reportedly at Dorpat in 1656. Made of pale greenish yellow silk, it has a breadth of about 97 cm and a length of no less than 136 cm. The guidon is decorated with the royal cypher C G R S (Carolus Gustavus Rex Sueciae) in silver, in a laurel wreath.[3]

Denmark: Colour of Jørgen Rosencrantz's Enlisted Regiment of Foot, 1657

The colour of Rosencrantz's Regiment of Foot, enlisted by Gunde Rosencrantz for his son Colonel Jørgen Rosencrantz (1634–1657). Manufactured in 1657 in Hamburg, and captured by the Swedes in Frederiksodde later in the same year, when Jørgen Rosencrantz was mortally wounded. The colour of the field is unknown but certainly pale. The painted lions hold a wreath of roses, to symbolise the name Rosencrantz ('rose wreath'). The texts are in Danish. The upper one is FOR VORIS KONGE OCH VOR LAND ('For our king and our country'). The lower text, SAA HAR VI HIERTE NV OCH HAND ('So we now have heart and hand'), corresponds to the painted device of heart and arm. The colour is typical of Danish flags in so far as it conforms to Continental practices and emblemata, but includes the red and white Danish flag in canton. At the same time, another colour of this regiment was taken. Painted on a blue field, it has other devices but was of roughly the same size and like this one included the red and white Danish flag in canton. The illustrated colour has a breadth of 205 cm and a length of 277 cm.[4]

---

[2] Army Museum, Stockholm; AM.068006.

[3] Depiction identified by Vladimir Velikanov's *Oderint Dum Probent* blog, <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com>.

[4] Army Museum, Stockholm; AM.080137.

Plate K

Brandenburg: Cornet of Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Regiment of Horse, 1655–1657

One of several Brandenburg-Prussian cavalry cornets captured by Czarniecki's units at Bromberg in February 1657. Another, from the life company of the same regiment, is illustrated in Vol. II (Plate C1). Based on contemporary published descriptions, the cornets were eight in number. They have been attributed to Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Regiment of Horse, under the assumption that the regiment received eight new cornets even though it consisted of only four companies. Four of the captured cornets must accordingly have been captured from the regiment's supply train.[5] Part of the contingent which Brandenburg provided to the Swedish field army in accordance with the January 1656 Treaty of Königsberg, Canitz's Regiment of Horse was permanently transferred to the Swedish army by the end of the year. The cornet included the name of Frederick William of Brandenburg. On the other side was instead the name of Carl Æmil (born 1655), the young Prince Elector. The cornets of the remaining companies each had a blue field. Each had a different coat of arms. The style, including the inclusion of the two names, one on each side, was otherwise similar.

Brandenburg: Guidon of Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Dragoon Regiment, 1655–1657

One of several Brandenburg-Prussian dragoon guidons captured by Czarniecki's units at Bromberg in February 1657, on the same occasion as the one illustrated in Vol. II (Plate C2). Based on contemporary published descriptions, the guidons were four in number.[6] There is no consensus on which unit they belonged to. However, assuming that Georg Friedrich von Canitz's Regiment of Horse originally consisted of dragoons, it seems likely that these dragoon guidons were the original ones fielded by the unit, and that they remained in storage in the supply train even though the regiment had received new cornets when it was upgraded to cavalry status. Alternatively, the guidons belonged to dragoon companies which were attached to the cavalry regiment – a common practice during the Deluge.

Plate L and M

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: Royal Military Banner of King John Casimir, 1654–1655

The Royal Military Banner (*chorągiew królewska wojskowa*; *regiae maiestatis militare vexillum*) was flown by the Polish Crown army, often but not necessarily by the Royal Guard. It should not be confused with the ceremonial Royal court banner (*chorągiew królewska dworska*) which was not flown in the field. The Royal military banner was made of silk, with an estimated breadth of 252 cm and a length of 344 cm. On the inner side, framed by the chain of the order of the golden fleece, is King John Casimir's coat of arms: the eagle of Poland and the chase of Lithuania, with the three crowns and the lion of Sweden, and, in escutcheon, the wheat-sheaf of the House of Vasa and the arms of Austria to indicate the King's paternal and maternal lineage. On the outer side is the Virgin Mary and the Holy Child above the crescent moon surrounded by a sunburst or nimbus. On this side, the banner has two Latin texts: PRO GLORIA CRUCIS ('to the honour of the Cross') and SUB TUO PRAESIDIO ('under your [Mary's] protection'). The Royal military banner of King John Casimir was surrendered to King Charles in Cracow in 1655 by Aleksander Koniecpolski, Grand Standard bearer of the Crown, in conjunction with the surrender of the Crown army.[7]

---

[5] Daniel Schorr, *The Bromberg Trophies 1657*, Northern Wars website (defunct), 2007.

[6] Schorr, *The Bromberg Trophies 1657*.

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth: Colour of unidentified company of King John Casimir's Royal Guard, 1655

All companies within King John Casimir's Royal Guard carried colours with a blue field, except the life company which had a white field following the practices of the Swedish army. Each had a prominent yellow St Andrew's cross. This reconstruction depicts the inner side, with the Virgin Mary and the Holy Child above the crescent moon surrounded by a laurel wreath. The surviving colours of King John Casimir's Royal Guard are about 173 to 181 cm in breadth and 190 to 218 cm in length. At present, the field is a faded light blue, but the original was probably darker. King John Casimir made frequent use of the colours blue and yellow to mark his claim on the Swedish throne. The colours of King John Casimir's Royal Guard were surrendered to Swedish units under Wenzel Sadowski when the Guard surrendered at Bautz, 1655.[8]

Muscovy: Banner of a Sotnya ('Hundred'), the Sovereign's Division, 1654

Manufactured in the Kremlin workshops, this banner depicts St Eustace (Placidus), whose name also appears on the banner. The banner has a breadth of 170 cm and a length of 180 cm. It was probably captured by Swedish units during the Muscovite siege of Riga in 1656.[9]

Plate N

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth: Colour of the Life Company of King John Casimir's Royal Guard, 1655

As noted, the life company of King John Casimir's Royal Guard had a white field following Swedish practices. Like the other Guard colours, it has a yellow St Andrew's cross. Each company colour had the same inner side, with the Virgin Mary and the Holy Child. All also had the same outer side.

---

[7] Army Museum, Stockholm; ST 28:1; AM.084017.

[8] Army Museum, Stockholm; ST 28:34.

[9] Army Museum, Stockholm; AM.082120; ST 21:32.

This reconstruction depicts the outer side (although incorrectly attached to the stave, see Vol. I, p.158), with King John Casimir's coat of arms: the eagle of Poland, the three crowns of Sweden, the lion of Sweden, and the chase of Lithuania, with, in escutcheon, the wheat sheaf of the House of Vasa superimposed on the red and white arms of Austria to indicate the King's paternal and maternal side. The coat of arms is surrounded by a laurel wreath and the painted letters I, C, R, P, Et, and S, signifying Iohannes Casimirus Rex Poloniae et Sueciae ('John Casimir King of Poland and Sweden'). Above the coat of arms is a small painted golden cross of St George with the letters I, N, R, and I, signifying Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum ('Jesus from Nazareth King of the Jews'). Surrendered at Bautz, 1655 (Army Museum, Stockholm; ST 28:36).

Further Reading

While there are numerous popular and academic books, in various languages, which describe one or more campaigns of the Danish wars and the wars of the Deluge, few modern works describe the 1657–1660 wars between Sweden and Denmark in more than general terms. Besides, national historiography in Denmark and Norway by tradition uses other names for the wars, based on local experiences. So are, for instance, the wars between Norway and Sweden in the former known as the Krabbe Wars (*Krabbekrigen*), after Iver Krabbe, who was in command on the Norwegian side, while in Denmark the term commonly employed for the wars is the Karl Gustav Wars (*Karl Gustavkrigene*), after King Charles.

The possibly most important contemporary source is Samuel von Pufendorf's history of the deeds of King Charles, which was the official Swedish history of the wars. It was first published in Latin so as to get maximum international exposure. It is perhaps most easily accessible to the modern-day reader in its German translation, which was published in 1697 as *Sieben Bücher von denen Thaten Carl Gustavs Königs in Schweden.* Pufendorf worked with primary sources and eyewitness accounts, but since King Charles already had passed away, Pufendorf had no means to learn the King's personal take on events and strategy decisions except through those who had heard him talk about them.

Another important contemporary source is Roger Manley's *History of the Late Warres in Denmark*. Manley was in Dutch service at the time, apparently in a secretarial position attached to the Dutch Ambassador. At the same time, he sent home news reports to John Thurloe, Secretary of State to the Protectorate's council of state and the Protectorate's head of intelligence. Manley was in Copenhagen during King Charles's second Danish war, which gave him access to senior commanders. Manley appears to have been in Danzig during the first Danish war. A similar, near-contemporary source is Philip Meadowe's *Narrative of the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars betwixt Sweden and Denmark*. Meadowe was a diplomat who participated in the Swedish-Danish peace negotiations from 1657 to 1659.

In comparison, the chapters of Jan Chryzostom Pasek's lively memoirs which describe his experiences during the war in Denmark must be read with a degree of caution. Pasek wanted to write a riveting yarn, not a dry but objective history, so he describes events in which he himself took part or that are known from other sources intermixed with often spicy but fictitious camp rumours of the type which flourishes in every army. In his memoirs, he takes most such rumours at face value and do not distinguish between what he himself observed and what he merely heard from others. Moreover, Pasek held a very low opinion of soldiers of non-Polish units so tends to attribute all victories and successes to Poles, and all defeats and failures to men of other contingents. In *Polakkerne i Danmark* (1896), the historian Stanisław Rosznecki attempts to sort out what Pasek experienced himself and what merely was hearsay.

Naturally, numerous source documents are also available in the national archives of the countries which participated in the wars. Most relevant sources are summarised and analysed in the Swedish Military Academy's series of studies on the wars of King Charles (*Carl X Gustaf-studier*) carried out by leading military historians of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Poland under the leadership of Arne Stade. The eight volumes, published between 1965 and 1979, provide detailed descriptions of most (but surely not all) campaigns. They also provide extensive archival citations, which make the volumes of the series invaluable sources on what is already known about these wars as well as the location of relevant archival documents. It is unlikely that we ever again will see a military history project with this magnitude of funding, access to archival resources, military and academic expertise, and not least time. While all volumes were published in a form understandable to Swedish readers, several were also translated into Polish and at least one into Finnish. In particular the contributions by Finn Askgaard, a Danish historian who reconstructed the entire war at sea based on archive documents, and Arne Odd Johnsen, his Norwegian counterpart, bring valuable data for our understanding of these campaigns.

With regard to earlier Swedish histories of the wars, Johan Levin Carlbom's several works (1905–1910) are very detailed but suffer from a number of erroneous details, which because of the lack of notes sometimes are difficult to identify. Torsten Holm's *Översikt* (1927) offers an excellent overview of the campaigns of the Deluge which still can be read with great profit, even though this brief work is dated with regard to some details. Among the older regimental histories, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia* 3:2 by Bertil C:son Barkman, Sven Lundkvist. and Lars Tersmeden (1966) remains a solid study. Intended to form part of the Swedish Military Academy project, it was published earlier and gives a for its time up-to-date interpretation of the battles in which the Life Guard took part, based on Swedish sources. Another important regimental history, an early version of which formed part of the Swedish Military Academy project, is Jonas Hedberg's *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid* (1982), which presents later research on the artillery not included in the project's volumes.

On the Danish and Norwegian armies, Gunner Lind's *Hæren og magten i Danmark 1614–1662* (1994) is an indispensable academic study, though it focuses on trends, not details. However, the multi-volume general military history *Danmarks krigshistorie* (2008) disappoints, despite contributions from prominent researchers, in its selective and often faulty interpretation of facts and events.

For the Brandenburg-Prussian and Imperial armies, the works by Curt Jany on the former (published 1901–1906 and 1928–1933) and those by Alphons von Wrede on the latter (published 1898–1905) are invaluable.

For information on Ukrainian cossack flags, a special mention should be made of Yurii Savchuk's *The Odyssey of Cossack Flags* (2012). For more information on Ukrainian cossack, Muscovite, Swedish, and indeed many other European flags, we should also mention *In Hoc Signo Vinces: A Presentation of The Swedish State Trophy Collection* by Fred Sandstedt et al. (2006), and Karin Tetteris's edited volume *In Hoc Signo Vinces: The Vexillological Seminar, Stockholm 2011 & 2013* (2016). All three were published in English by the Army Museum in Stockholm, the Trophy Collection of which is a veritable gold mine for information on early modern military flags.

Certain campaigns of the Danish wars remain under-researched. Perhaps surprisingly, these include some of the more significant campaigns, including the two sieges of Frederiksodde, the Scanian campaigns, and the operations of the coalition army in Jutland. To this could be added the fighting between Swedes and Norwegians in 1659 and 1660. In comparison to the Swedish march across the Belts, the war at sea, and the operations in Västergötland and Bohuslän in 1657 and 1658 which were covered in the Swedish Military Academy project, our understanding of these campaigns remains essentially unchanged since they were first studied by military historians more than a century ago. For the same reason, the campaigns in Bremen-Verden and King Charles's invasion of Holstein and Jutland have received comparably little attention from modern-day historians.

Since most works on the Dano-Swedish wars as well as the wars of the Deluge are published in other languages than English, the following bibliography is limited to the works most frequently referenced in notes and most useful for continued research. Other works are only mentioned in the notes. Yet more bibliographical data can be found in Volumes I and II.

Bibliography

Contemporary Sources and Compilations

Anon. [Philip Meadowe], *A Narrative of the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars betwixt Sweden and Denmark, Before and after the Roschild Treaty: with the Counsels and Measures by which those Actions were directed: Together with A View of the Swedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Germany in the year 1675, with Relation to England* (London: H. Brome, 1677).

Anon., *The Swedish Discipline, Religious, Civile, and Military* 1–3 (London: Nathaniel Butter and Nicholas Bourne, 1632. Edited by William Watts. Reprinted in facsimile by Pallas Armata, Tonbridge, Kent, 1998.)

Dahlbergh, Erik, *Erik Dahlberghs dagbok (1625–1699)* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1912. Edited by Herman Lundström).

Gordon, Patrick, *Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries 1635–1699* (Aberdeen: AHRC Centre for Irish and Scottish Studies/Aberdeen University Press, 2009–2016. Edited by Dmitry Fedosov.)

Gordon, Patrick, *Tagebuch des Generalen Patrick Gordon, während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen vom Jahre 1655 bis 1661, und seines Aufenthaltes in Rußland vom Jahre 1661 bis 1699.* (Moscow: Prince M. A. Obolenskiy and M. C. Posselt, 1849). The traditional, but inferior, published version of the diary, easily available online but more of an edited summary than a translation.

Gordon, Patrick, *Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries A.D. 1635–1699.* (Aberdeen: Spalding Club, 1859. An earlier edition of excerpts in English.

Jany, Curt, *Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres.* (Berlin: Grosser Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II / Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1901–1906). Jany's work has been described as the most comprehensive treatise of the subject not only of its time but of all times, since many of the original army records he worked with were destroyed in an air raid on Potsdam in 1945.

Manley, Roger, *The History of the Late Warres in Denmark, Comprising, All the Transactions, both Military and Civil, during the Differences betwixt the Two Northern Crowns, in the Years 1657, 1658, 1659, 1660* (London: Thomas Basset, 1670).

Montecuccoli, Raimondo, *Ausgewählte Schriften des Raimund Fürsten Montecuccoli* (Vienna: Kriegs-Archiv/W. Braumüller, 4 vols, 1899–1901. Edited by Alois Veltzé).

Noyers, Pierre des, *Lettres de Pierre des Noyers* (Berlin: B. Behr, 1859).

Pasek, Jan Chryzostom, *Pamiętniki: Całość* (Cracow: Polska Akademja Umiejętności, 1929).

Pasek, Jan Chryzostom, *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque: The Writings of Jan Chryzostom Pasek, a Squire of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. Translation by Catherine S. Leach.)

Pufendorf, Samuel von, *Sieben Bücher von denen Thaten Carl Gustavs Königs in Schweden* (Nuremberg: Christoph Riegel, 1697. Translation of *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo, Sueciæ rege, gestis commentariorum libri septem.* Nuremberg: Christophor Riegel, 1696.)

Roberts, Michael, *Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697: Government; Society; Foreign Policy* (London: Edward Arnold, 1968). Translation of numerous Swedish primary sources including records of the Council of the Realm.

Rosznecki, Stanisław, *Polakkerne i Danmark 1659: Efter Jan Paseks Erindringer* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1896).

Schildknecht, Wendelin, *Harmonia in fortalitiis construendis, defendendis & oppugnandis* (Stettin: Johann Valentin Rheten, 1652).

Terlon, Hugues de, *Memoires du Chevalier de Terlon* (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1681).

Troupitzen, Lorentz von, *Kriegs Kunst: Nach Königlicher Schwedischer Manier eine Compagny zu richten, in Regiment, Zug-vnd Schlacht-Ordnung zu bringen, zum Ernst anzuführen, zu gebrauchen, vnd in esse würcklich, zu unterhalten* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Matthaeus Merian, 1633).

Voget, Peter, *Wahrhaftiger und gründlicher Bericht von Belagerung und Eroberung der Haupt-Schanze in der Danziger Nährung* (Danzig: David Friedrich Rhete, 1661).

Later Studies

Alm, Josef, *Blanka vapen och skyddsvapen från och med 1500-talet till våra dagar* (Stockholm: Rediviva, 1975. First published 1932.)

Alm, Josef, *Eldhandvapen 1: Från deras tidigaste förekomst till slaglåsets allmänna införande* (Stockholm: Rediviva, 1976. First published 1934.)

Alm, Josef, *Arméns eldhandvapen förr och nu* (Stockholm: Kungl. Armémuseum, 1953).

Alm, Josef, *'Flottans handvapen'. Sjöhistorisk Årsbok 1953–54* (Stockholm: Föreningen Sveriges Sjöfartsmuseum i Stockholm, 1954: 67–147).

Asker, Björn, *Karl X Gustav* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2010).

Askgaard, Finn, *Kampen om Östersjön på Carl X Gustafs tid: Ett bidrag till nordisk sjökrigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-Studier 6, 1974).

Babulin, Igor' B., *Bor'ba za Ukrainu i bitva pod Konotopom 1658–1659 gody* (Moscow: Russkiye Vityazi, 2015).

Babulin, Igor' B., *Kanevskaya bitva 16 iyulya 1662 goda: Zabytaya pobeda* (Moscow: Russkiye Vityazi, 2015).

Babulin, Igor' B., *Bitva pod Konotopom, 28 iyunya 1659 goda* (Moscow: Zeughaus, 2009).

Babulin, Igor' B., 'Sostav russkoy armii v Chudnovskom pokhode 1660', *Reytar* 28 (2006); available from *Oderint dum probent* blog <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com>.

Babulin, Igor' B., 'Vazhneyshiye pobedy Rossii v russko-pol'skoy voyne 1654–1667 gg.: Otvet retsenzentu', *Istoriya voyennogo dela: issledovaniya i istochniki* 9 (2017): 375–397.

Babulin, Igor' B., 'Oborona Glukhova protiv pol'skoy armii korolya Yana Kazimira v 1664 g. *Slavyanskiy al'manakh* 2019: 213–36.

Barkman, G. Bertil C:son; Sven Lundkvist; and Lars Tersmeden, *Kungl. Svea livgardes historia 3:2: 1632 (1611)–1660* (Stockholm: Stiftelsen för Svea livgardes historia, 1966).

Bellamy, Martin, *Christian IV and His Navy: A Political and Administrative History of the Danish Navy 1596–1648* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

Bellander, Erik, *Dräkt och uniform: Den svenska arméns beklädnad från 1500-talets början fram till våra dagar* (Stockholm: Kungl. Armémuseum/P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1973).

Carlbom, Johan Levin, *Om Karl X Gustafs polska Krig och öfvergången till det 2:dra Sundskriget.* (Gothenburg: Centraltryckeriet/Oscar Ericson, 1905)

Carlbom, Johan Levin, *Tre dagars slaget vid Warschau den 18, 19 och 20 juli 1656: Samt de föregående mindre fältslagen 1655 och 1656 – Ett tvåhundrafemtioårigt minne* (Stockholm: Varia, 1906).

Carlbom, Johan Levin, *Karl X Gustav: Från Weichseln till Bält 1657 – Tåget över Bält och freden i Roskilde 1658* (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz, 1910).

Davies, Brian L., *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1774* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

Dzieszyński, Ryszard, *Kraków 1655–1657* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2019).

Englund, Peter, *Den oövervinnerlige: Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2000).

Ericson, Lars, *Krig och krigsmakt under svensk stormaktstid* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2004).

Ericson, Lars, 'Köpenhamn 1659', Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstedt, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, and Gunnar Åselius (eds). *Svenska slagfält* (np: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003, pp.206–14).

Ericson, Lars, Martin Hårdstedt; Per Iko; Ingvar Sjöblom; and Gunnar Åselius (eds). *Svenska slagfält* (np: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003).

Ericson Wolke, Lars, *1658: Tåget över Bält* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2008).

Fagerlund, Rainer, 'Kriget i östersjöprovinserna 1655–1661: Operationer och krigsansträngningar på en bikrigsskådeplats under Carl X Gustafs krig', Arne Stade (ed.), *Kriget på östfronten* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 7:1, 1979).

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *Muscovy's Soldiers: The Emergence of the Russian Army 1462–1689* (Warwick: Helion, 2018).

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *Charles XI's War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675–1679* (Warwick: Helion, 2019).

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *The Lion from the North 1: The Swedish Army during the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1632* (Warwick: Helion, 2020).

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *The Lion from the North 2: The Swedish Army during the Thirty Years War, 1632–1648* (Warwick: Helion, 2020).

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *Charles X's War 1: Armies of the Swedish Deluge, 1655–1660* (Warwick: Helion, 2021)

Fredholm von Essen, Michael, *Charles X's War 2: The Wars in the East, 1655–1657* (Warwick: Helion, 2022).

Frost, Robert I., *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education. 2000).

Frost, Robert I., *After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655–1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Gadzyatskiy, S. S., 'Bor'ba russkikh lyudey Izhorskoy zemli v XVII veke protiv inozemnogo vladychestva', *Istoricheskiye zapiski* 16, 1945 (Moscow): 14–57.

Gadzyatskiy, S. S., 'Kareliya i Yuzhnoye Priladozh'ye v voyne 1656-58 gg.' *Istoricheskiye zapiski* 11, 1941 (Moscow): 236–81.

Gawęda, Marcin, *Połonka-Basia 1660* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2005).

Glete, January, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, Acta Universitatis stockholmiensis (Stockholm Studies in History) 48:1, 2 vols, 1993).

Hazelius, Kim, *De kallades snapphanar: Friskyttar, rövare & bondeuppbåd* (Bjärnum: Bokpro, 2006).

Hedberg, Jonas, *Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid* (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982 (1995 edn).

Hernæs, Per Oluf (ed.), *Vestafrika: Forterne på Guldkysten - Danmark og kolonierne* (np: Gads Forlag, 2017).

Höglund, Patrik, *Skeppssamhället: Rang, roller och status på örlogsskepp under 1600-talet* (np: Universus/Forum navale 77, 2021).

Holm, Torsten, *Översikt över Sveriges krig under 1600-talets senare hälft* (Stockholm: Militärlitteraturföreningen 148, 1927).

Jany, Curt, *Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum Jahre 1807* (Berlin: Karl Siegismund, 4 vols, 1928–1933).

Johnsen, Arne Odd, *Krabbekrigen og gjenerobringen av Jämtland 1657–1658* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1967. Carl X Gustaf-studier 2.)

Klaje, Hermann, *Der Feldzug der Kaiserlichen unter Souches nach Pommern im Jahre 1659* (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1906).

Klitgaard, C., 'Nordjylland i Svenskekrigen 1657–60', *Historie/Jyske Samlinger* 3 (1954): 93–113.

Kotljarchuk, Andrej, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century* (Södertörn University College, dissertation, 2006).

Kurbatov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, *Iz istorii voyennykh reform v Rossii vo 2-y polovine XVII veka: Reorganizatsiya konnitsy na materialakh Novgorodskogo razryada 1650-kh–1660-kh gg* (Moscow, dissertation, 2002).

Kurbatov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, 'Russko-shvedskaya voyna 1656–58 gg.: Problemy kritiki voyenno-istoricheskikh istochnikov', *Rossiya i Shvetsiya v srednevekov'ye i novoye vremya: Arkhivnoye i muzeynoye naslediye* (Moscow, 2002): 150–66. Available from Vladimir Velikanov's *Oderint dum probent* blog <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com>.

Kurbatov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, '"Litovskiy pokhod 7168 g." kn. I. A. Khovanskogo i bitva pri Polonke 18 iyunya 1660 g', *Slavyanovedeniye* 4, 2003: 225–40. Available from Vladimir Velikanov's *Oderint dum probent* blog <www.rusmilhist.blogspot.com>.

Landberg, Hans, *Carl X Gustaf inför polska kriget: Kungamakt och statsfinanser 1655* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 4, 1969).

Lange, Ulrich. *Karl X Gustavs bror Adolf Johan: Stormaktstidens enfant terrible* (Stockholm: Medström, 2019).

Lappalainen, Jussi T., 'Finland och Carl X Gustafs ryska krig: Försvaret av den östra rikshalvan 1656–1658', Arne Stade (ed.). *Kriget på östfronten* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 7:2, 1979)

Lind, Gunner, *Hæren og magten i Danmark 1614–1662* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1994).

Malov, Aleksandr V., *Russko-pol'skaya voyna 1654–1667* (Moscow: Zeughaus, 2006).

Munthe, Ludvig W:son, *Kongl. Fortifikationens historia 2: Fortifikationsstaten under Örnehufwudh och Wärnschiöldh, 1641–1674* (Stockholm: Norstedt & söner, 1906).

Nowak, Tadeusz Marian, 'Det polska kronartilleriet före och under det polsk-svenska kriget 1655-1660', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973: 103–129).

Opitz, Eckardt, *Österreich und Brandenburg im Schwedisch-Polnischen Krieg 1655–1660: Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Feldzüge nach Dänemark und Pommern* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1969).

Ossoliński, Łukasz J. C., *Kampania na Ukrainie 1660 roku* (University of Warsaw, dissertation, 1995, 2000).

Podhorodecki, Leszek, '1659 års fälttåg i Kungliga (Polska) Preussen', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973: 295–323).

Rockstroh, Knud C., 'Bemærkninger vedrørende enkelte Afsnit af Krigen i Jylland 1657', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 7: 3 (1900): 118–49.

Rockstroh, Knud, 'Indledningen til Krigen 1657 samt Krigsbegivenhederne i Elbegnene indtil Udgangen af September nævnte Aar', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 7: 6 (1905–1906): 366–512.

Roessel, *Die erste Brandenburgische Flotte im Schwedisch-Polnischen Kriege 1658–1660 und ihr Kommandeur Obrist Johann von Hille* (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1903).

Romański, Romuald, *Cudnów 1660* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1996).

Sandstedt, Fred; Lena Engquist Sandstedt; Martin Skoog; and Karin Tetteris (eds), *In Hoc Signo Vinces: A Presentation of The Swedish State Trophy Collection* (Stockholm: National Swedish Museum of Military History, 2006).

Savchuk, Yurii, *The Odyssey of Cossack Flags* (Stockholm: Medström/Army Museum, 2012).

Sjöblom, Ingvar, 'Öresund 1658', Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstedt, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, and Gunnar Åselius (eds), *Svenska slagfält* (np: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003: 198–205).

Stade, Arne, 'Engelska memoarer: Manley's *History*, Meadowe's *Narrative* och Carl X Gustafs första danska krig', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965: 19–65).

Stade, Arne, 'Krigsrelationen om Tåget över Bält: Den samtida svenska propagandalitteraturen i källkritisk belysning', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965: 67–139).

Stade, Arne (ed.), *Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Källkritik och krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 1, 1965).

Stade, Arne (ed.). *Erik Dahlbergh och Carl X Gustafs krigshistoria* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 3, 1967).

Stade, Arne (ed.), *Kriget på östfronten* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 7, 1979).

Stade, Arne (ed.), *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979).

Stade, Arne; and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655-1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973). Published in Polish as Jan Wimmer (ed.), *Wojna polsko-szwedzka, 1655–1660* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1973).

Stevens, Carol Belkin, *Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995).

Tepkeyev, V. T., '"Ot nego, krymskogo khana, pravdy i postoyanstva net": Nabegi kalmytskikh otryadov na Krym vo vremya Russko-pol'skoy voyny 1654–1667 rr.', *Novyy istoricheskiy vestnik* 4 (38), 2013: 9–28.

Tersmeden, Lars, 'Carl X Gustafs armé 1654–1657', Arne Stade (ed.). *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979: 163–276).

Tersmeden, Lars, 'Carl X Gustafs armé: En konturteckning mot bakgrund av kriget mot Polen', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979: 9–48).

Tersmeden, Lars, '"Manskapsersättningsproblematiken' vid det inhemska infanteriet under Carl X Gustafs krig', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979: 77–115).

Tersmeden, Lars, 'Värvningskampanjen 1655', Arne Stade (ed.), *Carl X Gustafs armé* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 8, 1979: 117–62).

Tessin, Georg, *Die Deutschen Regimenter der Krone Schweden* 1: *Unter Karl X. Gustav (1654–1660)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1965).

Tetteris, Karin (ed.), *In Hoc Signo Vinces: The Vexillological Seminar, Stockholm 2011 & 2013* (Stockholm: Armémuseum, 2016).

Villads Christensen, Christian, 'De jyske Kirkebøgers Bidrag til Belysning af Krigen i Jylland 1657–59', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 6: 5 (1894): 519–54.

Wimmer, January 'Armé och finansväsen i Polen under kriget med Sverige 1655–1660', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: *Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier* 5, 1973: 41–101).

Wimmer, January, 'Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Operativ översikt', Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (eds), *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier* (Stockholm: Kungl. Militärhögskolan, Carl X Gustaf-studier 5, 1973: 325–417).

Wrede, Alphons von; with Anton Semek. *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht: Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 5 vols, 1898–1905).

Other titles in the Century of the Soldier series

No 1 ***'Famous by my Sword':*** *The Army of Montrose and the Military Revolution*

No 2 ***Marlborough's Other Army:*** *The British Army and the Campaigns of the First Peninsular War, 1702–1712*

No 3 ***Cavalier Capital:*** *Oxford in the English Civil War 1642–1646*

No 4 ***Reconstructing the New Model Army:*** *Vol 1: Regimental Lists April 1645 to May 1649*

No 5 ***To Settle the Crown:*** *Waging Civil War in Shropshire, 1642–1648*

No 6 ***The First British Army, 1624–1628:*** *The Army of the Duke of Buckingham*

No 7 ***Better Begging Than Fighting:*** *The Royalist Army in Exile in the War against Cromwell 1656–1660*

No 8 ***Reconstructing the New Model Army:*** *Vol 2: Regimental Lists April 1649 to May 1663*

No 9 ***The Battle of Montgomery 1644:*** *The English Civil War in the Welsh Borderlands*

No 10 ***The Arte Militaire:*** *The Application of 17th Century Military Manuals to Conflict Archaeology*

No 11 ***No Armour But Courage:*** *Colonel Sir George Lisle, 1615–1648*

No 12 ***Cromwell's Buffoon:*** *The Life and Career of the Regicide, Thomas Pride*

No 14 ***Hey for Old Robin!*** *The Campaigns and Armies of the Earl of Essex During the First Civil War, 1642–44*

No 15 ***The Bavarian Army during the Thirty Years War***

No 16 ***The Army of James II, 1685-1688:*** *The Birth of the British Army*

No 17 ***Civil War London:*** *A Military History of London under Charles I and Oliver Cromwell*

No 18 ***The Other Norfolk Admirals:*** *Myngs, Narbrough and Shovell*

No 19 ***A New Way of Fighting:*** *Professionalism in the English Civil War*

No 20 ***Crucible of the Jacobite '15:*** *The Battle of Sheriffmuir 1715*

No 21 ***'A Rabble of Gentility':*** *The Royalist Northern Horse, 1644–45*

No 22 ***Peter the Great Humbled:*** *The Russo-Ottoman War of 1711*

No 23 ***The Russian Army In The Great Northern War 1700–21:*** *Organisation, Matériel, Training, Combat Experience and Uniforms*

No 24 ***The Last Army:*** *The Battle of Stow-on-the-Wold and the End of the Civil War in the Welsh Marches, 1646*

No 25 ***The Battle of the White Mountain 1620 and the Bohemian Revolt, 1618–22***

No 26 ***The Swedish Army in the Great Northern War 1700–21:*** *Organisation, Equipment, Campaigns and Uniforms*

No 27 ***St. Ruth's Fatal Gamble:*** *The Battle of Aughrim 1691 and the Fall Of Jacobite Ireland*

No 28 ***Muscovy's Soldiers:*** *The Emergence of the Russian Army 1462–1689*

No 29 ***Home and Away:*** *The British Experience of War 1618–1721*

No 30 ***From Solebay to the Texel:*** *The Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672–1674*

No 31 ***The Battle of Killiecrankie:*** *The First Jacobite Campaign, 1689–1691*

No 32 ***The Most Heavy Stroke:*** *The Battle of Roundway Down 1643*

No 33 ***The Cretan War (1645–1671):*** *The Venetian-Ottoman Struggle in the Mediterranean*

No 34 ***Peter the Great's Revenge:*** *The Russian Siege of Narva in 1704*

No 35 ***The Battle Of Glenshiel:*** *The Jacobite Rising in 1719*

No 36 ***Armies And Enemies Of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 1 - Western Europe 1688–1714: France, Britain, Holland*

No 37 ***William III's Italian Ally:*** *Piedmont and the War of the League of Augsburg 1683–1697*

No 38 ***Wars and Soldiers in the Early Reign of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 1 - The Army of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 1660–1687*

No 39 ***In The Emperor's Service:*** *Wallenstein's Army, 1625–1634*

No 40 ***Charles XI's War:*** *The Scanian War Between Sweden and Denmark, 1675–1679*

No 41 ***The Armies and Wars of The Sun King 1643–1715:*** *Volume 1: The Guard of Louis XIV*

No 42 ***The Armies Of Philip IV Of Spain 1621–1665:*** *The Fight For European Supremacy*

No 43 ***Marlborough's Other Army:*** *The British Army and the Campaigns of the First Peninsular War, 1702–1712*

No 44 ***The Last Spanish Armada:*** *Britain And The War Of The Quadruple Alliance, 1718–1720*

No 45 ***Essential Agony:*** *The Battle of Dunbar 1650*

No 46 ***The Campaigns of Sir William Waller***

No 47 ***Wars and Soldiers in the Early Reign of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 2 - The Imperial Army, 1660–1689*

No 48 ***The Saxon Mars and His Force:*** *The Saxon Army During The Reign Of John George III 1680–1691*

No 49 ***The King's Irish:*** *The Royalist Anglo-Irish Foot of the English Civil War*

No 50 ***The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715:*** *Volume 2: The Infantry of Louis XIV*

No 51 ***More Like Lions Than Men:*** *Sir William Brereton and the Cheshire Army of Parliament, 1642–46*

No 52 ***I Am Minded to Rise:*** *The Clothing, Weapons and Accoutrements of the Jacobites from 1689 to 1719*

No 53 ***The Perfection of Military Discipline:*** *The Plug Bayonet and the English Army 1660–1705*

No 54 ***The Lion From the North:*** *The Swedish Army During the Thirty Years War: Volume 1, 1618–1632*

No 55 ***Wars and Soldiers in the Early Reign of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 3 - The Armies of the Ottoman Empire 1645–1718*

No 56 ***St. Ruth's Fatal Gamble:*** *The Battle of Aughrim 1691 and the Fall Of Jacobite Ireland*

No 57 ***Fighting for Liberty:*** *Argyll & Monmouth's Military Campaigns against the Government of King James, 1685*

No 58 ***The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715:*** *Volume 3: The Cavalry of Louis XIV*

No 59 ***The Lion From the North:*** *The Swedish Army During the Thirty Years War: Volume 2, 1632–1648*

No 60 ***By Defeating My Enemies:*** *Charles XII of Sweden and the Great Northern War 1682–1721*

No 61 ***Despite Destruction, Misery and Privations..:*** *The Polish Army in Prussia during the war against Sweden 1626–1629*

No 62 ***The Armies of Sir Ralph Hopton:*** *The Royalist Armies of the West 1642–46*

No 63 ***Italy, Piedmont, and the War of the Spanish Succession 1701–1712***

No 64 ***'Cannon played from the great fort':*** *Sieges in the Severn Valley during the English Civil War 1642–1646*

No 65 ***Carl Gustav Armfelt*** *and the Struggle for Finland During the Great Northern War*

No 66 ***In the Midst of the Kingdom:*** *The Royalist War Effort in the North Midlands 1642–1646*

No 67 ***The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660:*** *Volume 1: The War in the West Indies*

No 68 ***For a Parliament Freely Chosen:*** *The Rebellion of Sir George Booth, 1659*

No 69 ***The Bavarian Army During the Thirty Years War 1618–1648:*** *The Backbone of the Catholic League (revised second edition)*

No 70 ***The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643–1715:*** *Volume 4: The War of the Spanish Succession, Artillery, Engineers and Militias*

No 71 ***No Armour But Courage:*** *Colonel Sir George Lisle, 1615–1648 (Paperback reprint)*

No 72 ***The New Knights:*** *The Development of Cavalry in Western Europe, 1562–1700*

No 73 ***Cavalier Capital:*** *Oxford in the English Civil War 1642–1646 (Paperback reprint)*

No 74 ***The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660:*** *Volume 2: War in Jamaica*

No 75 ***The Perfect Militia:*** *The Stuart Trained Bands of England and Wales 1603–1642*

No 76 ***Wars and Soldiers in the Early Reign of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 4 - The Armies of Spain 1659–1688*

No 77 ***The Battle of Nördlingen 1634:*** *The Bloody Fight Between Tercios and Brigades*

No 78 ***Wars and Soldiers in the Early Reign of Louis XIV:*** *Volume 5 - The Portuguese Army 1659–1690*

No 79 ***We Came, We Saw, God Conquered:*** *The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's military effort in the relief of Vienna, 1683*

No 80 ***Charles X's Wars:*** *Volume 1 - Armies of the Swedish Deluge, 1655–1660*

No 81 ***Cromwell's Buffoon:*** *The Life and Career of the Regicide, Thomas Pride (Paperback reprint)*

No 82 ***The Colonial Ironsides:*** *English Expeditions under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1650–1660*

No 83 ***The English Garrison of Tangier:*** *Charles II's Colonial Venture in the Mediterranean, 1661–1684*

No 84 ***The Second Battle of Preston, 1715:*** *The Last Battle on English Soil*

No 85 ***To Settle the Crown:*** *Waging Civil War in Shropshire, 1642–1648 (Paperback reprint)*

No 86 ***A Very Gallant Gentleman:*** *Colonel Francis Thornhagh (1617–1648) and the Nottinghamshire Horse*

No 87 ***Charles X's Wars:*** *Volume 2 - The Wars in the East, 1655–1657*

No 88 ***The Shōgun's Soldiers:*** *The Daily Life of Samurai and Soldiers in Edo Period Japan, 1603–1721 Volume 1*

No 89 ***Campaigns of the Eastern Association:*** *The Rise of Oliver Cromwell, 1642–1645*

No 90 ***The Army of Occupation in Ireland 1603–42:*** *Defending the Protestant Hegemony*

No 91 ***The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643–1715:*** *Volume 5: Buccaneers and Soldiers in the Americas*

No 92 ***New Worlds, Old Wars:*** *The Anglo-American Indian Wars 1607–1678*

No 93 ***Against the Deluge:*** *Polish and Lithuanian Armies During the War Against Sweden 1655–1660*

No 94 ***The Battle of Rocroi:*** *The Battle, the Myth and the Success of Propaganda*

No 95 ***The Shōgun's Soldiers:*** *The Daily Life of Samurai and Soldiers in Edo Period Japan, 1603–1721 Volume 2*

No 96 ***Science of Arms: the Art of War in the Century of the Soldier 1672–1699:*** *Volume 1: Preparation for War and the Infantry*

No 97 ***Charles X's Wars:*** *Volume 3 - The Danish Wars 1657–1660*

SERIES SPECIALS:

No 1 ***Charles XII's Karoliners:*** *Volume 1: The Swedish Infantry & Artillery of the Great Northern War 1700–1721*

This book describes and analyses the two devastating wars fought between Sweden and Denmark-Norway during the reign of King Charles X Gustav of Sweden, an experienced former general of the Thirty Years' War.

The Dano-Swedish War of 1657–1658 was initiated by King Frederick III of Denmark-Norway, who saw an opportunity to recover the territories lost in 1645 and attacked Sweden while the Swedish king was fighting two simultaneous wars in the east – against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ('The Swedish Deluge') and Muscovite Russia. Based on his experiences in the Thirty Years' War, Charles X led an invasion army to Denmark from Sweden's possessions in Germany. After entering Jutland from the south, the Swedish army in a surprise winter campaign marched across the frozen Great Belt and Little Belt straits onto the Danish island of Zealand, threatening the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The rapid Swedish campaign took the Danes by surprise, and Denmark surrendered.

The Dano-Swedish War of 1658–1660 was a continuation of the previous war between Sweden and Denmark. This time, Charles thought that the time was ripe to subjugate Denmark under the Swedish Crown. However, Denmark received support from the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Emperor, Brandenburg-Prussia, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In early 1660, Charles fell ill and died, which paved the way for the Treaty of Copenhagen which restored peace between Denmark and Sweden and for the first time established a lasting border between the two countries.

Michael Fredholm von Essen presents new research on two wars rarely described in English. Additionally, the book explains the continued development of the Swedish Army and Navy after the Thirty Years' War and details the military systems of Sweden and Denmark-Norway. This third volume also continues and concludes the story of the devastating wars in the east between Sweden, the Commonwealth, Brandenburg-Prussia, Muscovy, Transylvania, Cossack Ukraine, the Tatar Khanate of the Crimea, and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire popularly known as the Swedish Deluge.

Century
of the
Soldier
1618-1721

HELION & COMPANY
www.helion.co.uk
helionbooks

ISBN 978-1-915113-60-3
9 781915 113603